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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines t.ho contribution that mathematical 
programming-models can make to the solution of the joint problem 
of investment and financing within a firm. In particular it con­
trasts the performance of rules for investment appraisal which are 
based on discounting methodologies with the solutions which are 
obtainable from linear programming models. Using a method of 
analysis which exploits the relationship between the primal and 
dual solutions in such models, it argues that there are strong 
theoretical reasons why linear programming models will not 
generate solutions which are radically different from those which 
can be arrived at by simple discounting procedures. It concludes 
that linear programming models in their current form add little 
to the practice of investment appraisal. It shows however, that 
such models provide a powerful framework for the development of 
normative decision rules for project appraisal within the broader 
context of the firm's operating environment. The impact of 
alternative measures of debt capacity and the effect of finite 
and irregular cash flow patterns on the investment decision are all 
considered using this framework. These ideas are then applied to 
the specific problem of the valuation of a financial lease contract. 
The final Chapter returns to the problem of using linear program­
ming models for investment appraisal and explores one way in which 





The Power and limitations of Mathematical Programming Models for 
the Appraisal 'of Capital Expenditure Decisions - A Survey.
1.1 Introduction.
The last t-.j years have seen an increasing acceptance by 
business analysts of the appraisal of capital expenditure by 
discounting the cash flows estimated to be generated by such 
proposals. Yet despite its theoretical superiority over other 
more traditional methods of investment appraisal it still lemains 
open to a great deal of criticism both of a theoretical and 
practical nature (see for example » Adelson(70)).
A parallel development of recent years has been the exploration 
and implementation of computerised financial planning models. These 
have been developed partially to provide subsidiary analysis to 
discounted cash flow (D.C.F.) appraisal and partially as a tool 
in their own right. In their simplest versions they take the form 
of a simulation model or rather, to use a more correct title, 
a financial statement generator in which the effect of various 
decisions on selected financial indicators can be readily assessed. 
Their virtue lies merely in the speed and power of computation 
rather than any inherent mathematical sophistication and it is 
probably for this reason that they have been fairly widely accepted 
in industry. Mathematical models in their more sophisticated 
versions usually take the form of linear programming (L.P.) *
* References give author(s) <>nd date of publication. Where two or 
more articles are referenced by the same author in the same year 
then additional distinguishing symbols will be used.
2formulations of some aspect of the companies operations. The 
particular aspect of a company's operations that has attracted 
most attention is the capital expenditure decision. However, 
in spite of the fact that the initial formulation of the problem 
is now over ten years old, the survey work by Grinyerand Wooller (75), 
Higgins and Finn (77) in the United Kingdom and the work of Naylor 
and Schauland(76) in the States indicate that che instances of 
its implementation are still relatively few.
The intention of this thesis is to evaluate the theoretical 
shortcomings of existing mathematical programming models* of tha 
investment and financing decision, to analyse and extend their 
contribution to financial theory as normative frameworks for 
decision making and to indicate one possible future direction of 
development that might enhance their managerial acceptability.
The purpose of this chapter is merely to survey the relevant 
background material and to summarize and underline the inter­
linking nature of the ideas which will be developed in the sub­
sequent arguments. The main themes of the research will be 
introduced initially in the following sections with no attempt 
at a detailed analysis. They will then be investigated more 
thoroughly in a corresponding later chapter.
The discussion will in general be restricted to deterministic or 
certainly equivalent formulations, though considerations of uncertainty 
also affectother aspects of the formulation. Many of the constraints 
included in the models (e.g. restrictions the number of times fixed 
interest payments must be covered) and designed purposely to cope 
with uncertainty in future cash flows. However, specific discussion 
of stochastic financial models as exemplified in the work of Byrne, 
Charnes, Cooper and Kootanek (67) or Nasland (66) will be excluded.
'|WT.
3The main weakness of the early work carried out in the field of 
normative models for capital investment selection is the assumption 
of independency in project selection. Lloyd Amey(72) classifies 
the interdependencies that do arise in practice into four main 
categories and it is these interdependencies that will form the 
subject matter of this thesis. These categories are not mutually 
exclusive but form convenient groups giving rise to particular 
problems. Briefly they are:
(1) Physical dependence where feasibility and 
profitability of accepting any set affects the 
feasibility and profitability of accepting any 
different set.
(2) Dynamic and intertemporal dependence arising from 
the timing of a particular investment.
(3) Serial dependence in that each investment may affect 
all future investments.
(4) Capital Market imperfections which cause the non­
separability of the firms investment decisions and 
the stockholders consumptions preferences.
Lloyd Amey considers two projects and shows under conditions 
ox perfect capital markets and with a cost of capital which is 
invariant with time then the internal rate of return criterion 
and net present value criterion with suitable modifications are 
able to cope with problems of mutual exclusivity, contingency 
and intertemporal dependence. He argues that modifications to 
such rules become impractical if the number of such interdependencies 
is large and in these circumstances mathematical programming 
formulations become necessary. Hence mathematical programming
1.2 Programming Models, Capital Budgeting and Interdependencies.
4is introduced primarily to provide an efficient combinatorial 
search procedure over feasible subsets. It is the practicality 
of the search which causes us to resort the mathematical programming 
and not any inherent superiority of the solution. Indeed as we 
shall see in certain cases alternative and equally efficient search 
procedures exist. Nevertheless mathematical programming remains a 
powerful tool for dealing with interactive financial decisions.
Unfortunately, the nature of the interactions in the case 
of financial models can cause severe problems of formulation.
A particularly apposite example is afforded by the paradox 
associated with the choice of objective functions; in that if 
one tiles to maximize the net present value of a se«. of projects 
which are subjected to budget constraints then since the dual 
values associated with the budget constraints give the correct 
discount rates to use in the objective function, one cannot 
specify the objective function until the dual- is solved, and one 
cannot solve the dual until the objective function is known.
It is worthwhile tracing the development of this problem histor­
ically since its affect on later workers in the field has been 
profound and a few subsequent writers* have not quoted the original 
paper by Baumol and Quandt(65) in which they first highlighted 
this paradox.
The problem of the selection of an optimal subset of projects 
when the firm is precluded from undertaking all projects with a 
positive net present value at its cost of capital was discussed 
first by Lorie and Savage(55). Unfortunately, they arrived at a 
solution largely by trial and error and hence their method was
*See for example Lustig and Schwab (68), Carleton (69), Elton (70),
Myers (72), Merville and Tavis (73), Burton and Damon (74).
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5unsatisfactory from a computational point of view.
It was Weingartner (62) who was the first to demonstrate
that the Lorie-Savage problem could be formulated as
n
Max Z - l c. x
j-1 5 3
subject to ¿ f v  xj s rt t-0,1,2, H
0 S Xj S 1, Xj integer
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where is the net present value of project j
is the net cash flow from project j in time t 
is the capital requirement of project j in time t 
F is the total capital available in t 
r is the borrowing rate
and x^ takes the value 1 if the project is accepted and
zero otherwise.
In this form the solution to the problem can be found by 
integer programming methods. By relaxing the integer constraint 
on project selection and regarding the components of the vector 
X as the scale cf acceptance of an individual project the problem 
can be reformulated as a linear programming problem.
The importance of this step is twofold. The first and most 
important consequence is that powerful algorithms exist for 
computational solutions of linear programs. As we shall see 
this relatively basic model can be extended easily to cope with 
constraints other than simple cash balance constraints. A second 
aspect of the formulation is one which we shall exploit extensively 
later. The formulation of the capital rationing problem by 
Weingartner is in terms of budgets and quantities of resources.
6In this thesis formulations of this type will be'referred to as 
the primal problem. Closely related to this primal problem is a dual 
problem which is in terms of prices and values of those resources.
The mathematical relationship between the primal and dual problems 
is discussed extensively in the standard works on mathematical 
programming (see for example Beale(62), Dantzig(63), Hadley (62)).
Of more immediate concern is the economic interpretation of the 
dual which gives information on the marginal value of additional 
funds.
The use of dual values to evaluate the cost of funds was 
considered first by Charnes, Cooper and Miller(59). They were 
concerned with the problem of a warehouse in which the primal 
objective function was undiscounted cumulative profits. In this 
case the corresponding dual variables took on the dimensions of 
interest rates. It was left to Baumal and Quandt (op cit) to 
point out that the dual solution of the Weingartner problem gives 
the opportunity value of an extra £1 in each of the constraint 
years. Thus this dual solution gives information on the'marginal 
efficiency of capital and hence the appropriate discount rate to be 
used in each time period. However, in the formulation of an objective 
function we have already assumed a particular discount rate. We 
thus have the Baumal and Quandt (65) paradox referred to above.
Tney claimed that a more correct form of the discount factor would 
be p /p where p ,p are the dual values associated with the budget 
constraints in year t and now respectively. This discount factor is 
the proposed replacement for Q +rj t the computation of c^.
In addition they argued that the capital outlays were merely the net 
cash outflows from the project selection. Thus their formulation 
of the problem is as follows:

8This is an interesting way of avoiding the problem since the 
constraints run over this period*0 to H-l, and the objective function 
over the non-overlapping period h to ". In this case the duals are 
unrelated to the post-horizon discount rates. The model assumes in 
fact that the post-horizon discount rate is sufficiently distant to 
be approximated by a constant.
Ironically, it also implies that sufficient uncertainty surrounds 
the objective function to make the problem of the appropriate discount 
rate immaterial. Thus we are trying to maximise a linear function 
of the subset of the information about which we are least certainI 
An additional criticism is that it can also be shown that it is 
equivalent to the maximisation of net present value under assumptions 
of a perfect market. However, such assumptions would preclude any 
rationing of funds and under such conditions there is no need to 
resort to linear programming models since conventional discounting 
techniques are adequate.
A modified form of this objective function is that used by 
Chambers (67), in which he maximises the net present value of the 
dividend stream. His objective function is:
*1-1 Dt V
z oHi* + u rh r
Here D is the dividend in time period t and V is the terminal* H
value of the firm. The discount rate i in this case reflects 
the shareholders' time preference. It should be noted that 
the last two mentioned objective functions are both variants on a
* In the original formulation the constraint set ran from periods 0 to H. 
The particular formulation here follows a modification by Bernhard (69) 
who pointed out that the Baumol and Quandt paradox then occurred in 
period H.
9is a linear function. They are in essence of the same structure 
as Baumol and Quandt's maximisation of the utility of withdrawals.
Many authors* have adopted this approach to the problem. They 
have resorted to the utility formulation of the problem and 
argued that the presence of capital markets imposes a well defined 
form for this utility function. While such an approach has strong 
theoretical justifications under assumptions of free access 
to capital markets it avoids, rather than resolves, the paradox 
and in a later paper when Chambers (72) modifies his model 
specifically to include financing opportunities as well as 
investment projects again resorts to a terminal value model to 
avoid interdependencies between discount rates and objective 
function valuation.
It is interesting at this stage to review one further** approach 
which has been suggested in the financial literature in which its 
origin lies in the original Lorie-Savage approach to the problem.
Its aim is to find a solution to the one period capital budgeting 
problem of choosing a set of projects when the outlay in the first 
period is subject to a cash constraint. The projects are initially 
ranked at the firms cost of capital and the internal rate of return 
of the marginally rejected project is determined. The projects are 
re-ranked at this rate of return and the new marginally rejected 
project is determined. This process is continued until such time 
as there is no change in the accepted project list (i.e. those projects
* For example, see Myers (72) or Elton (70)
• • See Quirin (67) or Lustig and Schwab (68).
more generalised form of maximising f (D, ,,V„) where f
10
with positive Net Present Value at che two discount rates). The 
idea behind this process is that the correct discount rate under 
capital rationing is the marginal productivity of capital or the 
internal rate of return of the marginally rejected project. This 
is in fact only a partial truth. The idea behind it appears to 
be based on an important paper by Hirschleifer (59) in which he 
discusses discount criteria and the appropriate discount rates to 
be used. One of his conclusions was that in cases where we are 
in a borrowing situation then the borrowing rate is the appropriate 
rate, in cases where we are in a lending situation then it is the 
lending rate, but in a capital rationing situation it is the marginal 
productivity of capital. While in itself this might appear ».n 
obvious result it does have very important ramifications, much of 
the theoretical basis of the Baumol-Quandt paper rests in their 
interpretation of the Hirschleifer paper. Atkins (72)has shown 
how this last approach can be reformulated as a mathematical 
programming problem. Thus the model is:
where the subscript zero denotes a budget constraint in the first 
period only. In addition it is required that the discount factor
this formulation the problem is solvable by the methods of parametric 
programming. The important point that this formulation shows is 
that this assumes that the discount rate is a constant for all periods
n
£. (1+r) -Max Z - l l j=l t=l




and its value is determined by the constraint only in the first year. 
There is no reason to assume that the discount factor applicable to 
the first year should persist beyond that year. The work of Hirsch- 
leifer shows that the correct discount factor applicable from year 
to year depends upon the budget constraints and lending or borrow­
ing opportunities in each of the years up to the horizon. This brings 
us full circle back to the problem of the relationship between the 
discount rates and the duals, and an understanding of this relation­
ship is a vital preprequisite to many of the ideas to be developed 
in later chapters.
Zn chapter two a simple numerical example is chosen and it 
is shown that it is possible to generate a solution in which the 
primal values are consistent with the dual values. By respecifying 
the problem, with greater attention being paid to a rigorous defini­
tion of the variables, it is shown that while Baumol and Quandt 
managed to identify correctly one solution, they succeeded in 
identifying merely one solution of many. Moreover, the solution 
they identified was unfortunately the null vector solution. It is 
shown further by introducing projects which enable funds to be 
carried between periods then the solution is both unique and 
non-zero.
Zn this way it is possible to generate an internal price- 
vector or generalized discount rate measuring the intrinsic 
profitability of a project set. This idea is readily seen to be 
an extension of the internal rate of return concept applied to 
individual projects to encompass the multiproject multi-period 
constrained case. The requisite ideas to interpret this extension 
can be found in the paper by Hirschleifer(58) which has already 
been referred to, while the more general nature of this solution
12
provides us with a mechanism for analysing the multi-period case. 
Moreover, it is argued that Hirschleifer's work was a natural 
forerunner of the later mathematical programming approaches and 
such is the fundamental nature of his results that they form a 
recurrent theme throughout this thesis.
1.3 Profitability Indices, Rules of Thumb and Approximate Solutions 
to Capital Budgeting Models.
It has been argued in the previous section that conventional 
discounting techniques will in general break down under problems 
of capital rationing because of the interdependencies that arise.
Tnis view of the inadequacy of discounting under such circumstances 
and the consequent need for mathematical programming models is 
widely accepted by academics.
Thus Amey(72) in the paper already cited states 
"in general a programming formulation is indispensable 
when there are interdependencies."
While Bromwich (70) in a survey of capital budgeting states
"The application of programming methods to capital rationing 
situations yields the set of investments, for each year, 
which maximises total net present worth in the face of 
scarce funds in the future. No rule of thumb criteria can 
do this satisfactorily because of the vast number of 
possible combinations of projects which could be involved." 
Nevertheless, despite their undoubted theoretical superiority, the 
rigid structure and prohibitive data requirements of many LP 
models is a severe limitation on their practical usefulness. Their 
implicit assumption of shareholder wealth maximization may well
attribute too much weight to this single criterion* and a naive_______
* This use of a single objective function to describe the organisational 
goals of the firm is discussed more fully in section 1.6.
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description of the planning process of the firm.. A more likely 
description of the planning process is the view argued by such 
authors as Simon (57) or Hopwood (74) where profitability is merely 
one of many criteria which need to be considered; albeit an important 
one and as such acts as a constraint on the decision making process 
rather than the overriding purpose of any decision. In this sense 
discounting is a very effective tool since it attributes a numerical value 
to the profitability of a project. The decision to accept or 
reject any project can then be made against other criteria with 
a knowledge of the consequent impact on profitability. The 
other great restriction on the use of mathematical programming 
as a practical method of project selection is the need for a complete 
specification together with a centrally coordinated analysis of 
all project opportunities upto some planning horizon. Not only does 
such a p»ocess appear to have prohibitive data requirements but 
may well cut across existing organisational responsibilities.
Hence although it could be argued that mathematical programming
is shunned merely because of organisational and data problems, a
rather more disquieting observation is where this is not the case
and authors cite numerical examples obtained from their models
then their solutions appear to differ little from solutions which
could be obtained by fairly simple rules of thumb.* In fact,
not only is there often a large measure of agreement but al«o the
difference usually seems to occur only among projects which are
marginally acceptable and for the very projects which the decision
to go ahead is most likely to be made on criteria other than the
purely financial anyway.______________________________ __________ _____
* A rule of thumb here is used as an "umbrella" term to include 
any form of analysis based on a discounting methodology.
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Examination of the published solutions of two of the major 
contributions to this field provide confirmatory evidence of this 
point. Weingartner (op cit p. 183) in an attempt to illustrate 
the misleading nature of discounting techniques uses a modified form 
of his basic horizon model for the selection of the optimal subset 
from a set of 30 projects whose cash flows span twenty-six years.
In the case where the decisions are made subject, to a simple upper 
bound on the amount of debt available in a period, 11 projects 
are included in this optimal set. However, out of the twelve 
projects ranked highest by an internal rate of return criterion 
eleven of them appear in the selected set. The only exception to 
this is a project ranked 9 with an internal rate of return of 11.03% 
compared with a cost of capital (rate on interest on debt) or 10%.
In fact the solution would tend to suggest that even this project 
is only just excluded since it has the la-gest reduced cost of 
the excluded set.
In an attempt to integrate the investment and financing 
decisions. Chambers *71) develops a complex and realistic model 
which consists of the selection from a set of thirteen projects 
available in each of five years up to the planning horizon. The 
projects can be financed by combinations of debentures and rights 
issues. Also available as options to the firm are the possibilities 
of investing either in the equity of other companies or short term 
government securities. The model incorporates the current United 
Kingdom tax system and selection is made subject to cash availability 
with debt availability restricted by the book level of gearing.
Thus the constraints impose a great deal of interdependency between 
project decisions since any project investment decision is likely 
to affect any future investment decision because of the impact made
15
by its retained earnings on the book value of the equity and hence 
the debt capacity of the firm. The results quoted by Chambers are 
that the same ten out of the thirteen available projects are chosen 
in each year. The remaining projectswhich are sometimes included 
and sometimes not, are ranked 10, 12, 13 by an internal rate of 
return criterion. Ctiambers calculates the weighted average cost 
of capital assuming a fully geared position as 9.8%, while the 
internal rate of return of these latter projects are 10.4%, 9.6% and 
9.2% respectively. He finds also that this investment strategy 
is largely independent of the films initial cash position and 
level of gearing.
While both authors correctly point out the incensistences 
of conventional discounting methods and analyse the dissimilarities 
of their solutions from those obtained by such methodsyboth gloss 
over the .emarkable degree of similarity. Thus it would appear that 
in the case of Weingartner's model a simple ranking by internal 
rate of return would have yielded a satisfactory, near optimal, solution 
and Chambers would have lost little if he had chosen projects with 
a positive net terminal value at the computed cost of capital. Thus 
neither model seems to offer a substantial improvement over 
elementary rules of thumb.
The question now arises whether these and similar results 
obtained on other models are simply freaks of particular data sets, 
or are inherent structural feature of such models. It is this 
task that occupies most of the third chapter but it must be pointed 
out that by concentrating on Weingartner's and Chambers* models, 
two models are being studied that have essentially the same basic 
structure. Both models are characterized by an objective function 
which is the maximization of the value of a firm where the
16
restriction placed on its investment schedule, apart from a cash 
balance requirement, is a limitation on the amount of debt it may 
incur by a debt capacity constraint. Despite considerable 
development and elaboration of the constraint set by the various 
writers* in the field this characteristic structure of maximizing 
a measure of the value of a firm subject to cash availability 
and restrictions on the level of debt remains a basic subset. Hence 
an understanding of the relationship between the mathematical 
programming solutions of the Weingartner and Chambers models and 
the discounting formulae should be illuminating of more complex 
formulations.
In Weingartner's c-sc the debt capacity restriction takes the 
form of a simple upper bound and in Chamber's case it is related to 
the book value of the assets. Another model apparently of the same 
form is where the restriction is a times interest covered on the 
debt. However, this constraint does differ significantly from the 
other constraints in that the limitation on the amount of debt here 
is solely a function of the (profitability) of tne investment 
decision.^" These three models cover the most commonly used 
accounting restrictions of the level of debt and the extension 
of the work to include theoretical financial market measures of 
debt capacity proves to be mathematically fairly simple.
The approach to be taken can be best illustrated by the 
contrast of the Lorie-Savage(55) method of solving the capital
rationing problem with that proposed by Weinqartner. Lorie-Savage
* °ee for example Bernhard (69) , Hamilton and Moses (73) or Myers and 
Pogue (74).
t In Weingartner's model the debt capacity is clearly independent of 
the investment decision. While in the Chamber's model although 
dependent in part on the investment decision the debt capacity can 
always be increased by a further equity issue.
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solved the one period case by a simple ranking procedure. Their 
solution to the two period case was also a type of ranking by using 
two indices, in this case the appropriate Lagrange multipliers for the 
budget constraints, which they arrived at by trial and error. 
Weingartner cast the problem into a mathematical programming form 
and showed that the general n-period problem is capable of systematic 
solution. Both techniques are search procedures) however Lorie and 
Savage were looking for the price-vector of the cash balances and 
could thus be considered to be a search of the dual spaces. On 
the other hand Weingartner and other writers who rely on linear 
programming formulations could be considered to be searching the 
primal space for the appropriate value of the decision vector.
The idea of searching for a constant price vector against 
which projects can be screened is not new. It has long been 
recognised that under conditions of capital rationing it is 
necessary to introduce a modification tc the simple rule of thumb of 
accepting all projects with a positive net present value at the 
lending rate and the most appropriate modifications have been debated 
extensively in the literature.* The main weakness of much of this 
discussion is that it centres around fairly simple numerical examples, 
which are chosen mainly to illustrate a particular point rather than 
to provide a general analysis.
In the Weingartner case the dual search proves particularly 
revealing. The model incorporates almost the same set of assumptions 
as simple discounting methods, the only difference being the imposition
* See for example Quirin (67), Schwab and Lustig (69), Bernhard (69) 
Beenhacker (73), Hoskins (74).
^ Two exceptions to this are the papers by Bernard (69), who uses 
a framework for analysis similar to that which will be developed 
and the one by Lustig or Shwab (69), though in the end both of 
these successfully deal with situations where the capital rationing 
applies to the first time period only.
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of a 'hard' constraint on debt availability and the dual analysis 
provides a rigorous framework for an examination of the necessary 
modification to discounting formulae in such situations.
In the Chambers' case, the dual search shows that a general 
analytical solution to the linear programming model is possible.
Hence in both these cases the dual search procedure proves to be more 
efficient and more useful than the primal search procedure.
While an analytical treatment suffices to determine the dual feasible 
region for Chambers'and Weingartners’ models it is difficult to 
extend this idea to more complex models. Nevertheless computational 
evidence will be cited to show the robustness of discounting 
indices even in complex models. However, the purpose of chapter 
three is not to develop rules of thumb to different kinds of models 
but rather to emphasise the power of conventional methods of 
appraisal,to gain insight into the nature of the solutions to these 
models and to attempt to define more clearly their role in practical 
decision-making situations,
1.4 Economic Objective functions, the valuation of investment opportunities 
and the finite horizoa problem.
Although evidence was cited in the previous section that the 
numerical impact of interactions between the investment and financing 
decisions may be less intractable than that suggested by many 
authors, the existence of this interaction where there are significant 
degrees of market imperfection* remains unquestioned. In any rigorous 
treatment of the theory of valuation of the firm the interaction 
needs to be treated explicitly.
* The most significant arguments to the contrary embodied in the work 
of Modigliani and Miller (58) specifically assume perfect market 
conditions.
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A mathematical programming framework affords a potentially 
very powerful analytical tool for this. The advantage of math­
ematical programming models in this area is their representation 
of the economic value of the firm as the objective function and 
their explicit treatment of market imperfections as constraints.
Many interesting and economically meaningful deductions can be 
made from these models by use of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions* for 
optimality.
The problem of valuation of the firm, within or without the 
context of mathematical programming, is a core problem of 
financial theory. The purpose of this part of the thesis is not 
to tackle directly any of the fundamental issues but to show the 
contribution that mathematical programming can make to exploring 
the consequences and logical consistencies of a particular 
formulation.
This contribution will be discussed more extensively in 
chapter four. In this section the background material and the 
nature of one particular problem will be discussed - the horizon 
truncation problem.
Of necessity any linear programming model of the firm must 
have a finite horizon. The properties required of this finite 
horizon focus precisely on the substance of chapter four - 
ti>e conceptual problems arising from the interactions of capital 
market imperfections and the impact on the valuation formula 
used for the objective function. This aspect is best seen in a 
historical context and once again the work of Weingartner provides the most
* Simple expositions of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be found in
standard operational research texts such as Hillier and Lieberman (67)
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appropriate vehicle.
As we have seen his original approach of maximizing the 
net present value of the project set was subject to Baumol-Quandt's 
criticism of inconsistency. Their suggested way out of the 
paradox of maximizing the utility of withdrawals from the 
firm by a model of the form*
Max l Ut Wt (1.4.1)
Subject to - l c ^  Xj*Wt SFt (1.4.2)
was rejected by Weingartner because of the problems of specification
of an appropriate utility function.^" Instead he resorted to a horizon
valuation model.____________________________________________________
* The notation is the same as in section 1.2
^ As mentioned, later writers such as Myers (72) have identified 
with the relative utility of total funds in time period t and 
thus with interest rates exogenously determined by the capital 
market. Thus Myers rewrites the model in the form
Max Ufc | ft + 1 °tj Xj] (1.4.3)
- 1 °t Ft + I ]  °t Ctj Xj U . 4.4)
subject to £ ' Gtj V Ft (1.4.5)
He argues that in a certain world, investors facing a prevailing 
interest rate K will all adjust their portfolios so that the 
following conditions hold
(1.4.6)
Defining Uq * 1 means that the firm can use the observed rate K 
to infer the marginal utilities required b/ the Baumol and Quandt
formulation
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Thus Weingartrier's reformulated model was 
n
Max Z -  Ï  c  x +
j-1 3 3
V - w T T
»•t. - l + vx - wa
(1.4.7)
(1.4.8)
j Ctj Xj + (1+rL,Wt-l “ (1+rB,Vt-l " wt * Vt S?t
t - 1, H - 1 (1.4.9)
Wt S Bt t-1,. (1.4.10)
0 i x^ £ 1 Vj (1.4.11)
V  wt*°- Vt (1.4.12)
with the additional notation
borrowing in period t. 
lending in period t. 
is the interest rate on lending, 
is the interest rate on borrowing, 
is a limit on the borrowing in t.
The scalar quantity crepresenting the post horizon value of
cash flows is given by
00 i t
1 ctj xj /  n (1+iT)t-H C3 y t-h+i t (1.4.13)
This approach gives rise to three important questions.
In what sense is the pursuit of optimal wealth at some future 
time compatible with maximization of the value of the firm now?
What is the significance of and the determinants of the choice 
of horizon?
What is the appropriate post-horizon valuation procedure?
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A dual analysis of this model provides a foundation for the 
answers to these questions, the dual of the cash balance equation 
gives the marginal value of an extra £l of earnings and thus the 
ratio of the duals in successive periods gives the interperiod discount 
rate at which projects ought to.be screening. In effect the dual 
is the opportunity cost of capital. The relationship between pfc, 
the lending rate and the borrowing rate and the dual on the debt 
capacity (X^ ) is
It should be emphasised that these duals are outputs from the optimum 
linear programming solutions. Thus where the firm is lending, the 
left hand inequality becomes an equality and pt = (1+r^)Pt+iJ where 
the firm is borrowing with spare debt capacity pfc = (1+r^) Pt+i an<^  
where the firm is borrowing upto its limit Pt = (1+r^) + X^ _.
Thus the opportunity cost of capital may be the lending rate, the 
borrowing rate or the marginal productivity of capital. The
is the value of the cash flow from project j valued at ii. Hence 
VJU is a generalization* of the net terminal value concept.
In answer to the first of these problems, Weingartner concluded 
that where borrowing and lending rates were equal with r^ *= rB
* See Weingartner (74) p.164 et seg. Page numbers refer to the 1974 edition, 
though the 1962 reference will be given where the historical context of the 
work is important.
(1.4.16)
marginal value of project j is given by p.. =
and borrowing is unrestricted^ then maximazation of the terminal value
t The inequality then implies pfc » (l+r)pt+1
or pfc *» (l+r)H t with p^ = 6j - J ct;j(l+r)H
t=l
of the firm was equivalent to the maximization of the net present 
value. However, this set of assumptions implies perfect capital 
markets and under such conditions a linear programming formulation 
of the capital investment problem is unnecessary. In conditions 
of capital rationing Weingartner concluded that maximization of 
the net terminal value was not equal to maximization of the net 
present value of the project set.
The dual analysis reveals also the difficulty associated with 
a specification of a suitable valuation function for post horizon 
cash flows. As Weingartner states
"The rate taken to be appropriate in computing the horizon 
values Oj is the lending-borrowing rate used in the models. 
However, this rate is not the proper one if there are 
effective limits on borrowing."
Thus Weingartner admits that while the correct discount rate is 
effectively incorporated into the valuation in the pre-horizon period 
it is not clear which of the borrowing, lending or marginal re.tes 
is the correct one in the post horizon period. Weingartner does 
provide a clear discussion of the requirements of an horizon, though 
little further guidance as to how one might determine such an 
horizon. Thus he states
"In order to unhook the infinite chains of actions and 
their consequences in the model of the firmb investment 
decisions, we seek a point in time such that the decisions 
which call for implementation before this date will be 
exactly the same, whether or not events past that moment 
are treated explicitly or implicitly (and hence partially 
ignored). More concretely, and in terms of our model,
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we seek a value of H such that the set of accepted projects 
having outlays or revenues in year H or sooner are exactly 
the same whether the model makes use of an infinite horizon 
or a horizon set at H.
In dynamic Models in general such a horizon does not 
necessarily exist or there may be many of them. If there 
are several the earliest having this property may be 
designated as the preferred one."
The discussion gives rise to a definition of a suitable horizon 
valuation - which shall be termed the fundamental horizon valuation 
principle.
The horizon valuation is a satisfactory valuation model if , 
for all optimal feasible solutions^the set of pre-horizon decisions 
with respect to that horizon would be uraltered for any other choice 
of horizon.
The existence of such a horizon will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
Weingartner's approach to the horizon truncation problem implies 
that the horizon is an intrinsic property of the model and its 
determinants are found from within the model. The alternative 
approach is to regard the horizon as a function of the firms planning. 
Such an approach is exemplified by Chambers (67) in his paper 'The 
allocation of funds subject to restrictions on reported results') 
he states that
"the horizon is chosen as a date beyond which opportunities 
cannot be predicted with any confidence, no information is lost 
by ignoring interactions between projects after that date, or 
assuming that funds sure reinvested at the standard rate. In 
this approach in which the aim was to develop a model to
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assist management with planning it was convenient to adopt 
the same planning horizon”.
While this may not be totally satisfactory from a theoretical 
viewpoint it may well prove necessary in practice.
In the later paper (71) on 'The joint porblem of investment and finance', 
he adopts a terminal valuation approach since
"This allows the marginal cost of capital in each year upto 
a planning horizon to be determined within the model”.....
He suggests that at the horizon the net value of post horizon 
cash flows (NPVH)
"takes no account of any prospects for reinvesting some or 
part of the capital at more than the marginal rate of return.
In fact managers would normally expect to be able to invest 
substantial sums after the horizon at better than marginal 
rates, and this expectation would normally be shared by 
shareholders. It would seem to follow that NPVH understates 
the true value of funds available after the horizon.”
Chambers recognises that the interactive nature of post horizon 
decisions may affect the opportunity cost of cash flows and hence 
the valuation.
The investment valuation method implicit with both Weingartner 
and Chambers models can be represented by Figure 1.4.1.
FIGURE 1.4.1.
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In order to avoid problems associated with the Baumol and Quandt 
paradox the horizon in used artificially to separate out the constraint 
set and the valuation flows. The reduced cost associated with a 
project decision produced by a conventional linear programming 
analysis is a generalised net present value which is equal to the 
post-horizon cash flow contribution less the use of capital and 
debt capacity valued at their opportunity rates in the pre-horizon 
period. It should be noted that in both models the post horizon 
cash flow valuation is approximated by using a pre-determined average 
discount rate and the debt capacity effects are totally ignored.
It can be seen that neither of these models can satisfy the fundamental 
horizon principle. The implications'and'limitations of such models will be 
discussed more extensively in chapter .four, while the next section will 
introduce the idea of using a mathematical programming framework for the 
evaluation of a particular financing instrument - a financial lease.
1,5 A mathematical programming framework for Lease* evaluation.
A financial lease is a noncanceliable contractual commitment 
on the part of the lessee to make a series of payments to a lessor 
for the use of an asset. The lessee acquires most of the economic 
benefits resulting from the use of the asset though the lessor 
retains title to it. The payments made by the lessee to the lessor 
are such as to reimburse the lessor for the assets and the financing 
costs associated with the assetc^plus any administration costs and 
to give him a return on his financial investment. Hence the decision 
to lease a piece of equipment is at one and the same time the decision 
to acquire that same piece of equipment. The contractual nature of
* In the ensuing discussion it is assumed that a lease refers to a 
financial lease rather than an operating lease.
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a lease repayment schedule means that the firm is undertaking a form 
of debt financing while simulaneously it is acquiring an asset which 
will alter the future cash revenues patterns of the organisation.
Thus by its very nature the lease contract is a prime example of an 
investment and financing instrument.
It would appear that the most suitable method for the 
evaluation i& to xnclude it within a mathematical programming 
model of the firm in which all the available investment and financing 
opportunities are considered simultaneously. While such an approach 
obviously offers a mechanism for integrating the lease decision into 
a formal planning system, the analytical framework afforded by 
mathematical programming theory can make a major contribution to the 
development of appropriate valuation formulae. The requisitive 
analysis is carried out in Chapter Five. In this section the relevant 
background and survey of some of the approaches suggested in the 
financial literature will be discussed.
The initial work of Vancil(63) was followed by a lull but more 
recently the attention of academics has refocussed on the lease-buy 
problem as is evidenced by a spate* of papers purporting to solve the 
lease-buy decisions. This revival in interest in the evaluation of 
financial leases would appear to stem in part from its increasing 
prominence in the planned financing structure of U.K. firms.
As Fawthrop and Terry (76) point out:
"The growing prominence in the U.K. capital market is made 
clear by a recent estimate from the Equipment Leasing Association 
which suggests that the industry now provides equipment with 
an initial cost of approximately £1,000 million."
* Of the 75 articles cited by ferry C76) the majority of these have 
been published between 1973-1976.
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While the numerous writing of academics has resulted in little 
consensus as to the correct method of analysis of a lease. A common 
but by no means universally accepted approach is to compare the merits 
of lease financing with that of debt financing via a discounted 
present value method of the cash flows resulting from these alternatives.
This gives rise to two particular measures of the cost of a lease 
which will prove of great value in our analysis. They are the interest 
rate on the lease and the after tax cost of the lease. The interest 
rate implied in a lease is just that rate of interest which when 
applied to the outstanding capital on the lease is such that the lease 
repayments meet both capital and interest. In order to make precise 
this definition and to facilitate the subsequent discussions it is 
convenient to write down the algebraic expressions for the lease-buy 
decision from the point of view of the lessee, using the following 
notations:
P = Lease payment at the end of year t (t=l,2,H)
b^ •• Tax allowance on the assets during year t (t=l,2,H)
= Interest payment on debt at end of yeai t (t=l,h)
= Repayment of principal at the end of year (t=l,H)
r = Debt interest rate
A  = Cost of asseto
wfc • Debt outstanding at the end of t 
T *• Marginal tax rate on corporate net income 
H = Length of the lease contract







and the after tax cost of the lease r defined by the equationii
Zn general, academics* tend to reject such measures as internal 
rates of return in favour of net present value methods, though in 
this particular case under the most rigorous analysis the former 
measure provides a very good decision parameter.
Mao's analysis(69) exemplifies the more usual net present 
value approach. The discounted cost of a lease financing i^i
while the corresponding cost of debt financing is
In the first expression only»the lease payments are allowable 
against tax while in tiie second expression both depreciation charges 
and interest charges are allowable against tax.- Hence from this 
analysis it can be seen that the value of the lease-buy decision is:
So far nothing has been said about the appropriate discount rate 
K to use and this remains the centre of much of the controversy about 
lease analysis.
Mao suggests that K is the firms marginal investment return; 
an assumption which would imply that the lease is being considered 
under some state of capital rationing. The use of the marginal
H P (1—T) + b T V t_________ t (1.S.6)
- wo (1.5.9)
* See Van Horne (77) p. 88
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investment return as the appropriate discount rate is 
subject to much dispute.* Other writers such as Vancil adopt 
an average cost of capital discount rate. Vancil»recognising that 
other sources of money are available^argues that it is desirable to 
eliminate the differences in the amounts of financing when comparing 
specific proposals. Since leasing provides more financing than debt 
the company Will nave more fixed charges under the lease plan than 
under the debt plan. These higher fixed charges may prompt investors 
to discount earnings (or dividends) at different rates. Vancil's (61) 
approach is to compare leasing with borrowing only after the difference 
in the amounts of funds provided have been removed. At a particular 
time t, of a lease repayment Pt, rwt represents the imputed interest 
expense while the remaining P - rwfc represents repayment of the 
principal. In order to remove the difference in the amount of 
financing provided by leasing and borrowing the Dasic Interest 
approach focuses on the tax savings associated with the non-interest 
portion of the lease payments. Hence the cost of leasing under 
this approach is given by the difference between the price of the 
assets and the present value of the tax savings associated with the 




(P r wfc )t_____
(1+K)t *1.510)
For the purpose of comparison, the present value of the 
alternative which is that of debt financing is just given by:
Ao
H WfcT
t£j_ (1+K) t (1.5.11)
* See Bower (73)
In this case the cost of interest charges on debt financing 
have been eliminated already and do not appear in the expression.
Leasing here is viewed as an alternative to debt. One of the 
difficulties of such an approach is that of comparing diftering 
amounts of debt financing and loan repayment schedules.
Using a variation of Vancil's algorithm, Bower, Herringer 
and Williamson(66) specifically tackle this problem by assuming 
that the loan payment schedule is the same configuration as the 
lease repayment schedule to 'wash out' this difference. The 
remaining details of their approach is of less interest to this 
brief survey than their choice of discount rate - both Vancil and 
Bower, Herringer and Williamson chose the’ weighted average cost of capital.
It can be argued that conceptually it is wrong to use the 
cost of capital in making decisions between methods of financing.
The cash flows under consideration are contractually fixed or 
are associated with tax savings and involve very little risk.
It thus seems erroneous to use a cost of capital, which emobodies 
a risk premium for the firm as a whole. The counter-arguments 
of Vancil and BHW is that investors and creditors, in their 
valuation of the firm, recognise the difference in tax savings 
between the two methods. Because both investors and creditors 
determine the overall cost of capital the average cost of capital 
is the appropriate rate. A cynic might well remark that the debt 
rate is avoided because discounting at a debt rate would in general 
cause leasing to be sufficiently unattractive and that neither 
of these algorithms would yield results which would explain its 
popularity. The use of the average cost of capital gives rise 
to one further problem. Where there is significant portion of 
lease finance,which will be usually more expensive than debt finance j
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then this fact ought to be reflected in the cost of capital rate.
Thus the discount rate used in the above algorithms is dependent upon 
the decision to lease. Such an interdependency would appear to be 
insolvable, at least within the current framework.
A lease clearly alters the pattern of future cash flows available 
for reinvestment purposes. All the approaches discussed so far 
concentrate on the lease as a financing instrument and make no 
attempt to analyse the investment consequences of the lease decision. 
Fawthrop and Terry(76) attempt to redress this omission by introducing 
the concept of residual balances. Their argument is that the cash 
inflows, net of tax and dividend payments, associated with the lease 
decision become a primary source of finance in the undertaking of 
further capital expenditure.
Any evaluation of - lease should attribute to the lease the 
value of this additional capital. The resulting analysis separates 
the cash flows associated with a lease into component cash flows 
and the resultant expression for the value of a lease takes the 
form:
PV (Lease) = PV (Net of tax operating cash flows)
+PV (Lease interest payments)
+PV (Repayments of Lease capital)
+PV (Earnings on Residual Capital Balances) 
where PV .«tends for the present value, evaluated at the weighted 
average cost of capital. , In common with Vancil the interest cost 
component of the lease is separated out. The significant difference 
between this expression and the other expressions is the inclusion 
of revenue flows in the evaluation of the lease, via the earnings 
on the residual capital balances.
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The residual capital balances need further explanation. The 
authors define these ast
"The residual amount of capital outstanding (on the lease) 
after successive cumulative repayments have been made".
They argue that these balances represent funds which can be reinvested 
so that they earn the average return on assets enjoyed by the firm. 
This return is assumed to be at a rate above the cost of capital 
of the firm and as such the assumption is tacitly made that 
the firm is operating in a capital rationing situation. It is 
interesting to compare this last approactv in which the investment 
alternatives are elucidated and valued at the marginal reinvestment 
rate before discounting at the weighted average cost of capital, 
with the first approach by Mao in which the financing flows are 
elucidated and valued at the debt rate before discounting at the 
marginal reinvestment rate. Thus the emphasis has shifted from 
the lease-buy option as a financing decision to that of an investment 
decision, while the intervening discussion concentrated on the 
differing amounts of debt available under the alternatives.
In summary, the debate on lease evaluation centres on two 
key issues.
The first of these is the appropriate discount rate to use in 
the evaluation. Clearly the lease involves an investment decision 
which implies the use of funds at the appropriate reinvestment 
rates. It is also a financing decision which because of its 
riskless nature is very similar to a debt instrument and suggests 
discounting at a debt rate.
The second major issue is the impact that a lease may have on 
the debt capacity of the firm. Since it has been argued that a
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lease is an alternative form of debt it will presumably affect the 
perceived capital structure of the firm. This change in capital 
structure should be reflected in any cost of capital used.
Both of these problems would seem intractable within the 
current framework.
The advantage of a mathematical programming framework is in 
its ability to cope with these issues. Within such a framework 
the appropriate discount rate is determined by the decision set 
and the debt displacement is reflected in the debt capacity constraint.
In chapter five a generalized expression which clearly defines 
the relative roles of t'.-e various discount rates and the debt capacity effects 
will be developed. The strength of this expression is in its ability 
to ensure a logical consistency between sets of assumptions about 
the nature of the capital markets and the resulting valuation 
formulae. Hence it is relatively easy to explore alternative beliefs 
about the operation of the capital markets. It will be seen that 
under the most rigorous assumptions of perfect capital markets 
leasing is an unattractive proposition. While as imperfections , 
in either the capital markets or accounting measures of debt, 
aro introduced into the assumptions then situations in which leasing 
would be an attractive proposition can be discerned.
1.6 Towards a practical planning system.
As was indicated in the introduction the survey work of 
Grinyer (72) and Higgins and Finn(77) in the United Kingdom and 
that of Gershefski(70) and Naylor and Schauland (76) in the States 
has shown that while there exists many corporate financial models
very few are of the mathematical programming type.*____________________
•Grinyer found only one optimising model out of fifty models in his survey 
while Gershefski suggests that 95% of the models he surveyed were of the 
simulation type - a result confirmed in the later survey of Naylor & Sehauiaiv
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The reasons for this soon emerge if we examine current ideas on the 
nature of the objectives and of the planning process within an 
organisation and contrast these with the structure of the objectives 
and planning process implicit in the two types of financial models.
The objective function normally chosen in most corporate financial 
mathematical programming models found in the literature is the maxi­
misation of the value of the firm. This valuation criterion is in 
accordance with traditional economic thinking which assumes that 
the objective of the firm is the maximisation of the long run profits. 
However, the inadequacies of classical economic theories in accounting 
for the behaviour of the firm has led to a series of revisions of 
tha concept of the firm as a profit maximiser.
One of the first major revisions was by Baumal(5 9 ) whose 
observations led him to conclude that firms do not devote all their 
energies to maximising profits but rather that)as long as a 
satisfactory level of profits is attained,a company will seek to 
maximise its sales revenue. The importance of this hypothesis is 
that the firm is no longer working towards a single objective 
but must balance two competing and not necessarily consistent goals. 
Baumol's idea is still primarily a description of the behaviour of 
the firm in the market place.
A more comprehensive and directly challenging attack on the 
economic theory of the firm arises from the work of organisational 
theorists. H.A. Simon(57) argues very persuasively that the omniscient 
rationality attributed to.economic man bears little resemblance 
to reality. A more accurate description of the behaviour of decision 
making within an organisation is that of a search for satisfactory 
solutions. In thia model of behaviour the objective function becomes 
a two valued utility function: good enough or not good enough.
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While most of the models that we have already discussed appear 
in part to incorporate these ideas by the inclusion of policy 
constraints such as a minimum level of return on capital. Simontf (64) 
interpretation of these constraints is somewhat different. In 
his view decisions are not directed towards a single goal but 
with discovering courses of action that help to satisfy a whole 
series of constraints. It is these constraints that motivate 
the decision maker and gui^e his search. In this sense the 
constraints are more 'goal like' than binding limits on the 
possible actions. Any planning mechanism ought thus to aid the 
decision maker to find 'satisfactory1 plans with respect to 
these constraints or goals rather than to maximise a single 
critericnand regard the constraints as inviolate.
The foregoing discussion provides a key for the understanding 
of the high deqree of acceptability of simulation models. The 
characteristic feature of these simulation models is that they 
examine the consequence of a decision by producing a series of 
financial indicators. These indicators range from projected profit 
and loss statements, balance sheets sources and use of funds 
statements to merely a few financial ratios. Hence, by having an 
immediate analysis of the consequence of any decision,the decision 
maker can search rapidly through a series of alternative plans 
hopefully to arrive at a satisfactory solution. Hence, the 
computer is merely performing, albeit many times faster, analysis 
traditionally carried by the accountant. Although their high 
degree of managerial acceptability may well stem from this 
emulation of traditional accounting methodologies it imposes
a severe limitation upon their power. In particular they are 
unable to provide much guidance in searches for alternative 
and possibly better solutions. Thus if a particular plan is 
unacceptable it is left to the user to input another series 
of decisions in the hope that this will improve the general level 
of performance. While it is true that certain models do incorporate 
decision rules*. These rules are usually simple pre-emptive lists 
such that ifa particular restriction is not satisfied in a period 
then the restriction is overcome by searching through a pre­
ordered list of alternatives. A more sophisticated variation 
of this is the method of backward iteration (Grinyer and Woller(75)) 
when previous decisions can be altered to overcome a restriction 
in a particular time period. Though again this can be seen as 
a limited search through a pre-ordered list.
In contrast mathematical programming is a very powerful 
tool. Its main limitation is that before the search is commenced 
it is necessary to specify a minimum set of conditions which any 
plan must satisfy together with a single measure of the value 
of this plan. This prior specification of minimum conditions 
and a single criterion introduces an unfamiliar and,possibly 
unacceptable,rigidity into the planning system.
A further contrast between financial simulation models 
and mathematical programming models is in the nature and quantity 
of the information flows between the model and the user.
*See, for example. Chambers, Singhai, Taylor and Wright (71).
38
Financial simulation models are characterised by requiring 
decision inputs from the user and output the information in 
the form of the consequent impact on the value of selected 
financial policy variables (e.g. return on capital, earnings 
per share). In linear programming models the information 
input is merely the data relating to the benefits and costs 
of various alternatives and the plan is output in the form of 
a set of decisions. In this case the impact on financial 
policy variables has to be determined separately. Hence, 
as currently used mathematical programming models search 
through decision space for a plan which maximizes a scalar 
measure of company performance whereas simulation models are 
used to search, even though that search is unstructured, 
over a vector of policy variables.
It is the contention of this section of the thesis 
that the acceptability ol simulation models stems largely ' 
from their ability to provide an interactive search mechanism 
over a vector of policy variables. It is thus the aim of 
the final Chapter of this thesis to illustrate one method 
whereby mathematical programming algorithms may be used to 
enhance this search.
The remainder of this section concentrates on the 
approaches proposed so far in the literature in order to 
understand why they have failed to provide a viable alternative 
to either simulation or LP models.
The work of Simon (57 and 64) Cyert and March(63) in 
developing a behavioural theory of the fir.n finds its recognition 
in operational research methodology in the recent development 
of multi-criteria methods. These methods accept the multi­
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criteria nature of many planning systemsand attempt to explore 
the various alternatives in a systematic fashion. Although this 
approach at first sight would appear to provide the appropriate 
planning mechanism a closer examination of the two mainstreams 
of research in this area indicate quite daunting implications 
for the management user.
The first of these approaches originates from the early 
work of Charnes, Cooper and Ijiri (63) in goal programing. In 
this approach the objective function usually takes the form of 
a weighted linear combination of deviations from a set of goals. 
While their formulation is intuitively appealing, its rather 
simplistic structure can give rise to anomalies caused by 
solution instabilities*. Another major difficulty is the
* A particularly apposite example is the case of attempting to 
maximise profits in each of two years where total profits are 
limited to a fixed quantity. If the problem is formulated as 
min (l+£) + z2
s.t. p^  ^+ S 1
P1 + P2 * 1
where p^, denote profits in each of the two consecutive years 
and z2 are shortfalls from target. The ratio 1 + E t 1 expresses 
a preference for profits in year one over year two. Then the 
solution if p = (0,1) for a positive value of £ and p = (1,0) for 
a negative value. Thus an infinitesimal charge in the weights can 
completely alter the form of the solution. While this exaraple may 
seem trivial and unlikely to occur in practice the reverse appears
to be true.
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specification of a trade-off function between conflicting goals.
This difficulty is compounded in the case of financial planning 
models because the goals are usually ratios introducing a non­
linearity into the problem.
The importance of ratios is fairly clear from the extent 
to which they are discussed in standard texts on financial analysis*.
In addition'there have been various publications which give ratio 
norms for various industrial categories. Although there is a 
plethora of ratios and their definitions vary widely (Perrin (6f>) ) 
certain key ratios can be identified as particularly significant 
in corporate financial planning. Obvious examples are measures 
of profitability such as return on capital,earnings per share, 
measurement, of debt levels such as gearing and times covered 
together measures of growth of sales and profit.
The idea of incorporating financial ratios into mathematical 
programming methods is not new. Chambers(07) in his paper 'Programming 
the allocation of funds subject to restrictions on reported results' 
concludes :
"It became evident in discussions of the first aspect - 
the effect on published results - that at least in the 
short run, managers were using several overlapping but 
distinct criteria to measure the firms' performance and 
the success of capital budgeting. On the other hand, they 
did not question the fundamental importance of cash flows 
which a project could be expected to generate. On the 
other hand, they were unwilling altogether to neglect the
*See Lev(74),Van Horne (77)
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changes which the project would bring about in other parts 
of the published accounts, derived on the basis not of 
cash flows but of accruals. They regard the accounting 
convention of assigning costs and revenues to the periods 
judged to give rise to them as defining rules of a game 
in which they wanted a good score."
However, in his particular model these ratios were hard 
constraints and could not be violated. A more appropriate model 
according to the organisational theorists would be one where 
constraints ware not hard and could be broken if it seemed 
beneficial. While got.1 programming certainly affords such a 
structurejthe quantification of constraint violations is a 
fundamental problem associated with the weights used in goal program­
ming. These weights are the relative value that the decision maker 
attaches to deviation from one criterion as opposed to another 
and the difficulty of attaching sensible values to these weights 
in any realistic planning model has led many authors to abandon 
goal programming formulations for financial models. Such an 
attitude is characterised by Carleton, Dick and Downes(73) •
"If the objective function in a goal programme has more than 
one argument, absolute priorities have to be imposed arbitrarily. 
Consequently, nonachievability of all the goals, when such 
is the programme solutions, leaves unanswered the important 
economic question of how objectives trade off against one 
another. In other words, finance theory, even applied gently, 
has something to contribute to management's undertaking of 
how financial policy requirements fit together. And goal 
programming is a substantially less powerful tool than linear
4programming for accomplishing this.«
It would appear that If an operationally viable search tool 
is to be developed goal programming as it currently stands falls 
some way short.
The second mainstream of multi-objective research is the development of 
algorithms for the generation of efficient solutions. A solution 
is said to be efficient if the performance on a particular criterion 
can only be improved to the detriment of the performance on some 
other criterion.* Clearly the decision maker need only consider 
efficient solutions in his search for the most acceptable one. For 
linearly independent criteria Benayoun and Tergny(70) have shown 
that these efficient solutions are situated on the boundary of the 
feasible region. If the efficient solution lies at a vertex, it 
is referred to as an extreme efficient solution, otherwise it is 
referred to as a non-extreme efficient solution. Every multi­
criteria LP problem has only a finite number of extreme efficient 
solutions but an infinite number of non-extreme solutions. Non­
extreme efficient solutions can be expressed as convex combinations 
of extreme efficient solutions, but not all such combinations yield 
non-extreme efficient solutions.^”
While a fairly comprehensive survey of algorithms for the 
determination of sets of efficient solutions can be found in
* Mathematically, if y^(x) , iei denotes the criteria on which decisionx 
is judged. Then solution x is efficient if and only if there is no 
other solution Y such than
YityJ^Y^x) vA
and
Yj^y) > Yi(x) for some iei 
^See Yu and Zeleny (73) for a further discussion of this.
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Thanassouilis (76)the basic limitation of the approach is 
self evident on consideration of the details of just two such 
algorithms. This limitation is a natural consequence of the 
fact that efficiency of solutions is a very weak form of 
comparison, leaving a large number of solutions to be 
considered before the final compromise solution can be selected.
For example an algorithm which has been proposed by Yu 
and Zeleny (73) . centres on the determination of all non-
dominated faces. Although strictly speaking such an approach 
should not be termed an algorithm,since it offers no guidance 
to the determination of a final solution even given that the 
'best' face has been determined,a more disturbing feature is 
the computational implications of the approach. Thus the 
method essentially requires consideration of some 2m+n systems 
of equations where m is the number of constraints specifying 
the feasible region and n the number of structural variables.
Since the problem posed for solution in the last chapter consists 
of some 77 structural variables and 48 constraints, this method 
is seen as computationally infeasible.
Another algorithm,which has been proposed by Evans and Steuer(75)
involves the determination of extreme efficient solutions. Briefly 
the method relies on the cdnnectedness of the efficient vertices 
and generates the complete series of efficient vertices by moving 
from vertex to vertes. A check for efficiency of vertex needs to 
be carried out at each stage and this itself requires the solution 
of a linear program. Again, such an algorithm proves computationally
Connectedness in this context means that a neighbouring efficient 
vertex can be obtained from the current efficient vertex in only 
one simplex iteration.
prohibitive* for most realistically sized problems.
It would seem that on the one hand goal programming methods 
confront the decision maker with a non determinable prior 
specification of trade-offs while the algorithmic searches of 
efficient solutions present the decision maker with a superabundance 
of alternatives. Thus,until the informational inputs required of 
the decision maker in goal programming can be reducedfor ,until the 
algorithmic approach can be modified to produce appropriate and 
order subsets of possible efficient solutions^neither method can 
be considered as practical.
In chapter four a utility framework for goal programming is 
examined. This framc.'ork provides a powerful and insightful 
mechanism for the development of the tools necessary for carrying 
out an interactive search of the set of efficient solutions. In 
the next section a realistically sized planning problem is proposed 
to provide the discipline of a precise contextual setting for a 
thorough test of these search procedures. It will be seen while a 
natural strategy evolves the essence of the method developed is 
in its flexibility of response to the decision makers preferences.
In this way, a model is developed which may in the end begin to 
bridge the gap between mathematical programming models and simulation 
models.
1.7 A financial planning model.
The central theme of this thesis is the nature, impact and
Steuer reports that a sample of 25 constraints, 50 variable problems 
with three objective functions had an average of 605 extreme efficient 
vertices and required 152 seconds of CPU time on an IBM 370/165 
computer. However, the time required appears to increase exponentially 
with the size of the problem and he was unable to obtain complete sets 
of solutions in any reasonable time to problems*much larger than this.
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resolution of the interdependencies that arise between the
investment and the financing decision. In previous sections various
aspects of these interdependencies have been introduced, though
most of the subsequent discussion of necessity has centred around
fairly simple models. Thus in section 1.3 it was suggested that
models which consist only of a cash constraint and a debt capacity
constraint (nay be 'solved' by a relatively straight forward
application of discounting principles, though it is certainly
far from clear how such discounting approaches might behave in more
complex models. Section 1.4 introduced some of the problems that
arose out of interdependencies between the form of the valuation
model, the financing options and the constraint 3et. In particular
it concentrated upon the effect of a finite horizon time. The extent
to which this poses a problem in practice for large scale planning
models remains unknown. A similar question emerges in the theory
of lease valuation. While analytical methods suffice far the
development of valuation formulae in most of the models mentioned
so far, such methods have proved inadequate when it comes to dealing
with more elaborate models. This is of course a major weakness
in the analysis since the leasing decision appears to be a result
of a complex interaction of tax laws and debt availability determined largely
by reporting standards. Finally the work of the last section
suggests that the firm operates in an environment where its courses
of action are constrained by consideration of the impact that they
might have on a whole multiplicity of criteria. An exploration of
this idea requires a model rich in detail but much less rigid in structure
than the conventional linear programming models hitherto discussed.
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Unfortunately, many of the models which have been used to 
illustrate the various aspects of the above problems are relatively 
trivial in nature and fail to provide adequate test material.
In order to provide for a more comprehensive examination of the 
ideas developed in this thesis a realistically sized* programming 
model of the firm was developed.
The model was developed in two distinct forms. The first of 
these follows the traditional economic valuation approach where the 
objective js the maximisation of shareholder wealth. In this 
model all the constraints are hard constraints in that a plan is 
infeasible unless it simultaneously satisfies all the constraints.
The same data and basic structure is also used to generate a parallel 
version which takes the form of a 'goal' programming model. In this 
model all the financial restrictions or constraints are 'soft' 
constraints and hence it is possible that all or any of these 
restrictions may not be net in an acceptable plan.
The model provides a central test bed for the computational 
evaluation of the main ideas of this thesis and despite its size 
and complexity it plays a contributing rather than leading role in 
this thesis. In order to emphasise the nature of this role and 
avoid breaking up the theoretical arguments, a detailed statement 
of the model is reserved for the appendices with a discussion of 
the structure of the objective function in the appropriate chapters.
A short summary of the main features of the model should suffice 
at this point, while a detailed mathematical statement can be found 
in appendix I.
The final form of the model had over 360 variables with over 
180 constraining and defining equations excluding simple bounds.
«7
As already stated, the model is a linear programming 
representation of the investment opportunities over time facing 
an organisation together with corresponding a set of financing 
alternatives. Briefly, it contains four groups of variables 
representing accounting quantities, financing and investment 
opportunities and variables associated with goals and targets.
The accounting variables have been chosen at a level of detail 
that gives sufficient richness for the purpose in hand without 
an excessive amount of detail. Hence, while current assets are 
included at an aggregate level, capital assets are grouped into 
two categories to allow for different tax treatments. Also 
overdraft, dividends and tax payable are identified as 
separate elements composing the short term liabilities because 
of their importance as financing elements. For the same reason 
long term capital and shareholders capital are separately identified 
also. The modal has two main groups of constraints.
(a) A technological set consisting of the cash balance 
equations and accounting definitions.
(b) A financial policy set associated with the performances 
on certain key financial criteria such as return on 
capital, times interest covered, earnings and dividend 
per share.
Apart from the financing alternatives the firm is faced with a 
series of decisions to be made about investments in projects.
There are 16 different projects in all, though since some of these 
projects are available in more than one year there are in fact up 
to 45 projects available over the eight year planning period.
The projects are specified in terms of their contribution to sales, 
earnings, current assets and liabilities together with a statement
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of their capital requirements in both building and land and plant 
and equipment. The internal rate of return of these projects 
varies between 7.5% and 15.5%. A complete summary of the projects 
occurs in appendix IV.
It is further assumed that the organisation at the start has 
already a series cf on-going operations and future financing 
commitments such as planned long term debt requirements. Apart 
from these projections resulting from its current operations, the 
firm has a series of policy targets, for instance a minimum return 
dividend payout and capital in each year, and sales targets which 
it hopes to achieve over the planning period. A statement of 
these targets together with the other base data appears in appendix 
III. Also contained in appendix III is a statement of the taxation 
allowances which the organisation may claim and details of the 
assumptions made about the timing of the cash inflows and outflows 
during a year.
It will be seen that the model in itself is not original, indeed 
it would be difficult to generate a model which is completely different 
from all the many other models produced in this field. Clearly, 
the antecendents in the literature on whose ideas the model is 
based can be found in the pioneering work of Heingartner (621, 
the work of Chambers (67,71) on the incorporation of financial 
constraints and equity issues, the share price valuation approach 
of Carleton(70) and the complexity and output procedures by 
Hamilton and Moses (73) . The model is little more than a synthesis 
and extension of the features considered best in these models.
Any unique nature lies in the use and emphasis of the model and the 
structure of the objective functions necessary for goal programming.
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CHAPTER 2.
Interdependencies, Hlrschleifer, Baumol and Quandt,
2.1 Introduction.
In this chapter the nature of the interdependencies that 
arise between the set of investment decisions and the discount 
rate at the optimum in capital budgeting models is examined in 
detail. As-was indicated in section 1.2 Baumol and Quandt (65) 
suggested that the dual values gave the correct discount rate or 
opportunity cost of funds to use in the formulation of the 
problem. The subsequent attempt to solve the problem reformulated 
in this way led them to suggest that there was no solution other 
than the null solution. The following section shows how it is 
possible by paying particular attention to the assumptions and by 
careful definition of the mathematical variables to cite numerical 
counter examples with non-trivial solutions in which the discount 
rate is consistent with the dual value. Section 2.3 then, 
provides a formal mathematical treatment of the problem in which 
it is shown that in general there exists many consistent solutions 
and the numerical example is merely one of a particular subset 
of these solutions. Section 2.4 identifies the economic meaning of 
these solutions and the implications for discount methodology by 
relating the solutions to the fundamental paper by Hirschleifer 
(58) on the theory of optimal investment decisions. It is argued 
in conclusion that this paper forms a basis for the development 
of mathematical programming approaches to the capital investment 
problem.
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2.2 A Respocification and Numerical Counter-Examples.
The Baumol and Quandt model Is, as already stated:
Max B “ l I cjt(pt/Po)j t
- X4 j 2.2 .1
•fc* - S cj t V Ft t»0,l,2•• • a T 2 . 2.2
The fa'ctor p./p which is the discount rate is arrived t o
at by the following argument. If we were indifferent to either
£1 00 now or £ 1 1 0 in one year's time, it would imply that we were
discounting funds at 10%. In general indifference between an
amount S now and S, in time period 1 where S « KS,, implies o 1 o 1
a discount rate of K.
Thus briefly, Baumol and Quandt argue that within the
mathematical programming framework the value in year zero of an
Sz 3fadditional Sq pounds is ^  gjr since each pound will add gjr
‘ o • o
to the capitalised present value of tne earning stream, where Z
denotes the discounted value of the firms earnings and Fq is the
budget constraint in year zero. This indifference between Sq
in year zero and in year 1  implies a discount factor applying
between 3z /3zi year 0 and year 1 of gsr /^p since SQ in year zero
3z ’ °adds So ^  to the discounted value of the earnings stream and
° ° 3zin year 1 adds gj- to the discounted value of the earning
3z ^stream. Now is equal to the dual price (denoted by p )
3Ft
corresponding to the t-th constraint. Thus writing as the 
corresponding (one period) discount factorwe have Dfc « pfc/Pt_i and 
the present value of (discounting for all t periods up to the 
present) as
So ” DlD2 * " ’DtSt = ^t^o* St 
Thus the discounting factor for funds in period t is pfc/p0 *
2.2.3
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As already stated, Baumol and Quandt form the dual of their 
model and conclude that the only solution to the problem is the 
trivial one. However, their particular form of the model has 
some rather strange assumptions and by modifying and clarifying 
these assumptions the model takes on a form which has a non-trivial 
solution.
The three main modifications that need to be made to the 
Baumol and Quandt model are:
(i) An upper limit need." to be placed on the amount that
can oe invested in any one. project. This is rather more
realistic than Baumol and Quandt's projects because 
even if a particular project was. unbounded it is unlikely 
to have a linear return to scale. The imposition of upper 
bounds allows a piece-wise linear approximation to the 
returns to the project to be made. It is in fact a general­
isation or extension of the model rather than an additional 
restriction. The other point about this restriction is 
that many of the conceptual ideas behind this formulation 
are contained in Hirschleifer's paper on the theory of optimal 
investment and in this paper he introduced the idea of 
ranking projects to enable the generation of a production 
function with diminishing returns to scale. While one 
could generalise or rather restrict the arguments to 
infinite linear projects it is mathematically of much less 
interest.
It should perhaps be noted that under this modification 
Baumol and Quandt's conclusion no longer follows.
Thus the dual of the formulation is:
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l cjtPt * 1/Po l ajtPt 2.2.4.
where is the dual associated with o<x^ ( 1 , 
Then (-1 - 1/PQ) £ GjtPt * ~ vj 2.2.5.
and this no longer implies that CjtPt * ° 2.2.6 .
for all j, a necessary condition in Baumol and Quandt's proof.
(ii) Another clarification which is necessary is that there
exists a 'market' mechanism for carrying money from one period 
to the next. It is thus convenient to make the simplest 
assumption that there exists an unbounded project with the 
cash flow characteristics of - 1  in period t and 1 + i in 
period t + 1 for all t. This is perfectly general, provided 
that ?f necessary i may be zero. The original Baumol and 
Quandt model provides no explicit mechanism for carrying 
forward money from one period to the next and they fail to 
clarify the position of any surplus funds.
(iii) if we adopt the same arguments for relating the duals to
the discount rates as Baumol and Quandt, in that indifference 
between
St- 1 3z3Ft- 1
and
effectively determines the discount rate. The only difference 
is the specific problem of when one of the duals vanishes.
3zIf = 0 then it does not mean that £1 in year t is worthless
3Ft
Since at least in the proposed modal the oound can be loaned
to the money market at an interest i until required nor does
a 5=—  “ 0 imply that the prevailing one period rate is 
3Ft-l
infinite. To avoid this problem of dividing by zero we can
u p  where t ouse the equivalent form in the model that pfc " 
ufc is the discount factor as defined above.
The reformulated model is i
Max Z - J l c. u x 2.2.7
t jeJ 3 3
s.t. - £ ci#. x. (F t-0,l,....T 2.2.8
jeJ 3 3 c
0<x. <1 j£J* 2.2.9
where J refers to the total investment opportunity set and J' 
is the production subset.
In additioii the constraint relating the duals to the discount
rates are written p^ « u_p t«l,....T and where u « 1.t t o  o
Before attempting to solve the general problem it would seem 
prudent to look at particular examples in order to gain some 
insight into the structure of any solutions.
The examples are so framed that the optimal investment schedule 
would appear to be fairly obvious. The rationale behind this 
intuitive example is then examined in order co relate it to 
the previous analysis.
TABLE 2.2.1 Net Cash Inflows from Investments.
^'■''«^Time
Project'*^,^ t- 0  t- 1  t- 2 Upper Bound
X1
- 1  1 . 1
- 1  2 1
*3 • -1 0 2.5 1
- 1  2 1
X, -2 3 15
X6
- 1  1 . 1
Budget h 1 o
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. Consider the investment opportunity set in Table 2.2.1 
where
(a) X, and X, represents investment in finance markets of 10%.
1 o
These projects are assumed unbounded.
(b) u1 and u2 denote the 1 and 2 period discount rates.
Then the objective function is
Max = (-1 + l.lu^X + (-1 + 2Ul)X2 + (11 + 2.Eu 2)X3 
+ <-ux + 2u 2)X4 + l-2\i1 + 3u 2)X5 + (-Uj^  + l.lu2)X6 
subject to
xx + x2 + x3 < S
X. + 2 X_ + X, - 2 X, - 1.1 X. < 1 4 0 0 « X
- 2.5 X 2 X. - 3 X. - 1.1 X. 6 0 3 4 0 X






If we look at the first year investment opportunities then
clearly X2 is superior to X^ and a combination of X2 with either
X4 or X^, provided one has not already exhausted these projects, is
superior to X3< Thus it would seem the rational investment is to
accept X2 at scale which exhausts the budget. This leaves 2
available for investment in period 1 , being the 1 from the budget
and >) x 2 being the return in period 1 from Xj. Again it would seem
that the rational investment schedule is to take X. at full scale4
and X^ at scale *j which exhausts the budget. Thus the optimal 
solution would appear to be
X2 “ x 4 “ x 5 “ •» with xa - X3 - X6 - 0. 2.2.15.
What implications has this for the discount rates? Returning to the
original arguments of Baumol and Quandt presumably the investor
would be indifferent between 6 in year zero or 2 6_ in year 1 sinceo o
an additional 6q in year zero could be invested in project 2 to give 
in year 1. Thus it would appear that the appropriate discount factor 
is *j i.e. u3 = li. In year 1 the investor is presumably indifferent
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between an extra 6  ^in year 1 or an extra 3/26^ in year 2 since the 
best available opportunity is that of X,. where for each 2 units of 
investments in year 1, 3 units are returned in year 2. Thus the 
appropriate discount factor between 1 and 2 is 2/3 and u^ - 1/3 
<= 2/3 x u^).
An obvious but fairly important point is the way in which the 
discount rate is determined by the marginally rejected projects. 
There are several other features to note.
TABLE 2.2.2 The cash flows associated with the ontimal investment 
schedule.
Projects oII4J t«l t=2
X2 -4 +1
X4 - 1 2
X5 - 1 1.5
Totals •4 - 1 3.5
Discount rates 1 4 Ì/3
Discount values -4 -4 1 .1 / 6
.". Total N.P .v. is 0.167
If we look at the individual projects that constitute the optimum 
solution then we find that the N.P.V. of X^.which is the only project 
accepted in full» is positive while the N.P.V. of X2 and Xg, which are 
the partially accepted projects, is zero and the N.P.V. of the rejected 
projects X^, Xj, Xft is of course negative. Thus the discount rates 
as determined sort out the projects into the fully accepted, partially 
accepted and totally rejected projects which groupings then satisfy 
the budget constraints.
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The discount rates can be more formally related to the duals
by examining the effects of small increases in cash to the formulated
linear programming problem, when the optimal solution is assumed
to be X, » X_ ■ S and X. = 1. Then an extra 6 in year 1 increases 1 5  4 o
the objective function by an amount p 6 . If an extra 6 were available 
J o o o
it would alter the cash flow pattern since presumably it would be
invested in X^ t.o increase the objective function value by an amount
(-1 + 2 u , ) 6 . In addition the extra 26 then made available in 
1 o o
year 1 would then be invested in X^ to yield an extra 36q in year 2
and make a net increase in the objective function value of (-2 u3 + 3 u 2)6q .
We can thus write p 6 «* (-1 + 2u,)6 + (-2u, + 3u,)6 . 2.2.16.o o 1 o 1 2 o
A similar argument for an extra 6  ^available in year 1 gives
P1 61 = ** ("2ul + 3u 2 , 5 1 2.2.17.
Since in year 2 there are effectively no more investment 
opportunities facing the firm
P, - 0
We have also assumed that p_ = u.p and that p, = u.p .4* 4m O  X X O
These five equations have the unique solution
«1  “  1/2 u 2 1/3 P2 ' pi = pe - 0.
If we substitute for u^ and u2 in the objective function then indeed 
we confirm that
Z - -0.45 Xx + 0 X2 - 0.167 X3 + 0.167 X4 + 0 Xj - 0.3 Xfi 2.2.1C. 
subject to the same constraints as before has the solution that the
objective maximum is 0.167 which occurs when X^ = 1 and the associated
*
duals of each of the constraints is zero. This point is not surprising 
since the discount rate is determined by the marginally rejected 
projects X2 and X^ which thus have zero N.P.V. and extra funds would
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merely be available for investment in these projects and would 
contribute nothing to the objective function. These results could 
well be expected to hold for all cases and the following example 
provides further evidence of this.
Consider the effect of project X3 having the following cash
flow pattern. -1 ,1 ,2 .5., and the budget constraint in year 1  being reduced
to 0, while being increased to 1 unit in year 0. The complete
investment opportunities are as in Table 2.2.3.
TABLE 2.2.3
Time
Project t- 0 t- 1  t=2 Upper Bound
X1 - 1  1 . 1 1
X. - 1  2 1
4m
X3 -1 1 2.5 1
X4 - 1  2 1
X5 -2 3 1
X6
- 1  1 . 1
Budget 1 0  1
If we choose to invest in project 2 then we could re-invest 
the 2 units made available in year 1  in projects X^ and X^ to give 
a total of 3.5 in year 2. If we undertook project X3 in year 0 
then the 1 unit made available for re-investment in year 1  could be 
invested in to give a combined cash flow of 4.5 in year 2.
The two investment schedules give resulting cash flows of -1, 0,
3.5 and -1, 0, 4.5, the latter being preferable, assuming re­
investment, to other alternatives and clearly then the optimal 
solution appears to be X^ * 1  X^ « 1  with X^ - X4 - Xj “ Xfi ■= 0 .
What discount rates do these projects imply? If we formulate o<tr L.P. 
model and carry out the procedure outlined previously then the following
results apply:
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Max Z - ( - 1  + l . l U j ^  + ( - 1  + 2u^) X2 + ( - 1  + ux + 2.5 ul2,X3
+ (-ux + 2u 2)X4 + (-2u1  + 3u 2)X& + <-ux *■ l.lu2)X6 2.2.19.
subject to X1 + X2 + X3 * 1 2 .2.2 0.
X. + 2X, + X, - X, - 2X - 1.1 4 5 6 3 2 Xx t, 1 2 .2 .2 1 .. -2.5X, - 2X - 3X_ - 1.1X. (0 3 4 5 4 2 .2 .2 2 .
o « x 2, x3, x4, x5 <i 2.2.23.
Again consider the effect of an additional 6q , 6x in years 1
and 2 , where fi , 6 . > 0 . o 1
Then
p 6 = (-1 + 2u, ) 6 + (-2u + 3u ) 6  O O 1 O 1 2 o 2.2.24.
i.e. P3 = (-1 + 2u 3) + (-2UJ + 3u 2) 2.2.25
and Px = «ï (-2ux + 3u 2) 2.2.26.
P2 “ o 2.2.27.
with
p 2 “ U2Po'Pl = U1 P 2.2.28.
The solution is
ux = 1/2,Uj » 1/3,Po = pi - p2 = 0 2.2.29.
If we discount the project cash flows at these rates then the N.P.V. 
of projects X^ and X^ is negative while the N.P.V. of projects X^ and 
X4 is positive and the N.P.V. of X2 and X5 are zero. However, in this 
case we have integer solutions and in effect we have no marginally 
rejected projects. Now previously the discount rates were determined 
by the marginally rejected projects. If we examine the argument more 
closely we see that in evaluating the duals the additional assumption 
was made that 6q , 6^ were positive. If one were to ask the question 
what is the value of K such that one would be indifferent between 
paying out 6^ in year one or k 6^ in year 2 the answer,again assuming 
is positive would not be a value of K ■ 2/3 since a reduction of
in the budget availability in year one would reduce the amount of 
money available in year 2 by 26^. In the first year the problem is 
even more complicated since a reduction in the current budget of 6q 
reduces the amount of money available in year 1  by and in year 2 by 
26q . Again if we relate these to the duals the appropriate discount 
rates are:
with p ■■(-1 + u, + 2.5u ) + (-u, + 2u_) 2.2.30.o 1 2  1 2
The solution in this case is u^ = 4/9,u^“ 2/9. Discounting 
the projects at these rates then projects Xj, Xj, Xj, Xfi are negative 
while X^ and X^ are zero. There are of course two other solutions; 
these are associated with either relaxing the constraint at zero 
while tightening the constraint in perico one,or alternatively, 
tightening the constraint at zero while relaxing the constraint in 1 . 
Thus as a generalisation where the linear programming model results 
in a solution where the accepted projects in a particular period have 
integral values then the interperiod discount rate between that period 
and the following has two values depending on whether one is considering 
increments or decreases to the budgets constraints.
2.3 The Mathematical Theory*
Having considered some examples it is now appropriate to draw 
together the mathematical theory. There are really two cases to 
consider depending on whether funds can be 'carried forward' or not.
For the sake of completeness both cases will be considered.
•This analysis was developed by Atkins in the paper by Ashton and Atkins (76),
it is included here for completeness.
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Using the same notation as above the problem is of finding 
U* p and X, such that
" “ l l UtcjtXj * U’CX
and -Cx £ F
Xj < l all j
Xj i 0 ufc i 0, and pfc >0 for all j and t
and Pt is the dual of budget constraint






A solution (x,u) to this will be termed a consistent solution. 
That is, an investment schedule along with a set of discount rates 
that are in the correct relationship to the value of marginal budget 
changes and which together maximise the present value with respect to 
those disccnt rates is a consistent solution.
Taking the general case first, if we can find x, U, p, V, W such 
that the following equations are satisfied, then by Kuhn-Tucker 
theory (x,u) is consistent.
I °jtUt + l CjtPt - vj + Wj - 0 all j 2,3.6.
Pt (Ft + \ CjtXj) = 0 
vj (1-x^) = 0 WjXj - 0
Pt > 0 etc.
pt “ V o









Simplifying and using our knowledge that we would expect pfc to 
be zero we have:
(1 + pQ) C'u - IV + XW 2.3.12
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V^(l-x^) ■* 0 “ 0 1. > x^j > 0




1-x, for convenience, we know that any zero solution
Min y' . V + X' . w
such that (1 + p ) C u  - IV + IW » 0o
F + CX > 0
Xj + Yj “ 1 Xj, yj > 0 etc.





Lemma: The minimum of thj quadratic p . q where each set of variables
satisfy some linear equations Cp < C and Dq *i d occurs at a point p*, q* 
which are vertices of their respective convex regions. Proof is trivial, 
e.g. write each as a linear combination of their vertices.
Thus in order to- ensure that all consistent solutions have been 
found it is only necessary to inspect the vertices.



















In this case spare cash in time period 1 is lost as it cannot be 
used. Problem max (-x^ -Xj) + ul^xl^  + u2^xl + ^*®x2^  2.3.19.
X1  + x 2 * 1 , 5  
* 1  + X1 ‘ 1  
*2  *  x 2 "  1





the extra optimality conditions are
-1 + 2.5u 2 - v 2 + y>2 “ 0 2.3.24.
and we wish to minimise z = x^w^ + x2w2 + ^lvl + ^2V2 2,3.2b.
The vertices are shown in figures 2.41 below and each combination 
investigated in table 2.4.2.
-1 + u^ + u^ - v^ + w1 = 0 2.3.23.
Figures 2.3,1








y (1 ,1 ,0 ,0) (0,0)








d,i) 0 0 0 1.5 0
(0 ,1 ) 1 0 0 1.5 . 6
(0,lj) * 1.5 .5 0 .75 . 6
(*5,0) * 1.5 1 0 0 .3
1 1 0 0 0
Thus we see that there exist many consistent solutions in general
remembering that the relevant linear combinations of the above are
also consistent. Even if only those schedules are considered which
exhaust the initial budget (marked *) there are three consistent 
solutions. To be complete the condition uq = 1 ought to be released 
and u^ set equal 'a 1 (say) so that solutions with u q = 0 can be 
generated. There is thus also a straightforward way of generating 
such consistent solutions if required. A dual vertex is chosen 
e.g. u - (1,0,1) and the relevant L.P. e.g.
is solved to give consistent solutions as above. This existence of 
consistent solutions is not guaranteed of course for each dual vertex 
as is shown in the example above when u = (1 ,1 ,'0) and the projects must 
be chosen to exhaust the first year budget.
If the practically more interesting case when excess finds can be 
'carried forward' at a minimum market interest rate of i (>0) is 
considered, the use of net present value criteria in general assume 
the existence of such financial opportunities, so it would seem 
reasonable to include them initially as part of the project set. He 
thus have a new project associated with each year with cash ¿lows of 
-1 and 1+i in succeeding years. This implies that the budgets are 
entirely used in each except the last period and the objective function 
becomes
Apart from the added constant this is very similar to the horizon
Max 1. (-x^-Xj) + OfXj^ + KXj^ + 2.5x2) = 1.5v.^ 




value or in this case just terminal cash problem
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Max 2.3.29.
and the two solutions are identical apart from the duals differing 
by a fixed proportion. As the horizon value problem has a unique 
solution, apart from alternative neighbouring optima, it can be used 
to find consistent solutions of the Baumol and Quandt model with 
project bounds added. Thus in the 'carryover' case, not only can 
consistent solutions exist, but also can be found by the solution of 
u single horizon value maximisation linear programme. This theory 
can be illustrated by adding to the simple example two further 'carry 
forward' projects with i ■» 0. The data is now as shown in Table 2.3.3.
TABLE 2.3.3. Time Upper bound
0 1 2
project 1 - 1 1 0
2 - 1 1 1 1
3 - 1 0 2.5 1
4 0 - 1 1
Budget Mt 1.5 0 0
The problem is
max
U2 (X2 + 2.5x 3 + x4> 2.3.30.
such that X1  + X2 + x3 S 1.5 2.3.31.
- X1 - X2 + x . < 0 4 2.3.32.
x2 < 1 x3 < 1 2.3.33.
The solution to this is
X1 - 0 X2 = .5 x3 *■ 1 X4 " .5 2.3.34.
with Uo “ 2UT and u^ = u2 e.g. u * (1 ,.5,.5) 2.3.35.
65
If the previous analysis of enumerating all vertices was undertaken, 
it would be seen that with five primal vertices and seven dual vertices 
only one of the corresponding thirty-five combinations was consistent.
The use of this value of U in calculating the net present value of projects 
predicts correctly which projects would or would not be undertaken.
They are also the dual values of the budget constraints.
As important point must be noted with regard to this analysis.
The dual equations, C'll - XV + XU - 0 u, v, wio, strictly define an 
unbounded cone, all the equations passing through the origin. This 
means that the only dual vertex is the origin. This certainly is a 
solution in general just as Baumol and Quandt claim in their paper, 
but in order to span the dual space rays are needed as cone generators, 
and it is these latter that have provided the solutions.
2.4. An Economic Interpretation.
It is now worthwhile recapping the main ideas and seeing what
conclusions can be drawn. The starting point was the same objective as
Baumol and Quandt, that of attempting to find a solution to the problem
of maximizing the net present value of the projects we accept, subject
to budget constraints, when the discount rate is determined by the dual
evaluators. The first point to make is that as soon as we impose upper
bounds to project investments and rewrite the relationship between the
duals and the discount rates in the form p. = u.p then the Baumolt C O
and Quandt analysis breaks down. In fact the logic breaks down even 
without the extension to include upper bounds. Thus Baumol and Quandt 
used the fact that the dual equation
E CjtPt * °  2.4.1.
being also the coefficient of x^ in the objective function would
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force Xj * 0 and hence obtain the trivial solution-. But it has been 
argued that because of what the model is trying to do one would expect 
that partially accepted projects would have
l cjtut ” 0 2,4.2.
and as an unbounded project will always be partially accepted if at 
all then x^ equal to anywhere from zero to infinity would also be a 
solution, and hence solutions other than the trivial one exist. As 
has been shown it is possible to find solutions to such formulations 
which satisfy the above conditions. Such solutions have been called 
consistent solutions and it has been proved that these solutions lie 
at the vertices of the project space. Where there are no specific 
projects for carrying cash forward from one period to the next if has been 
found that there may be several quite different alternative solutions.
In the cases where there are carry forward projects then the problem can 
simply be reduced to the problem of maximizing the horizon value* which 
will in general have a unique linear programming solution.
It is interesting to note that the set of discount rates generated 
in this last case, which is of course the most frequently occurring in 
practice, removes some of the problems surrounding the re-investment 
assumption in discounting techniques, (see for example Fawthrop (71)), 
since the re-investment assumption is stated explicitly and the future 
discount rates automatically reflect the re-investment assumptions.
It is also worth noting at this stage another property of this set of 
discount rates. If we find the net present value of each of our projects 
at this set of discount rates, then our decision rule is quite simple.
We reject projects with a negative net present value and accept those 
with a positive net present value. Such a decision rule will automatically
See Freeland and Rosenblatt (77) for a general proof of this result
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satisfy our budget constraints and maximise our net present value.
It should be added that this set of discount rates causes the dual 
evaluators to be zero, since the interperiod discount rates are deter­
mined by indifference to small increments in the budget constraints at 
the optimum. Thus the zero of the dual evaluators would seem to be an 
inherent feature of the model.
While these properties of our discount rates are all very 
satisfying as regards their internal consistency it does not prove the 
validity of the model when judged by external criteria and the implications 
of the findings as regards the specification of a theoretically correct 
objective function have yet to he discussed. Much of the theoretical 
underpinning of these moaels rests on Hirschleifer's (58) original 
analysis.
If we return to th<s analysis we find that he was concerned with 
decision rules which maximised utility of consumption and among the rules 
he considered were the net present value criterion and the internal rate 
of return criterion. His methodology was to use an isoquant framework 
to develop a theoretical understanding of the problem and it is worthwhile 
repeating here some of that analysis. Initially two particular cases will 
be cited, one in which the optimum is achieved by a mixture of 
investment in production opportunities followed by investment in capital 
markets,and the other in which the optimum is achieved by a combination of 
investment in production opportunities coupled with borrowing from the 
capital market.
Figure 2.4,1. illustrates the first of these cases
FIGURE 68
2.4.1
The axis W , W, represent the amount of income available for o l
consumption in time period 0 and time period 1. Income available for 
consumption at time period 0 may be transformed into income available for 
consumption in time period 1 by investing in the production Opportunities 
Q P S N. The dashed line represents the market line and it is assumed 
that funds can be borrowed or lent at a constant interest rate i - the 
slope of the market line is -(l+i).^, U2 represent increasing utilities 
of Wg, W^. In the absence of market opportunities the decision would 
be starting with initial income OQ at time now to invest in productive 
opportunities upto the point S, when the utility of ( W W ^ )  would be 
maximised. In the presence of market opportunities then the decision 
would be to invest in production upto point P and then to lend to the 
market to point R when a position on the utility isoquant Uj which is 
higher than U^  ^could be achieved.
In the second case illustrated by Figure 2.4.2. the decision in the 
absence of market opportunities would be invested in production 
opportunities upto level QS. The availability of the market line enables4
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production to be carried out until P followed by borrowing from the 
market along PR enabling R to be reached which is on isoquant
It should be noted that in order to define a suitable production
opportunity set the projects are ranked according to diminishing
returns to scale. The criterion is the net increase in period 1 for unit
sacrifice now. Mathematically it can be represented by Ai^/i-AW )-l.
» 1At the optimum the slope of the productive function - --- gives the
marginal productivity of capital. One particular rule that 
Hirschleifer considers is that the firm should adopt all projects 
with a positive net present value at the market rate of interest.
This is equivalent to choosing all projects such that AWo + AW^/(l+i) 
is positive or equivalently - Sw^HoAl+i. In the two cases discussed 
so far such a rule would cause selection of all production opportunities 




Hence the rule of accepting all projects with a positive net present 
value at the market rate is a correct one in such circumstances. Such 
a rule it should also be noted maximises the net present value of the 
chosen project set. Indeed the criterion maximisation of the net 
present value of income from the investment would give also the 
correct production investment decision, since this involves max'imisation 
of Wo + Wj/U+i) which is a series of isoquants parallel to the market 
line, though as we shall see this criterion is not the correct one in 
general. It does not give the correct solution where the firm does 
not have access to market opportunities or at least has only limited 
access.
The particular case in which the firm does not have access to the 
capital is illustrated in Figure 2.4.3. shown below and it is 
convenient at this stage to relate these diagrams move directly to the 
mathematical programming approach.
Figure 2.4.3.
Hirschleifer's analysis indicates that the production set QR 
should be undertaken. A few preliminary remarks enables us to 
identify easily the correspondence between this analysis and the 
mathematical programming approaches to this problem. The first point
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to note is that the ranking of projects is merely .a device for 
finding efficient boundaries. Thus if the projects were ranked 
according to decreasing returns to scale we get the curve QPT and 
different choices of projects give the various points within the feasible 
region TRPQ. If we allowed further the possibility of not requiring 
income to be invested then the set of feasible alternatives is the area 
in the positive quadrant defined by TRQO. The tifect of introducing 
market opportunities is merely to alter the feasible regions. Thus 
Figure 2.4.1. can now be redrawn as Figure 2.4.4.
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where W, * f (W ) defines the production function, the net present 1 o
value of the adopted project set is
For the strictly convex monotonically decreasing function that 
we have postulated in our analysis such a function h.'*» its maximum value 
at point T, where Wq* = 0. At this point the magnitude of the slope 
or discount rate is smallest and the included project set is the largest. 
This is the solution that we have identified in which all available 
income is reinvested. In Figure 2.4.3. it corresponds with the 
adoption of all productive investments QT.
■ In the case where the production function is piece-wise linear 
the solution is not necessarily unique in that we may be indifferent 









Hence AB, BC; CD, DE represent projects, we are indifferent to 
the scale of project DE and the remaining projects when evaluated at 
the slope of DE make positive contributions to the net present value.
Figure 2.4.7
If Baumolo and Quandt's original formulation of the two period 
case is considered in these terms (see Figure-2.4.7.), then 
since there are no scare constraints a particular project 
AB (say) would dominate all other projects. The discount rate would 
be determined by the slope AB and the net present value would be zero 
since we are indifferent to all points on AB - the line of zero net 
present value when discounted at the gradient of AB.
2.5 Conclusion.
In the end perhaps none of this analysis now seems very profound.
In reformulating the Baumol and Quandt model we have defined a closed 
system whereby all cash generated in a period must be used in that period 
or carried forward to later periods. The only exception to this is the 
last period when the carry over mechanism does not apply. We can 
hardly expect such a model to make statements about our consumption
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preference since consumption is never an alternative that we 
provide to the model. Nevertheless such is the nature of the analysis 
that it defines clearly the various roles played by the productive and 
market investment, our utility function and the emergent discount rates 
We see that the appropriate investment criterion is not the maximization 
of net present value of the project set, but rather, that of finding the 
appropriate discount rate which are determined by the gradients at the 
points of tangency between the highest isoquant and the production- 
investment-financing opportunity set. Such a decision rule divides 
the project investment set into those which have positive present value, 
those which have negative present value and those which have zero net 
present value. The adoption then of all projects with a positive net 
present value will result in the highest isoquant being attained and 
while such a decision rule obviously maximises the net present value of 
the accepted set at that rate, the converse is patently not true. The 
maximisation of the net present value will not automatically generate 
discount rates which will lead us to operate so that our utility is 
maximised.
The foregoing discussion contains several important ideas which 
will be examined in some detail in later chapters. In chapter three, 
consideration will be given to methods of identifying the set of discount 
rates which correctly partitions projects into totally accepted, rejected 
and partially accepted subsets. It will be seen that frequently it is 
considerably easier to search for this set of discount rates first,and 
hence compute project acceptability, rather than to attempt to find the 
investment schedule directly. It is also clear from the discussion that 
if, as we presumably are, interested in the firm as a means of generating 
income for consumption in future periods, then we must be prepared to 
state explicitly our time preference for consumption. In chapter four
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an attempt is made to consider the impact of capital market opportunities 
on this preference function. It will be seen that the existence of 
capital markets largely enables the consumption decisions to be 
uncoupled from the investment decision, though the extent of the 
achieved independency between the investment and consumption decisions 
is determined by the degree of perfection assumed in capital markets.
In order to facilitate this discussion it is necessary to examine 
explicitly the impact of uncertainty on the valuation of income 
streams by introducing parameters specifying the degree of uncertainty 
of these streams. While quite an elaborate normative framework for 
decision making can be constructed by the introduction of a single 
measure of the risk of an income stream, in practice, the capital 
markets estimate the size and risk of income streams by consideration 
of a whole series of indicators. The final chapter of the thesis 
shows how it is possible to develop an algorithm where the investment 
and financing decisions are made in a pareto optimal fashion with 
regard to this set of indicators.
In summary the Baumol and Quandt paradox appears to stem from a 
misconception of the nature of the net present value criterion. 
Nevertheless its resolution is an essential prerequisite to the 
discussion of the various models proposed in subsequent chapters 
of this thesis. Its resolution reassures us of the validity of the 
formulation, and the deductions made from, these models and an 
understanding of the paradox in terms of Hirschleifer's analysis 
provides us with a useful overview of some of the core issues facing 




Discounting Methods and Rule of Thumb Solutions to the Capital 
Budgeting Problem.
3.1 Introduction
An appealing and potentially very powerful idea was identified 
in the last Chapter. If by some method we could discover the correct 
discount vector, then this vector would lead us immediately to the 
optimal investment schedule since it could be used to partition the 
project set into three categories consisting of accepted, rejected 
and marginal projects. Where the firm is operating in a perfect 
capital market under conditions of certainty then the prevailing 
market rate provides the single parameter necessary for the 
computation of this vec-or. In this case the rule project selection 
reduces to the familiar discounted net present value criterion at 
the market rate. In the more realistic case when assumptions of 
certainty in future operating income do not hold then restrictions 
are normally imposed on the amount of borrowing (or debt financing) 
that a firm may undertake. In such circumstances the discount 
vector is no longer simply related to a single market rate and 
it would seem necessary to employ some method for seeking out the 
appropriate vector. In mathematical programming formulations of 
the capital budgeting problem restrictions on the amount of debt 
financing that may be used are incorporated into the model in the 
form of explicit constraints and the search for a discount vector 
is nothing more them a search of the corresponding dual space.
If the only concern were the gaining of optimal solutions then 
the search of the dual space is usually no simpler than the direct 
determination of the investment schedule by the more normal search
l
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of the primal space and the foregoing observation is trivial.
If however, a major concern in the appraisal of capital expenditure 
decisions is the generation of methods which can be used to filter 
or preselect projects for further scrutiny then the contrast between 
the primal and dual search is far from trivial. In fact a case 
will be argued that reasonably good and robust approximations or rules 
of thumb can be-generated more easily,and their strengths and weaknesses 
can be analysed more readily,through the medium of the dual formul­
ation than through the primal. In the models which will be investigated 
the success of the search over the dual feasible region rests on 
the existence of an exterior financial market which provides either 
sources of capital or investments for surplus funds. It will be 
seen that the dual equations associated with these market instruments 
confine the dual feasible region so that it is sufficiently 'small', 
with relatively well defined boundaries, that an optimum or near 
optimum can be found with a minimum of computational effort.
In this Chapter consideration will be given to numerical solutions 
to the capital budgeting problem which can be achieved by simple rules of 
thumb derived from an analysis of the dual space. These solutions 
will be compared and contrasted with the formal solutions of the 
corresponding primal linear programming problem. In particular 
three models will be discussed in some detail. These are the 
Heingartner (63) model, the Chambers (71) model and the model 
proposed in section 1.7 of this thesis.
The basic horizon model of Weingartner forms a natural starting 
point for such an analysis. Not only does it occupy a central place 
in the literature but it incorporates the same set of assumptions 
as conventional discounting methodologies; differing only in the
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introduction of an additional, though crucial, assumption, of a
'hard' constraint on capital availability. Because of this it
has become a yardstick against which rules of thumb may be measured.
In section 3.2 the dual analysis is carried out for the Weingartner 
model. This analysis leads to a natural ranking of the projects 
for each particular time period. It is these rankings that form the 
basis of the search procedure proposed and a framework for the analysis 
of other rules of thumb.
In the section following the deal analysis is used as a 
framework for the examination of some of the other rules of thumb 
proposed in the literature. It is argued that while all are capable 
of giving the correct (optimal) solution under certain circumstances, 
none of the other methods can guarantee an optimal solution. However, 
it is further argued that the structure of the investment project 
set is such that most of these rules will give reasonably close 
approximates to the optimal solution.
In section 3.4, the method stemming from this dual analysis is 
applied to Weingartners basic horizon model. The particular 
problem chosen is the one employed by Weingartner to illustrate 
the use of linear programming for the optimal choice of projects 
subject to a hard rationing constraint. It is seen that the 
Weingartner problem does not really provide an adequate test of the 
method since its solution can be virtually determined immediately 
by inspection of the rankings generated. A more testing problem 
is proposed where there are many attractive projects competing for 
very limited funds. In all there are forty-five projects available 
spread over eight time periods where capital rationing occurs in 
five of these periods. Nevertheless the method is able to generate 
the optimal solution to this problem without too much difficulty.
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The Chambers model (op cit) is a different order of complexity 
from the Weingartner basic horizon model. Its restriction on debt 
is related to the booh value of the assets and would thus appear 
inextricably tied up with the investment decisions. Despite this 
the dual analysis in section 3.5 of the market instruments, although 
algebraically tedious, yields a particularly simple decision rule which 
enables the project set to be classified into the three basic 
categories discussed earlier. Moreover, it is seen that this 
analysis proves considerably more insightful into the structure 
and nature of the solution than the straightforward application of 
a conventional linear programming algorithm.
The model proposed in section 1.7 is of a different order of 
complexity again from the Chambers model. Not only does a times 
interest covered constraint more intimately link* the investment 
and the financing decision but there are in addition many other 
constraints on the investment and financing decisions. As one 
might anticipate the incorporation of these additional constraints 
prevents a rigorous analytical treatment of the dual structure. 
Nevertheless it will be seen that a fairly crude approximation still 
leads to an acceptable decision rule. The implications of these 
observations for possible future directions of work in mathematical 
programming formulations of the capital budgeting problem are examined 
in the concluding section.
3.2 The Weingartner Model
The basic horizon model of Weingartner with 'hard' constraints 
on the level of debt can be written as
See footnota page 18 of this thesis.
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Max 7 c.x. + v„ - w„ j_l 1 j T T 3.2.1.
subject to
- I cn xj + ri - WX « F1
J •
- I ~ d + V V l  + 't + (1+rB,Wt-l - Wt * Ft r'°r tm2.... T
3.2.2.
i B^ for t“l»...,T-l 
».2.3
0 < x. < 1 all j»l,...,N and vfc, wfc i for all t 3.2.4
where x^ denotes the scale of acceptance of project j
cfc_. is the cash inflow from project j in time period t
wfc,vt denote borrowing and lending respectively in t
Ffc is the cash flow available from existing 'old' projects
Bfc is the upper limit on borrowing in period t
r , r arc the borrowing and lending rate of interest respectively 
B L ® c
and cj = £ ---—1 is the post horizon value 3.2.5
t=T+l (1+r )B
The dual equations corresponding to lending and borrowing are:
P. - (1+r )p. > 0 for t«l,...,T-l 3.2.«t Lt t+1
-Pt + (1+rB,Pt+l + B > ° 3.2.7




where Pfc is the dual on the cash balance constraint and 8^ is the 
dual on the borrowing constraint. Inequalities 3.2.6 and 3.2.7 give
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(1+rL,Pt+l * Pt < <1+V Pt+l + St 3-2*10
If we consider first the slightly simpler case where borrowing 
and lending rates are both equal to the single rate r. Then 
inequality 3.2.10 implies
Pt - <l+r)pt+1 + Bt t-l....,T-l and PT«1 3.2.11
or
Pt - (l+r)T_t + l (l+r)8_tBa
S-t
3.2.12
The reduced cost associated with project j is thus
T-l s
^ + l <=tiPt *= 3 + l c <l+r> + l l c . (1+r)“" o  3.2.13
3 t-l J t-l 3 s-1 t-l 3 s
and the decision rule is accept project j at full scale if the 
reduced cost is positive, reject if negative and partially accept 
when the reduced cost is zero. In the absence of capital budgeting 
constraints then = 0 for all t, and the rule becomes the 
familiar net terminal value rule.
If the net terminal value of project j is denoted by
T
NTV. = 6 + l c (l+r)T_t 3.2.14
3 3 t-l 3
the discounted cost in time period t of expenditures to date 
on project j by
TV. (t) - - 7 c ,(l+r)t S 3.2.15
,j s-1 sj
and the effective budget limit formed from the debt limit in that 
year plus accumulated funds from 'old' projects by
$ t-sL - B + T F (1+r)c s t t ss-1
3.2.16
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then the dual of the original horizon model can be written as
MIN Z li. + I L 6 j 3 t « c 3.2.17
such that
T-l
li > NTV - I TV <t)8
3 J t-l 3
> 0 all j 0t > 0






Furthermore if a project is accepted then the right hand 
side of inequality 3.2.18 is positive. If the project is rejected 
the right hand side is negative. Whereas if the project is 
partially accepted then the right hand side is zero. Thus the 
problem of choosing the optimal project set can be reduced to 
one of finding the appropriate 8-values. Once these B-values are 
known we can find those which will be accepted at their upper 
bounds, those that will be rejected, together with the partially 
accepted projects. A convenient way of looking at this is to 
consider the (hyper) planes in the 8-space associated with each 
project defined by the equality
T-l
Z TV.(t)6 - NTV. 3.2.20
t-l 3 * 3
This can be illustrated in figure 3.2.1 for the two dimensional 
case by the simple example of the eight projects shown in Table 3.2.1.
Thus project A requires cash outlays of £100 in year one, £50
in year two and £30 in year three. The horizon is coterminous
with year three r.nd the post horizon value of cash flows for
project A is £246 at 10%. Hence for project A we have the linear function
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40 - lOOBj^  - 160$2
The equation defined by equating this expression to zero 
defines a line in the 3-space (figure 3.2.1). Projects G,F do 
not begin until period 2, hence their vertical plot, while project 
H has a negative net terminal value at 10% and can be rejected without 
further consideration*.
Table 3.2.1 A simple example: PROJECT DATA
Capital Outlays
Project Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 *C1 TV (1) TV (2) NTV IRR(%)
A 100 50 30 246 100 160 40 24
B 100 50 40 256 100 160 30 22
C 100 100 100 351 100 210 20 16
D 50 10 10 89 50 65 8 16
E 50 50 50 162 50 105 2 11
F - 50 40 100 0 50 5 20
G - 100 60 175 0 115 5 15
H 100 50 20 193 100 160 -3 9
Di 160 100 100
Bi 100 100 oo all figures in £
Li 280 398 428
The positive quadrant is divided into two regions by each 
project line, one region away from the origin where 
T-l
NTV “ l TV (t)B. < 0 * 3.2.22
3 t-l 3
representing rejection and the other region where 
T-l
NTV - l TVAt)& > 0 3.2.23
3 t-l 3
representing acceptance. Hence in general for any set of 6-coordinates
* It is of course preferable to lend money to the capital market 
at 10% than to invest in project H, ceteris paribus:
85
lines passing to the left of that coordinate represent rejected 
projects and lines passing to the right of the coordinate represent 
accepted projects. It follows that any continuous monotonic non­
decreasing function in the positive quadrant passing through the 
origin represents a ranking of the projects. As the origin in 
the 0-space is approached along this curve the list of projects 
accepted at full scale increases.
FIGURE 3.2.1 The P-space for the projects in Table 3.2.1.
0.1 0.2 0.3
3.3 A Re-examination of Rule of Thumb Solutions to the Hard 
Rationing Problemt
The previous discussion provides us with the necessary 
framework for the rigorous examination of the various rules of 
thumb proposed in the literature.
Take for example the case where the only significant budget 
constraint is in the first year. This implies that all the duals
0. are zero apart' from 0 and the solution to the dual L.P is 
* 1 NTV
given by merely accepting projects in the ranked order of i.TVj(1)
which is the familiar ratio of terminal value to initial outlay, 
the Lorie-Savage (55) solution*. In figure one this rank is 
generated by descending the axis.
On the other hand the ratio of discounted benefits to 
discounted benefits to discounted costs might be considered 
more appropriate for cash flows spread over several years**.
This is equivalent to setting 3 ^ = 0  and 32 > 0 in the 
example and can be achieved by the rank ^X^-2 ^ or equivalently
by using the rank defined by descending the 02 axis.
A third familiar rule of thumb is ranking projects by internal 
rate of return. This is equivalent to making another approximation 
to the dual, namely by putting 0fc = 0t+^(1+i) t=l,2,...,T-2 3.3.1
and
Bw . - (i-r) 3.:T-l
and using i as a parameter. In terms of figure 3.2.1. this is
equivalent to ranking along the parameterised curve
* Bernhard (71) correctly analysed this ratio using a method of 
analysis similar to the one developed here, though he failed to 
extend his analysis to the case where the binding constraint 
was otlier than in the first year.
** See Quirin (67)
t The section is based on analysis carried by Atkins in the paper by Ashton and Atkins (74).
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8t - (i-r)(l+i)T_1"t t-1.... T-l 3.3.3
more simply for the two dimensional case under discussion
B1 " 62 (l+r+B2) 3.3.4
Another frequently suggested rule is to rank by some measure
NTV
as discounted benefits/discounted costs, that is b y _.. andTV^ (T-l)
to calculate the IRR of the marginally accepted project. The 
suggestion is now to rerank projects again by NTV/TV(T-1) but using 
the internal rate of return of the marginally rejected project as 
the new discount rate, in this case r = 20% as the project is F.
The idea behind this is that this rate is a better aDproximation 
to the 'true' opportunity cost of funds. The assumptions behind 
this idea were discussed in section 1.2. This is equivalent 
to a second approximation to the dual by making
BT-1 3 + (i-r) 3.3.6
BT-2 (i-r)(B+l+i) 3.3.7
Bt “ (l+i)Bt+1 for t=l,2.... T-3 3.3.8
K  - (i-r) (B+l+i) (l+i)T-2_t for t=l, 2,...,T-3 3.3.9
where i is now a constant, the internal rate of return of the 
marginally rejected project, in this case 20% and 3 is the parameter.* 
In the example i=0.2, r=0.1 and the reranking is equivalent 
to ranking along the line defined by B2 » 3 + 0.1 3.3.10
*The proof of this was first derived by Atkins in the paper by 
Ashton and Atkins (74). It is reproduced in appendix XIV.
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■= 0.1 (6+1.2) 3.3.11
or equivalently the line
ex -  0.1B2 + 0.11 3.3.12
which is shown dotted in the diagram. The new ranks, which could 
be calculated from the original data as being in the order A B F G 
D C E, corresponds to the ranks along this line. The implication 
behind this approach is of course to continue to rerank until no 
further changes occur.
It should now be plain that not only can many of the 
traditional rules of thumb be investigated by means of the 
approximations that they imply to the dual, but also conversely 
that almost any continuous monotonic non-decreasing function of 
the 6^ ,'s has an implication as some form of ranking procedure.
Now such an observation would be of practical significance only if 
rankings obtained from the various rules of thumb were roughly 
similar.
In this type of model, this is likely to be true since the 
rankings in each period are computed from the relative values 
of NTVj/TVj(t) where
the least weight is given to the most recent. This smoothes the
Further simplification occurs because we need only to consider the
a net absorber of funds. Typically this is for only the first few
TVj + (1+r)TV. (t-1) with TV. (t) - -c 3 3 3.3.13
ranking of a project whilst TV^(t) >0, i.e. whilst the project is
years of a project's life.
All these factors help to reduce the number of intersections 
of the lines and hence to reduce the number of alternative possible 
rankings. In this context it can be noted that the axis-ranks 
play a very special role in that they really define extreme project 
ranks and hence span all possible rankings. Thus if the axial 
ranks are quite similar so also will be any other rank, including 
such 'average' ranks as internal rate of return. This result alone 
can often simplify problems.
Take the example above, and accept projects in the ranked order 












Thus immediately A and B can be accepted, E and H rejected, 
leaving just C,D,F and G as possible marginal projects. In fact 
more than this can be claimed as can be seen by inspection of the actual 
NTV/TV(t) ratios as below.





Project F clearly dominates both C and G in the sense of having a 
higher rank in each year and will always be chosen in preference,
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which leaves the principal choice to be between D' and F or even 
both. In this way mere inspection of the axis ranks can often 
reduce the number of likely combinations down to very few. In 
this case only two real options remain, either to accept D completely 
and F partially at 0.26 or F completely with D at 0.43, the latter 
being also the IRR solution incidently. This simple case also 
illustrates a point worthy of further consideration. Once the 
marginal projects have been identified, a task which it is argued 
is not laborious for most financial models, then the final choice 
is most likely to be made on the grounds of criteria other than 
the purely financial. Thus the two remaining options above differ 
by about *j% in the final plan value, which is likely to be of much 
less practical significance than many other features of projects 
D and F that have not been considered in this simple model.
A further observation supports the claim that in practice the 
number of plausible rankings might be quite small. In the large 
number of experiments carried out on these types of models in 
the development of this thesis seldom were there solutions in 
which the 8t are non-zero in more than two or three years. In 
fact, Heingartner’ s own result, in which a twenty-six year horizon 
model ultimately had only one non-zero is by no means untypical.
It is, of course, simple enough to artificially generate a project 
set in which every 8t is positive, it need only contain as many 
projects as years. The point is that this seldom seems to occur 
on real project sets. This will be returned to below, but its 
practical importance will be emphasized here.
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Firstly, knowing which 6t are likely positive means that the 
dominance analysis above need only be done in those years. Secondly, 
and somewhat conversely, the dominance analysis usually helps to 
highlight the years in which 6fc > 0 anyway. Thus in the example 
above, the two options of D or F partially accepted both imply 
year two as the bottleneck. In which case only the NTV/TV(2) 
ranking is relevant, leading to the optimal solution below
A B D F V1 Wl V2 W2 D
Year 1 -100 -100 -50 0 0 70 0 0 180
Year 2 - 50 - 50 -10 -14 0 -77 0 100 100
Return 246 256 89 28 -110 - 407.6
where project A, B, D are fully accepted, with project F partially 
accepted at 28%. Any deficit or surplus funds result in borrowing 
and lending decisions.
3.4 A rule of thumb solution to Weingartner's Horizon Model
A claim has been made above that the number of different 
plausible rankings is likely to be quite small and hence that many 
'rules of thumb' such as IRR would be fairly robust in the sense 
of giving near optimal solutions for many different project sets.
As such a claim must ultimately depend on the particular types of 
project sets under consideration no exact proof can be offered, 
only a case can be argued as has been done. This case has only 
been illustrated by a small example so far, so this section concludes
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(i) Welngartners Horizon Model
This model considers 30 projects over twenty six years, although 
the horizon is drawn in year 21. The cash flows associated with 
projects are displayed in Table 9A.1 on page 180 of Weingartner*
(74) and this table is reproduced in appendix XV • Many 
of the projects can be eliminated from further consideration since 
they are simple investments returning less than the cost of capital. 
Thus only projects 1 to 9 inclusive and 15, 16, 23 and 24 warrant 
further consideration. Tables 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 show the value of 
TVj(t) and the 8-values** respectively for these projects. Where 
the project begins to make a net contribution to the firm having 
repaid the debt the ratio is not calculated. The final Z row gives 
the sum of tne TV^ for the projects. It should be noted that the 
net funds required by projects exceeds those available only during 
the first three years. Hence the constraints on project selection 
need only be considered for years 1, 2 and 3. The square boxes 
indicate the first partially rejected project ranked individually 
in each of these years, so that all projects are immediately 
accepted except for projects 1, 4 and 23. The relevant ranks for 
these are summarized in Table 3.4.3.
TABLE 3.4.3.
Year
1 2  3
1 6 7 8
Project 4 7 8 9
23 - 6 7
* References to page numbers are those of the Kershaw edition
(published in 1974) of 'Mathematical Programming and the analysis 
of capital investment problems" by H.M. Weingartner.
** Attention is drawn to the relative stability of the rankings 
implicit in these 8-ratios.
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Project 23 dominates the others and is therefore accepted at its 
maximum scale of 0.7. The other two are rejected. This is 
identical to the LP solution shown in Table 9A.6 on page 183 of 
Weingartner's text.
It is also worth noting that the internal rate of return 
solution, apart from upgrading project 23 to full scale would simply 
interchange projects 1 and 15, bringing the former in and taking the latter 
out. This would affect the total plan by only about 1.4*. Hence 
while it has not been difficult to generate the optimal solution 
to the Weingartner model by a simple search of the dual space though 
more important to notice is that even a solution obtained by a simple 
ranking by IHR would have given reasonable results.
(ii) Example Two
The project data in appendix IV was generated from summary
statistics of actual company operations. The primary purpose of
this data was to provide realistic test material for the discussion
in chapter six on tne problems of large scale financial planning
models in practice, though the irregularity of the resulting cash
flow patterns makes it appropriate data for a more thorough testing
of the ideas put forward in this chapter. A simultaneous reduction
of both cash availability from existing projections and the cost of
additional funds was made to ensure that borrowing was forced to
its limit in most years. Appendices IV & XV containsall the relevant
cash flow data and the results of a particular LP solution* to the
Weingartner horizon model with''hard' upper bounds on debt availability
can also be found in Appendix XV. In this solution the cost of borrowing was S*
* This solution and all the other LP solutions quoted in this chapter
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and the borrowing constraint was active in five out of the seven possible years.
The data necessary for a solution via the method outlined above 
is summarized in Table 3.4.5. Because of the volume of the data it 
is convenient to break up the analysis into three distinct phases.
Phase 1
In this phase the projects which will definitely be accepted 
and those that will definitely be rejected are identified. Thus 
projects which return less than the lending rate can be eliminated 
from further consideration. Hence project PR05 available ia years 
2, 4, 6, project PR21 available in years 2, 5 and 6 and project PR23 
available in years 1, 5 and 6 are rejected immediately. Whilst 
from the axial NTV/TV rankings in each year, 10 projects can be 
accepted without further analysis. This leaves 27 projects as 
possible contenders for marginal acceptance. The remaining 
funds available for each year from 2 to 7, the only likely 
bottlenecks are shown in Table 3.4.6.
TABLE 3.4.6 (In flOOO’s) Total net capital available in each year.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bt 750 750 750 750 750 450 450 450
Dt 400 300 200 0 0 0 0 0
^t 1150 1482 1741 1820 1906 1698 1798 1905
Capltal PHASE I 469 1070 1056 1414 1091 1447
Available
for (a) -66 404 -118 -120 -78 144
further PHASE n (b) -180 299 -27 -1 68 153
investments (c) -281 357 9 -46 -40 96
310PHASE III 0 0
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Phase II
Of the eight remaining projects competing for the available 
469,000 in the second, year, the three projects PROlYl, PR12Y1 and 
PR13Y2 dominate the others. As funds will only cover the 
acceptance of at most two of these three, the remaining five can 
be rejected. Phase 11(a) continues with the alternatives of choosing 
PROlYl and PR12Y1. Because of the dominance existing between 
projects available for starting in periods three and four PR0174 and 
PR13Y3 are chosen and the others rejected. Phases 11(b) and II(ci 
correspond to the other two alternatives. The remaining cash 
balances for the three alternatives are shown in Table 3.4.6j 
the negative balances can always be removed at a later stage by 
accepting partial rather than whole projects. The critical years 
are now seen to be 2, 4, 5 and 6 and the ratios for the three projects 
under consideration are shown in Table 3.4.7.
TABLE 3.4.7.
Years
2 4 5 6
PROlYl 0.44 0.28 0.39 2.14
PR12Y1 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.66
PR13Y2 0.28 0.57 0.70 20.03
It can be seen that PR12Y1 is almost dominated by the other 
two in these crucial years. Thus alternative 11(b) is seen to be 
the most appropriate choice and the negative balances can be 
removed by accepting partial projects. Project PROlYl is choser. at 
full scale rather than PR13Y2 because it has the higher ratio in 
the most crucial year, year two. The result is shown as step III. 
This result is in fact Identical to the optimal linear programming
solution. The final column indicates the IRR solution, in which 
for projects available in more than one year, preference is given to 
earlier years and it should be noted that this also differs little 
from the optimal solution for this particularly severe example. The 
value of the program loading by IRR is £2664 compared with the true 
optimal of £2671. It is perhaps this observation which is more 
disturbing than the fact that the trueoptimum has been obtained 
by a simple rule of thumb. While this exercise was carried out for 
further models with different initial cash flows and different interest 
rates, similar results were obtained and it is not worth repeating the 
analysis here. When differences were allowed between the borrowing and 
lending rates then this introduced a certain degree of 'fuzziness' 
into the investment decision consisting of those projects whose 8 rankings 
differed at these two rates. The differences in fact were quite small 
and further were only relevant for those marginal projects whose 
investment decision overlapped a transition between a budget surplus 
and a budget deficit. Again in all the cases examined the IRR 
provided a good ranking method for projects and this can be illustrated 
if once more we return to an example from Weingartners original work*
Here Weingartner assumes at 10% borrowing rate and a 5% lending rate.
The optimal project subset according to the LP solution consists 
of 19 projects from the available 30, though selection by an IRR 
ranking would have produced only one error in project selection and 
would have been within 2% of the value contributed by the optimal 
project set.
The observations of this section at present are merely 
discomforting for the proponents of linear programming models but
* See Weingartner (74) p. 189
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against this it should be pointed out that this model represents 
pioneering work in the field and is relatively, unsophisticated. It 
would now seem appropriate to examine the decision power of linear 
programming models of a more complex and sophisticated nature.
3.5 The Chambers Model
In the previous section a claim was made, based on a straight
*forward analysis, that for Heingartners horizon model many simple 
rules of thumb give tolerably close solutions to the optimal. In 
this section a similar claim, albeit in a slightly different form, 
is made about another major class of models. Whereas the Weingartner 
model considered debt capacity to be determined by fixed upper bounds, 
these models limit debt by restricting its value to be less than a 
fixed fraction of the value of equity in each year upto the horizon.
The example chosen is the well known model by Chambers (71) which
was introduced briefly in section 1.3. In Chambers model both
debt and equity are measured in terms of book (accounting)
values*. Since a detailed discussion of the structure and
results of the model is readily available in the original article
it is not repeated here, though summary data relevant to the subsequent
analysis can be found in appendix XVIII.
The model may be stated as **
H 19
Max l l V .X . (3.5.1.)
t=l jil t;i t3
* Myers and Pogue (74) develop a similar model where debt and equity 
values are in accord with capital market valuations. An analysis 
of this will be postponed until the next chapter.
** See Chambers (71), p. 272
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subject to l V e 1 S g t-1,2,.•• .H (3.5.2)
(3.5.2)
0 S X tJSl for j-1,... .14 o s x tj j=15,17,18,19* (3.5.4) 
where Lfc and Et represent the total value of debt and the book
value of equity a*- the end of period t» g is the specified leverage.
'old' projects already on the books, dividend payments and debt
labelled j=15,17,18,19 will be considered in more detail below.
and the cash flows of each project. The dual equations associated 
with the financing and investment instruments of rights, debentures, 
market investments and government securities will be analysed 
individually.
The case of rights (Project 17)**
This term should be adjusted slightly to allow for flotation 
costs but this will be ignored below. St is the issue price in period 
t, i represents the return available to shareholders on comparable
cash flow stream is given by
•Project 16 is an aquisition and will be omitted here for simplicity.
** The project numbers refer to the original article.
The constraints F^, and represent respectively funds flow from
repayments as planned at the outset- The refer to the scale of 
project j begun in period t for j=l,.... 14. The projects






equity investments elsewhere and is the dividend per share. The
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Ft*17 " (-St'dt+l'dt+2'
and the impact on equity by
Et,17 “ <St'St"dt+l'St‘dt+l'dt+2'' .)
Thus the dual equation, with and l as the duals on the
balance and the gearing constraints respectively, is
H / H s \
<“stpt + Z V s 1 ' 9 ( V t  + I (st “ 2 drU s )t s=t=l s s \ t s=t+l * k=t+l /




Defining L = £ f, and t|i = (1+i)* - p - gL
k-c * t
,H+l-t
Equation 3.5.9. simplifies to
V t 2 s=t+l
S 'll 2 0 HVH
SH -1^H -1 2 V h e t C -
which implies that all 2 0 or equivalently that
Pt + gLt S (1+i)
H+l-t
Investment in common stock (project 19)
The dual equation for investment in common stock with
return of r is straightforward, affecting as it does only e
cash equation and the debt capacity permanently.*
Pt + g ? * t 2 (l+i)H+1-t 
s=t














This combined with the previous result for rights issue gives
Pt + gLt “ <1+i>H+1_t (3.5.16)
Confirmation of this result and encouraging evidence of the 
correctness of the above analysis can be made by reference to the 
results in Table 5, page 277 of Chamber's article. The point is 
illustrated in Table 3.5.1. although a discussion will be postponed 
until after debentures have been considered.
TABLE 3.5.1 A Comparison of the Theoretical and Computed values of pt+gLfc.
Year pt Xt Lt Pt * Lt (1.12)
1 1.507 0.262 0.535 1.774 1.762
2 1.437 0.070 0.273 1.573 1.573
3 1.308 0 0.203 1.409 1.405
4 1.153 0.038 0.203 1.254 1.254
5 1.038 0.165 0.165 1.120 1.120
Debentures (project 18)
Because of considerations of tax lags, flotation costs, the 
impact of interest payments on retained profits, the dual equations 
for debentures are algebraically tedious; nevertheless they 'respond' 
to the same approach. The cash stream associated with a unit 
(£100,000) debenture issue is
Ft,18 = (100 - f, - lOOr (1-T) ......) (3.5.17)
where r is the debt rate, f the flotation costs, and T the corporation 
tax rate. The effect on equity is
E„ “ (f ,r (1-T), r(l-T), .... ) (3.5.18)J.O
while the debt is permanently changed by 100.
* The sign change is due to an inequality reversal
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The dual equations are
-Pt(100-f) + Pt+1100r + Pt+2100r(l-T) ___ PH100r(l-T)
H
+ (100+gr)i. + l <100+gr+gl00+(l-T) (k-t))i
k-t+1 *
!- 100 + f + 100 rT for t-l,....H - 1 (3.5.19)- 100 + f for t-H (3.5.20)
or on rearrangement
f(Pt+gLt) - 100(pt-Lt) + Pt+1100rT (3.5.21)
H f-100 + f + lOOrT
+ 100r(l-T) l {p +gL }
s=t+l S S 1-100 + f (3.5.22)
Using the result in equation 3.5.16 that
Pt + 9Lt = <1+i)H+1-t
||
Pt ' L t S l ' i o o ' r T + r(1"T) l (l+i)H+1_Ss»t+l
+ (l+i)H+1_t + Pt+1rT for t«l,...H-l (3.5.23)
or with = K
e
Pt - S K | (l+12)H+1-t - 1 | + (1-r) + Pt+1rT (3.5.24)
which gives on substituting the numerical values of the various 
parameters.
Lt s 1.002 for t “ 1 (3.5.25)
£ 1.073 for t = 2 (3.5.26)
£ 1.114 for t = 3 (3.5.27)
£ 1.164 for t - 4 (3.5.28)
£ 1.221 for t 5 (3.5.29)
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One year government securities (project 15)
With the interest rate on securities as rL and the corporate 
tax rate of T, with a one year lag in payment then
Pt,15 " (1' - a * rLU  V *  (3.5.30)
and the impact on equity is
Et>15 = <0,rL <l-T), rL (l-T), rL (l-T), --- ) (3.5.31)
Then for t=l,2,....H-3
Pt * (1+rL)Pt+l " rLTPt+2 + gV l
t* thai
[1+r 1+r. ( 4r T ^iH+l-to ì t,2J J




p. 2 (1+r (1-T))U li
H+l-t (3.5.34)
The results so far have been generated purely algebraically, but 
an economic interpretation gives some insight. For rights issue the 
total contribution of an extra £l of rights to the objective value must 
be less than or equal to 12 per cent, since otherwise rights would be 
issued until it was no longer profitable to make further issues. The 
contribution of £l of rights in relaxing the cash balance constraint 
is Pt and the contribution to relaxing the debt capacity constraint**
H+l-tis Hence the inequality pfc + *iLt £ (1.12)
H+1-+* In fact the equality + gLfc = (1+i) could be used to impose
a stronger lower bound of p , but the size of the correction scarcely 
warrants it. *
** It should be noted that the right hand side of the leverage constraint 
t t t tis O.SFq - L_ where E , L represents tho Equitv and Debt at time t
resulting from the initial decisions. Thus an additional £l of 
equity relaxes this constraint by 0.5
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Similarly the company can get a return of at least 12% by investing 
£l in the equity of other companies. The opportunity cost of such an 
investment, which is pfc + *jLt» is thus at least 12% or as an inequality 
Pt + *lLt 2 U-12)H+1-t-
H+T—These last two results imply that pfc + >jLt - (1.12) . This is
because the firm can be considered in equilibrium with other firms in the
market. The value of funds to the investor whether they are payments to
the firm for rights or whether they are receipts in the form of dividends
from other companies is 12%. The precise division of the value of these
funds between their effect on the leverage constraints depends on the
other financing/investment decisions of the firm.
Since investment in 1 year government securities does not have a
substantial impact on the debt capacity, the interperiod discount rate
should be no less than 4% or pfc 2 1.04pt+^. By similar reasoning to
the case of rights issues, the total contribution of an extra £l of
debt must be less than 4%.* The contribution of £1 of debt in relaxing
the cash balance constraint is pfc and its impact through a permanent
H+l—treduction in debt capacity is L^. Thus pfc - S (1.04) . These
inequalities differ from those derived earlier, but this intuitive approach
ignores transaction costs, tax-lags and the effect of interest payments
on retained profits (and hence equity reserves). The difference is
fairly slight and it is convenient to use this intuitive approximation**
to obtain just one more result. When debt is being issued, the inequality
H+l—Tbecomes an equality and so = (1.04) . Combining this result
* To be more accurate, for government securities pfc 2 1.036pt+^.
** The debenture equation is a fairly crude approximation which works 
reasonably trail over the limited range considered. It should be noted 
that the 4% used in this approximation is the IRR of the after tax 
flows and not the after tax nominal cost.
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with pfc + >jLt = (1.12)H+1-t! and solving for pfc and gives
H+1-t + V3(1.04,H+1-t •Pt - 2/3(1.12) 3.5.35
Lt = 2/3(1.12) H+l-t (1.04)H+l-t 3.5.36
The first equation implies that where the firm is raising debt,
even though the firm may not necessarily be at its leverage limit, then the 
appropriate discount rate is just a 'weighted average cost of capital', 
with the equity rate of 12% and the debt of 4% weighted in the ratio 
of 2:1.
and the leverage dual is seen as the difference between the weighted average 
cost of capital and the debt rate. Thus although the pure debt appears 
cheaper, there is an opportunity cost associated with debt which is just 
equal to this difference.
Returning to the previous inequalities they may be summarized 
as below
Uxl .fThe equity inequality (3.5.16) + >jLt - (1.12)
The debt inequalities (3.5.25 - 29)
pfc - Lt S 1.002





The inequality (3.5.34) for government securities
This dual feasible region can be represented as shown in 
Figure 3.5.1.
FIGURE 3.5.1 108
Figure 3.5.1. represents just the t'th section of the dual space. 
The feasible region is just the hatched line. This enables a 
complete set of rectangular bounds corresponding to the end points of 
this 'truncated line* representing the dual feasible space to be 
calculated. The upper bounds on together with the lower bounds 
on L arise from when the firm is raising debt. In the figure this 
occurs when the firm is 'operating' at the upper left-hand end of the 
hatched line. The lower bounds on arise from when the firm is in a 
cash-surplus situation or operating at the lower right-hand end of the 
line. These bounds are shown in Table 3.5.2. together with the 
results obtained with the data in appendix XVI and the result? quoted 
from the original paper.*
* The program results (see appendix XVIII) differ slightly from those 
published by Chambers due to some slight discrepancies in the source 
data. Chambers' results are in parentheses.
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TABLE 3.5.2.
Year lower actual upper lower actual upper
1 1.573 1.576(1.507) 1.582 0.361 0.367(0.535) 1.138
2 1.155 1.408(1.437) 1.437 0.273 0.339(0.273) 0.843
3 1.114 1.308(1.308) 1.308 0.194 0.197(0.203) 0.362
4 1.075 1.157(1.153) 1.194 0.121 0.197(0.203) 0.362
5 1.036 1.036(1.038) 1.081 0.077 0.169(0.165) 0.169
These results are encouraging evidence of the correctness of the 
analysis. In particular it should be noted that in periods 2 and 3 when 
the firm is raising debt the value of P is precisely that given by'the 
weighted average cost of capital.' The importance of these results is that 
they give an upper and lower bound on the 'value' of an individual 
project. This value is an adjusted net present value in that it consists 
of project cash flows valued at the horizon plus- an estimate of the 
contribution that these project cash flows make to the debt capacity.
With these bounds, projects can be screened into those which will 
definitely be accepted (i.e. those whose lower bound is positive) , 
those which may or may not be accepted, (these will have a negative 
lower bound but a positive upper bound) and those which will definitely 
be rejected (i.e. those with negative upper bounds). The result 








In effect Table 3.5.3 presents a formal solution to the 
Chambers model for all possible combinations of initial cash 
flow positions and debt commitments.* The final investment decision 
of course still depends upon the initial state of the firm and linear 
programming is a readily available mechanism for determining an 
optimum with respect to this initial state. The dual analysis yields 
little more than a sophisticated version of Hirchleifers (59) rule 
discussed in section 1.2 - 'where the firm is borrowing funds then 
the appropriate discount rate is the borrowing rate, where the firm 
is in surplus then the appropriate rate is the lending rate' - though 
in this case the actual discount rates were adjusted for the impact 
of the project on debt capacity.**
Clearly however, it would be presumptious to draw general 
conclusions from an examination of just two simple*** models and 
further discussion of the issues raised by the foregoing analysis 
will be postponed until a further and more complex model has 
been examined.
* Linear programming solutions corresponding to extreme configurations 
of initial cash flows and debt commitments can be found in appendix XVI.
** It is perhaps worth emphasising that the linear programming solution 
was achieved only by the somewhat artificial device of assuming 
identical projects where available in each year. Such an assumption 
is not necessary for the solution arrived at by the dual analysis. 
Furthermore this dual analysis illustrates the relatively minor impact 
of assumptions made about future investment opportunities on current 
investment decisions.
*** in fairness to the authors it should be mentioned that Chambers in 
an unpublished working paper and Weingartner in his book have proposed 
extensions to their basic models. The impact of these extensions 
will not be analysed here in detail since many of them have been 
incorporated into the nexL model to be discussed.
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3.6 The impact of additional constraints
This chapter has so far dealt with models which consisted only
of cash balance constraints and debt capacity constraints. The
particular model proposed in section 1.7, while maintaining this
basic structure, has many additonal constraints. While some of these
can be considered primarily as restrictions on the investment set -
for example the restriction on the return of capital is in this
category - some of these such as dividend policy restrictions can 
I
be considered as a restriction on the financial market opportunities. 
Moreover, certain restrictions such as the times covered constraint, 
intimately connect investment profitability to the debt raising 
potential. The effect of these additional constraints is effectively 
to preclude a rigorous analytical treatment of the investment schedule 
in a manner similar to that carried out on the Weingartner and Chambers 
models. This is confirmed by a cursory examination of the impact of 
the non-debt capacity constraints. Clearly if the initial level 
of debt were very high it would be impossible to cover debt by the 
available projects; equally if the required minimum return on capital 
were pitched too high, again there would be no feasible solution 
and the dual space would be unbounded. Thus the impact on the non­
debt capacity constraints can be major. Hence, in this case no rule 
of thumb (excluding the simplex algorithm and its variants) readily 
gives the correct solution. The question remains however, whether 
the use of such simple rules as selection by net present value or 
internal rates of return would break down completely, or whether they 
still remain fairly good rules and produce, if not optimal, at 
least reasonably good solutions. Such an answer would, by its very 
nature be specific to the model under discussion. Nevertheless it
1t3
may provide us with a justification for the use of financial linear 
programming models, equally it could well provide further evidence 
of the power of discounting methods.
The complexity of the duals leaves us with little alternative 
but to begin the analysis on a simplified model which retains the same 
basic structure. Such a model would consist of a cash balance 
equation plus a times covered constraint.* * There are two forms of 
debt in the model developed. Examination of the runs included in the 
Appendices suggests that it is long term debc (which incidentally has 
the lower nominal rate) that is generally preferred. So it is 
to this that our attention is turned first. An immediate problem is 
that the restriction on debt is related solely to project profitability 
no amount of equity can relieve this constraint unless a profitable 
project exists. The implication of this for our analysis is that 
we start by considering intersections between investment opportunities 
and the debt opportunities in our dual analysis.
Consider a project beginning in time t which returns a constant 
infinite income stream with an internal rate of return m. If we 
further assume that the tax rate on earnings is 50% with no tax lag, 
then the associated dual equation*** is
pt - mpt+1 — 2mAt+1 - mpt+2 — 2mAt+1 i 0 3.6.1.
* Analysis of the dual inequalities associated with debt, equity and 
market investments can be found in Appendix XVII. Results from
this analysis are merely quoted in this chapter.
** This constraint is assumed to be of the form that the earnings
before tax and after depreciation must be r.t least K times the interest 
on debt. See equation 2.0J of Appendix I.
*** This dual equation could be regarded as arising in two ways. One 
is that all projects can be analysed in terms of a constant earning 
stream and that this equation is related to a particular project.
The alternative and probably more realistic analysis, is that the 
equations are average equations over all of the projects which commence 
in a particular time period.
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where X^ is the dual on the times covered constraint .
The dual inequality associated with a r.cn-repayable debt
instrument of nominal rate r is of the form
2 0  3.6.2
If we consider the situation in which debt is being raised and 
the limitation on the times covered constraint results on the marginal 
project having an internal rate of return m, inequalities 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. 
then become equalities.
We can eliminate the debt duals by multiplying 3.6.4. by Kr 
and 3.6.5. by 2m and adding these two equations. The resulting 
equation is of the form:
Pt(Kr - 2m) - Pfc+1 (Krm - mr) - Pfc+2 (Kr» - »r) .... « 0 3.6.3.
If we assume that a solution* to the equation exists in the 
form Pt+j “ up then the following characteristic equation results.
* Methods for the solution of such difference equations are discussed 
extensively in standard texts (See for example Goldberg (58))





f 9ir (1 - az - az ) - 0 3.6.5
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which reduces to
■ * (1 * * )
Ignoring the trivial solution tt = 0 then








I£ we ignore the impact of the non-debt capacity constraints 
then the dual inequatlites for the issue of dividends and rights 
lead to the single equality*
Pt " (1+i)Pt+l 3.6.9.
where i denotes the equity rate.
Hence if the above analysis is correct, it would suggest that 
the internal rate of return of the marginal project (m) is given 
by the solution of
3.6.10
Kr
(K-l) + 2i 3.6.11
Projects with an internal rate of return above this value 
would be accepted, while projects with a lower internal rate of return 
would be rejected.
* See appendix XVII. This equality can be deduced easily by
equating the non-debt capacity duals in the appropriate inequalities 
to zero.
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Since the derivation of this formula has been intuitive rather than 
rigorous, before proceeding it is worthwhile examining whether this 
fairly crude approach has any validity in practice. In the model 
under discussion the values of the parameters in the formula are 
i = 12*, r = 8*, K = 10*. This gives a value of 10* as the 
appropriate cutoff rate. The model was run with all the financial 
reporting constraints suppressed except the times covered constraint. 
The results are illustrated in Figure 3.6.1. The horizontal axis 
is the internal rate of return of the project. A cross above the 
line denotes an accepted project, a cross below the line denotes 
a rejected project, marginal projects are marked on the line.
A vertical line of crosses arises because the projects are repeated 
in later years and thus there is more than one project with the 
same internal rate of return. The cutoff rate is in fact quite 
sharply defined at 8.7*; there being only projects PR02Y5 with an 
internal rate of return of 9.08* and PR25Y5 with an internal rate 
of return of 10.06* in direct violation of this cutoff rule.* It 
should be noted that there are several marginally accepted projects 
with relatively high internal rates of return. The reasons for 
this will be examined in detail later.
FIGURE 3.6.1.
* It should be noted that only the initial outlay from project PR25Y8 
occurs in the pre-horizon period. Hence, it hardly constitutes a 
valid counter-example since the accept-reject decision is largely 




XX A A X
5 6-- 7-- 8---9-
x x t* x
X X *





*. X X REJECT
The results are sufficiently encouraging that it is worthwhile
extending this model to cover short term debt or overdraft. The
dual inequalities associated with overdraft (nominal rate r ) ares
-pt + (1+r /_) . + K r V  , * 0 t-l,....T-l (3.6.12)t S/2 t+1 S t+1
If overdraft is being used as a financing instrument in time period t 
then
Krs t+1 = P. <1+rs/2) t+1 (3.6.13)
while for the marginal ("infinite") project inequality still 
holds. If we find the relationship between the discount rates 
in consecutive years then the same functional form as before holds 
with
[ ”>(K-l)r 1
[ (Krs - H t+1
(3.6.14)
with r this time replaced by r^.
This gives an expression for the internal rate of return of the 
marginal project of
Kr i_ s____
m = (K-l)r + 2i (3*. 6.15)
since r = 12%, the cut off rate for projects selected by overdraft s
only would be m = 10.9%. Figure 4.6.2. shows projects selected by
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This analysis also suggests that where the firm has both long 
term debt and overdraft available, most of the debt financing will 
take place by the one with the lower nominal rate. Such a result 
is confirmed readily by inspection of any of the linear programming 
solutions included in the appendices.
In general the introduction of other 'balance sheet’ constraints 
will distant the cut off rates and may well blur its sharpness. 
Figures 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 show project selection subject to all the 
constraints. The first of these is selction with normal earnings 
from existing projects and the second illustrates selection where 
there is a 10% reduction in earnings from existing projects.*
FIGURE 3.6.3.
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* Normal here is a convenient reference term for the case where earnings 
from existing projects are as in appendix III. It was chosen
as a base case since it represented the lowest level of earnings for 
which a feasible solution existed in the absence of any investment 
projects. The usefulness of this as a base point will become self 
evident in the next chapter. Parametric analysis further showed 
that if earnings from existing projects were reduced by 21.2% there 
was no feasible solution even with all project opportunities present.
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While the other constraints do have some distant effect, it is 
much less than might be expected and it is worthwhile trying to explain 
this. As in the previous models, discounting indices are merely 
ranking devices on the desirability of projects. The power of ranking 
methods in generating approximate LP solutions has been used by others, 
notably Senju and Toyopa (68) for the solution of integer programming 
problems. Fogler (72) has directly exploited thxs algorithm for the 
selection of optimal investment portfolios. He carried out a series 
of experiments using ranking procedures on an integer problem with 
60 projects and 30 constraints. His conclusion was that the portfolio 
selected gave a 'total profit impressively high' (when compared with 
the true optimum). One of the key assumptions made by Fogler in 
explaining this, was that there was some degree of linear dependence 
between the constraining equations. Thus he argued that a project's 
use of a particular resource was roughly proportional to its use of 
other resources.
In the case under discussion here the development of the analysis
so far has rested largely on the fact that the cash flows are proportional
to the pre-tax earnings. Examination of the other constraints shows
that in the case of return on capital constraint the 'numerator'
is also proportional to the pre-tax earnings. This is also true
of the earnings per share and the dividend cover constraints since
here the numerator is proportional to the net profit after tax which
in turn is roughly proportional to the pre-tax earnings. Thus the model
here satisfies this condition* of the constraint set being linearly
* Of the remaining constraints, clearly the dividend per share constraint 
is in no way proportional to the pre-tax earnings. However, this 
independence does mean that it has a minimal effect on project 
selection since it largely determines the cash disbursements from 
the firm and as such its major effect is in the financing strategy.
The remaining constraint does exhibit a 'loose' relationship with 
pre-tax earnings since both the current liabilities and pre-tax 
earnings are each roughly proportional to the level of sales.
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dependent in some approximate way - though in the end the power of this 
single parameter of internal rate of return is still most impressive. 
Table 3.6.1. provides a further illustration of this.







Value 6« 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13%
Normal 1984 1/60 1790 1848 .1861 JL87?; 1842 1753 1752
Reduction by 5% 1720 1523 1548 1583_ 1520 1534 1478 1497 1504
Reduction by 10% 1435 1186 1117 1327 1206 1235 1214 1202 1206
Increase by 5% 2232 1986 2010 2101 2124 _2138 1220 1994 1994
The projects are selected with different internal rates of return 
used as a vut-off* and at different levels of earnings from existing 
projects. The maximum values as the cut-off rates are varied are 
indicated by the boxed entries. In the case of normal earnings and 
a 5% increase in normal earnings, the maximum value does in fact occur 
at a cut-off rate of 10%. Thus the predicted rate indeed minimises 
the difference in value between the optimum solution and the solution 
arrived at by a simple IRR cut-off rule. He can look at another 
measure of difference between the solutions by looking at the size 






* In the linear programme, the post horizon value of a project in the 
objective function was increased by a large i-ositive value for an 
internal rate of return greater than the cut-off rate and a large 
negative value if the internal rate of return was less than the cut­
off value. Thus selection was by feasibility than by internal rate 
of return then optimal financing and investment in the usual way. A 
statement of the objective function can be found in appendix V.
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. (OPT)where is the scale at which project j is undertaken
in the optimum (LP) solution;
(XRR)Xj is the scale of acceptance of project j for a
particular IRR cut of rate.
This error norm is shown in Table 3.6.2. for various internal 
rates of return used as the cutoff.
TABLE 3.6.2. ERROR NORM FOR SCALE OF PROJECTS*




Normal Earnings 5.79 11.73 17.73
Decrease by 5% 8.74 12.93 15.01
Decrease by 10% 9.61 10.95 11.35
Increase bv 5% 6.06 6.66 17.28
From table 3.6.2. it can be seen that minimising the error in the 
scale of project selection does not necessarily give the optimum 
solution with respect to maximisation of the value of the firm.
The error in the scale of project selection tends to be minimised 
around 8% while the loss in value arising out of imperfect selection 
tends to minimised* * at around 10%. Thus the dual analysis of the 
simplified which predicts that the appropriate internal rate of 
return cut-off rate is 10% appears to be well justified.
While selection by a simple IRR cut-off gives satisfactory solutions 
once the appropriate cut-off rate has been determined. The prior 
determination of this cut-off rate may be considered to be not an easy
* The final year (year 8) was omitted from the analysis since their 
selection was largely just an NPV criterion at 10%. This implied an 
upper bound of 41.0 for the D - statistics.
** When earnings from existing projects are reduced more new projects 
need to be introduced to maintain optimality. This accounts for the 
lower cut-off rate.
task. The theme of this chapter has been that fairly simple rules 
of thumb give good ranking methods for use in a preliminary screening 
of projects. The projects can be then further scrutinized against 
other criteria before a final selection is made. It is possible 
to simulate such a decision procedure on the LP model. This is 
done by ranking the projects according to the internal rate of 
return and then including in the objective function a large positive 
multiple of this rank.* Since the simplex algorithm proceeds 
by including in the solution the non-basic variable with the largest 
reduced cost, this device ensures** that projects are loaded 
sequentially by their IRR ranks. Table 4.6.3. shows the results of 
such a procedure. If t.l.e stopping criterion adopted is that the
TABLE 3.6.3. LOADING BY IRR RANKINGS




Iteration Objective Iteration Objective Iteration Objective !
No.*** Value No. Value No. Value
64 1841 56 2029 56 1289
65 1851 57 2050 57 1295
66 1855 58 2097 58 1296
67 1858 59 2097 59 1296
68 1866 60 2141 60 1287
69 1870 61 2146 61 1274
70 1868 62 2164 62 1277
71 1838 63 2190 63 1269
72. 1840 . 64 2203 64 1272
73 1839 65 2203 65 1275
74 1834 66 2202 66 1253
75 1827 67 2195 67 1238
76 1824 68 2142 68 1233
78 1800 69 2138
70 2122
* The precise formulation of this problem can be found in appendix
** In actual fact, the optimisation algorithms XDLA are considerably more 
sophisticated than this with block pricina, major and minor iterations 
plus many similar facilities incorporated as standard. It is possible
(continued on page 123)
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loading of project ceaSe3 wheh the objective value falls in
tv/o consecutive iterations then the following results are obtained.
TABLE 4.6.4 THE ADOPTION OF PROJECTIONS BY IRR RANKINGS




Normal Earnings 1984 1870
Earnings increased
by 10% 2471 2203
Earnings reduced
by 10% 1435 1296
Table 3.6.4. illustrates the sort of results that might be 
achieved using a financial statement generator, where a 
preliminary screening or ordering of the projects is carried 
out by an IRR criterion and final selection is made subject 
to a satisfactory performance on a whole host of other criteria. 
It further emphasises the power of discounting indices 
particularly when used in conjunction with a financial statement 
generator.
In fairness the results look better than they really are.
A more correct measure of the power of the methodology is in a 
comparison of the additional contribution to the value of the 
firm made by the adopted projects in each case. Considerations 
of feasibility make estimations of the value of the firm in 
the base case of no additional projects available difficult *
however, by careful parameter specification to ensure that the 
optimisation procedure accords with this simple description.
*** The iteration number is the iteration number of primal dual
algorithm used by XDLA. The initial basis is the optimal solution 
(not necessarily feasible) of the linear programme with all 
projects excluded.
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to determine. However, in the case of normal earnings an 
optimum feasible solution without projects does exist and the 
corresponding value of the firm is £l.30m. Thus the optimal selection 
of projects increases the net present value of the firm by £0.68m 
whereas the rule of thumb selection just discussed only increases 
its value by £0.57m. If we assume that the base value of the firm 
in the case of above normal earnings and below normal earnings is 
£l.43m and £l,17m respectively.* Then the rule of thumb added 
value is £0.77m and £0.13m compared with possible values of 
£l.04m and £0.26m respectively. Whilst such a rule may be considered 
adequate at normal earnings and above, it performs fairly badly under 
conditions of low earnings. ,
If a comparison is made between optimum project selection and 
internal rates of return at differing levels of earnings then 
apparent anomalies are observed.
TABLE 3.6.5. OPTIMAL PROJECT SELECTION and INTERNAL RATES OF RETURN





PROlYl 13.04 7----- / ✓ PR02Y5 9.08 X X xPR04Y1 15.59 / / ✓ PR03Y5 11.47 ✓ / 0 . 1 1PR12Y1 12.13 ✓ ✓ X PR11Y5 11.68 0.45 0.54 XPR13Y1 13.97 ✓ / ✓ PR21Y5 5.2? X X XPR16Y1 8.62 X X X PR23Y5 6.73 X X XPR22Y1 8.75 ✓ ✓ ✓ PR04Y6 15.59 / V /PR23Y1 6.73 X X X PR05Y6 7.41 X X XPR03Y2 11.47 ✓ / 0.64PR11Y6 11.68 / ✓ ✓PR04Y2 15.59 ✓ ✓ X PR14Y6 8.7 ✓ ✓ /PR05Y2 7.41 X X X PR15Y6 10.06 ✓ / /PR13Y2 13.97 / / / PR16Y6 8.62 ✓ / ✓PR14Y2 8.7 / ✓ / PR21Y6 5.22 X X XPR21Y2 5.22 X X X PR23Y6 6.73 ✓ 0.81 0.34PR24Y2 8.57 X • X X PR01Y7 13.04 / / ✓PR02Y3 9.08 / ✓ X PR04Y7 15.59 / ✓ /PR11Y3 11.68 0.49 0.39 0.63PR14Y7 8.7 / / /PR15Y3 10.06 / ✓ X PR22Y7 8.75 X X XPR01Y4 13.04 ✓ ✓ ✓ PR02Y8 9.08 X X XPR05Y4 7.41 X X X PR15Y8 10.06 X X XPR11Y4 11.68 0.33 0.39 X PR22Y8 8.75 X X XPR12Y4 12.13 / ✓ / PR25Y8 10.51 X X XPR13Y4 13.97 / ✓ ✓
PR14Y4 8.7 ✓ ✓ /PR22Y4 8.75 / / / 4
PR25Y4 10.5 ✓ / ✓
* The figures are estimates arrived at by taking values 10% 
above and below the £l.30m figure.
Inspection of Table 3.6.5. shows that not only is the investment
profile relatively stable over this range of earnings but also 
project 22 available in years 1, 4 and 8 with an internal rate 
of return of only 8.75% and project 14 available in years 2, 4 and 
6 with an internal rate of return of 8.7% always tend to be included. 
On the other hand project 11 which is available in years 3, 4, 5 and 
6 with an internal rate of return of 11.68% is marginal in years 
3, 4 and 5. Clearly our analysis is inadequate unless we can 
explain these anomalies.
Returning to the dual analysis and ignoring all but the 
cash balance contribution and the debt capacity effects the 
reduced cost * (p^ ) of project j beginning at time t is given by
Pj “ cjtPt “ Cjt+lPt+l + Xtejt + Xt+lejt+l <3-6-16>
where in addition to the usual notations e_. ^  is the (book) 
earnings of project j in period t and A here denotes the dual 
of the times covered constraint.
In the absence of constraints other than that on debt capacity 
then the equity relationship
Pt “ (l+i)Pt+1 (equation (3.6.9))
and the dual equality (equation (3.6.2.)) associated with the 
raising of long term debt still hold. Hence
Pt + V t + l  + KrXt+l + r/2Pt+2 + KrXt+2-
If we make the assumption** that At is proportional to p^ii.e.
Xt “ fp^ where f is a constant) then the value of f is given by the
* Again this reduced cost has been calculated within the context of 
an "infinite" horizon model.
** This assumption is made purely on intuitive grounds. In the end 
the justification for it rests on the results that it is able to 
generate.
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solution of the equation
= 0 (1.6.17)
Thus f is given by the expression
(3 .6.18)
Substitution of this result into the expression for the reduced 
cost* of the project (equation 3.6.16) gives
pre-tax earnings also discounted at i. Hence the present value 
(reduced cost) of a project is partially its net present value at 
the equity rate and partially a discounted earnings premium. The 
cash flow contribution can be adjusted for the finite horizon
present value of the post-horizon cash flows discounted at the 
appropriate rate.**
If numerical values*** of expression (3.6.19) are calculated 
they can be seen to accord fairly well with the actual values 
of the reduced cost produced by an LP solution. Table 3.6.6. 
illustrates this point for various solutions reflecting assumptions 
about the level of earnings from existing projects and the 
presence or otherwise of non-debt capacity constraints.
* Some confidence is gained in the correctness of the analysis by 
a comparison of the structure of this expression with the corres­
ponding but more rigorously derived expression for the reduced 
cost which will be found in 5.5.
** A rate of 10% coinciding with the theoretical IRR cut off rate, 
was assumed throughout most of these computational experiments.
*** Since debt capacity effects are ignored in thte post-horizon LP 
solution for the sake of comparison consisted of only the 
pre-horizon earnings.
p.. » NPVj + f*E. (3.6.19)
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TABLE 3.6.6. Observed and Predicted Reduced Costs of Projects.
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/This is seen to be particularly true where all the constraints 
other than the cash balance and debt capacity constraints are 
suppressed. In general the observed reduced cost is less than the 
predicted reduced cost. This is because in calculating the reduced 
cost it is assumed that the debt capacity constraint was always binding. 
In this analysis the debt capacity premium is normally large (and 
positive) compared with the net present value.
In fact the net present value of the cash flow3 serves as a 
rough estimate of the lower bound of the reduced cost. The inter­
period cash discount rate is approximately 12% whether the firm 
is borrowing or lending. Hence if the firm is always in a surplus 
position implying a zero value for the projects contribution to 
debt capacity then the reduced cost of the project is simply the 
discounted value of its cash flows at the (relatively high)
12% rate. Whereas if the firm is always in a. deficit situation 
and forced to raise debt finance then the earnings premium 
makes a large positive contribution to the reduced cost of the 
projects. Therefore the predicted reduced costs of Table 3.6.6. 
which gives a full weighting to the earnings premium cure 
effectively rough estimates* of the upper bounds of the reduced 
costs. Again this accords well with observation. In particular 
this analysis explains the relative attraction of certain projects 
with a low IRR (e.g. projects 14 and 22), since for both of these 
projects the debt capacity premium makes a substantial contribution 
to their overall value.
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* The estimates are not precise as in the Chambers case because 
it is assumed that the debt capacity constraint is either 
binding in every year or binding in non precise estimate would 
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other than the cash balance and debt capacity constraints are 
suppressed. In general the observed reduced cost is less than the 
predicted reduced cost. This is because in calculating the reduced 
cost it is assumed that the debt capacity constraint was always binding. 
In this analysis the debt capacity premium is normally large (and 
positive) compared with the net present value.
In fact the net present value of the cash flows serves as a 
rough estimate of the lower bound of the reduced cost. The inter­
period cash discount rate is approximately 12% whether the firm 
is borrowing or lending. Hence if the firm is always in a surplus 
position implying a zero value for the projects contribution to 
debt capacity then the reduced cost of the project is simply the 
discounted value of its cash flows at the (relatively high)
12% rate. Whereas if the firm is always in a. deficit situation 
and forced to raise debt finance then the earnings premium 
makes a large positive contribution to the reduced cost of the 
projects. Therefore the predicted reduced costs of Table 3.6.6. 
which gives a full weighting to the earnings premium are 
effectively rough estimates* of the upper bounds of the reduced 
costs. Again this accords well with observation. In particular 
this analysis explains the relative attraction of certain projects 
with a low IRR (e.g. projects 14 and 22), since for both of these 
projects the debt capacity premium makes a substantial contribution 
tc their overall value.
* The estimates are not precise as in the Chambers case because 
it is assumed that the debt capacity constraint is either 
binding in every year or binding in non precise estimate would 
require consideration of the debt capacity constraint in each year 
independently.
These predicted reduced costs should be a useful index of 
project profitability since they provide a measure of the attract­
iveness of a project with respect to the basic constraints of 
cash availability and debt capacity. In order to simulate the 
use of this index as a preliminary screening device, the linear 
programme was set up with a large weighting in the objective 
function proportional to the rank of the predicted reduced 
cost. Hence a term of the form 1000) (RANK.-N) was included
j 3in the objective function where RANK ^ denotes the rank c* 
project j according to its predicted reduced cost (see 
Table 3.6.6.) By varying the size of N using objective 
function parameterization the cut-off rank for project acceptab­
ility was altered. Again such a process of including projects 
into the investment schedule subject to a satisfactory 
performance on other financial criteria simulates an approach 
frequently adapted by users of financial statement generators.
Table 3.6.7. shows the results of such an experiment.
12?
TABLE 3.6.7. VALUE OF THE FIRM SELECTION ON REDUCED COST RANKING
N NormalEarnings
Earnings 
plus 1 0 %
Earnings 
less 1 0 %
1 0 N/A
1 1 2335
12 1881 2338 N/A13 1883 234814 1887 234115 . 1888 2346 134916 1883 _  2.346 134917 1858 2334 132318 1854 2308 132019 1874 2312 1322
20 1870 2320 1322
2 1 1873 2310 1305
22 1869 132123 1862 132824 1847 132725 1833 131426 132027 131628 N/A ' 131229 N/A 1294
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It can be seen that in general the peak value of the firm 
occurs for a value of N around 15. Consideration of Table 3.6.6. 
shows that this solution corresponds to the adoption of all projects 
with a positive value for the predicted reduced cost. It can be 
seen also that this index is an improvement over the IRR index* 
in that the additional contribution to the value cf the firm of 
the adopted project set is now £0.58M, £0.91M and £0.18M for 
the case of normal earnings from original projects and earnings 
10% above and below this figure respectively. This figure compares 
with the corresponding optimal IP solution of £0.68M, £l.04M and £0.26M. 
The question still remains whether such a solution is acceptable.
The suggested approach here is typical of that of financial statement 
generators It issimple to use and understand and generates 
good,rather than optimal,project sets which satisfy general 
restrictions imposed on financial policy variables. These financial 
policy constraints themselves'carry a cost of course and a further 
increase in the value of the firm is theoretically possible if the 
project set were chosen ignoring all but the restriction on 
debt capacity. In fact this cost is£0.12M, £o .15M and £0.09M in the 
particular cases considered here. Thus the loss due to using a non 
optimal but feasible solution method is less than the loss incurred 
because of considerations given to financial policy.** Because of 
adverse reactions by the financial markets it is not usually possible 
to ignore restrictions orr financial policy variables. Under such 
circumstances it is vitally important to have a method which is
* There are subsidiary peaks which roughly coincide with the adoption 
of an identical number of projects to that of the optimal LP solution. 
There are however slight discrepancies between the adopted sets in 
the two cases.
/ x ** In the case where financial policy considerations do not play a
significant part in project selection we can revert to fairly simple 
models and of course rule of thumb solutions.
capable of exploring fully these constraints and here financial 
statement generators in 'conjunction with simple rules of thumb 
are frequently more flexible and more acceptable tools than 
complex and rigid LP models.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter just three models have been examined in detail. 
They all have the same basic structure, being concerned with the 
optimal selection from a set of investment projects according to 
a discounted cash flow criterion modified by restrictions on debt 
availability. In addition, the last model discussed includes 
many further restrictions on the possible investment and financing 
strategies. Optimal or near optimal solutions to each of these 
models were generated by an analysis of the dual inequalities 
associated with the financing instruments. Apart from providing 
numerical solutions to these models the analysis provided ar. 
insight into the impact on project selection of different structures 
for the restriction on debt, thus establishing a formal correspondence 
between the solutions generated by LP algorithms and those based on 
a discounting methodology. In the case of the Weingartner model 
it was seen that many of the rules of thumb proposed in the 
literature are merely attempts at approximations to the dual solution; 
while for the Chambers model, the existence of a general (and 
economically sensible) anàlytical solution was determined. The 
greater complexity of the last model discussed meant that the 
analysis was intuitive and lacking in rigour. The aim here was 
to identify the principal determinants of project selection that
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might serve as a preliminary screening device. Mathematical 
niceties were largely ignored and while some of the loose ends 
will be picked up in the next chapter the justification for the 
analysis must rest with the results generated.
However, the purpose of this chapter is certainly not to 
suggest that the methods of analysis developed here should 
replace linear programming approaches and a discussion of the relative 
merits of the two methods is an irrelevant side issue which 
diverts attention away from more important points.
The first of these is that for all three models there existed 
a class of projects whose acceptance is not doubted on purely 
economic grounds. Equally there existed a class of projects 
whose inclusion could not be justified on purely economic grounds.
In this sense none of the proposed methods, whether simple 
discounting procedures or formal mathematical programming treat­
ments can really claim superiority. The identification of good 
and poor projects with respect to a net present value criterion 
is not really a problem. Any of the methods mentioned in this 
chapter will readily identify these two sets. If there is 
any superiority in mathematical programming solutions it is in 
their ease with which they can make decisions about projects 
whose inclusion or otherwise may make a marginal impact on the 
value of the firm. Thus it would seem that in their current form,t '
linear prograiraning models of the capital investment decision 
provide the proverbial sledgehammer with which to crack the 
capital investment nut.
It must, though, be stressed that this in no way denies 
the contribution of the models of Weingartner and Chambers to 
the development of the subject. Weingartnor•s work, apart from
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forming a basis of all subsequent models, provides the framework 
within which the methods of discounting can be examined. Chambers 
model makes a valuable theoretical contribution to the problem 
of the treatment of equity financing, as well as of project valuation 
under restrictions on the book value of debt by providing a 
means of valuing a project's effect on debt capacity. From 
this discussion, emerges a recognition of the important role which 
can be played by mathematical programming models in the theory 
of normative decision making. In particular this brings us to the 
second main point of this chapter - that a major contribution of 
these capital investment models is in the provision of a frame­
work for a rigorous analytical treatment of the impact on project 
valuation of capital market imperfections.
Weingartncr (62) was aware of the analytical power of these 
models and he discussed at some length the effect on the optimal 
investment schedule of hard capital rationing. Bernhard (69) 
also makes extensive use of the analysis of the dual inequalities 
in his survey of capital budgeting models and more recently 
Myers (74) has used this approach for the valuation of projects in 
the light of modern developments in financial theory.
-In chapter four this work will be drawn together in an attempt 
to move towards a more consistent theory of investment project 
appraisal. In particular two important and complementary ideas 
will be looked at within this primal-dual framework. These 
arc, firstly a generalization of the Modigliani Miller cost of 
capital formula to deal with finite horizon projects and secondly 
«n extension of the MM fundamental principle of valuation to 
deal with optimal growth paths in infinite horizon planning
situations
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Continuing in the same vein, chapter five extends the 
analysis on the impact of various debt capacity constraints on 
project valuation by looking in detail at the valuation of one 
specific type of project opportunity - the financial lease contract. 
Whereas the impact of debt capacity restrictions may be marginal 
for many capital investment opportunities this will certainly not 
be true for the leasing decision, which is a simultaneous invest­
ment and (debt) financing opportunity. A mathematical programming 
formulation affords a natural framework within which such analysis 
can be carried out.
While the foregoing discussion clearly reveals an important 
role for LP models in fii^ ince, the original intention of this 
research and the explicit intention of most other workers in 
this field is the provision of management decision tools. If 
we now redirect our attention back to this issue and reconsider 
what was the intended primary role of TP models in finance we can 
discern two distinct lines of approach.
The first is to cling to the belief that the practical 
complexities of an actual planning situation are such that a LF 
formulation is still the only realistic way of determining 
an optimal plan and the existence of analytical solutions to simple 
models in no way invalidates the methodology.
There, are two main objections to this belief. The first is 
the lack of evidence that complex LP models yield radically different 
results from fairly simple models. Certainly the evidence of 
this chapter suggests that even for relatively complex models 
simple discounting rules still remain very useful indicators of 
the attractiveness of projects. Moreover the more elaboration 
of the constraint set may well detract from, rather than enhance,
their usefulness. Such models require an a priori specification 
of a minimum set of conditions which must be fulfilled by any plan 
and would seem an inadequate reflection of the planning process.
In fact the whole approach seems far too rigid and naive ever to 
gain managerial acceptance.
The alternative approach is to regard LP as merely one 
aid in the battery of tools which are available to financial 
planners. Thus Chambers (72) in a follow-up paper to the 
'Joint problem of Investment and Finance' discusses how his particular 
model might be implemented. He suggests that his LP model is 
best used in conjunction with a financial statement generator.
Heie the financial statement generator is used tc explore 
alternative dividend policies while the LP model is used to select 
the optimal set of investment projects with respect to a particular 
dividend policy. While such a procedure is clearly a more acceptable 
use of LP models than attempts bo use them as all embracing central 
decision processes, it does subscribe to the notion of LP models 
as preselection devices and it is their superiority in this role 
which has been subject to most questioning in this chapter.
In summary, in their current form LP models of the investment 
and financing decision would appear at best to perform inadequately 
their intended primary prupose of being a major decision tool of 
corporate financial planners. The central problems surrounding 
their usage in such a role arises from their inability to address 
directly the main issues in the financial planning process. The 
need is for methods of identifying and of exploring alternative 
financial strategies. While LP models are very effective in 
identifying feasible (and optimal) plans with respect to a 
particular criterion, they are far too rigid for the exploration
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of alternative strategics. In contrast simulation models have 
proved very effective for the exploration of alternative strategies, 
though their main weakness is their inability to give direct 
guidance to other and possibly improved strategies. In chapter 
six the issue of developing a mechanism which directly tackles the 
problem of identifying and exploring efficient financial strategies 
is discussed. The aim here is the development of a corporate 
financial planning model with the flexibility and managerial 
acceptability of a financial statement generator, yet, which retains 
the powerful decision logic of a mathematical programming model.
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CHAPTER 4
Economic Objective functions, the Valuation of Investment 
Opportunities and the Finite Problem.
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter the discussion concentrated on the 
generation of approximate numerical solutions to LP models of 
the investment decision. The method of approximation was to take 
the discounted cash flow valuation of an investment project and, 
using Lagrangian multipliers, compute an adjustment for the projects 
contribution to debt capacity. This adjusted net present value 
incorporated the impact of the interactions which arise between 
the investment and financing decision under conditions of imperfect 
capital market.
Now among the core problems of modem corporate financial 
theory is the valuation of individual projects within the broader 
context of the firms total operating environment. While the problem 
is usually broached within the framework of perfect capital markets 
in equilibrium, it is the extent, and impact, of market imperfections 
that lead to severe analytical difficulties. Thus the emergence 
of mathematical programming models as a means of integrating 
the investment and financing decision, and of rigorously exploring 
the resultant interactions, provides a very powerful analytical 
tool for the development of more rigorous theories of valuation.
In particular unlike more traditional methodologies of financial 
theory, where the arguments are developed in terms of 
infinite and»frequently constant, non-interacting income streams
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and financing outflows, mathematical programming provides a means 
of dealing with irregular and finite transaction patterns.
In this Chapter the discussion will corcentrate on the contribution 
of mathematical programming financial models to the development 
of normative models for project valuation.
The starting point for such a discussion is a brief resume of 
approaches to the valuation of uncertain cash flows via the use of 
risk adjusted discount rates together with the implications of 
different capital structures for the investment decisions. The 
next section uses these ideas, which are central to financial 
theory,for the development of alternative formulations of 
objective functions which can be incorporated into mathematical 
programming models for financial planning. Within such a framework 
the formulations of Carleton (69), Weingartner (63) Chambers (71) 
and other authors are examined and from this framework a general 
theory of the sequential valuation of individual investment 
projects is developed. These ideas are extended to a more 
rigorous analysis of the cost of capital formula first derived by 
Modigliani and Miller and it is shown that their formula breaks 
down in general for the appraisal of finite or irregular investment 
cash flows. The remainder of the Chapter is devoted to various 
aspects of the horizon problem. Thus section 4.6 examines the 
way in which an analysis of the dual equations in the prehorizon 
period facilitates a consistent formulation of the horizon valuation, 
while the final two sections look at possible applications in 
financial modelling situations of the recently developed theory 
on the solutions to infinite time horizon LP models. Here both 
the nature of long run equilibrum solutions and the practical 
implications of using finite horizon approximations is examined
in detail.
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4.2 The Cost of Capital and Risk Adjusted Discount Rates.
Differenceswhich arise in the form of the expression for the 
cost of capital result from the two different approaches* taken 
towards the valuation of total corporate cash flows. The first 
approach, the net operating income (NI) approach computes the 
value of the firm by capitalizing the income (dividend) stream 
accruing to the shareholders and adding to this the value of debt. 
The alternative approach, the net operating income (NOI) approach 
computes the value of the firm by directly capitalizing 
the net operating income of the firm. Both these approaches 
to the derivation of a cost of capital will be considered 
here since they provide an insight into the structure of valuation 
formulae commonly used in financial planning models. It is also 
a convenient point at which to define a notation which will be 
used throughout this Chapter.
Let V = Value**of the firm at time t 
tot = Value of debt at time t 
= Value of equity.
The relationship between these values at any point in time is
Vt » u>t + il>t 4.2.1.
i = Equity discount rate
____________r = (pretax) rate on the firms debt_______________
* See Durand (59) or any modern standard text on financial management 
such as Van Horne (7 7 ) or Heston and Brigham (78).
** At this point the term 'value* has not been defined precisely; 
for instance whether it is book value or market value. The usage 
will be defined within the context of a particular argument. Neither 
will any precise interpretation of the various interest rates 
be offered until much later in the Chapter
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In the simple* analysis that follows it is assumed for convenience 
that the income generated by the firm will persist at its current 
level for all future time.** This implies no net new investment on 
the part of the firm. In addition there are no corporate taxes and 
all income is redistributed as dividends.
Let x = The expected income from operations in each year
Then x = r«o + iiji 4.2.2.
and X _ EW jljjV = V V
4.2.3.
If further K denotes the fraction of debt in the capital structure, 
then the weighted average cost of capital -a can be defined as £. . 
Hence a = Kr + (l-K)i 4.2.4.
The debate on the cost of capital centres on the way in which 
i, r and consequently a varies with the proportion of debt in the 
capital structure. Modigliani and Miller (58, 59) argue that 
under assumptions of a perfect capital market and no corporate 
taxes then the value of the firm and hence the value of the average 
cost of capital is independent of the degree and leverage. Their 
argument rests on the ability of an investor to undo corporate 
leverage by personal borrowing or lending. Against this Durand (59) 
questions the extent to which arbitrage can take place because of 
perceived differences between personal and corporate gearing, 
while Baxter (67) and Stiglitz (72) argue that non linear effects 
of bankruptcy costs will in the end imply an optimum debt equity
* It should be pointed out that the analysis presented here follows one 
of the accepted patterns of analysis of financial theorists and is 
presented as a vehicle for introducing the concept of a cost of a 
capital. It will be argued that because of the excessively restricted 
assumptions made it is an inadequate theoretical framework for analysing 
the impact on investment decisions of debt financing.
** Hence the t subscript will be omitted in the remainder of this section.
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structure.
In contrast the traditionalists* argue that both the returns 
required by debt holders and by equity holders vary as the degree 
of 'financial risk' or gearing varies, but in such a way that at 
some stage the weighted average cost of capital has a minimum.
With the introduction of corporate taxes the value of the 
company is altered because of the tax deductability of the interest 
payments and thus the after tax earning where T is the tax rate 
then
xT = (x - ru>) (1 - T) + ru
= x(l - T) + rT(o 4.2.5.
According to the NOI approach,so vigorously argued by Modigliani and 
Miller (63,69), the ejected income stream x(l - T) should be 
capitalised at the constant rate a^ where aQ is the rate of capital­
isation of a pure equity stream from the firm and the 'certain' tax 
savings stream should be capitalised at the 'risk-free* rate r.
Thus the value of the firm is given by v «• & + Tu> 4.2.6.o a_o
and consists of the firm market value under all equity financing plus 
the present value of tax generated capital allowances.
In contrast the NI approach,adopted-by traditional:theorists 
argues that the after tax residual earnings should be capitalised 
at i,being that portion of the income attributable to shareholders, 
with the interest component capitalised at r.
This gives
v - w + 1* r-gfrp ( 1 - T > 4.2.7.
Using as a definition** of the cost of capital x(l-T)/v then these
* See for example Solomon (63)
**It should be emphasised that this is merely one of many possible 
definitions (see Nantell and Carlson (75). An alternative 
definition will be provided in section 4.4.
two approaches give a value for the cost of capital of
a = a (1 - KT) 4.2.8.o
in the Modigliani and Miller (MM) case and
a = i(l - K) + Kr(l-T) 4.2.9.
for the traditional case. While it can be seen that both of 
these costs of capital are functionally dependent on K, the 
traditionalist further argues that the variation of the equity 
rate and the debt rate with K is such as to result in a minimisation 
of the cost of capital and a consequent maximisation of the value of 
the firm.
In the MM case the average cost of capital appears to decrease 
uniformly as the amount of debt increases to the point at which 
there would be no equity financing. A resolution of this paradox 
of bankruptcy is offered by Robichek and Myers (65) who argue that 
the possibility such that there is some limit on the proportion of 
debt in the capital structure. Thus both approaches introduce a 
debt capacity restriction which takes the form of a target limit 
on the percentage of debt in the total capital structure. The 
incorporation of such a restriction on debt turns out to have had 
a profound influence on the structure of mathematical programming 
models used for financial planning.
One further point which has been largely glossed over so far 
in this thesis and is of particular relevance to this Chapter is 
the implicit assumptions made in the approach to the valuation of 
returns from risky investments. In essence, the approach adopted 
throughout this thesis has been to value a risky investment by 
discounting the expected cash flow stream resulting from the 
investment at a rate adjusted for the 'risk' of that stream. The 
theoretical justification for such an approach lies in the work 
of Sharpe (64), Litner (65) and Black (72) all of whom examined
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the determinants of the market price of a security or risky asset 
under equilibrium portfolio conditions. Their work, on the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) uses a two parameter specification 
of risk in which it assumed that the investor is economically rational 
preferring more expected wealth to less expected wealth, and is 
risk averse, measuring risk by the standard deviation of the return 
from an investment. The development of the theory assumes perfect 
capital markets, homogeneous expectations of returns from investors 
and equality of borrowing and lending rates. The impact of relaxing 
some of the assumptions in capital asset pricing theory are discussed 
by, among others, Mao (71), Jensen (72). In the original, Sharpe, 
Litner and Black treatment of the CAPM a one-period horizon model is 
assumed. The extension to a multi-period model has been carried 
out by Brennan (73) and Faxma (77) and it is this last mentioned 
author who provides both a detailed analysis of, and deviation of, 
the form of the valuation of risky investments used in this thesis.
Farma's starting point is that according to CAP theory, 
the excess one-period return required of a risky investment over 
that of a risk free asset* is proportional to the excess market 
return** over a risk-free asset, where the constant of proportionality 
depends on the covariance of the return from the individual risky 
asset with that of the market portfolio. He then extends and 
generalizes this one-period model into a multi-period valuation 
model. A sufficient condition for the multi-period model to take 
the form of a discounted sum of expected cash flows at a constant
* Typically it is argued that Government stocks provide such a 
risk-free asset.
** This is the return expected from a portfolio of all the risky 
securities of the market held in proportion to their market value.
discount rate is that the risk-free rate is constant and known 
and that the future covariances of the cash flows from the investment 
with the market returns are also constant and known. In terms of 
most of the valuation models discussed in this thesis this condition 
is satisfied provided that the operating environment of the firm is 
stable and provided that the firm has a fixed (as measured in terms 
of risk) investment policy with respect to this environment.
4.3 Valuation models and the structure of Objective functions
As was discussed in the last section, two different approaches 
have been taken to the valuation of the firm. The approaches are 
the net income approach and the net operating income approach. Both 
of these need to be considered here since they give different, 
though not necessarily contradictory, forms for the cost of capital. 
In view of the furore created by the debate on the effects of capital 
structure on the cost of capital, the non-contradictory nature of 
the results emerging from some of the analysis to be presented in 
this chapter might seem surprising. The reasons for such results 
arise from the restrictive nature of the assumptions which are 
necessary in most linear programming models which are to be used 
for financial planning.
In essence such models are required to attribute a value row 
to a decision taken at time t in the future. Thus it is necessary 
to identify a mapping PV : where Vo is the value now of the
decision zfc. The requirement that such a function is linear 
implies that the discount rate is a constant and independent of any 
decisions taken in the intervening period, including decisions 
taken about the capital structure. While such an assumption might 
seem prohibitively restrictive if LP models are being used for
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the development of financial valuation theory, it must be viewed 
within the context of such models. The basic structure of these 
models is that they consist of a valuation (objective) function and 
a debt capacity constraint. In general the relative cheapness of 
debt results in this debt capacity constraint being binding in 
most periods. Thus this produces the stable capital structure necessary 
for the assumption of constant discount rates.
The lack of contradiction between NI and NOI approaches is 
further a consequence of defining only two of the three interlinked 
discount rates which relate to debt, equity and operating flows. The 
third discount rate is a deduction from the model and is dependent 
on the structure of the model. It is important to stress this 
difference between discount rates which are deductions from a model 
and those which cure either implicitly or explicitly prior specifications 
to a model, since this problem is a constant source of misunderstanding.
In particular the early attempts at the formulation of appropriate 
objective functions for use in mathematical programming models were 
subjected to the severe criticism of Baumol and Quandt of primal- 
dual inconsistency*. The result of this was that the objective 
functions of the early models ** were solely horizon valuations.
Thus the constraint set was specified over the pre-horizon period 
while the objective function merely valued the post-horizon effects. 
Hence the valuation of individual projects was such that the 
pre-horizon period valuation was carried out via a dual pricing 
mechanism while the post-horizon valuation was carried out using 
a predetermined constant equilibrium cost of capital.
* See section 1.2 % •** See for example the discussion of Weingartners and Chambers 
models in section 1.4
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Clearly such a methodology is unsatisfactory from a 
theoretical point of view, since the valuation is arbitrarily 
dependent on the horizon, and from the practical point of view, 
since here net present value methods are in general preferable 
to net terminal valuations. Fortunately it was possible in Chapter 
two to identify the source of this paradox and to provide a satisfactory 
resolution of it.
The paradox stemmed largely from a misinterpretation of the 
model where an attempt was made to make statements about consumption 
preferences from a model which specifically excluded the consumption 
alternative. This error was further compounded by the assumptions 
that the firm and/or individual investors were excluded access to the 
capital market. Thus in order to make progress it is necessary 
to specify the nature of possible consumption functions* and market 
discount rates and to take cognizance of role of the capital 
market in the determination of these rates.
If we thus adopt the alternative model proposed by Baumol 
and Quandt of mavimising the value of the utility of withdrawals, 
then we have in the notation introduced earlier
MAX = i|»o (D,E) 4.3.1.
A well defined mathematical structure can be imposed on the 
function by reference to the fundamental principle of valuation 
as expounded by MM (61). The return to equity (i) can be defined 
in terms of the net increase in share price plus any dividends flows 
in relation to the initial share price. The relationship is thus
* In fact as we shall see, under assumptions of perfect capital 
markets then the consumption decision is irrelevant to the 
investment decision.
i -
d + p . - pt *t+l
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4.3.2.
where p price of shares at the start of period t and d is the 
net dividend per share paid at the end of period t.
Equation 4.3.2. can be rewritten in the form
dt * Pt+ 1 
(1 +i) 4.3.4.
If in addition the number of shares outstanding at the
start of t is nfc.
Then <|>t = ntPt = ntdt + ntpt+lU+i) 4.3.5.
and
ntPt+l “ "t+lPt + 1 " <nt+l~nt)pt+X
*t “ Et
giving
\  - Et + *•t+ 1
(1 +i) where = n^d^ 4.3.8.
Now while equation 4.3.2. defines the return on equity 
mathematically, the actual value of i is exogenously determined 
by the capital market forces. These take into account the business* 
risk In., the fims bperating income and financial risk involved in 
the finite capital structure. With the assumptions that the firm 
continues to invest in projects with the same degree of business 
risk and that the debt capacity constraint ensures a stable capital 
structure then i can be regarded as a constant. If it is further 
assumed that all new issues are in the form of rights which are totally 
taken up by existing shareholders,** then the recursive use of
* In keeping with the discussion in section 4.2, business risk must 
now be defined in terms of the covariance of the returns on the 
firm's project with the return on the market portfolio.
** This simplifying assumption is necessary since we are concerned 
with maximisation of shareholder wealth. If the body of share­
holders were allowed to change, it is no longer clear how the 
possible conflicting interests of existing and future share­
holders can be catered for.
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expression 4.3.8 gives a value for the equity of the form
H-l Dfc _ Et l|»H 
* 0  " (l+i)t + (l+i)H 4.3.9.
In essence the capital market has imposed the necessary 
structure on the utility function of equation 4.3.1. This 
generates with a very convenient form of objective function for 
incorporation into linear programming models. The first two 
variables Dfc, present no problems in evaluations since they are 
readily incorporated as decision variables within the model though
of course <|l„ does present the now familiar horizon value problems.H
This valuation formula was first developed by Carleton (70) 
and most of the models discussed so far can be considered to be 
specific examples of it. The derivation presented here is to 
clarify the assumptions and the context of the formula and to 
enable the limitation of any conclusions drawn from such a model 
to be clearly seen.
If we refer back to some of the models already discussed
in the first Chapter, the objective function in the Weingartner
model is trivially maximize t|> - V (X) - u or the equityH H H
proportion of the post-horizon cash flows. Here V (X) is the 
post-horizon value of the firms net operating income valued at the debt 
rate. The implications of such a model are that there is a 
predetermined dividend policy and that the firm is operating tinder 
conditions of perfect certainty.
Of more interest is the Chambers (71) model. In this model 
the net present value at the horizon (NPVH) of rights, as well 
as debt and project cash flows, are treated explicitly. In the 
valuation of equity and debt Chambers argues:
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'Managers should be led to make a new rights issue only if 
there is some increase in the value of the firm to existing 
shareholders after giving subscribers to the new issue a 
return (in this example of 12 per cent) . A NFVH of the new 
rights issue is, therefore, defined as that ¿mount at the 
horizon which, taken together with the dividends to which they 
will be entitled over the planning period, gives a return of 
1 2 per cent to new investors.'
A similar argument is used to obtain NPVH for debentures issued 
in the planning period by discounting post-horizon cash flows associated 
with these at 4 per cent, while post-horizon cash flows from investment 
projects are discounted at a weighted average cost of capital.
Thus for rights the post-horizon value is the alternative cost 
to the shareholders of money they subscribe in t. This is given by
- Pt(l+i) for
- ^Pt(i+i)H_t - j1^dt <i+i)H“TJ
H - 1
for t = 1, H - 2 4.3.10.
where pfc is the price of a unit of equity issued at t and d^ is 
the dividend per share which the firm plans to pay in t.
The whole valuation model in fact can readily be seen as an 
example of the analysis developed above. The model relating the 
value of future equity streams to the shareholders is
«r1  ! *H
* = ¿ ± 71+1)* « V W  + UiljTT 4‘
where the additional notation nfc is the number of rights issued 
at time t. Since in the Chambers' model the dividend policy is 
predetermined then can be written in the form*
There appears to be a slight anomaly in the treatment of t«l with 










The first term is just a constant and the expression in curly brackets 
is just a constant times the following expression
We still need a valuation for ib the value of the equity portionH
of the firms terminal value. Referring back to the earlier work 
we have the equation 4.2.1.
V is related to the value of the firms future after tax cash flows H
and u> refers to the debt servicing and repayment streams. By 
discounting the former at the weighted average cost of capital and 
the latter at the debt rate. Chambers is essentially adopting a 
traditional approach to valuation. It will be argued that such 
a valuation is consistent in the sense that all the valuation 
procedures used within this model are consistent with the explicit 
and implicit assumptions made about the behaviour of the capital 
markets. To justify this statement it will be necessary to develop
4.3.16
*H “ VH " WH
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a more general framework for the analysis of the relationship 
between individual investment and financing projects which is 
implied by the structure of an LP. While this occupies most of the 
next two sections it is worth examining briefly a paper by 
Bhaskar (74) which illustrates some of the pitfalls involved in 
attempting to devise a consistent formulation of a financial 
linear programming model. In this paper Bhaskar attempts a 
rigorous analysis of the way in which borrowing and lending 
instruments might be incorporated into a capital budgeting model 
in the light of modern financial theory. However, his choice of 
a modified Weingartner model as the analytical framework is 
singularly unfortunate.
The model* as presented is
n
Max 7 c.x. + c V. 4.3.17.
j- 1  j j v
subject to
- J ^ t j ^  + Vt - (1+rX.) V l  " “t + (1+rB)Mt-l*Ft 4-3*18
cot s Bfc 4.3.19
O S x ^ S l
The notation used is the standard one adopted in this thesis
with the caveat that the interpretation of the coefficients in the
00objective function is slightly different. Here c V t
1 t-071^
* This includes the minor modification of considering 1 year debt only. 
Bhaskar incorporates debt with a longer repayment period.
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is the net present value (as opposed to net terminal value) at
rL - aa weighted average cost of capital (a) while c *= —1 is
<l+a)C *
similarly a net present value of £ 1 of lending at the same weighted 
average cost of capital. Two imnediate problems present themselves 
within such a valuation framework. One is the choice of discount 
rates and the other is the implication that such discount rates 
carry about the capital markets.
The use of a weighted average cost of capital is motivated 
by the MM argument that the weighted average cost of capital (unlike 
the equity rate) is independent of debt decisions in a perfect 
market. While the use of a constant weighted average cost of 
capital facilitates a linear structure, the MM hypothesis specif­
ically assumes perfect capital markets. As Bhashar himself admits 
in a postscript
'is it valid to assume an MM type world in a (hard) 
capital rationing situation? The problem here is that'I
it may not be possible for arbitrage to take place 
because of capital rationing.'
This gives rise to the second main problem.
Bhashar in using a constant cost of capital has actually assumed 
that while the firm has limited access to the capital market (as 
implied by the constraint on debt )the shareholders themselves 
have perfect access (i.e. unlimited personal borrowing or lending 
at the debt rate r). While this assumption might not seem totally 
unacceptable, Bhashar has made no provision in the model for the 
firm to raise further equity capital. Thus he has included 
shareholder investment/consumption preferences within the valuation 
procedure but omitted from the model the necessary mechanism 
whereby these preferences might be exercised.
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There is also an inconsistency in the incorporation of
lending into the model. The implication of the NOI income approach
assumed by MM is that projects should be valued at a rate appropriate
to their risk. The implication of this is that the lending project
which consists of cash flows of - 1  and 1 + r should be discountedL
at r the lending rate. It would thus disappear from the objective 
function. While Bhashar argues that such a solution is suboptimal 
using a two project counterexample*, he misses the point that the 
lending project has altered the business risk and thus the equity 
return require by shareholders.
Clearly if the intention is to use LP models for developing 
financial theory, or indeed, as a decision making aid, then a 
great deal of care must be taken in structuring the model. In the 
next section a framework is developed which allows for a more thorough 
analysis of the implicit assumptions made with LP models for 
financial planning and in section 4.6 illustrates the methodology 
applied to the model introduced in section 1.7.
4.4 The Cost of Capital ; a General Framework
While empirical evidence on the cost of capital debate has 
proved inconclusive** the resolution of the issue is of less 
immediate importance to this thesis than the shortcomings of the 
theoretical analysis. In particular two of the assumptions which 
were made in the analysis presented in section 4.2 are sufficiently 
restrictive to invalidate the application of the cost of capital
* A rigorous development of a model incorporating the assumptions of 
modern financial theory will be presented and analysed in section 4.5.
** See Durand (59); Weston (63).
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formula in nearly all capital investment decisions. Clearly, a 
cost of capital formula whose derivation is subject to the 
assumption of no net new investment is not the most appropriate 
method for screening new capital investment projects. Further 
the assumption that the net contribution of the set of investment 
projects will be a constant income stream in perpetuity must be 
considered at best a very poor approximation to reality. Thus the 
task of this section is to present a method of analysis which does 
not require these assumptions.
With this aim in mind, consider the following model of the 
set of investment and financing decisions facing the firm
MAX ifi (X, D,E,b>) 4.4.1
subject to cash balance restrictions
- 7 c .X. - w + D - E  — F 4.4.2oj j o o o o
" ? CtjXj ■ “t + (l+r (1-T>)wt l  + Dt ~ Et = Ft t=l,H 4.4.3 
3
and a restriction on the level of debt finances
U)t S <J>t (X,D,E) 4.4.4
plus a scale constraint on the project
0 S X. S 1 4.4.5
and the usual non-negativity conditions where the heavy type 
denotes vectors whose individual components are interpreted* as 
follows:
* Again the notation is presented here for convenience and complete 
list of the mathematical notation used throughout this thesis can 
be found in appendix II.
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- dividend paid in time period t
- equity issued in time period t
- debt financing in period t
Xj - scale of acceptance of investment j 
and the other symbols are:
Cjt - cash inflow from project j in t 
Ffc - funds from existing project 
T - corporate tax rate 
<(>t - debt capacity in time period t 
If we further denote by:
p^_ - shadow price on additional cash
- shadow price on debt capacity
V i - shadow price on the scale of acceptance of project j 
H - the planning horizon
then Kiiin-Tucker optimality conditions give for dividends
« , 30,
pt _ E xt  35“ * sett=0 t t
4.4.6
and for equity issues
« 3*t 30»
"pt + ^ Xt 3i~ 2 3e t- 0  t t
4.4.7
while for debt the relevant inequality is
-pt + Cl«d-T))Pt+1 + 4.4.8
and that for the scale of acceptance of a project is 
H Hyj 2 t o h  ~  % pt°tj_ £ xt ’£ x ~
3 dxj t- 0  * t3 t=0 j
4.4.9
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The right hand side of inequality 4.4^9 can be considered to be a 
generalisation* of the net present value concept to include the 
project contribution to debt capacity. Hence if the expression 
on the right hand side is positive then the project is included 
in the optimal solution, if the expression is negative then the project 
is rejected whereas a zero value results from partial acceptance.
The project decision is thus dependent on its own direct 
contribution to the value of the firm and to the debt
3Xicapacity as well as the marginal value of funds pfc and the
marginal value of extra debt Xfc.
In general both and can be determined by consideration 
of the financing opportunities. Thus if we assume that equity 
issues can be treated as negative dividends** then this implies
while if defbt financing is being undertaken, inequality 4.4.8 becomes 
an equality and we have
*See Weingartner (74) or Peterson (69) p. 446 for a fuller discussion 
of this point. Extensive use has already been made of this idea in 
chapter III.
**This assumption requires no difference in effective tax rates between 
dividends and retained earnings, no transaction costs and that all 
rights are taken up by existing shareholders. These assumptions are 




a<i< _ _ aii) 4.4.11
giving
4.4.12
pt + (l+r(l-T))pt + 1 + At = ■&- 4.4.13
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Equations 4.4.12 and 4.4.13 are usually sufficient to define
and X^ from this we can deduce a value for the right hand side
of inequality and hence the appropriate valuation formulae for the
contribution from a potential investment.
These observations provide for a more rigorous definition of
the term 'cost of capital' than that which is to be found in standard
texts for use in capital investment appraisal.
If f is a function l/ll (l+u(T>) of the parameters u,t 
;T-1
where u = g (p,A, i|»', ) such that for project j involving net cash
inflows c__t in t
l f(u,t) c < 0 
t=0
u (t) > Ptft- 0 u(t) “ Pt *< 0 u(t) < Pt 4.4.14
then p* is the cost of capital. In the type of model being 
considered here u and thus p* is in general a function g of 
p,A,^’,+' where both the dual vectors p,A and the vectors of 
derivatives can in turn usually be expressed in terms of the
interest and tax rates supplied to the model. There are two important 
points to be made about the valuation formula and cost of capital 
formula developed here.
The first is one to which frequent reference has already been 
made and will be only briefly mentioned again here. In finite 
horizon linear programming models where the impact of any decision 
extends beyond the horizon period the valuation formula, and 
hence the cost of capital, may depend on the choice of horizon.
The second is that any investment project valuation formula is 
critically dependent on the assumptions of the impact of debt and
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equity on the value of the firm and the value of debt capacity. 
Once these assumptions have been made then the appropriate formula 
for valuation of an investment project follows as a logical 
consequence. Such an observation provides a method of checking
resultant valuation of an investment project will reveal the 
nature of any implicit assumptions made about investment cash 
flows. Both these points will be briefly illustrated for the Chambers 
(71) model.
The valuation model used by Chambers has already been discussed 
in some detail in the previous section. The objective function 1 is 
a discounted value of the cash flows associated with the issue of 
rights, debentures and investment projects. In contrast the debt 
capacity | is a constant multiple g of the book value of new equity 
and retained earnings and is thus affected by the issue of rights, 
profits retained from investments and such expenses as flotation costs 
of new financing.
The analysis of the dual equations associated with equity 
issues and with debt financing has already been carried out 
in section 3.5. It was shown that when debt financing was being 
used then the dual on the cash balance equation (equation 3.5.35) 
could be approximated by
while if the firm was in a cash surplus situation in the sense 
that it was lending money to the fixed interest market, the cash 
balance dual was given by the expression (equation 3.5.34)
the consistency of the formulation, since presumably the
Pt




In both these cases, equation 3.5.36 , gave the debt capacity 
1 H-tconstraint dual as V  » -  t (1 +i) - p. ].t g t
The resulting project valuation, as represented by the reduced 
cost, thus values cash flows at the appropriate borrowing or lending 
rate upto the horizon. Moreover, the borrowing rate in the pre­
horizon period turns out to be a weighted average cost of capital 
rate where the weighting factor is based on a book value figure.
In the post horizon period, there is no information as to whether the 
firm is in a cash surplus situation or a cash deficit situation.
Chambers in fact chooses a weighted average cost of capital figure, 
where the weighting is again in terms of book values. Thus the model 
gives a consistency at least in the approach adopted, if notin the precise 
functional form, to valuation.
Some inconsistencies do arise but these are of a technical 
nature,arising from the finite horizon,rather than inconsistencies 
arising from the assumptions implied by the choice of valuation model 
and the nature of the restrictions on the use of debt. These do 
result in project valuation being norizon dependent, though this 
dependency is not critical.* Thus in the pre-horizon period the 
weighting is done after the 'time factor* has been applied to the equity 
and debt rates whereas in the post-horizon period the weighting 
is done prior to the application of a time factor. In addition while a 
project^ (small) contribution to debt capacity is valued at 
shadow price on debt in the prehorizon period, this contribution is 
ignored post horizon.
* Thus in Chapter three it was seen that valuing a project merely by 
discounting at the weighted average cost of capital, which is 
equivalent to a zero horizon time, did not lead to major distortions 
in the investment decision.
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Although the Chambers' model provides a specific illustration 
of some of the conclusions that can be drawn from a general approach 
to project valuation, this analysis alone does not justify the rather 
elaborate framework which has been developed in this section. The 
justification presented in the introduction to this section for the 
development of the framework was that the resulting valuation 
formulae,and hence any cost of capital deduced from it, are not dependent 
upon any assumed regularity of perpetuity of cash flows. In the 
next section it will be shown using a dual analysis, that the 
widely accepted MM cost of capital formula as represented by equation 
4.2.8. does not hold for finite or non-constant cash flows.
4.5 The MM cost of capital formula for finite and irregular flows.
Myers and Pogue (74) developed a model to be used for practical 
financial planning which they argue is in accordance with modem 
financial theory. In particular they sepcifically assume two 
basic postulates of capital market theory to hold namely*
"1. That the risk characteristics of a capital investment 
opportunity c m  be evaluated independently of the risk 
characteristics of the firm's existing assets or other 
opportunities.
2. The Modigliani-Miller result that the total market value 
of the firm is equal to its unlevered value plus the net 
present value of taxes saved due to debt financing."
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For practical planning purposes, Myers and Pogue admit to a 
certain degree of market imperfections, introducing constraints on 
liquidity and dividend policy. However, in a separate paper Myers 
(74) considers only the impact of a constraint on debt capacity on 
the rules for project selections. Myers' main attention is on the 
theoretical structure of the model and his subsequent mathematical 
analysis is both obtuse and incomplete. In this subsection the model 
will be cast into a more convenient conceptual form and its 
implications will be explored using the ideas and methodology of 
section 4.4.
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Some preliminary comments on the structure of the model are 
necessary prior to any mathematical analysis. The objective function
4.5.1. is to maximize the market value of the firm where the market 
value according to MM is the market value of the unlevered firm 
plus the present value of tax-savings. The market value of the un­
levered firm is just the sum of the after tax cash flows from projects 
- . discounted at a rate aQ, which is assumed to be the appropriate
rate for the particular risk of that project assuming a base-case of 
all equity financing.* The present value of tax savings is just the 
after tax cash flows on one year debt discounted at the rate r and 
thus consists of the sum of terms like - ^  ^ u t-
Hence the objective function is a direct consequence of the two postulates 
ennunciated at the beginning of this section.
Equations 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 just represent the familiar cash
balance equations and do not present any particular problems. The
restriction on the level of debt - equation 4.5.4. - is such that the
debt at time t must be less than some fraction K of the total
market value of the firm at time t. Hence it is assumed that the
firm readjusts its debt level at the end of every period in terms of
its total market value at that time and that this level is maintained
during the next period. Equations 4.5.5. and 4.5.6. and thus merely
X wconvenient definitions of V , for carrying out the necessary 
revaluation of the firm in each period. In terms of the discussion 
of the previous section the total market* *value of the firm (V) 
is defined in terms of X and w  while the debt capacity <J> is also
•See Myers and Pogue ibid p. 587.
**The use of total market value V rather than the value of equity ip implies 
that the function V such be substituted for ip in the analysis of the 
previous section.
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functionally dependent on the decision vectors X and cj* Since this
analysis to be presented shortly is in terms of net present values
the finite horizon does not present any problems in theoretical project
valuations since H can be defined to occur after the last of the projects
cash flows. However, a full understanding of the model does not
emerge until the effect of H tending to infinity is considered,
and this will be done in section 4.7.
The assumption of dividend irrelevancy is reflected in the fact
that the inclusion of the terms Dfc, Efc in the cash balance equations
dV dvdo not affect the value of the firm, hence -■ = =0. An3Dfc 3Et
immediate consequence of this is that » 0 for all t and this 
observation simplifies the analysis considerably.
However, since the mathematical analysis becomes algebraically 
complex it is perhaps easiest to illustrate the approach by considering 
investments lasting over periods 0 and 1 only. Now the dual inequalities 
for the initial debt and the initial value of the debt stream give 
respectively
4.5.8
- KXQ + (l+r)exW ü 0 4.5.9.
The solution of this system is




The positive value to tells us that the debt constraint is binding, 
as indeed one would expect in an MM world, since the tax shield on
debt results in debt being relatively cheap.
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Consider the case of a single project with investment cQ  ^“ -1 
to be made now (time t»0 ) and an after tax cash flow of c ^  ■ 1 + x* 
one year later*. The analysis of the dual inequalities associated 
with the scale of acceptance of a project gives the (generalized) 
net present value of this one period project taken at full scale** 
as
4.5.12.
while the dual inequality associated with the value of the project 
income stream is
- KXQ + (l+a())01 2 0 4.5.13
X XSince this implies 0^ > 0  and thus V > 0  the inequality becomes an
equality from which




Substitution of the values of and 6^ into equation 4.5.12 
gives the generalized net present value of the project as
- 1  + f ^ _ + -  ------1L1+a0 (l+r’)(l+ao)J 4.5.15
which implies in accordance with the definition of cost of capital 
in the last section, a screening rate for the one period project of
aQ - rRT 4.5.16
* This implies an after tax return of x'. Thus if x is the pre-tax 
return then x' = x (1-T) and the pre-tax cash inflow is i+x (x_t )
1 - T *
The analysis further assumes that there are also sufficient profits to 
take full advantage of tax allowances.
** Since in this case and in the subsequent analysis, the results apply 
to any project the distinguishing j subscript is omitted.
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This is identical to the formula deduced by Myers (74).
It should be noted that in general that p* = aQ - rKT | - ~ j  > aQ - aQKT 
the discount rate postulated by Modigliani and Miller. This analysis 
can be extended to determine the total value of
income in any time period. Thus the dual inequalities for debt and 
the debt income stream at time t. are
MM,




-KXt  + <i+*)0t+1w -  etw 2 0 4.5.18
The first of these implies that > 0 and the debt constraint
Wis always binding. This in turn implies that > 0 and thus both 
of these inequalities become equalities.
A little algebraic manipulation yields the simple recurrence 
relationship
X^Il+r(1 -KT)] = Xfcl 4.5.19
from which it can be deduced that the shadow price on debt capacity 
is given by
1 — t (l+r')t+i 4.5.20
The contribution to debt capacity of an additional £1 of income
X(i.e. after tax cash flow) in period t is given by the dual 0t to the 
equation 4.5.5. which values the income stream. Consideration of 
this dual equality* gives
- + <1 +ao)et+iX ‘ etX * ° 4.5.21




(l+a0)(1 +r')r  +
t- 1
(l+a0) 4.5.22
Using the result of equation 4.5.14
X _ KrT 
1 ~ <l+a0)(l+r')
then we get
„ X KrT KrT______
t (1 +a Kl + r ' ) 1  (l+a„)1 (ltr1) * - 1  *"o o
KrT
(l+r ' ) (l+aQ) t 4.5.23
4.5.24
Thus an extra £1 of income in period t makes a direct contribution
of t t  to the value of the firm and an indirect contribution
(1 +a0,,: KrT T  1 1
via its impact on the debt capacity of (a _gl) I (1Vr. )fc ~ (i'+a )'t
Hence the appropriate discount factor for the cash flow c in t is
]■
1 KrT 1 _ 1
(l+aQ)c aQ - r 1 [«l+r'jt (l+a0)t
This is the closed function form of the adjusted present value 
formula (APV) of Myers, and hence for convenience his nomenclature 
will be used. Myers(74) suggests the APV of a project can be computed 





Clearly the first term represents the value now of an uncertain 
cash flow c t - p e r i o d s  hence. The second term can be interpreted
period t- 1  and knowledge of this cash flow makes a contribution to
at an interim period s and knowledge of this cash flow increases the 
present value of debt capacity now by an amount
This concept of the value of knowledge of future cash flows is a 
natural extension of the windfall gain concept of income discussed in 
Robichek and Myers (65).
By reverting to the form for the APV originally derived in 
equation 4.5.29 several results follow almost immediately. In the 
case where the project is a perpetuity with constant cash inflow 
stream where - C (say) t“l,2....«°
as follows. The uncertain cash flow in t, has a value of in
o
the value of debt capacity now of '(1+ri ^ t x . Hence the gener.




(1 +r')s+ 1 (1 +a )t-so
4.5.31
4.5.32
where I is the initial investment o
gr
Por Z0 = P (1-KT) o
Io 4.5.33
4.5.34
where 0 = p (1-KT)’ is the weighted average cost of capital accordingo
to Modigliani and Miller.
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Where the cash flows can be regarded as equivalent in risk
to that of borrowing, as in leasing cash flows then a can be seto
equal to r. In this case for an asset costing C
APV - C o o
H Ct H Ct
J. (l+r*)t = Co " Jri+rd-TK)]* t=l t=l
Here is the case flows associated with the leasing decision 
consisting of after-tax lease repayments and loss of tax allowances.
This is the result obtained by Myers ét-al (74) using.a variation on the 
APV approach and will be rederived more directly in the next chapter 
by solving the appropriate particular case of the recurrence 
relationship 4.5.26 and 4.5.27.
The discount rate p* at which shareholders ought to screen 
cash flows from projects can be defined by the solution of equation 
(2 2) such that
H C H C H C
J o  U+P*)* " APV° " <1‘<X> J o  + “ J 0 <!+«,>* 4-5’ 36
FIGURE 4.5.1 The relationship between the APV cut-off rate and the 
MM cost of capital
Discounted values 
of projects cash 
flows
While no general algebraic expression exists for the solution 
of such an expression it is relatively easy to show that for most 
investment projects such a solution does exist. Moreover, the 
computation of the solution is relatively trivial. The only additional 
notation necessary for this discussion is to define a net present value 
function by the equations
' v Ctf(x) =■ 2. ---7- ^ (x>o) 4.5.37
t=0 <l+ £>
f (0) =* C (x *= 0) 4.5.38o
It is clear from the above definition that the net present value 
of the cash flows at a discount rate y, NPV (y), is just f ( ^ ) . It 
follows also from the above definition that
APV = (1-a) f(i.) + a f (V ) 4.5.39o r ao
The function f is a continuous function of y for non-negative
values of y. Moreover for simple investment* it will be a concave
monotonically increasing function. As y increases (i.e. the discount
rate tends to zero) the function will tend asymptotically to the 
T
positive value £ C . Typically the shape of the function is as in figure 
t- 0 1
4.5.1. where the two axes are the discounted values of the cash flow 
and the reciprocals of the discount rates.
The desired results follow almost immediately. APVq is a weighted
linear combination of f (V  )• f (V ,) where the weights a, 1 -a respectively
0 1 1  are both positive and sum to unity. Hence f(— ,) > APV > f(/ ) and 
> a° 
once f ( /y) has been computed for appropriate values of y in the range
(V s y s V . ) ,  \  . which is the abscissa value** for which the function is 'a r* p*
* See Mao (69) for a discussion of simple investments.
** The continuity of f ensures the existence of such a discount rate.
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equal to APVq can be found by Interpolation. 
Now
1 -g a_ 
r* ao
4.5.40
1 1 4.5.41a <1-TK) “ jF o
o
a, l-a. We can use the concavity of the function f(y) to deduce 
the following result.
The result is a generalisation of the result observed by Myers for the 
one period case. All these results are illustrated in figure 4.5.1.
Thus it is seen that the MM cost of capital formula will in 
general break down when applied to projects whose cash flows 
are not constant perpetuities. There remains the problems of 
how one might compute or observe the rate aQ and of its relation­
ships to the equity and other rates. These issues will be 
discussed at some length in section 4.7, while the following 
section looks in detail at how the dual analysis might be extended 
to examine the ^consistency' of formulations of financial programming
f<X.) - APV p* o 4.5.42




While the increasing monotonicity of f further implies
4.5.45
or
P > P 4.5.46
models in practice
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4.6 Consistency and the elimination of Formulation Errors.
The model introduced in section 1.7 and detailed in 
appendices I £ III is fairly complex, and as such is liable to 
formulation errors. There are at least two different and very distinct 
methods of checking the consistency of the formulation. The first of 
these is the 'traditional' double entry form. Here the consistency 
of the formulation is checked by constructing balance sheets and cash 
flow statements from the structural variables in the model. Such a 
method is primarily a method of checking the consistency of the 
technological set of equations (equations Al. 1.1 to Al. 1.14 of 
appendix I ). In effect the report writer computes independently 
from the LP model the increase in shareholders equity and the increase 
in liabilities together with the change in the net cash balance 
position which are brought about by the year on year decisions.
The change in the capital provided is compared with the increase in 
the total assets of the firm as represented by the LP variable 
ASSETS^ while the change in the cash balance position is compared 
with the net change in the LP variables MARK^ - OVDR^. Appendix IX 
illustrates such a check.
In addition to any errors that might arise in the constraining 
equations,errors can,and do,arise in the formulation of the objective 
functions. Here the dual system of equations provide an interesting 
means of 'audit'.
The theoretical justification for the approach adopted again 
arises from the work of Hirschleifer. He showed that given free 
access to the capital markets the appropriate discount rate for 
investment appraisal was determined by the return required on the 
particular capital market instrument which was utilised in arriving 
at the investment decision. Further the discussion of chapter two
showed how this ciscount rate was siiqply related to the ratio of successive 
cash balance duals*. These ideas can be used to check that the single 
economic criterion used for valuing the firm (appendix V ) is con­
sistent with the technological set of equations defining the accounting 
and cash flow relationships (equations Al.l.lto Al.LMof Appendix I )
The methodology is to find the relationship between the objective 
function coefficients and the duals on the cash balance equations on 
the financial policy constraints. The dual variables associated with 
the financial policy constraints (equation A1.2.J. to AL2.6of appendix I) 
are then set to zero thereby simulating free access to the capital 
markets. The resulting relationship between the dual values on the 
cash balance constraints and the coefficient in the objective function 
provides a check on the consistency of the model structure.
The single economic criterion used in all but the 
penultimate chapter of this thesis is the maximization of the value 
of the net equity stream (i.e. dividends less rights issues) 
upto the horizon plus that portion of the horizon value of 
the firm which is attributable to the holders of equity. Thus 
the objective function takes the form
H-l DV H P.RG I|»H
"“ ♦o' J x Yi+ift+T - lx 7iii)F + Yi+iytf 4-6-1
which for convenience of the subsequent discussion will be 
written
* This statement does not contradict any of the arguments of this chapter. 
Here the assumption is being made of free access to one particular 
financial instrument. The rest of analysis presented in this chapter examines 
the interacting roles of various types of financial instruments where 
restrictions are placed on the use of these instruments.
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H
MAX ij ■= T ZDV . DV*. ZRG . RG) + O *•_ t t t t
zo vd r h . o v d r h
(l+i)H
z llh-i *zllh-i z° v dV i -o v dV i 2m a r k _1 .z m a r k h _1
(l+i)H + (l+i)« + (1+i)
(1 +i)" + (l+i)H + (l+i)i n i 4.6.2.
where the individual contributions of the various investment and 
financing instruments are individually identified and are denoted 
by the prefix Z.
Examination of equation 4.6.1. imnediately reveals some apparent
anomalies in the valuation of pre-horizon equity flows. Dividends,
but not rights, are omitted from the expression in the final year.
Furthermore the dividend variable in t is discounted by V ,  . . ,t+l'(1 +x)
whereas the rights stream is discounted by j t. An examination*
of the dual equation soon reveals the reasons.
The dual equality corresponding to the issue of dividends (DV^) 
for periods 1 to H is
* The work of this section rests heavily on the preliminary dual 
analysis which is carried out in appendix XVII .
It is thus assigned in the subsequent discussion that H S 8 .
-  CLt  + p fc -  OTARGt DCOV,t 4.6.3.
and the equality (A17.5) for CLt in periods 1 to H is
CT^t = pt " Pfc+1 ~ « ROCEt + 3 LODYt
Hence Pt + 1 = ZDVt - O. ROCEfc + B BLQDY^ (t=l,H) 4.6.4.
For time period t=H, the corresponding equations are
DTARG - E DOOV = ZDV H H 1H 4.6.5.
and




ZDV„ = a ROCE - e LQDY - DTARG - E DCOV„ n H H n H 4.6.6.
It follows from the initial discussion that we are interested 
in valuing dividends given free access to the capital markets.
In effect this means that we can ignore the financial policy constraints 
and set their dual values to zero.
Thus ROCEt - LQDYfc 
This implies that
DTARG fc = DCOVt = ERPSt = 0 (t=l,H) 4.6.7.
Pt = ZDVt_1 (t=l,H) 4.6.8.
and
ZDV = 0 H 4.6.9.
Since the implications of these last two equations are best 
considered in conjunction with the raising of equity capital, 
further discussion of equations 4.6.8 and 4.6.9 will be temporarily 
postponed.
For rights issued at price P the dual inequality is
- Ppt + EQt Z ZRGt (t»l,H) 4.6.10
while the dual equation associated with the number of shares 
outstanding (NUM^) is
EQt - EQt + 1 + 6 ERPSfc - W DTARGt = 0 (t=l,H)
and
EQ„ + 6 ERPS - Ü) DTARG = 0 H H H
In the absence of financial policy considerations then the last two 




from which it follows that
ZRGt S -P.ZDVt l <t=l,H) 4.6.12
Where the inequality is an equality if rights are issued.
Consider first the apparently anomalous result that the objective 
function coefficient valuing dividends at the horizon is zero. The 
reason for this becomes clear if the definition of the dividend 
variable is re-examined. DV represents the declared dividend at the 
horizon which is to be paid one year later in the post-horizon period - 
it does not represent a cash flow. Its contribution to the value 
of the firm will be represented via an increase in short term market 
investments, being money set aside for dividends declared but not 
paid. The accrual nature of the dividend variable is reflected in 
the time lags between the two sides of equality4.6 .8 . Here the 
objective function coefficient for dividends in t is actually 
related to the cash balance dual in t+1. In the case of rights 
issues, RG^ represents the number of rights issued in time period t and 
gives rise to an actual cash flow. As a consequence, there are no such 
time lags in the corresponding equations (equations 4.6.11 and 
4.6.12) for rights.
It follows from the analysis of Hirschleifer that given the firm 
is actually issuing dividends or rights the interperiod discount factor 
is just 1+i, i.e.
= 1+i 4.6.13







P <t=l,H) 4.6.15ZRG.’t (l+i)t
and
1 (t=l,H-l) 4.6.16ZDV,t = (l+i)t+i
with ZDV„ « 0 as before. '
The foregoing analysis takes care of the equity streams and detaile
consideration must now be given to the term iJ> . The portion of theH
horizon value which is attributable to the equity holders consists 
of the post-horizon operating cash flows from projects adopted in the 
prehorizon period, less the horizon value of debt. The horizon value 
of the investment projects is just the net post horizon cash flow 
from projects discounted back to the horizon at 10%. A rate of 10% 
was chosen in keeping with the earlier analysis of section 
where it was shown that a reasonable cut off rate for the screening 
of projects was 10%. This would appear to be the most suitable rate 
since the model is largely concerned with accept/reject decisions.
This rate, of course, was deduced from a dual analysis of the cash 
balance and debt constraints and itself is illustrative of another 
example of the use of cash balance duals in the valuation procedure.
If the objective function value of the short term investments 
is now considered, then for the variable OVDRfc, the following 
dual inequalities hold
-RS.EA + CL + yECOV k ZOVDR (t=l,H-l) 4.6.17t t t t
and
CL + YECOV k ZOVDR H H H 4.6.18
In addition we can use the equalities A17.9 and A17.17 for
CLfc and EAfc to deduce
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ZRGt = - Yl^l)T  (t-l,H) 4.6.15
and
ZDVfc = '('i+i)^T  (t«l,H-l) 4.6.16
with ZDV„ ■ 0 as before. rl
The foregoing analysis takes care of the equity streams and detaile
consideration must now be given to the term <|i . The portion of theH
horizon value which is attributable to the equity holders consists 
of the post-horizon operating cash flows from projects adopted in the 
prehorizon period, less the horizon value of debt. The horizon value 
of the investment projects is just the net post horizon cash flow 
from projects discounted back to the horizon at 10%. A rate of 10% 
was chosen in keeping with the earlier analysis of section 
where it was shown that a reasonable cut off rate for the screening 
of projects was 10%. This would appear to be the most suitable rate 
since the model is largely concerned with accept/reject decisions.
This rate, of course, was deduced from a dual analysis of the cash 
balance and debt constraints and itself is illustrative of another 
example of the use of cash balance duals in the valuation procedure.
If the objective function value of the short term investments 
is now considered, then for the variable OVDR^, the following 
dual inequalities hold
-RS.EA + CL + YECOV. k ZOVDR (t=l,H-l) 4.6.17t t t t
and
CL„ + YECOV,, 2 ZOVDR 4.6.18H H H
In addition we can use the equalities A17.9 and A17.17 for 
CLfc and EAfc to deduce
from which
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Pfc2-ZOVDRt + (l+RS)Pfc+1 + TRSpfc+2 - RS(1+aT)ROCEt + 1  
+ aROCEt - RS.T .PLQDYt + 1 + RS (1-T) ERPSt + 1  
+ RStl-Tl.DCOVt + 1 - RS.ECOVt + 1 - YECOV^J t=l,H-2) 4.6.19
PH-! * - ^ V l  + <1+RS>PH
+ aROCEH l - RS . T . 3LQDYt + 1 - g.LQDYfc
+ RS(1— ) ERPS + RS [1-T] DCOV - RS.ECOV - YECOV , 4.6.20H H H n”A
PH ^ - ZOVDRy + aROCEH - B.lqdyh - yecovh 4.6.21
In the absence of financial policy constraints, then the relationship 
between the cash balance duals for t=l, H-2 when overdraft is being 
used is
Pt - <l+RS)Pt + 1  - T.RS.pt + 2 4.6.22
The interpretation of this equality is fairly simple. The -(1+RS)
represents the repayment of debt plus interest in time t+1 of the 
debt taken out in t. The term + T.RS.pt + 2 represents the tax 
relief which occurs in time period t+2. If we are interested in 
the interperiod discount rate IT where pfc = 1Tpt + 1 then * is 9iven 
by the solution of
IT2 - (1+RS)TT + T.RS = 0 
or
(l+RS) ± /(1+RS) 2 - 4TRS. . , ,,TT - --------- j---------------  4.6.23
Now RS and T. are small, being 0.12 and 0.5 respectively and we
can approximate it ignoring terms the order of (RS) 5 by
(1+RS) ± [l+5fi + 2RS (1-2T) - 4 (j p -2 (l-2T)2] 4.6.24
IT - - 2 J
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Considering only the positive square root* we have
IT “ 1 + (l-T)RS + T.RS2 (1-T) 4.6.25
Here the principal term in the interperiod discount rate is 
(l-T)RS, the after tax rate on debt, while the term T(1-T)RS 
is a 'correction* due to lagged tax allowances. With RS - 0.12 
and T = 0.5 then the interperiod discount rate is 1.0636. The 
validity of the expression can be checked by examining the ratio 
of the cash balance duals when overdraft is being used in the 
absence of other constraints. Thus in the sample printout - Figure
4.6.1. - overdraft is being raised in period three and four. Hie 
cash balance cuals are 0.7105 and 0.6682 giving an interperiod
discount factor of 1 .0633.
FIGURE 4.6.1.
NAME R.H.S. DUAL PRICE
CB1 I -4580.0000 0! 8943CR2 I 0 0.8546CB3 0 0.7105CB4 1 0 0.6682CBS | 1 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.56S7CB6 0 0.5087CB7 I _  0 ' 0.4525CBS 0 0.4040 '
This offers confirmation of the correctness of our analysis. The 
analysis now affords us with a mechanism for correctly determining 
and ZOVDRy ^• If we assume that at the 
planning horizon the value of the firm must be reduced by the value 
of outstanding debt to give the value of the equity portion then 
we have ZOVDRy = -1 in equation 4.6.2.
*The boundary conditions are chosen so that only this root appears 
in practice.
the value of ZOVDRH ^
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In order to ensure consistency in the valuation then
ZOVDR.H-l needs to be defined so that
4.6.26
or
IT “ - ZOVDR^^ - (1+RS) 4.6.27
Thus
Z O V D R ^  - T.RS - T (l-T)RS2 
Hence with RS = 0.12 and T = 0.5 then
4.6.28
ZOVDRjj = 0.0572 4.6.29
Although this term might seem somewhat peculiar it arises from the 
following cash flows shown schematically in the Figure 4.6.2.
FIGURE 4.6.2.
Thus £1 borrowed at the end of year H-l results in a cash outflow of 
RS in year H consisting of interest payment with a reduction in the 
tax paid in the post horizon period (i.e. at the end of year H+l) 
of T.RS. This tax relief when valued at the horizon by discounting 
at the effective rate on debt tt contributes 1
or ignoring terms of order (RS).3 T.RS - T(1-T)RS* to the horizon value. 
A similar piece of analysis can be carried out for market investments. 
Here the interperiod discount rate in general is given by
Interest 
paid (R!=:)








1 + (1-T)RS*+ T.RS (1—T)
1 + (l-T)RI + R(1-T)RI* 4.6.30
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Again this result can be confirmed by examination of the 
cash balance duals where market investments are being raised.
Such a result is shown in figure 4.6.3. for H = 8 where the ratio 
of the duals is 1.0 36 22 against a theroretical value of 1.0 36 25. 
This gives a value for the horizon value of short term investments
taken out in period H - 1 of -0.0338 where this term again arises 
from tax payments made post horizon on the interest received in 
period H.
FIGURE 4.6.3. 
NAME VALUE REDUCED COST
B MARK1 ♦ 209.2234 0
MARK2 ♦ 0 -0.0749
B MARK3 ♦ 361.3706 0
B MARK4 ♦ 249.0143 0
B MARKS ♦ 2/5.8134 0
B MARK6 ♦ 1597.3600 0
B MARK/ ♦ 3H60.3429 0
B MARKS ♦ 7390.7397 0
NAME R.H.S. PRICECIS -902.0000 1.0000CB1 -4580.0000 1.3642CB2 0 1.2605CB3 t 0 1 .1935sCB4 \ 0 1.1516'CBS 1000.0000 1 .111 3n 
1.0725'CB6 0C8Z 0 1.0350CBS 0 1.0000
It should perhaps be further emphasised that not only does this
analysis provide a mechanism for determining the appropriate value
of the objective function for short term investments and loan, it 
also provides a method of structuring the technological constraint 
set. In particular a great deal of difficulty was encountered 
because the variable specification contained both transactions which 
were accruals and actual cash flows. The 'reasonableness' of equations 
4.6.25 and 4.6.30 suggest that the current asset and current 
liabilities were indeed correctly incorporated into the model.
Finally the impact of long term debt must be considered
For long term debt (LL^) issued in period t we have 
“ Pt + Dt ’ ZLtt 4.6.31
where ZLL^ is included since a 15 year debenture taken out in 
any of the eight prehorizon- periods will always have some post­
horizon cash flows.
For long term debt outstanding in t, (DE^) we have the 
equality
-RLPt+1 + (l-T)RL PRfc+1 + Dfc - Dfc+1 + YECOVt - 0 (t-l,H-l)
and
He can substitute in this for PR from equation A17.14
Pt - (l+RL)Pt+1 + TRLpfc+2 + OT.RL R O C E ^  + B'ERIJ.QDY^ 
+ (l-T)RI^RPSt+1 + (l-T)RL DCOVt+1




and from equation 4.6.31 to deduce
(t-lfH-2) 4.6.32
with
P„ , - (1+RL)P„ + T.RLP + (1-T) RL.ERPS + (1-T)RXJXX)V„ H-l H H n *»
- 2LLh-1 - ZLLH 4.6.33
and
4.6.34
Pt  -  ( l+ R L ) P t+1  + W t+2  » -  ZLLfc+1 4.6.35
ph_i - (1 >RL)Ph - - m , 4.6.36
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ph “ u t ty -  + yec° vh 4-6-37
Again at the horizon it is convenient* to define Z(DE ) =■ -1. WeH
also make the assumption that while the firm is borrowing the 
interperiod discount rate is a constant it. The solution to the 
homogeneous part of equation 4.6.35 gives a value for tt of
TT “ 1 + (l-T)RL + T(1-T)RL2 4.6.38
Thus for consistency
ZLLjj j = T.RL - T(1-T)RL* 4.6.39
and
ZLLt = 0 (t*l,H-2 and t-=H) 4.6.40
Again the non-zero objective function coefficient arises 
from post-horizon tax relief on debt interest payments made in 
the pre-horizon period. In particular for the model under 
discussion with RL = 0.08 and T - 0.05
ZLL «= 0.C384 4.6.41H-l
4.7 Infinite Time Horizon Linear Programmes and Long Run Equilibrium 
Solutions
All the models referenced so far in this thesis have been finite
horizon models where the investment and financing decisions are
considered jointly over some finite planning period. As has already
been demonstrated the net result of such an approach is that projects
are valued at an internally determined opportunity cost of capital
♦Strictly speaking the outstanding net of tax interest stream and the 
final repayment should be capitalized at the internal rate of return 
of the stream. In general, and in this case in particular, the 
correction is negligible.
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in the pre-horizon period but are valued by a pre-determined cost 
of capital in the post-horizon period. Hence in the case of 
Weingartner's horizon models and the Chambers' model where 
analytical solutions to the implied pre-horizon opportunity cost of 
capital were available it was possible to compare this solution with 
the post-horizon discount rate and to examine the nature of the 
post-horizon approximation in some detail.
Chambers is aware of the approximate nature of his post-horizon 
valuation procedures and addresses directly the way in which it 
might be improved both theoretically and practically. Thus he 
states*
"Managers would normally expect to be able to invest 
substantial sums after the horizon at better than marginal rates,
....  NPVH understates the true value to the firm of funds
available after the horizon"
He gives a careful analysis of the extra information needed to 
avoid such an undervaluation. He states that if details were available 
of the likely returns on future investment opportunities then an 
appropriate adjustment could be made providing of course that the 
capital market parameters do not change. Carleton (70) also 
considers in some detail how he might provide a reasonable post-horizon 
valuation. His solution to the horizon value problem is to assume 
that the firm enters a steady state growth situation and values the 
anticipated dividend stream using Gordon's (62) model. He further 
suggests several ways in which the growth rate can be extrapolated from, 
and made to be consistent with, the pre-horizon performance.
* Ibid p. 286
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A formalization of these two approaches would lead to the 
following infinite linear model:
Max c'.z° + irc'z1 + ir2c ’.z2 4.7.1.
subject to
[BJz1 <; fo
-lAlzl + Cb Jz 2 S (l+g)f
- [Alz1 + [Biz2 * (1+g)2f 4.7.2.
where in this notation
Z* - is a non-negative (column vector) of decisions (including 
financing decisions) taken at time t.
C' - is a (transposed) valuation vector 
[B] - is the pre-horizon matrix of resources uses 
[Al - is the matrix of post-horizon consequences
f - vector of flows from existing operations, being the first 
period values.
ir - is a discount factor 
and g - is a growth factor
Thus the set of decisions facing the firm now cam be considered 
as part of a set of decisions from a repeating set* of opportunities. 
The total decision set then can be seen as the first of a set of 
infinite decisions. The linear program to be solved can be thought 
of as an infinite ladder as represented by figure 4.7.1.
•The period of this repeating set may of course be longer than a 
year. In the subsequent discussion it is convenient to consider 
the period as a year for simplicity of argument.
It should be emphasised that the above structure is merely an 
explicit formalization of the implicit assumptions of finite horizon 
valuation models. Thus implicit in the valuation models of Weingartner
Chambers, Carleton and other writers is the continuing existence of 
both the firm, future investments and the capital markets.
Furthermore it is generally assumed that there are no major changes 
at the horizon in the parameters describing the behaviour of these 
markets. Hence no radically new assumptions have been incorporated 
into the generalization of the existing approaches.
The infinite system of equations 4.7.1. and 4.7.2 can be written 
in the more compact form
00
Max l IT C z *
t- 0
4.7.3
such that CB]Z° S f0 4.7.4.
[Biz* - [A]zt _ 1 S ( 1+g) 4.7.5.
One immediate observation is that if T| is the dual vector associated
with period 1 resource allocation, then the reduced finite LP
FIGURE 4.7.1 ••
DECISIONS 0z * 2 1 AVAILABLE RESOURCES
Matrices of [Bj
r ------ •
_ u  - -..-fXL__________
resources -[a ] [B] • u+g)2f _ _ _ —
uses [A] IB] 1 d+g)f
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C'Z° + HjCAlz® 4.7.6.
tB]z° S f 4.7.7.o
gives the same decision set for the first period as that of the 
infinite LP describe by equations 4.7.3., 4.7.4 and 4.7.5. Such 
a valuation model would satisfy the postulated horizon principle.
The difficulty remains, of course, of actually computing i)^ . Most 
authors h a w  approximated ^  by a constant one-parameter cash discount 
vector. For example. Chambers uses the approximation ^ (a) =
a is used as a single parameter for valuating cash flows and the null 
vector is the valuation vector for the post horizon debt capacity 
effects.
The theory of infinite LP systems which can be represented by 
equations 4.7.3., 4.7.4. and 4.7.5. have been explored extensively by 
Evers (73, 74, 75, 76, 77) who discusses the existence of long run 
equilibrium solutions as well as methods of generating horizon 
valuations such that the infinite model can be truncated in a 
way that satisfies the horizon principle.
Evers shows that under certain conditions* one of which is 
ir(l+g) < 1 then the decision vector Zfc and the dual vector to 
the infinite LP system converge in the sense that
where z” and rf are the equilibrium primal and dual vectors given by 
the solution to the system.
*For a discussion of these conditions see Evers (June 73 p. 13). It 
will be assumed in the subsequent discussions that these conditions 
are satisfied.
where the weight average cost of capital





(CBi - “'<!«,>) 4.7.10
i CB] - [A] J Ijf - V » C 4.7.11
\  /where
7 ’ .7 + Tf .7 - o 4.7.12
and
»V _ _v,z,q,y so 4.7.13
The application of the theory to financial planning models 
can be illustrated by constructing a simple example. Thus with 
the objective function the maximation of the present value* of the 
future dividend stream the infinite horizon model is
CO
^  'J’o “ l (l+i) Dt 4.7.14t?=u
with a cash balance constraint**
X + D - to) ^ F o o o o
Xt - (l-Hc')X x + Dt + tl+r(l-T)]u)t l - <i»t £ 0 (Pt) 4.7.15
plus a debt capacity constraint where debt is limited by the value 
of the equity
u>t S H|»t (Xt)(t“0 ,l,*>)
In addition MM's fundamental principle of valuation gives
4.7.16
Dt + *t " = 0 (t-0.1.-) <0fc) 4.7.17
If it is assumed that the firm has a growing set of opportunities then 
Xt S (l+g) 1  (t=0,“>) <Mt) 4.7.18
* It is, of course, necessary to assume that the shareholder requires 
a constant return from the firm. This assumption will be discussed 
in more detail later.
**The symbols in brackets represent the dual variables.
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Here it is assumed that projects consist of an investment of 1 
followed by a return of l+x(l-T) = 1+x1 the following year. Thus 
the return from the project is constant, in keeping with the 
earlier discussion, but the scale of opportunities is increasing. 
Then it is relatively easy to identify that
1 - 1  0 1 and [A] » 0 -(1 +r) 0 1
0 1 -K 0 0 0 -K 0
1 0  1 0 0 0 1 0
' O o o »-• .° 0 0 1 .
The equilibrium combination* for this system is
solution identified above, there is the possibility that the 
original system may have a homogeneous solution which satisfies
and the general solution to the system is then the equilibrium 
solution plus the homogeneous solution. In this case the equation 
4.7.14 - 18 give
*For the models discussed here the equilibrium solutions are relatively 
easy to find. A general algorithm based on complementarity theory for 
the numbrical computation of equilibrium is to be found in Evers (June 
73, Nov. 73., July 77).
4.7.20
4.7.21
* ~ 9 4.7.22i - g + Kr(1-T) - Kg
7  = 1
when it is assumed i > x' > r(l-T) > g giving the equilibrium 
path on multiplying by (l+g)^. In addition to the equilibrium
- tAlzt + - 0 4.7.24
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Dfc - (i)t + Xfc = -(l+r(l-T))wt + (l+x’)Xt 4.7.25
U>t  -  KJ|»t  -  0 4.7.26
Dt + 4.7.27
Xt 0 4.7.28
A non-trivial solution to this system exists where
♦t [1 + i + K(l+r (1-T)) 1 + K 4.7.29
The expression in brackets is similar to the conventional weighted 
average cost of capital formula and will be denoted by a. The 
complete homogeneous solution then becomes
♦t - (l+a)ii»t l
Dt - (i—a) if»t
“t = K*t
xt «* o
The difficulty here is obvious. This solution implies that the 
firm is growing at a rate 1 +a which is greater than its growth in 
opportunities which are only growing at the rate g. Clearly such 
a situation is not acceptable. Also the debt is growing at the 
rate 1 +a and would soon far outstrip the value of realisable assets 
(i.e. assets in place) which are only growing at the rate 1 +g. - a 
situation which would not be permitted in practice. The reason for 
this anomalous behaviour of the debt capacity constraint arises 
because the firm is able to borrow large amounts of funds at a 
rate r against a 'promise' of increased future dividends and then 
to distribute these funds to shareholders with a preference rate i. 
The increased future dividends are then met by further borrowing.
Evers explores the conditions under which it is possible to
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produce a valuation model such that the truncated LP gives the 
same solution as the infinite LP. He concludes that such a valuation 
is possible for systems where the square matrix H defined by
contradicts the initial assumptions. The requisite truncation 
condition is always satisfied for systems for which the homogeneous 
solution is the null solution.
The problem is thus is to attempt to identify systems with 
trivial homogeneous solutions which have non-trivial equilibrium 
solutions. It was suggested that the 'South-Sea bubble' 
phenomenunwould not have occurred in practice because the debt 
would have been restricted by the value of assets in place.* Thus 
consider the model
* Myers (78) in a paper 'The Determinants of Corporate Borrowing' 
comes to a similar conclusion about the importance of the value 
of existing assets, using what appears to be a completely different 
approach. In fact, there is some similarity in that both approaches 
make assumptions about how the providersof debt capital view promises 
of future income streams.
- 1
[Hi = (CBl - ttCa D) [Bl 4.7.31
has no eigenvalues e^, such that
1  2 --- > (l+g)ir 4.7.32
Here [a ! , [B*I are the matrices formed from Ca I and [B] but with
the column and rows associated with non-basic components of
the (Z,f)) equilibrium combination deleted. In the example
under discussion the eigenvalues of H are 1 (three times)
and
Condition 4.7.32 holds for e=l in which case ——— = 0 but thee
condition applied to last eigenvalue requires > a which
MAX J 0 (l+i)t
such that X - (l+x)Xt l + Dt “ “ t + s 0
Xfc S (l+g)fc 4.7.33
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where the debt capacity is limited by the current value of assets,
1 .*.
U>t S K X t 4.7.34
This system gives rise to the following equilibrium equations 
with primal
D + ®  + y. = 01 +g 1 +g 1
S’ + y2 = KX
x + y3 = 1 4.7.35
and dual
with complementarity and non-negativity conditions holding, the 
solution of this system is
D = * ~ BL ♦ gt1-??) p,li + g
8  - '
X - l  U- K<1-r; - *> 4.7.37
provided i > x >  r >g and > K 4.7.38
It is worthwhile interpreting these solutions in some detail.
If an extra £1 is available then since there are no further investment 
opportunities the correct decision is to distribute that £1 , hence 
J5'»l, ignoring the discount factor.
In contrast if an extra £i of debt capacity becomes available 
then this results in an extra £l now with interest £r and capital
repayable one year later giving a net present value of
Whereas if the scale of a project can be increased then the net
1 +xpresent value of the investment is worth - 1  + but gives an 
increase in debt capacity valued at K with a net benefit
then the equilibrium solution would b e D ’=5T=iü = 0. In these 
cases the firm would either not be able to raise loans sufficiently 
cheaply or the return on the assets would be insufficient to support 
debt finance. Under such circumstances the firm would quickly 
redistribute earnings from its existing assets to shareholders without 
making further investment and cease trading.
The model as represented by 4.7.33 and 4.7.34 is in fact 
considerably more general than might appear at first sight. While 
the debt capacity is restricted by the value of the assets in 
places, other restrictions on debt take a similar mathematical form. 
Thus if the restriction on debt was such that debt interest was to 
be more than times covered by income then the restriction would 
have taken the form
w S(l+x)Xt / = Kt'Xt * K^d + q ) *
* fKtr
Alternatively, for a simple "upper bound on debt the form would 
have been £ (l+g)t B.
This last form is essentially Weingartner's model with the 
possibility of a uniform growth in both opportunities and debt
K(l-r) - (i-x) 
1 + iof
It should be noted that if r > -—  * ^  or if x < Kr - g(l-K)
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availability. Hence all these three models have a restriction on 
debt capacity of the form u>t £ (1 +g) and as such if i > x > r will 
have a solution of the form above. These models are also well- 
behaved in the sense that they have trivial homogeneous solutions 
thus the homogeneous solutions to the system defined by 4.7.33 and
4.7.34 is
Dt - “ t " " (1 +r)“t-l 
U)fc “ 0
xt - 0 4.7.39
with solution Dfc = (i>t « = 0. 4.7.40
Thus such a model is capable of truncation in accordance 
with the horizon principle propounded.
This model as originally introduced by equation 4.7.33 and 4.7.34 
related debt to the value of assets and could be considered a simplified 
version of the Chamber^ model with taxation and depreciation ignored.
It should be noted that in this case the shadow price on debt is
proportional to the difference between the equity and debt rates - 
a structure very similar to that deduced in section 3.5 for the 
shadow price on debt in the pre-horizon period.
In Weingartrier's version of 4.7.33 and 4.7.34 i**r and the
equilibrium solution is u  • 0, S’ = —7“ , X - 1 4.7.41l+g
with corresponding duals pf«l, X = 0 , 1 1 = (assuming that the
investment returns more than the debt rate). It should be noted 
that under such circumstances capital rationing no longer exists 
since the debt capacity dual is zero. This fact on reflection is 
not surprising. If the firm is capable of generating surplus 
funds after servicing its debt then given sufficient time in a stable
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operating environment the firm will move into a permanent funds 
surplus situation.
Since in the Weingartner model debt has no intrinsic value,* 
once this point is reached no further debt will be raised.
A cursory glance at the literature on capital budgeting will 
reveal that nearly all Weingartner type models where numerical 
examples are included display a short run rationing phenomena.
The method of analysis discussed so far has concerned itself 
with long run equilibrium conditions whereas the real power of linear 
programming models is in the planning over relatively short time 
periods where the firm is essentially in a disequilibrium condition. 
In such cases the cost of capital as defined in section 4.4 may take 
completely different forms under such conditions of equilibrium and 
disequilibrium.
The following model should clarify the problem. Assume 
that the objective of the film is the maximisation of the net present 
value of the dividend stream, where the upper limits on the level 
of debt is imposed by the suppliers of capital (i.e. both equity 
and loan capital). Therefore assume that debt must be less than a 
fixed percentage of the value of the firm as measured in terms of its 
(current) asset level^and^as measured by its market value. Here the 
market value is again simply the projected future dividend stream.
It is further assumed that these restrictions lire such that the 
resulting debt structure means that the lender of debt finance and 
the shareholders are happy with a constant return.** Hence the 
model is
* A consequence of no taxes and a world of certainty.
** It would be easy to extend the model to cover an increased step 
function for the debt rate as debt increased but for illustration 
purposes it is not considered necessary here.
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iii - T 1 4.7.42t-o <1+i)t• Dt
X + D — b) S r 4.7.43o o o O
(l+x)Xt l  + Dfc - ü>t + (l+r)ut x S 0 t»l,® 4.7.44
*t + Dt - (i+i)*t l = 0 4.7.45
xt s U+g)* 4.7.46
0) S K I b 4.7.47t m t
“ t 5 Vt 4.7.48
plus non-negativity conditions.
In the long run the debt will grow at the rate of growth of
investment opportunities i.e. at 1+g. The equilibrium conditions
result from the debt restriction (inequality 4.7.48) on the value
of the assets and will be given by the equations of the last section.




The equilibrium path for dividends thus is CD in Figure 4.7.2. 
and the dividend payment is given by
If the initial flow of funds into the firm is such that it is 
unable to pay out the initial (equilibrium) dividend then the 
firm will use debt to grow at a rate faster than the growth in 
opportunitiesjprovided that this does not violate the restriction 
imposed by its level of assets }until it reaches the equilibrium path. 
Hence if the initial optimum dividend payment is represented by the point 
A ¿the firm will move along the path AB until it meets the 
equilibrium path CD at B. Thus the complete solution of the 
firm's dividend decision is represented by the path ABD. Once the 
firm has reached its equilibrium path then the value of a project 
commenced in time period t is
which consists of its discounted cash flow value at the equity rate 
plus its debt capacity contribution.
However, while the firm is on the portion AB of its path then 
the above cost of capital formula do not apply. If we assume that 
the firm is using debt financing then the dual analysis yields
[ * ' -  K_ r(l-T) + g(l+K_) 1





Now under the assumption that the level of debt is determined 
by the market constraint = 0 and the solution of 4.7.51 and





1 + k m 4.7.53
Here a is the traditional weighted average cost of capital.
In this case the generalised NPV of the project is simply of the one 
period project is
Equation 4.7.54 is of course the standard text book formula.
Hence it is seen not only is the cost of capital critically* 
dependent on the restriction on debt capacity but the actual form 
that such a restriction takes may vary over the life cycle of the 
firm. In this particular case initially the firm is able to use 
debt financing to grow at a rate faster than its growth in oppor­
tunities but in the long run the firm must be restricted to grow 
at the same rate as its opportunities. It should also be noted 
that in the early phase of its growth the weighted average cost of 
capital is actually independent of the precise debt equity ratios 
but is the appropriate valuation rate for projects provided that the 
firm is using debt finance. This is a consequence of assuming that 
the equity and debt rates themselves are constant up to a 
fixed level of gearing and inelastic thereafter. Clearly such an 
assumption does place severe limitations on the conclusions that can 
be drawn from such models and this is a point which must be re-addressed 
in the final chapter. In addition the model just discussed was 
developed in a framework which does not strictly accord with modem 
financial theory and must therefore be considered as merely illustrative
of the problems involved in long term and short term financial planning.
* Elton, Gruber and Leiber (75) explore the long run cost of capital in 
continuous time using control theory. However, they erroneuously assume 
the MM cost of capital formula to hold under different forms of debt 
capacity restrictions.
<l+a)t (1 +a) 4.7.54
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The model developed by Myers and Pogue (74) and represented 
by the systems of equations 4.5.1 to 4.5.7 is in accord with 
modern financial theory and it would thus seem appropriate to 
explore the nature of any long run equilibrium solutions. For the 
convenience of the analysis it is convenient to assume only one 
investment project consisting of a unit outlay and a return of 
1 + x' the following year. The model is represented by 4.5.1 
to 4.5.7 can be then conveniently rewritten in the form
MaxV° = K ^ 1 xt + a ^ f c r ^ t )  4 '7'55
subject to
X - (i> + D - E = Fo o o o o
X - (l+x’)Xt - wt + (l+r(l-T))u>t 
“t 5 K(VtX + Vt“>
vï - i  -  ( l4x ’ )xt - i  + xt  -  V  “ o
(1+r)Vt-l“ - rTWt-l - Vt“ = ‘°
xt s (l+g)fc
<p)o




(t=i,»> O tx) 4.7.58
(t-i,»») CD 4.7.59
4.7.60
plus the usual non-negativity conditions, except for 8^*, 6^  which 
are free variables.
The model as formulated in equations 4.7.55 to 4.7.60 differs 
significantly from the other models discussed in this section in that 
there exists two separate and non equal discount factors in the 
objective function. Thus the theory developed by Evers cannot be 
applied directly. However, if feasible solutions exist such that 
for the primal solution Z -Ml+g) Z and for the dual solution
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^  t t#v
1  -ni i| with complementarity holding then such a solution is 
optimal. Starting with the dual system such a solution turns out 
to be relatively easy to find. Thus we are seeking a solution with
, 8 , 6 ,y such that ratio of successive 
dual values in a constant.
Now equation 4.5.19 for Xfc gives
. Xt- 1 ______rT______
t “ [l+r(l-KT)] “ tl+r(l-KT)]t+l
~Thus we must take X ■ and the ratio of successive duals
as ^ +r. £oit the equilibrium solution to be asymptotically consistent
with the solution of section 4.5.
This implies 8^ “ 1 4.7.61
4.7.62
4.7.63
For such a system to satisfy complementarity then all the primal 




~  ~x ~(0 V - \T + V 4.7.66
4.7.67
Since this solution is primal-dual feasible and complementarity holds 
then it represents the long-run equilibrium path.
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Apart from the (l+g)t growth factor the long run value
of the firm is
V 4.7.68
Now the net operating income in time period t is (l+g)t(x'-g)
or a stream x'-g growing at the rate 1+g in perpetuity. Hence the 
implication is that to value to total income of the firm this stream 
should be discounted at a rate a where a is given by the solution to
If the income stream is constant, with g = 0, then the above
expression reduced to a (1-KT) which is of course the MM formula.o
As was observed in section 4.5 the MM cost of capital is not correct 
for a non-constant stream, though except in simple cases analytical 
expressions do not exist for the cost of capital.
This pleothera of rates might appear somewhat confusing and so 
far the analysis has not indicated how or even whether it is possible 
to compute these rates from readily available data. Fortunately, 
it is relatively easy to relate the above rates to the return on 
equity and the cost of debt.
MM's fundamental principle of valuation as present in 
equation 4.3.8 defines the return on equity as
4.7.69




Then from the cash balance equation for the long run 
equilibrium path





Vi - Vi - “t-1
in accordance with the earlier definition contained in equation 4.2.1. 
This gives for i the expression
(x’-g) +| r ’-g
(“ ) (v ? )
U-K) 4.6.73
After some further algebraic manipulation, the following relationship
emerges
i(l-K) + Kr (1-T) = a rKT (a^-g)o r-g o




Hence the conventional weighted average cost of capital formula
still holds in this growth case provided the inadequacies of the MM
cost of capital formula are accepted. Thus a is computable fromo
measurements of the equity return and the formulae as presented in 
this section are consistent. This provides some justification for the
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comnent made in the introduction to section 4.3 that the different 
forms for the cost of capital are not necessarily contradictory 
provided they arise from different but consistent approaches to 
the valuation problem.
4.8 The practical implications of a finite horizon
Frequent reference has already been made to the horizon problem.
In particular two aspects have been of prime concern in this chapter. 
The first has been the impact of a finite horizon on the use of LP 
models in the development of theories of valuation. The second is 
the practical implications of using a finite horizon in financial 
planning models. It is this latter aspect which is now of immediate 
concern.
Two possible approaches to determining that horizon has already 
been discussed in section 1.5. These are the pragmatic approach 
adopted by Chambers (71) who argues that the planning horizon in 
practice is largely determined by the firms forecasting ability 
and natural planning cycle and the theoretically appealing, though 
possibly non-implementable approach of Weingartner (63) who suggests 
that it is the point at which increasing the horizon yields no net 
benefit. The questions to be addressed in this section are two­
fold. What are the potential dangers in the Chambers approach and what 
are the problem of devising a practical methodology which conforms 
with Weingartner's definition of horizon?
It is assumed that in any implementation, whatever approach 
is adopted in determining the horizon, the model would be used 
on a rolling-horizon basis, whereby decisions would be tentatively 
made in all years upto some horizon but only the year-one decisions
ate.
would be implemented. At the end of year-one all data would be 
updated and tentative decisions again would be made upto the horizon 
advanced by one year. This time year two decisions would be implemented. 
The planning process would thus continue on this rolling-horizon 
basis, with planning being over several years, though with only 
imnediate decisions being implemented. While such a process overcomes 
in part the static nature of LP planning models, it does not in 
itself solve the problem of how distant the horizon should be
In this section the suggestion of Weingartner that different 
horizon dates should be tried until one is found which does not 
(materially) affect the implemented decisions is explored. The 
exploration is carried out using the model proposed in section
1.7 and detailed in appendices I to V.
Such an exploration of course must be specific to this model and 
to the horizon valuation used; however, if this model is accepted 
as being of realistic complexity then the result of such experiments 
might give some indication as to the seriousness or otherwise of 
finite horizons in practical planning situations. It is also perhaps 
worth noting that although Weingartner's ideas on the determinants of 
the horizon have been widely accepted by other writers, there appears
to have been no actual experimentation to determine its viability.
/
In order to simulate the rolling-horizon planning process 
the following set of experiments were carried out on the LP model.
The horizon was fixed successively at times upto eight years 
ahead* in steps of one year. The post-horizon valuation <|i at 
each of these horizonswas just that described in section 4.6 and 
took the objective function took the form
* This did of course assume that the initial decisions did become 
independent of the horizon within the eight year period. The 
somewhat arbitrary and expedient assumption is justified by the 
results later in this section.
Max J j 
t- 1  ( * '(lTi)™
4.8.1
The LP model was set up so that it was possible to suppress any 
constraints occurring in the periods t=I!+l to t=8 . Thus the constraint 
set was operative only over the pre-horizon period.
With the model set up as described and the horizon set at 
the value H, the optimal decision set for the periods t=l to H was 
found. The first year (t=*l) investment and financing opportunities 
were fixed at their solution values using a simple bounding procedure 
and the horizon was advanced one year. A new optimal solution with 
respect to both the horizon H + 1 and the existing (or 'implemented') 
year-one decisions was found. The projects and investments for 
the second year (t=2) were fixed at their optimal values. The 
process was repeated until the planning covered the whole eight 
year span hence simulating a 'rolling-horizon' decision procedure 
The experiment was repeated for values of H ranging from 1 to 8 
in integer steps and for varying levels of earnings from existing 
projects.
It should be emphasised that the D-statistiC*in Table 4.8.1. 
applies only to the first six years, since projects selected in 
years 7 and 8 are largely on a NPV criterion in any case. Further 
the results are strictly only true when the planning horizon in 
H years for projects implemented in time period t such that t + H S 8 .
Tables 4.8.1. and 4.8.2 shows the effect of various planning 
horizons on the error in project selection, as measured by the D- 
statistic and by the value of the plan. These results are displayed 
graphically in figures 4.8.1. and 4.8.2. Six years was chosen since
* See section 3.6.
TABLE 4.8.1. Error in project selection for different horizons
^HORIZON TIME (H) 
LEVEL
OF EARNINGS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Normal Earnings 7.71 7.01 2.69 1.05 0 .8 6 0 0
Above Average Earnings 7.44 7.44 2.51 1 . 1 0.74 0.74 0
Below Average Earnings 10.36 7.82 4.85 3.63 2.40 2.40 0




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Normal Earnings 1915 1921 2022 2051 2063 2063 2063 2063
Above Average Earnings 2399 2430 2534 2556 2557 2557 2561 2561
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for H - 6 errors in project selection occurred only in the first 
two years, whereas for H *= 7 errors occurred in all the years 
upto the horizon. Full details of these results can be found in 
appendix XIX.
It is possible to examine how far ahead planning must take place 
before a particular years decisions are unaffected and before a 
particular year's decisions are only marginally affected. This is 
shown in Table 4.8.3.
*4.8.3. Planning Horizon (H) necessary before a particular year's 
decisions are unchanged
\ L E V E L  OF 
^XFARNINGS
YEAR 0 F \  
DECISION (tN.
Normal Above Average Below Average
Identical Marginal Identical Marginal Identical Marginal
1 4 4 7 4 7 4
2 6 1 3 3 N/A 5
3 6 1 7 3 5 1
4 N/A 3 5 2 2 2
5 N/A 1 1 1 N/A 3
Many of the conclusions to be drawn from these results are 
fairly obvious though it is worth speculating on possible explanations 
of these results to see if any general statements about financial planning 
models can be made.
As can be easily seen from figures 4.8.1. and 4.8.2. the more
distant the planning horizon the greater the accuracy. In fact the
indication is that in this particular case a horizon of four to five
* In this table, N/A (not available) means that the horizon time H is 
such that t+H is certainly greater than 8 years, while a 'marginal* 
difference in solutions means that the total size of the errors in the 
scale of project selection is less than unity.
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years is sufficient and that information about other projects beyond 
this point is of no further value.
In this context it is important to stress the change in the 
nature of the information which takes place at the horizon. The 
assumption is that the expected value of a projects contribution to the 
firm does not change as the planning period unfolds and the horizon time 
recedes. All that changes is the information available about new and 
alternative opportunities. Thus the risk profile as measured by the 
expected return and the variance of the returns* does not alter > 
but rather^the uncertainty surrounding alternative opportunities is 
removed. Hence risk is differentiated from uncertainty by the 
existence or otherwise of knowledge about the probability distribution 
of returns (see Luce and Raiffa (57)). Using this terminology, the 
conclusion is that for this particular model the project decisions are 
largely independent of the actual planning horizon and the uncertainty 
implied by that horizon,provided that the planning horizon is more than 
five years hence. While this conclusion is of course specific to this 
model these results when considered in conjunction with those of chapter 
three suggest that certain more general conclusions might be drawn.
In chapter three, it was argued that simple discounting rules 
break down only slowly as the complexity of models is increased. Now 
discounting techniques are horizon-independent valuation procedures 
using pre-determined interest rates. The model being discussed here is 
a straightforward extension of such a procedure. The investment project 
is valued using interest rates and resource shadow prices internally 
determined by investment and financing interactions in the pre-horizon
* This is implied by the use of a constant discount factor to value 
the project cash flows
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period, while a simple discounting procedure at some predetermined 
rate is used for post-horizon valuation. The evidence of Chapter three 
suggested that the internally determined interest rates were relatively 
stable and could be approximated by easily computable constant parameter 
vectors. Thus, simple discounting rules were able to generate solutions 
whose value was in excess of 90% of the optimal value. This result 
is bettered by using a horizon of only three years within an LP 
model and lends further support to the argument developed in that chapter 
that it is only during the first few years of a project's life, while 
the project remains a net investment to the firm, that the accept-reject 
decision is doubtful. Once this initial investment period has been 
fully analysed any decision made about the project is unlikely to be 
revised in the light of further information about other opportunities. 
Hence a horizon of three to four years should suffice under such 
circumstances. One strength of LP models of course lies in their ability 
to rigorously analyse this initial period of a project's life.
Finally the increase in the value of the firm's plan is not 
proportionately reflected in the decrease in the error in the D-statistic. 
This suggests that the extension of the planning horizon merely enables 
a more accurate analysis of projects whose contribution to the firm 
is increasingly marginal. This merely re-echoes a point made throughout 
chapter three about the role of LP in discriminating between marginal 
projects.
While investment projects exhibit a remarkable degree of 
stability with respect to choice of horizon, the financing projects 
exhibit no such stability. Table 4.8.4. summarizes the change in the 
use of financing instruments between a one-year and an eight-year planning
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horizon at a normal level of earnings from existing projects.
TABLE 4.8.4. Effect of planning horizon on financing
YEAR
INSTRUMENT HORIZON' ___
i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
OVERDRAFT ONE-YEAR HORIZON - - 223 166 249 88 240 -
EIGHT-YEAR HORIZON - - - 26 - - - -
RIGHTS ONE-YEAR HORIZON 88 794 75 1 1 - - -
EIGHT-YEAR HORIZON 232 800 - - - - - -
LONG TERM ONE-YEAR HORIZON 374 2 1 1 1000 459 1000 - -
DEBT EIGHT-YEAR HORIZON 483 4 619 10 00 812 945 592 -
The most obvious comment concerns the relative use of overdraft 
and long term debt facilities. Short term financial planning, as 
represented by the one-year horizon model, requires much more use of 
the comparatively expensive overdraft financing. Planning over a 
longer term horizon results in the use of the cheaper long term debt.
This particular point is perhaps the most crucial problem in the use of 
finite horizons. Although project selection remains robust with respect 
to the choice of horizon, financing alternatives appear not to.
While it could be argued that the difference in costs between alternative 
forms of finance is small, this argument ignores the hidden cost of 
bankruptcy. Thus the incorporation of restrictions on possible 
financing alternatives in the pre-horizon period is largely to 
eliminate the possibility of such an occurrence and the choice of 
a financing strategy which is acceptable in the pre-horizon period 
could lead the firm into serious difficulties in the post-horizon
period.
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One approach to this problem is to use horizon posture constraints 
which ensure that the firm's financial structure at the horizon is such 
that difficulties are unlikely to occur in the post-horizon period.
This approach suffers from being somewhat arbitrary, attaching no costs 
or benefits to deviations from the target structure, and does not directly 
tackle the essentially static nature of such a planning model. The 
alternative approach is to incorporate the effect of post-horizon 
constraints into the terminal valuation procedure. In fact this is the 
approach which is adopted in a joint and unpublished piece of research 
by the author in conjunction with Atkins, and as such, only the method 
and results will be outlined here.
The particular problem is whether the valuation algorithm can be 
devised which satisfied the fundamental horizon principle. While Evers 
provides an existence proof of such a valuation procedure he ¿fives 
no indication as to how such a valuation formula might be devised in 
practice.
The infinite LP system of equations can be recast into the 
mathematically equivalent form
Ip (f )= MAX c'z° + m|i (s) \O O 2o l 1 f
such that
[B] 2 ° i  fo
and where
S = (i+g)fQ - [Alz°.
where iJj (f ) emphasises the dependence of the plan on the initial " o
vector f and i|», (s) denotes the horizon valuation which is o 1resource
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dependent on the initial decisions. This structure 
is in effect nothing more than an extension of MM's fundamental 
principle of valuation. Thus the dividend maximization model when 
recast into such a form becomes
il (F ) -o o MaxD1
er
+ V W >  1i . i  j
where the vector JMD^) denotes the resources available in period 
one depending on the dividend paid out at the beginning of the 
period T denotes the feasible set of dividends.
The above system is a dynamic programming formulation with a 
multidimensional state vector (Bellman and Drefus (62)). while 
such systems are frequently computationally intractable (Morin (77)) 
several factors enable reasonably good approximations to the solution 
to be generated for only a small increase in the computing time.
Firstly for most financial models the solution, or at least the investment 
set, is relatively stable with respect to the vector S. Furthermore 
the solution derived using more conventional valuation formulae 
as well as the equilibrium solution of the infinite horizon model 
provide a series of good starting points. The procedure thus depends 
on the fact that <p is piecewise linear and convex and that initial 
approximations can be generated using the conventional valuation 
procedures and the equilibrium solutions to span the space of 8.
The algorithm then uses these values to generate new (t|>,S) combination 
improving the approximation to the function In effect the
combinations (<|>,8) represent states on the possible path as the 
firm moves towards the equilibrium combination (<¡1, S). Once the 
firm reaches its equilibrium path it will remain on it.
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Using such an algorithm, convergence turns out to be fairly 
rapid. Thus for a problem consisting of 10 projects and 8 financing 
opportunities subject to 5 pre-horizon constants only 25% was 
added to the computational time using this algorithm as opposed 
to a conventional terminal valuation procedure.
Although the set of investment decisions was only marginally 
affected using this horizon valuation procedure, the level of 
debt financing was altered by a factor of six. In the conventional 
form of the model the level of debt was restricted in the pre-horizon 
period by a times interest cover, though clearly there were no 
restrictions on the times covered factor in the post horizon period.
Thus the incorporation of a 'post-horizon constraint* directly 
into the valuation procedure avoided the potential difficulty arising 
from a failure to cover interests payments adequately in the post­
horizon period. The danger therefore of using finite horizon models 
in practice lies not in the investment opportunities foregone, but 
rather,from the possibility of accepting (financing) commitments 
which might seriously jeopardize the long term viability of the 
firm.
4.9 Conclusion
In this chapter the role of mathematical programming models in 
analysing the interactions between the investment and financing decision 
have been examined. Within this mathematical programming framework 
it has been possible to develop normative rules for the appraisal of 
investment projects. The main conclusions to be drawn from such an 
analysis are that any cost of capital formula used for project 
appraisal is critically dependent on the nature of the restrictions
2 H
placed on the level of debt and that the conventionally accepted MM 
cost of capital formula breaks down for finite or irregular cash 
flows. The methodology adopted further provided insight into the 
consistency and structuring of financial planning models. Also 
examined were the practical implications of a finite horizon in 
LP financial planning models. It was argued that the investment 
decision is largely independent of the planning horizon and that the 
use of finite horizons does not pose any severe limitations on the use 
of LP models for such purposes. However, the real problem in using such 
models appears to lie in the danger of undertaking financing commitments 
which might seriously jeopardize the future profitability of the 
enterprise. Fortunately, relatively minor changes to the computational 
procedures enable this particular problem to be overcome.
In summary this chapter has explored the contribution that linear 
programming models can make to the extension of discounting 
techniques into situations where the capital markets impose 
restrictions on the access to borrowing. In the following chapter 
these ideas are further applied to the analysis of one particular 
financing instrument - a lease contract.
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CHAPTER 5
THE VALUATION OF A FINANCIAL LEASE - A MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING 
FRAMEWORK.
5.1 Introduction.
One possible method of evaluating a lease in practice is to 
incorporate the lease as a project into a mathematical programing 
model of the firm in which all investment and financing decisions 
are considered simultaneously. While such an approach is certainly 
valid, the work of chapter 3 suggests that the solutions generated 
by many of these models show little or no improvement over discounting 
approaches. Moreover, this work, together with that of the last 
chapter, has shown that many linear programming formulations of the 
investment decision are equally capable of analytical or semi- 
analytical solutions. Thus mathematical programming models of the 
investment and financing decisions provide more than a mere 
computational tool for lease evaluation; they provide a generalised 
framework in which analytical expressions for the value of a lease 
may be derived.
The derivation of these analytical expressions is by the use 
of the Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for constrained optimis­
ation. In this chapter a general mathematical programming model 
of the firm will be developed and by the use of the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions an expression for the value of a lease will be deduced.
The mathematical programming approach is similar to that developed 
in the recent paper by Myers, Dill and Batisto (76) and this paper 
owes much to their excellent exposition.
The particular valuation model generated by Myers will be 
examined in some detail. Myers' work assumes that the correctness 
of Modigliani and Millers (MM) contention that the only value of debt
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is in its tax shield, that dividend policy is irrelevant and that 
the assumptions of the capital asset pricing model holds.
In contrast the section following adopts a traditional approach 
to valuation and uses an analogous expression resting on the 
different assumptions of traditional financial theory. These two 
expressions are contrasted with "naive discounting” measures of the 
value of a lease and it is seen that the relative 'pureness' of the 
assumptions of the economic theory underlying the MM and traditional 
valuation models fail to provide an adequate rationale for leasing.
In the following sections various accounting measures of debt 
capacity are introduced. Thus the next section uses a mathematical 
programming model of the firm developed by Chambers (71) in which 
debt is measured in book value terms and the restriction of the 
use of debt in a restriction on the (book) level of leverage. This 
accounting valuation introduces sufficient imperfection into the 
measurement of debt that situations are identified when it is 
preferable to lease even though the after tax interest rate on 
lease finance is higher than that on debt finance. Of course, 
it could be argued that the financial markets are unlikely to 
use such a "naive" measure of debt such as book values preferring 
to relate the amount of debt to ejected future earnings. The 
next section therefore modifies the Chambers' model so that the debt 
capacity is related to the future cash inflows. It is shown that 
rather than removing the arbitrariness from the book measures of 
debt capacity such a step compounds the problem and, depending 
on the precise nature of the times cover constraint, situations 
arise when leasing can seem very attractive indeed. The next model 
of valuation examined in Weingartner's basic horizon model (74) 
with single bounds on debt availability. This model enables the 
impact of "hard" capital rationing on the lease evaluation problem 
to be determined.
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All these models have the common basic structure where the 
only financial restriction is on debt availability. The model 
outlined in section 1.7 has many other constraints imposed on its 
investment and financing strategies and it is worthwhile examining the 
determinants of the lease decision in such circumstances. Although 
a rough analytical treatment of project selection was produced 
in chapter three it is preferable here to identify post ante the 
precise role played in the valuation by the various constraints.
In section 5.8 a methodology is developed which separates out 
the contribution to the lease value of the various constraint sets.
The final section draws together the conclusions arising from 
the various models and suggests that the economic analysis of the 
lease evaluation problem may well view leasing in too simplistic 
a framework. The main reasons for leasing that emerge from this 
chapter are the imperfections of accounting measures of debt, 
the non-availability of medium term financing opportunities and 
the need for balance sheet management.
5.2 An Analytical Framework.
We assume that the objective of the firm's management is 
the maximisation of the value <p of the firm at some, as yet, 
unspecified time, i.e. Max tp(X, L, v, W, D, E) subject to a 
cash balance constraint
Ct (X,L,v,K,D,E)<Ft 5.2.1.
and a debt capacity constraint
wfc ( (X, L,v,D,E) 5.2.2
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plus the scale constraints
0 < L j C x j  if 1 5.2.3.
Here L denotes a vector of leasing opportunities, where the 
individual components of L are associated with the scale of a 
particular lease opportunity. The rest of the notation is as before 
and is summarized for convenience in appendix II.
The Kuhn-Tucker condition for optimality when applied to 
the leasing variable give
M 8 sct 8 , 3»t I
'  J o “'  5ÎJ * J o * '  ‘
5.2.4.
If project j is leased then the inequality becomes an equality and 
the reduced cost the lease is given by
H 3c. H d<t>.„ L 3£ v « t A y l
V-\ = " £ pt It" + i K3 3Lj t-o 3Lj t-o fc 3Lj
5.2.5.
If we look at the terms in more detail then we see that
'il
is the direct marginal increase in the value of the company for
9cteach unit of leasing. ^ —  is the cash flow associated with a unit
3 jof the lease and is the discounting or compounding factor, 
depending on whether the model is a net present value model or a 
terminal horizon model. Hence, the first two terms represent the 
’pure' cash flow effects of the lease.
3<t»tThe term gj—  is the amount of debt capacity used up by the 
lease and Xt is the value associated with the debt capacity. Hence 
the role of is akin to the role played by the dual on the project 
constraint and can be interpreted as the generalised net present 
value of the lease. If the right hand side of equation 5.2.5. is 
negative the lease ought not to be taken on, while if it is positive
the lease ought to be adopted. The only real problems are the
Pt, Xfc, and . Their values are intimately linked 
to the valuation model adopted and the measure of debt capacity
vaiues |£-
chosen. The remainder of this chapter is concerned with this problem.
5.3 Lease evaluation in a Modiliqani - Miller World.
As already stated Myers assumes the correctness of MM's
contention that the only value of debt is its tax shield, that dividend
policy is irrelevant and that the assumptions of the capital was
pricing model holds. He shows in a separate paper (Myers (74)) that
the implications of such assumptions are that pfc ** 0. In addition
the marginal value*of debt, where debt is one-year renewable, is 
irTgiven by Xfc = (i+r)fc~*~l for years which debt is raised.
The 'cheapness' of debt in the MM world would ensure that debt
is always used to its limit and hence that the debt capacity
constraint is always binding. The MM idea is that an upper limit on
the amount of debt is imposed by the existence of a target ratio of
the market value of debt to the market, value of the firm.
A' complication arises because the market value of assets have
differing risks attached to them. Thus we could identify the debt
capacity <t>t with KJ|»t where K is the firms overall target debt ratio
or with T K. il where K. is the debt ratio associated with a particular j i jt i
asset risk stream. For the time being we shall assume the latter 
more general form and discuss the problem again when we come to 
interpret our solution. It should also be noted that Myer’s restriction 
on debt applied solely to 'pure' debt; his measure of debt does not 
include leasing - a point which is not at all clear from Myers' owen 
analysis, the impact of the lease on debt is via its impact on the 
market value of the firm. If we denote the value of £l leasing at
*See equation 4.5.20
time t by V then we can use the adjusted present value approach, 
discussed in the last chapter.
3l|< H a*









Here gj—  = where 1^ is the debt value ratio for the lease
and gj—  = where Afc denotes just the net present value per £1 
of leasing of the lease cash flows. The discount rate according 
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Hence combining equations 5.3.2 - 3 - 4 and 5 gives
-(b T + P (1-T)) V
*• - C r —  + fV + ±(1+r) t (1+r) 5.3.6.
Hence
(btT + Pt (l-T)) t+1
t [ 1+r (1—KjT) J 11+r (1-KjT) 3 5.3.7.
Hence 5.3.7. relates the value of the lease at time t to its value
at time t+1 and the cash flows incurred by the lease contract in the
intervening period. Now on termination of the lease the value of the





where c is the cost of the asset o
We can thus use the recurrence relationship (5.3.7.) together 
with the boundary conditions to generate the value of the lease* as:
which is Myers' formula, though Myers'own derivation is somewhat 
more complicated.* * The issue still remains as to the appropriate 
value of Kj^ .
If it is assumed that because of the contractural nature of 
lease repayments that a lease is associated with cash flows which are 
certain then it could be argued that the value of should be 
riskless value and be equal to unity. This approach then gives a 
value for the lease of
This is, of course, just the net present value of the after 
tax cash flows associated with the lease discounted at the after 
tax debt rate. Hence, the lease decisions with these assumptions 
would appear to be quite simple. If the after tax rate on debt is
‘Strictly speaking this is the value per unit of leasing. For ease 
of reference the term value will be used.
** The formula could have been derived as a special case of the adjusted 
present value formula. The certain nature of the cash flows implies 
that aQ = r and substitution of this value into expression 4.5.29.
gives the desired form immediately. The formula was derived from first 
principles here in order that the various assumptions made could be 
cited explicitly.
V = co o
H P (1—T) + b Ty ________ ttl+rll-l^T))1 5.3.9.
H P (1-T) + btT
5.3.10V = co o
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greater than this after tax cost of the lease it is preferable to 
lease rather than to use debt finance. If the cost of the lease is 
greater them the after tax debt rate then debt finance is cheaper. 
Since in general as Vancil (61) observes debt is usually a cheaper 
form of finance than a lease; in a Modigliani-Miller world leasing 
is unattractive. Perhaps this rather simplistic result from a 
relatively sophisticated piece of analysis is disappointing: though 
on reflection, it is not surprising. Indeed it would perhaps be 
surprising if the assumptions of market perfections subsumed within 
this model led to any result other than the value of a lease is just 
the after tax cash flows discounted at the after tax debt rate.
In a strict economic market view it is difficult to see that leasing 
is anything other than a relatively unattractive alternative*.
5.4 A Traditional Approach.
While a few authors have used the after tax cost of debt as 
the appropriate discount rate, many authors have used a weighted 
average cost of capital formula, where the weighting factor is a 
debt equity ratio. It is possible to redefine i|>,$ such that the 
mathematical programming formulation accords with this 'traditional' 
approach.
* Myers thoroughly explores the problem of the effects of differing tax 
rates on the lessee and lessor as well as the effects of different 
depreciation patterns and shows that this may give rise to 
circumstances when leasing is attractive. This chapter assumes 
throughout that the firm is paying tax at a standard rate on all 
its earnings and uses for the sake of numerical illustration on 
straight line depreciation. The purpose of the chapter is to 
identify reasons for leasing which do not arise solely because of 
particular advantageous tax situations.
223
The particular model chose is the one of section*
s.t. Project cash flows + D - E - (w -w ) + w r(l-T) i f
w  t  t  L"*J. U*"JL fc
(l+i)l|»t _1  - Dt - Efc +
where , Dfc, E , wfc i 0
The objective function in this case is the maximization of the 
net cash flows to the shareholders discounted at the (equity) 
rate i where maximization is carried out subject to a restriction 
on the market values of debt and equity.
As we saw in section 4.7 a dual analysis of this model yields
plays the role of the weighted average cost of capital. The shadow
w — IT (1-T)price on debt is given here by X = ---- r— i—
It should be noted that the lease interest rate plays no role 
in the weighted average cost of capital. This is because we have 
made the implicit assumption that while the lease may effect the 
value of the firm by affecting the future dividend streams it is 
assumed that it does not affect the perceived risk of that stream. 
In other words we have assumed that the return required by the
* It may seem strange to choose a model which has been subject to 
such severe criticism in the last chapter but it is a convenient 
vehicle for the analysis. We must of course assume that the firm 
is in a disequilibrium state and currently using debt to grow 
faster than the growth rate of opportunities. It must be further 
assumed that there are other restrictions on debt which are 
currently non binding but which will be the eventual determinants 
of the equilibrium values.
a value for Pt = where a
(1 +a)
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holders of equity and debt is not materially affected by the lease 
decision. While this assumption may not be strictly justified 
it is difficult to incorporate alternative assumptions.
A more intractable difficulty is the effect that the lease has 
on the debt capacity. If the lease has no effect, then clearly 
the impact of the lease is merely via its effect on the cash 
balance equations and = 0 . Also in this case 7^ -  = 0 since 
the firm is valued in terms of its net equity flows. The term
3ct
("Ct> are just the depreciation tax shields and the lease 
repayments. They are given by the expression
or just the incremental cash flows associated with the lease evaluated 
at a weighted average cost of capital. This analysis is, of course, 
equivalent merely to treating the lease as another project and as such 
is somewhat unsatisfactory since a lease may be viewed, in part, 
as an alternative to debt. If we assume that this is so and incorporate 
the value of the lease into the debt capacity constraint, so that this 
constraint now reads:
Cfc «* Pfc(1-T) + bfcT 5.4.1
H Pt (l-T) + bfcT
5.4.2
Wt + Vt < ^ t 5.4.3




a - r(l-T) 
(1+w) 5.4.5.
Then
H C + fVV T 5.4.6.
(l-ta) Vt+1 5.4.7
5.4.8
Again with the same initial conditions and end conditions as in 
section 5.3 the value of the lease is given by
Thus in this case the value of the lease is just the after 
tax cash flows discounted at the debt rate. Neither result is 
surprising, if the lease makes no impact on debt capacity then 
it is merely another project and its value is just the incremental 
cash flows of the lease evaluated at the weighted average cost of 
capital. If the lease is treated as an alternative to debt then it 
must also be valued at the debt rate. While the latter treatment 
would seem preferable it is clear that in general the relative 
cheapness of debt would make the lease unattractive. Again within 
a framework of theoretical market valuations of assets and liabilities 
leasing is an unattractive instrument.
The foregoing analysis uses market values for measuring debt 
capacity in which the ability of the firm to support debt is related 
to future income streams. In general* financial markets actually
H Pfc(1-T) + btT
5.4.9
*See for example Barges (63)
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impose restrictions on the use of debt which are more closely 
related to accounting valuations. In these debt capacity is 
related to current income levels and existing asset-liability 
structures. The remainder of this chapter looks at lease 
evaluation methods where debt capacity is measured in more con­
ventional accounting terms.
5.5 Leasing in an Accounting Framework.
The model of Chambers (71) is eminently suitable for the 
analysis of the impact of the accounting treatment of leases. The 
model incorporates the main features of the current U.K. taut 
system and the restriction placed on the level of debt is the 
book (accounting) value of gearing or leverage.
Moreover, as was shown in section 3.5, the linear programming 
has a well defined dual feasible region which is capable of an analytical 
treatment. However, one of the difficulties of this particular 
model is that the algebraic expressions for the duals associated 
with the cash balance constraints and the debt capacity constraints 
are cumbersome. Thus, the dual on the cash balance constraint* 
is given by the solution 3.5.14 and 3.5.24
while the dual on the debt capacity is given by equation 3.5.14
* This is the dual where the firm is actually raising debt. It will 
be assumed temporarily that if the firm is leasing it remains in a 
deficit (debt raising) state implying that the funds required for 
investments in fixed assets exceed that generated by on-going 




Here g denotes the level of gearing, i the equity rate and f 
the flotation costs associated with equity.
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Since this (and most of the subsequent models to be discussed) 
are terminal valuation models in which the objective function is 
the maximization of the horizon value of the firm, it can be 
assumed, without loss of generality, that the horizon is coterminous 
with (or post dates) the last lease payment. This ensures that
The cash flows* associated with the lease repayments are 
Pt (l-T) + bfcT and the book value of the lease at time t is given
by:
section 1.5). In addition the decision to lease would affect the 
book value of retained earnings arising from the difference in
* This is a minor inconsistency here since the debt dual is calculated 
assuming that there is a one year lag in tax payments while this 
calculation on the lease repayments assumes no tax lag. However, 
since the purpose of this section is to identify the circumstances 
under which leasing takes place it was not thought necessary to 
change this assumption for this section only. It will be seen 
that this difference is not crucial.
^ For the sake of convenience it is assumed that book and tax 
depreciation rates coincide.
h -i PT 5.5.1
T=t+1 (l+ir)H_T
i t
where iT is the implied pre-tax interest rate on the lease (seeli
lease repayment and depreciation expenses, bfc 









+ g I  <p -b ) (l-T)
T-l c
5.5.3.
This defines ail the terms of equation 5.2.4. though the resulting 
algebraic expression conveys little insight into the impact of such 
a valuation system on the lease decision. In order to gain same 
idea of the order of magnitude of the various effects, some numerical 
computations were carried out.
In Table 5.5.1, the net present value /£100 of lease is shown 
assuming a 12% equity rate, a limit on debt to equity of 50% and 
a 40% tax rate. The equity flotation costs were 3% and the lease 
was repaid in 5 equal annual instalments. Straight line depreciation 
over 5 years was assumed throughout. *





__________ _______ — ill______
rate
Before After Nominal rate _ _ before tax 8 9 10 11 12Taxi«; Effective . . , -, . 3.3 4.0 4.0 after tax 5.3 5.9 6.5 7.1 7.7
6 3.7 -0.3 1.1 2.6 4.0 5.5 6.9 8.4 9.8
8 5.0 -3.1 -1.6 -0.1 1.3 2.8 4.3 5.7 7.2
10 6.2 -5.9 -4.4 -2.9 -1.4 0.1 1.6 3.1 4.6
12 7.5 -8.7 -7.2 -5.7 -4.2 -2.7 -2.3 0.3 1.9
14 8.7 -11.6 -10.1-8.6 -7.0 -5.5 -4 -2.4 -0.9
16 9.9 -14.5 -13.0 -U.5 -9.9 -8.4 -6.8 -5.3 -3.7
18 11.2 -17.5-16.0-14.4 -12.8 -11.3 -9.7 -8.1 -6.6
20 12.4 -20.6-19.0-17.4 -15.8 -14.2 -12.6 -11.0 -9.5
*The net present value is related to the net terminal value by the 
factor <l+i)H .
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In table 5.5.1. it is assumed that the firm is always in a 
deficit situation. With such an assumption it can be seen that 
a lease is only attractive where its after tax rate is comparable 
with the after tax rat on debt. Thus in the original article 
where Chambers used a 6% before tax (4% after tax rate on debt) 
a lease does not become attractive until its after tax rate 
is down to 4.3%.
At first sight even this may seem somewhat puzzling. Thus 
a firm finds it more attractive to lease a project at an after 
tax cost of 4.3% when debt is available at only 4%. This point 
is immediately clarified if we write down the net cash flows 
together with the effects on debt capacity of an 'acquire plus 
buy with debt' as against on 'acquire via a lease' decision for 
£100 of assets. These are shown in Table 5.5.2.
Table 5.5.2. Comparison of cash flows and capacity effects.
YEAR
DECISION
, , , . - POST 
x ■* 3 HORIZON
Buy with debt 
Debt servicing flows 
Use of debt capacity
LOO (6) (3.6) (3.6) (3.6) (85.3) 
L01.5 103.3 105.6 106.9 108.7
Acquire via lease
100 (23) (23) (23) (23) (23) 
101.5 86 69.1 50.8 30.9
Lease servicing flows 
Use of debt capacity
While the net present values of the two cash flows streams 
differ little, both having an internal rate of return of about 4%, 
the debt capacity effects differ markedly, if debentures are 
issued to fund the project the use of debt capacity increase over time.
230
This is because apart from the debt being assumed non-redeemable 
during the life of the project the servicing of this debt reduces 
profits and thus the book value of equity via retained earnings.
In the case of a lease, the lease repayments reduce the book value 
of the outstanding debt and hence release debt capacity, the 
reduction in retained earnings caused by the lease playing only a 
minor role.
The debt capacity is even more marked if it is assumed that 
the firm is in a cash deficit position for the first three years 
and a cash surplus for years 4 and 5. This case is shown in 
table 5.5.3.
Table 5.5.3. Net present values/£l00 Lease
Assuming the firm is in a cash deficit* position









5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Effective 
after tax 3.3 4.0 4.6 5.3 5.9 6.5 7.1 7.7
6 3.7 7.6 8.1 8.6 9.1 . 9.6 10.1 10.6 11.1
8 5.0 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 6.9 7.4 7.9 8.4
10 6.2 2.3 2.8 3.3 3.8 4.2 4.7 5.2 5.7
12 7.5 -0.4 0.1 0.6 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.4 2.9
14 8.7 -3.1 -2.7 -2.2 -1.7 -1.3 -0.8 -0.4 0.1
16 9.9 -5.9 -5.5 -5.0 -4.6 -4.1 -3.7 -3.2 -2.7
18 11.2 -8.8 -8.3 -7.9 -7.4 -7.0 -6.5 -6.1 -5.6
20 12.4 11.7 -11.2 -10.8 -10.4 -9.9 -9.5 -9.0 -8.6
* The interperiod discount rate when the firm has surplus funds is 
calculated from P 
stock.
capacity is calculated as before from the formula X
(l+i„(1-T))P. . where i is the rate on Government G t+l g
In this case i_ was assumed to be 6%.G The dual on the debtt(l+l)H','1~t-Pf] 
t (1+9)
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Under such circumstances, for instance, the rate at which leasing 
fails to be attractive when the after tax debt rate is 4% is now 
as high as 7.5%.
5.6 The Times Covered Constraint.
The Chambers model discussed in the previous section uses 
as its restriction on debt capacity the level of the firm’s gearing. 
One other frequently used restriction on the level of debt which 
we have identified, is the extent to which the interest costs 
are covered by the earnings of the firm. It is relatively easy 
to modify the Chamgers model so that the restriction on debt is 
in the form of a times interest covered. If we assume that the 
after tax interest payable is covered K times by the net after 
tax operating cash inflows in that period, the dual inequalities 
for debenture issues at time t are of the form:
H-l H
-p + l r (1-T)p + l Kr (l-T)X « -1 t=l,..... H-l 5.6.1.
t T—1+1 T T—t T
-p„ + K (1-T)X ( -1 t=H 5.6.2.H XT H
The dual inequalities for rights issues lead us to the conclusion 
that:
Pt Z (l+i)H+1_t 5.6.3.
If we assume for the ease of analysis that the firm is in a 
deficit situation* throughout the period of the lease and it is 
raising both debt and equality in each year, then the above set of 
inequalities become equalities. We can deduce that:
* A sim'-lar assumption, which was later relaxed, was made in the
previous section
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Pt - (1+i)H+l-t 5.6.4
i - r(l-T) 
Kr(l-T) ](1+i)H-t t-1,2 H-l 5.6.5
X = ___i___H Kr(l-T) 5.6.6
There remains the problem of the measurement of the 'debt* 
associated with the lease. One possible alternative would be to 
examine the cover of the imputed interest portion of the lease. 
However, such an analysis is rejected here for two reasons.
The first is that the purpose of this constraint is to relate 
more directly the ability of a firm to meet contractual payments 
out of its operating income. Under such circumstances the parti­
tioning of one such payment into two cash flow streams (which 
are to be analysed differently) would seem nonsensical. The 
second objection is that such a treatment is in effect largely 
an accounting approach, apportioning repayment into interest 
plus repayment of principal, and as such is similar to the analysis 
already carried out on the Chambers model.
Equally, since a lease repayment is in part an interest 
payment and in part a repayment of capital it should not be 
unfairly treated (in comparison with debt) by assuming that the 
total lease payment must be covered K times by the net cash 
inflows.
The approach adopted is that the operating cash flows after 
tax and after lease repayments have been made must cover interest 
payable K times. Such a restriction clearly suffers from fairly 
obvious drawbacks. The main one is the rather arbitrary division 
into a risky 'adjusted' income stream and fixed debt interest payments.
It has the very great advantage of computational simplicity
The analysis carried out, therefore, must be considered as 
illustrative of the approach rather than definitive.
The value of the lease becomes with = 0
3Lj
H -I h -1
c (l+i)H+1 - l (l+i)H+1_T fp_<1-T) +b T - [ (l+i)H'T [p (l-T)lb T
° T=1 L T T J T=1 L
(” (1~X) "| + fp (l-T) + b t ! -------L Kr(l-T)J LPH ' H J Kr (l-T) 5.6.7.
which, ignoring the anomalous 'end effects' term for debt capacity 
i i-r(l-T)of -— . ■ ■ ■ instead of - , the expressions for the net terminalKr ii-T) Krii-T)
value of lease can be written as:
(1+i)H+l 5.6.8.
The expression in the square brackets is the net present value 
of the lease. It can be seen that this value is the net present 
value of the cash flows associated with the cost of the lease 
discounted at the equity rate plus a premium proportional to 
this net present value. Hence, while the lease repayment cash 
flows are evaluated at a relatively high equity rate, making the 
lease attractive, cognisance must be taken of the penalty 
associated with the use of the debt capacity.
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_________
Table 5.6.1. summarises the effect* of various debt rates, 
leasing rates together with times-interest covered factors on the 
net present value of £100 of leasing. The lease again is assumed 
repayable in equal instalments over five years.





0.20 0.24 0.28 0.32 0.36 0.40 0.44 0.48
TIMES
COVERED N . AFTER TAX DEBT RATES
1 11.1 10.7 10.3 10.0 9.6 9.6 9.3 8.8
5 8.5 7.5 6.6 6.0 5.4 5.0 4.6 4.3
10 6.6 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.6
15 5.4 4.2 3.5 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
20 4.6 3.5 2.8 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4
LEASE RATES
AFTER TAX £npv / £100 OF LEASE(before tax
in brackets)
3.7(6) 14.0 11.2 8.3 5.4 2.6 -0.3 -3.1 -6.0
5.0(8) 11.0 8.0 5.1 2.1 -0.8 -3.8 -6.8 -9.7
6.2(10) 7.9 4.9 1.8 -1.3 -4.3 -7.4 -10.5 -13.6
7.5(12) 4.8 1.6 -1.6 -4.8 -7.9 -11.1 -14.3 -17.4
8.7(14) 1.6 -1.7 -5.0 -8.3 -11.6 -14.8 -18.1 -21.4
9.9(16) -1.7 -5.1 -8.5 -11.9 -15.3 -18.7 -22.1 -25.4
11.2(18) -5.1 -8.6 -12.1 -15.6 -19.1 -22.6 -26.1 -29.6
12.4(20) -8.4 -12.0 -15.7 -19.3 -22.9 -26.5 -30.1 -33.6
* The Table relates the NPV/£100 of lease to the debt times covered 
factor and the after tax lease rate. Thus a debt times covered 
factor of 0.28 (column 3) is equivalent to a times covered value 
of 5 and an after tax debt of 6.6% or to a times covered of 10 and 
an after tax debt rate of 4.6%. At an after tax lease rate of 5% 
both of these combinations give a positive net present value to the 
lease of £5.1/£100 leased.
t Equity Rates (i) « 12% Tax Rate (T) - 40%
F denotes the debt times-cove red factor
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The results are not surprising. If the debt rate is low or the times 
interest cover is low, then the structure of the debt capacity constraint 
favours leasing and leasing becomes quite an attractive proposition.
Thus it is marginally worth leasing (£1.6 NPV/ElOO leasing) even if the 
after tax lease rate is 8.7% when the after tax debt is only 4,6% 
provided the cover required is 20. With a debt rate at 8,5% after tax, 
the cover needs to fall to 5 times for leasing still to be attractive. 
Again it is worth emphasising that such an analysis is merely 
illustrative of the problems and possible results of using a times 
interest cover restriction of debt. It must be remembered that 
the actual values computed rest heavily on the definition of 
'times covered'.
5.7 The Weingartner Model and Leasing.
It has been seen that under certain circumstances leasing may be 
attractive, though this attraction would appear to stem from the 
ability of a lease to meet a medium term debt requirement or from a 
particularly favourable method of accounting for the impact of a 
lease on debt capacity. Even under such circumstances the attraction 
of a lease is frequently marginal. Two authors who have suggested that 
leasing may be particularly attractive where there is some form of 
hard capital rationing are Fawthrop and Terry (75). In this case 
Heingartner's basic horizon model provides the requisite analytical 
framework and it is thus appropriate to attempt a formal treatment of 
the lease decision within this model.
An immediate problem is the way in which the lease affects the 
debt capacity. For the sake of convenience it is assumed that the 
value of the one-year renewable debt plus the value of the after tax 
lease repayments should not exceed the borrowing limit in any one 




- J c . L. + I c . x. j oj j * oj j + v - 0) £ Do o o (5.7.2.)
(5.7.3.)
t-1,2, H - 1 (5.7.4.)
0 < t 1 (5.7.5.)
Again, for ease of analysis, the lease is assumed to start in the first year 
and the last lease payment terminates prior to the horizon.
The dual analysis of lending and borrowing instruments give
Hence the value of the lease (dropping the j subscript) is given by:
Again these equations are somewhat cumbersome and in order to gain 
insight it is convenient to discuss the simplified situation where 
the debt constraint is binding only in the first period when the 
lease contract is made. In this case the lease is undertaken 
specifically to relieve the capital rationing in this year. The
pt = (l+r<l-T))pt+1 + Xfc (5.7.6.)
H-l
(5.7.7.)
co t-0 -* t=l
t-1 T-t t-1
(5.7.8.)
(|(l+r<l-T))H + x j  - l (Pt (l-T) + btT}(l+r)H_t 
[Co(1+r(1-T))H " E (Pt<1-T) + bfcT) (l+r(l-T))H_t ] + c X o o (5.7.9.)
Examination of this expression shows it to be the net terminal 
value of the lease cash flows at the market rate plus a premium,
C0XQ . This premium is the funds made available by the use of a 
lease time the debt capacity shadow price. This shadow price is the 
net terminal value per unit of outlay on the marginal project. Thus 
the value of XQ represents the (above average) return on a project 
which is only marginally accepted because of restrictions on funds.*
It can be seen, therefore, that this premium plays a similar role to 
the residual capital balances suggested by Fawthrop and Terry.
Again the unwieldiness of the resulting algebraic expression for 
the value of a lease affords little in the way of a general understanding 
of the impact of the various parameters. One further complicating 
factor is that for an accurate computational analysis to be carried 
a detailed specification of all project cash flows and capital 
availability is necessary, and no simple general analysis is achievable.
However, the magnitude of the shadow price on debt in any year is 
intimately linked to the existence of marginal projects with above 
average rates of return and it is possible to produce a reasonable 
computational analysis, without the details specified above, by 
averaging out the debt capacity effects. Thus although in any full
* In the cane where the marginal project is the lease project then
this expression further simplifies and the value of the lease becomes 
the not terminal value of the lease cash flows plus the net terminal 
value of the project cash flows. This is merely because the lease 
enables thin project which would then be rejected because of lack of 
funds to he undertaken.
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analysis the inter-period discount rate varies from year to year depending
on whether the debt capacity constraint is binding or not, we can
assume* that p « (1+i ) ,  where i denotes the marginal c m t+1 m
reinvestment rate. This gives a value for pfc ofs
p - (1+i )H-tt m (5.7.10.)
and a value for Xfc of:
- (i-r(l-T))pt+1 - (i-r(l-T)) (l+im)H-t_1 (5.7.11.)
with these assumptions the net terminal value of the lease becomes:
j i(Ptd-T) + V )
.H-t-1C0 (l+im)H - l (Pt (l-T) + btT) (l+im)H_t - l Pt (l-T) (i-ir (l-T)) (1+i^1
(5.7.12.)
and the net present value is obtained by dividing this last expression 
by l+r(l-T) H giving
t l+i 1 H f H P. (l-T)+bT H P. (l-T)(i-r<1+v '  " J i  (1+i«)t+i
d-T))
(5.7.13.)
This expression relates the value of the lease to the repayments, 
capital allowances, debt rates and the above average return on projects.
Various values of this expression were computed for differing 
lease rates and a debt rate tax of 10%. The results are shown in Table 5.7.1.
TABLE 5.7. it* The Net Present Value/£100 of Lease at various marginal 








12 • 13 14
(after tax) 
15 16 17
12 6.2 10.6 12.7 15 17.4 20 22.6 25.4
14 7.3 8.3 10.4 12.6 14.9 17.4 20 22.6
16 8.4 5.9 8 10.1 12.4 14.8 17.3 19.9
18 9.5 3.5 5.5 7.6 9.8 12.1 14.5 17.1
20 10.6 1.1 3 5 7.1 9.4 11.7 14.2
22 11.7 -1.4 0.5 2.4 4.5 6.6 8.9 11.3
24 12.8 -3.9 -2.1 -0.2 1.7 3.8 6 8.4
26 13.9 -6.4 -4.7 -2.9 -1 1 3.1 5.4
28 • 15.0 -9 -7.4 -5.6 -3.8 -1.9 0.2 2.4
30 16.0 -11.6 -10 -8.4 -6.6 -4.8 -2.8 -0.7
32 17.0 -14.2 -12.8 -11.2 -9.5 -7.7 -5.8 -3.8
34 18.1 -16,9 -15.5 -14 -12.4 -10.7 -8.9 -6.9
36 19.2 -19.6 -18.3 -16.8 -15.3 -13.7 -11*. 9 4-10.1
was discussed in section 3.3. See also appendix XIV.
** The assumptions made in drawing up this table were:
(1) the lease repayments are in 5 equal instalments(2) The tax rate Is 50% with no tax lag(3) Straight line tax depreciation over the life of the lease.
239
It can be observed that the use of debt capacity by the lease 
means that the reinvestment rate must be slightly higher than the 
after tax cost of the lease before it is worthwhile leasing.
Fairly clearly the higher this reinvestment rate the greater is the 
value of the lease. Fawthrop and Terry illustrate their algorithm 
with a reinvestment rate of 15% after tax and an after tax lease 
rate of 12%.
Attention must be drawn to the reason for leasing. It may seem 
somewhat puzzling that the lease is not dominated by debt in that fairly 
clearly since the debt is renewable on a one year basis a 'debt package' 
could be put together which should be cheaper. However, the 
assumptions made are that for a lease taken out at time t the impact of 
the lease on the debt capacity is not recognised until time t+1.
While this may appear to invalidate the analysis since leasing is only 
made attractive by a favourable and somewhat arbitrary 'accounting' 
convention, this is only partially true. It may well be that one 
year (short-term) debt would not be available for the financing 
of a medium term project. Where this is so and the lease is used 
to overcome a medium term financing difficulty then the foregoing 
analysis is substantially correct.
5.8 Leasing and Financial Policy Considerations.
It would seem worthwhile to conclude this chapter with an 
analysis of lease projects in the model proposed in section 1.7.
Here the presence of a whole multitude of other constraints precludes 
a rigorous analytical solution and the approach adopted is somewhat 
different. The aim of the method developed is a post ante analysis 
of the impact of the various constraint sets on the value of a 
lease. This can be achieved by allowing lease financing to be 
available to a few of the projects. Because of the different 
tax allowances available on building and machinery four projects
were chosenjtwo where the capital investment was in buildings and, 
two where the capital investment was in machinery. Thus projects 
PR04Y1, PR03Y2, PR04Y2, PR11Y3, were assumed available for leasing 
and the relevant costs per £100 of lease are shown in Table 5.8.1. 












As in section 5.6 it was assumed that the lease forms a prior 
claim on earnings and that the (pre-tax) earnings after lease payments 
must adequately cover interest charges before tax (in this case the 
cover is assumed 10 times). An analysis of the leases is shown in 
Table 5.8.2. The repayments represent a reduction in the (pre-tax) 
earnings of the projects while the capital cost causes a corresponding 
change in the book value of assets. Hence since the leases are specified 
in terms of these accounting variables it is necessary to develop a 
methodology by which the impact of changes in accounting variables can 
be translated into their cash flow contribution, their debt capacity 
contribution and their impact on the other financial policy constraints. 
This can be achieved by partitioning the dual vectors associated with 
earnings and changes in assetsjinto a cash flow component, a debt 
capacity component and a financial policy component. Calculation of 
the reduced cost of the lease projects then gives its net present 
value with these three components clearly identified.
In order to carry out such an analysis, the following identities 






F 0 3  BLt+l ” °*0313 EAt " 0,2 TPt + °’191 TPt+l + 0,04 TAt+l
- 0.04 TAt - pfc + pfc+1 + a ROCEt | (t-1,7) (5.8.1.)
TA - 0.5TPt (t-1,7) (5.8.2.)
0.75 PE - 0.25 EAt - 0.75 (Pt"Pt+1> + 0.5( T P ^ T P ^ )  (t-1,7)
(5.8.3.)
P t  -  T pt+1 -  [l-K X T ] ROCEt  -  TBEQDYy 
- (1-T) ERPSfc + (l-T)DC0Vt - ECOVfc (t-1,7) (5.8.4.)
together with the boundary conditions
bl8 - ( -p8 0 0 ) (5.8.5.)
PE8 “ ( -p8 0 0 ) (5.8.6.)
t a8 - ( 0 0 0 ) (5.8.7.)
ea8 - ( P8 0 0 ) (5.8.8.)
where the partitions refer to the cash balance dual, the times cover 
dual and all other constraints respectively. Using backward recursion 
starting at t=7 the following partitioned dual vectors can be computed 




















BL,t - 1.03 )BLt+l ' °-°313 EAt " °‘2 TOt + °’191 TPt+l + °-°4 TAt+l
0.04 TAt - Pt + Pt+1 + a ROCEfc > (t-1,7)
TAt - TAfc+1 - 0.5TPt (t-1,7)
(5.8.1.)
(5.8.2.)
PEt - 0.75 PEfc+1 - 0.25 EAt - 0.75 (Pt"Pt+1> + 0.5(TPt-TPfc+1) (t-1,7)
(5.8.3.)
a t - Pt - Tpt+1 - [1+aTj ROCEt - TBLQDY
( 1-T) ERPSfc + (l-T)DCOVt - ECOVj. (t-1,7) (5.8.4.)
together with the boundary conditions
b l8 - ( OGOQ 0 ) (5.8.5.)
pe8 - ( "P8 i ° 0 ) (5.8.6.)
TA8 " ( o : o 0 ) (5.8.7.)
“ a * ( p8 : ° 0 ) (5.8.8.)
where the partitions refer to the cash balance dual, the times cover 
dual and all other constraints respectively. Using backward recursion 
starting at t—7 the following partitioned dual vectors can be computed 
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TABLE 5.8.2. An analysis of the lease data.
Project L04Y1 POST HORIZON VALUE*» 0 AFTER TAX COST » 11.9*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Plant £ Equipment 250 130
Repayments (69.2) (105) (105) (105) (105) (36)Tax Relief 34.6 52.5 52.5 52.5 52.5 18Loss of Allowances (125) (65)
Net Cash Flow 250 (64.2) (135.4)(52.5) (52.5) (52.5) 16.5 18
Project L03Y2 POST HORIZON VALUE* = -24.6 AFTER TAX COST 4.8*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Building £ Land 200
Repayments (56) (56) (56) (56) (56)
Tax Relief 28 28 28 28 28
Loss of Allowances (40) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4)
Net Cash Flow 200 (96) (32) (32) (32) (32) 24
Project L04Y2 POST HORIZON VALUE* = 11 AFTER TAX COST 10.5*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Plant £ Equipment 250 130
Repayments (66) (100) (100) (100) (100) (34)Tax Relief 33 50 50 50 50
Loss of Allowances 125 (65)
Net Cash Flow 250 (61) (132) (50) (50) (50) 16
Project L11Y3 POST HORIZON VALUE = 6.5 AFTER TAX COST 7.6*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Building £ Land 225
Repayments (68) (68) (68) (68) (68)
Tax Relief 34 34 34 34
Loss of Allowances 45 (4.5) (4.5) (4.5) (4.5)
Net Cash Flow 225 (113) (38.5) (38.5) (38.5) (38.5)
h°rizon value is the post horizon cash flows associated with the lease 
oun e a 10*. In general because the leases occur relatively early in
S e  LnS E T ?  Pefi0dpthese values « e  fairly small. The after tax cost is
Examination of the vector for instance PE shows that £1 increase
in the cost of plant and equipment say in year 5 decreases the net
present value of the programme by £0.3439. This is in part of a
change in the net present value of direct cash contribution £0.3360
which arises mainly out of the discounted cost of the asset less
tax reliefs. In addition the effect of depreciation is to decrease
the debt capacity by £0.0346 because of the consequent reduction in
the reported earning. Finally the alteration in the capital base and
to the reported earnings makes a net contribution to relaxing the
other constraints of £0.0267. It is now easy to ascertain the
individual components of a lease decision. If the vector BLL'
LPE , denote the amount of building and land leased and the amount 
of plant and equipment leased respectively over the planning period, 
while P denotes the repayment schedule and NPVH^ the NPV of post 
horizon cash flows associated with the leased then the value of the 
lease (reduced cost) is
VL - NPVHl - BLL . BL - PEL . PE - P . EA - P ■ ECOV
Computation of this expression using the partitioned vectors 
give the individual contributions of the various constraints.
These are shown in table 5.8.3.
TABLE 5.8.3.
SOURCE NET PRESENT VALUES
L04Y1 L03Y2 L04Y2 L11Y3
CASH 8.7 25.8 19.1 11.9
EARNINGS COVER (40.1) (27.1) (22.0) (19.7)
OTHERS 2.2 2.8 2.9 3.6
NET (29.2) 1.6 0 (4.2)
The result of the computer run is that only project PR03Y2 
with a positive reduced cost is leased at full scale while leases 
on projects PR04Y1 and PR11Y3 which would make negative net 
contributions are rejected. Project L04Y2 is partially leased. Thus
only the cheapest lease, as measured by after tax cost is adopted.
The after tax cost of this lease is 4.8%. Lease L04Y2 with an 
after tax cost of 10.5% breaks even. It is interesting to compare 
this with the after tax cost of long term debt at 4% and the after 
tax cost of overdraft at around 6%. The above analysis gives some 
indication of the effect of the financial policy constraints on 
the lease decision. In both the case of the lease adopted at full 
scale and in the case of the partial lease it is their positive 
contribution to relaxing other constraints that prevent them from 
being rejected. While the above analysis is specific to this run, 
it is illustrative of a general methodology in which a lease is 
considered within the total planning framework. The particular 
analysis presented here shows how it is possible to ascertain the 
impact of any particular'subset of financial policy considerations 
on the value of the lease.
5.9 Conclusion.
The purpose of this chapter has been twofold. The first 
has been to present a general framework for the analysis of the 
lease-buy decision. The value of such a framework lies not in its 
ability to innovate new financial theory but rather in its ability 
to rigorously explore the ramifications of existing theory. It 
assumes a consistency in the lease valuation process by ensuring 
that the valuation is a direct and logical consequence of any 
initial set of assumptions. Hence within this framework it has 
been possible to explore the conventional discounted cash flow 
approaches to the lease-buy decision by looking at economic measures 
of debt capacity where debt capacity is measured in terms of 
future income or dividend streams. The relatively uncomplicated 
discount structures that emerge from such an analysis is not really 
surprising on reflection. The underlying assumptions of such approaches
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are essentially simplistic in nature. A mathematical programming 
framework merely adds sophistication in the rigour of the analysis 
and not in any refinement of the assumptions made. Within such a 
framework leasing tends to be a relatively unattractive proposition.
Of course, such a conclusion is reached without reference to the 
possible impact of differing tax rates on lessee and lessor or any 
discussion on the possible impact of the various patterns of capital 
allowances. It is acknowledged that these can have profound influences 
on the lease decision, a point which is thoroughly investigated by 
Myers et al (76). The emphasis of the discussion here has been 
to concentrate rather on other forms of market imperfections and this 
fulfills the second purpose of the chapter.
The two particular market imperfections that were discussed in 
detail were concerned with the problems associated with ’accounting* 
measures of debt and with the term of the loan not coinciding with 
a temporary shortage of capital.
In both the case of the Chambers' model, where debt was measured 
in terms of book 'accounting' values, and in the Weingartner model, 
where the debt limit was a 'hard' limit on fixed commitments, situations 
were identified where despite the relatively higher after tax cost 
of a lease when compared with the alternative debt financing, leasing 
still proved to be attractive. The subsequent analysis showed that 
this situation arose because the term of the lease was more suitable 
to the particular financing requirements of the firm. In the 
Chambers’ model the lease was most attractive when used as an 
instrument to overcome a temporary rationing situation. In the 
Weingartner model, which exemplified discounting approaches in 
a 'hard' capital rationing situation, the attraction of a lease 
rested in its ability to expand the pool of available finance.
While in the latter a situation with hindsight it may seem obvious 
that leasing would prove to be attractive, the algorithm developed
¿tv VLVfJW:
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a formal analysis of this situation and clarified the roles played 
by the debt interest rates and the marginal reinvestment rates.
Although the times covered constraint was introduced primarily 
as a method of relating more closely the income streams to future 
contractual obligations, the rather arbitrary from of the reuslting 
restriction negated this aim. Certainly situations were readily 
observable when leasing was very attractive but this depended very 
clearly on our measurement of the times covered factor. Thus in the 
end this section merely served to emphasise the severe limitations 
of deterministic or certainty equivalent analysis of the lease 
problem. A theoretically correct analysis of the impact of uncertainty 
would require a full specification of the variances and covariances 
of future income streams together with the costs of default on 
contractual commitments. At present such an analysis is not within 
the ambit of this thesis.
In the final section the analysis was extended to examine the 
impact of general financial policy consideration on the leasing decision. 
It was shown that within the context of a fairly realistic planning 
situation leasing may prove a valuable strategy - though this 
value arises from the informational content of the company's 
accounts and in such circumstances leasing presents a very useful 
'window-dressing' mechanism which can mitigate in its favour.
In summary it is difficult to see the attraction of leasing 
within a rational economic market framework. Certainly situations 
under which leasing should be taken have been identified in the 
paper but these stem from imperfect capital markets and what in 
effect amounts to a sort of 'off-balance sheet' financing caused 
by imperfections in accounting measurements. The irony is that the 
academic debates on leasing have concentrated upon attempts to 
'purify* existing algorithms. This much sought after promised land 
may well turn out to be a desert.
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Chapter 6. Towards a practical planning system.
6.1 Introduction.
So far this thesis has concentrated entirely on the structural 
interdependencies and their relationship to financial theory which 
arise in the use of corporate financial mathematical programming 
models. Hopefully it has been shown that such models can make 
major contributions to our theoretical understanding of the capital 
investment decision. However, such a contribution is purely 
normative and the models discussed so far have clearly failed to 
fulfil their original purpose of providing a comprehensive methodology 
for tackling the intricasies of corporate financial planning.
In this last context the only computer based models to have 
achieved any degree of success have been fairly simplistic financial 
statement generators. From the point of view of the Operational 
Research scientist, the comparative failure of mathematical programming 
models must be viewed with some disquiet. Operational research 
scientists have been unable, in effect, to provide Corporate 
Financial Management with a more sophisticated decision aid than 
the use of the computer as a consolidator of projected accounting 
and financial transactions.
A possible key reason for the comparative-failure of the programming approach 
has already been identified. In section 1.6 attention was d^awn to the 
difference between the nature of the search procedure in financial 
statement generators and mathematical programming models; mathematical 
programming models search through decision space for a plan which 
maximizes a scalar measure of the firm's financial performance 
whereas simulation models are used to search over a vector of 
projected financial policy variables. The central hypothesis of
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this Chapter is that a large degree of the managerial acceptability 
of financial statement generators stems from this ability to explore 
a vector of financial policy variable. The basic intention of 
this last Chapter is to present one approach which shows how 
mathematical programming algorithms can be adapted to enhance the 
efficiency of this search over the vector of policy variables.
In section 6.2 a set of financial policy variables will be 
defined over which a search is to be carried out together with a 
model which enables the search to be accomplished. The section 
following then discusses the problems that are likely to arise 
within such a model structure and the limitation of the currently 
proposed methods of vector optimisation. ' Section 6.4 develops a 
theory of the nature of multicriteria decision making and section
6.5 suggests how such a theory might be implemented. The 
remainder of the Chapter is concerned with possible approaches to the 
implementation of these ideas. However, because many of the 
problems identified remain unsolved,and their solutions would appear 
to require major extensions to the theory of multicriteria 
programming,the procedure is presented as a case study. Here, 
the various difficulties encountered are identified and discussed 
though in the end they have frequently to be circumvented by ad hoc 
procedures. In spite of the obvious shortcomings of the methods 
devised it is hoped that this final Chapter opens up a new direction 
for further research rather than closes a hitherto promising 
avenue.
6.2 The Structure of the Model.
The model introduced in section 1.7 is a linear programming 
representation of the investment opportunities together with a set
of financing alternatives facing an organisation over an eight year 
period. It has been used extensively in the earlier Chapters 
in a conventional linear programming format where the optimization 
was carried out using a scalar measure for evaluating the set of 
decisions. In this latter form restrictions imposed on the value of 
financial policy variables were minimum conditions that any plan 
must meet and plans which did not belong to this feasible set 
were rejected from further consideration. Clearly the use of the model 
in this way does not conform to the nature of the planning process 
as elucidated by organisational theorists.* In their description of 
the planning process decisions are not directed towards a single 
goal but are rather concerned with discovering courses of action 
which help satisfy a whole series of targets or constraints. These 
targets are not set a priori and constraints other than the 
technological set are not inviolate. Hence if we are to modify 
the current model in line with this description-of the planning 
process, then the modifications should try to facilitate the 
identification and ordering of sets of satisfactory plans with 
respect to the financial policy constraints rather than to search 
out a single optimum. _
It is relatively easy to adapt the model to try out these 
ideas. The existing constraints can be viewed as falling into 
one of two disjoint sets. These are a technological set consisting 
of cash balances and accounting definitions, and a policy variable 
set consisting of various financial criteria. This policy variable 
set is constructed from criteria measuring return on capital 
employed, earnings per share, dividend per share, liquidity, times 
interest covered, dividend cover, sales and profits. Only sales
* See section 1.6
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and profits are new; the remaining policy variables have always 
been included but with minimum bounds imposed on their possible 
values. This minimum bound must now be removed and a more 
realistic mechanism for controlling their possible values be 
introduced since these eight policy variables in each of the eight 
years up to the planning horizon now constitute sixty-four criteria 
over which a search is to be carried out.
6.3 The choice of multicriteria method.
Even a brief reflection of this model serves to highlight 
some of the potential difficulties that are faced in the 
development of a comprehensive multicriteria methodology.
(a) Firstly, there is simply the problem of size, especially 
the number of criteria. Where numerical solutions to multi­
objective problems are quoted, the actual problem tends to 
have it relatively small number of criteria (Geoffrion, Dyer 
and Feinberg (72), Evans and Steuer (73)). The large
number of criteria in financial planning stems from the decision 
makers desire to maintain control over both short term 
(liquidity) and longer term (sales growth) criteria and to be 
able to differentiate this control at a year by year level of 
detail.
(b) Many of the criteria are ratios, in fact six out of the eight 
basic criteria are making 48 ratios in all. The difficulties 
are obvious. The various approaches suggested in the literature 
were rejected; fractional programming methods (See Kornbluth (73)) 
were considered too cumbersome and expensive on computer time, 
neither are such methods readily available to practioners, 
substituting a surrogate fractional function (Hannan (77))
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appeared to wildly inaccurate. In the end a. somewhat ad hoc 
approximation was substituted whose justification must rest 
in the results it produced. It did enable a linear search 
to be carried out over the efficient set of non linear 
solutions.
(c) Many of the criteria are interdependent, in the sense that 
regardless of the actual feasible investment set, criteria are 
functionally related via the accounting definitions. An 
extreme example of this is that earnings per share equals 
dividends per share times dividend cover. This type of 
problem is not removed by redefining the criteria set to 
remove any mathematical redundancies, (Shubik (61)). For
one thing such independencies are not always so explicit, being 
frequently related through timelags associated with tax and 
dividend payments; and secondly, that would be to withdraw 
a step from the, decision makers involvement. He has typically 
specified that the set of criteria is a minimum set with which 
he is prepared to interact and he wants to b^ able to explore 
preferences with respect to them all.
(d) Finally these criteria are meaningful in financial and company 
terms. This comment is not as trite as it seems. The criteria 
cannot be handled as a homogenous group; at different stages
of the exploration process different criteria will assume more 
significance and varied levels of aggregation or disaggregation 
will be appropriate.
This final source of difficulty is worth exploring further because 
it will greatly influence the choice of a successful methodology.
Tnus, particularly in the early stages, the growth factor and average 
level of criteria such as sales, profit and dividend per share
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arc liable to be much more important than an individual year's 
figures. In later stages when the overall plan strategy has been 
roughly determined, consideration may then be given to individual 
criteria in particular years. Further an examination of the criteria 
shows that they can be classified conveniently into three main sets. 
These arei
(i) Profitability Indices - return on capital employed, net 
profit after tax, sales, earning^ per share.
(ii) Dividend Policy Variables - dividend per share and dividend 
cover.
(iii) Safety ratios - times interest covered, and liquidity.
The final form of the solution could be schematically represented 
by figure 6.3.1. where the criteria have been characterized by 
level, growth and stability of growth. Thus experiments with 
alternatives might cluster around broad strategies such as 
profitability indices versus safety indices or, within the setting 
of dividend policy; dividend per share against the risk measure 
implied by dividend cover. It is within such characteristics that 
the search for efficient solutions should be carried out. This 
observation provides both a structure to the search and a 
corresponding reduction in the size of the search space.
TIME
The problems of size, ratios, interdependencies and
intelligibility not only exposes the deficiencies of existing 
methodologies but has a profound influence on the actual choice 
of methodology. Two of the three main methodologies available 
were dismissed almost immediately as being, as of this date, 
unable to deal with realistically sized financial planning problems. 
These were, firstly, the a priori calibration of a utility function 
over the criteria (Bristin (66), Keeney (75)). This was not solely 
because of the notorious difficulties involved in extracting and 
analysing appropriate data but equally because it went against 
the philosophy of interactive methods which financial management 
find attractive - that preferences are developed during the 
process of comparing alternative, not a priori. Secondly, methods 
which involved enumerating efficient vertices (Evans and Stueur (73) 
Zeleny (74)) were also dismissed. With so many extreme vertices 
the methods for reducing them to a workable number seemed too crude 
and primitive for the type of structured search which was aimed for. 
Thus only the third type of methodology remained - that of 
interactively searching the decision maker's preferences.
It is natural in financial planning to speak in terms of targets 
or goals; company performance as measured by such criteria as 
dividend cover, liquidity, or return on capital employed have 
target ratios adopted by custom and practice. In this sense as has 
been argued before, many of the constraints typically used in 
mathematical programming formulations are more goal-like than 
binding limits on possible courses of action. Hence an obvious 
choice of methodology is a goal programming formulation where it 
is understood that both weights on goals and goal deviations are 
available to be modified interactively. The goal constraints 
referred to here are, of course, just the financial policy variable
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set discussed earlier in this section.
6.4 A Utility Theory Framework for Goal Programming.
In order to carry out effectively the above search procedure 
it is necessary to re-examine the various goal programming formulation 
within a coherent and comprehensive framework - such a framework is 
found in utility theory. To this end consider the diagram below 
showing the position of targets in criteria space. For simplicity 
of exposition the argument is restricted to just two criteria, 





Tb*» dotted curves represent the decision makers utility indifference 
curves and prior to experimentation we have very scant knowledge of 
this indifference map. In general we know only his prior guesses of the 
target values and the relative importance attached to meeting chose 
targets. In addition we can make certain further assumptions about 
the general nature of indifference curves such as convexity,
continuity and differentiability.
Having decided to use target programming we have already 
implied an approximation to the indifference curves U “ 
constant, by concentrating attention on the disutility of under- 
achievement given by
within the target region defined by Y^ i T^ for all. Outside the 
target region the form of DU changes, a typical illustration is 
given in Figure 6.4.2.
At any point on the curve DU - constant, the slope of the tangent 
gives the relative tradeoffs between the criteria that the decision 
maker would accept at that level of the criteria. Thus a linear
j. Goal programming concentrates on this type of approximation





• DU = CONSTANT
CONSTANT
approximation to DU of the form £ u^(T^-Y^) would indicate that
a reduction of —  in the
i
 underachievement of goal i would be just
compensated by an increase of
where the u's play the part of goal weighting.
An alternative linear approximation to the function u(T,-"y, .Tj-Yj )
is the Chebychov norm of minimizing maxfuj(Tj-y^,u2 (T2~Y2),0}. 
This will be referred to as minimax programming where the aim is to 
minimize the maximum shortfall from target over all the criteria. Both 
of the approximations discussed so far can be considered specific 
examples of the general model
Where T denotes the feasible region and target overachievements 
are ignored. The goal programming formulation corresponds to the 
p-1 norm when we have
* The work of this section was carried out in early 1974. In fact 
prior to this date it would appear that Lane (72) in an unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis also correctly identified the nature of the linear 
approximation implied by goal and minimax programming. However, he 
failed to identify the hybrid linear approximation to be discussed 















Yi(x) + ^  * T± all i x e r (6.4.6.)
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This form is unsuitable for many uses, but with financial models 
it is positively misleading. To explain this consider the isoquants 
or this utility approximation shown in figure 6.4.3. with Y(r> 
representing the image of I' under y^ for all i-1,2
FIGURE
G.4.3.
The linear approximation within the target region implies that 
only vertices arc possible contenders for 'solutions' and that slight 
changes in the u^ causes jumps, often major, in such solutions. If 
we return to the simple example of section 1.6 where an attempt was 
made to maximize ptofits (P^»P2) in two consecutive years then the 
p»l metric gives the following goal program to be solved for Pj*P2
MIN (1+eJZj^  + z2 (6.4.7.)
s • t • P1 + Z1 * 1 (6.4.8.)
P2 + z2 i 1 (6.4.9.)
P2 + P2 ‘ 1 (6.4.10.)
The solution is f ■ (l,Oj for positive values of C and 
f » (0,1) for negative values. Hence with this metric, infinitesimal
4changes in the preferences can completely alter the solution.
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While an attractive choice for p might appear to be the 
p«2 metric in which the objective is to minimize the weighted sum 
of the squares of deviations such a choice would lead to quadratic 
programming with a prohibitive increase in computer time. The 
other obvious choice resulting in a linear function is the 
p»“ metric, and this is the minimix formulation
such that
MIN z





MIN MAx| o, u. (T -jf (X))| (6.4.13.
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The isoquants are now right angles 'corners' anchored to a line
through the target point of slope (...., —  This makes the
Ui
solution point a continuous function of both the weights ui and the 
targets T^. This is illustrated in Figure 6.4.4.






1+e s 1. This ratio is both intuitively reasonable and is also 
continuous with respect to E, where E is in [0,°°).
Unfortunately,.the existence of upper bounds in Y(D on the 
value of a criterion, as with Y2 (X) in Figure 6,4.4. causes multiple 
solutions and the possibility of nonefficient solutions such as 
Y“ (0,b2) above.
To overcome the inherent problems of both values of p»l and 
pxx> extensive use of a linear hybrid formulation was made. This was
MIN c*H z + £ zi (6.4.14.)
so that
Yi (X) + (z+zi)/ui * Tl . all i (6.4.15.)
x e r
In this formulation if z were to decrease by 6 within the target
region then each z^ needs to increase by 6 and hence the objective
changes by -a 5 N*S where N* is the number of the z. that need to H l
increase to allowz to decrease. When < 1 we have minimix programming
when a >N where N is the number of criteria, goal programming. As H
aH varies between these extremes the isoquants associated with each
value of OjjVaries also. The effect of this is to 'smooth' the
solution in that as a decreases the solution changes from a typical H
p»l goal programming form where weighted deviations from tarqets are 
at extreme value, to one whereby the weighted deviations tend to 
equal one another as with px*> or minimax programming. This is a 
particularly useful property when an attempt is being made to plan 
overtime, since the degree of stability of a solution can be 
controlled by the single parameter a . Figure 6.4.5. shows the 
effect of varying the a parameter in the model for the profit and 
sales target. In this experimental run, where only these last two
4





meant that the number of non-zero z and z increasedSALhS/C PROFIT ft
resulting in a wider year by year variation.*
6.5 The Implementation.
It is clear that computer and software manufacturers have 
developed very efficient and sophisticated linear programming 
algorithms, matrix generators and report writers. To throw away 
this accumulated experience and develop specific computer codes 
would have been to step away from implementation. However, the 
decision to use existing software**does place limitations on the 
interactive process and the structuring of the model.
The interactive process used with the goal programming formulation 
was to adjust weights and targets parametrically. Thus, for 
illustration treating only the extremes of goal programming with 
p»l and minimax programming with p** we have objective function 
and right hand side parametrics respectively.
p»l p«o°
MIN l u.(1+X.)y. MIN z
i 1 1 1
z/
Yjix) + y i  2 Ti  Ti (l+X± )
X E r (6.5.1.) xe r  (6.5.2.)
* In the actual run, their objective function employed goal programming 
for all the policy variables except sales and profit. The substructure
of the model relating only to sales and profit was
where
subject to
Min a I + I 'SALES ,t PROFIT,t
MAX Cz z 1SALES, PROFIT
SALES /.ZSALES^SALES,t) »
fc “sales, t
______ . *zPROFIT+zPROFIT,t>PROFIT + ----------------
PROFIT ft
SALES TARGET^
. i PROFIT TARGET^
The initial work was carried out using the ICL linear programming 
package XDLA at the University of Birmingham, England. The work 
was completed using the IBM linear proqramminq package MPSX/370 at 







Usually eleven steps were taken in the parametric direction 
and the results filed for subsequent analysis. A hierarchical 
structure of information was then made available from each run so 
that the decision maker was able to see the consequences of a decision 
in any detail required. This hierarchy consisted of:
(a) Average values over time of levels and growth (where 
relevant) of each of the criteria for each value of the 
parameter.
(b) The value of each criterion in each year for a particular 
parameter value.
(c) Balance sheets, cash flow statements and profit and loss 
statements corresponding to any solution.
(d) The unanalyscd linear programming solution.
This information was available on a visual display unit as 
required, though facilities existed for immediate hard copies of any
or all of this information. Some sample print-outs are included 
in appendix XIII . As far as the decision maker was concerned 
this output was comparable to the results of a cash flow simulation 
for eleven choices of options. The inputs required of course 
were much different.
The problem of ratio criterion in this application was only 
overcome by an ad hoc procedure which needs to be replaced by further 
theoretical research. Full details are given as they occur in the 
next section but the principle is to convert the constraint
Nit(X>
+ -i T..Dit(X) it it
where are linear functions on X to
ÍNit(X) - Dit(X).T.t> ♦ ZU L {D.t(X)> ^  > 0
Where the suffixes refer to criterion i in time period t, 
z^t conveniently denotes a percentage shortfall from target T^t 
and M n ^ t (x)} is the estimated likely value of the denominator 
D^t (X) in the region of the 'optimal* solution. For many financial 
criteria such denominators display regular growth and a reasonably 
accurate prediction of their values over the planning period is 
not too difficult. Thus for the model proposed in this thesis the 
denominator is always one of the following: total net assets, current 
liabilities, number of scares issued, interest payable or dividend 
payments. The first three have a fairly large starting base and 
accumulate steadily though the last two can be more volatile and 
are more troublesome especially if a significant tranche of long 
term debt is repayable. The values of course of these denominators 
can bo updated as the search progresses. Furthermore the search 
will tend to become concentrated on a particular part of the efficient
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surface when fairly accurate predictions of their likely values 
are possible.
It should be not^d however, that errors in the predicted 
value of the denominator merely affected the interval at which 
these solutions were filed for further analysis by the report writer. 
The report writer computed the precise value of the criteria at 
these solution points from the actual value of the denominators and 
not their expected value. In this way a non-linear search was 
controlled by a linear search procedure with a consequent gain in 
processing time but without loosing any of the structure inherent 
in the non-linearities.
6.6 The Search Strategy.
The search procedure was originally envisaged as taking 
place over three distinct phases, which are described below:
(i) Phase I
The primary purpose of th5 s phase was to obtain rapidly a 
region of the efficient surface over which a more detailed 
search could be carried out. To achieve this a goal programming 
approach was adopted between criteria but with a minimax approach 
within each criterion over time. Clearly while stability 
between criteria was not important, stability over time within 
a particular criterion was considered important. There was 
also a secondary purpose to this phase which was to determine 
rough orders of magnitude of the criteria weights. While 
the final solution over the other phases does not depend 
on the weights, the speed at which convergence is obtained 
clearly docs. Throughout the search it was found to be 
important to keep the relative deviations of all the criteria
4
from the targets roughly balanced.
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While phase I was concerned with determining the appropriate 
region over which to continue the search, phase II was concerned 
with a more detailed search of the average levels and the growth 
rates of an individual criterion. The method used was minimax 
programming between criteria and within criteria. This was 
necessary to remove some serious instabilities that had been 
observed in phase I.
(iii) Phase III
Ideally on exit from the second phase both leve-13 of stability 
of growth rates should be satisfactory and there remains the 
possibility of traiing-off stability in qrowth for a criteria 
against the actual growth rate for the criteria. This was 
to be achieved in the third phase.
As it turned out even this three phase approach was too rigid.
While phase I proved' relatively straightforward the second and third 
phases were less so. This was largely because the next most appropriate 
step to take in a search procedure is a response to the current 
solution. In this case it depends on how the decision maker perceives 
the weaknesses of the current solution. Thus the essence of any 
multi-objective method is a flexibility in response.
6,7 The Phase I search
This search was carried out using objective parametrics on the 
eight weights relating to the criteria. Stability between time 
period within a particular criterion was maintained by using the 
minimax metric over time within a criterion. Hence the model was
(ii) Phase II
recast into the form
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MIN l u (1+A.)z
iei x 1
( 6 . 7 . 1 . )
so that
z± > 0 all i,t (6.7.2.)
x e r
where is the weighting on z^ and T^t is the target for criterion 
i in time period *.. Thus although the criteria themselves are the 
ratio of the linear forms D^fc(X), where trivially D^fc(x) - 1
for sales and profit, they have been recast into a linear form by 
multiplying throughout by Difc(x) and using L;Difc(X)) as the coefficient 
of z^. It should also be noted that by including T.fc in the coefficient 
of z^ the individual z^'s represent maximum percentage deviates* 
from target for a particular criterion.
Initial values for ui and were set from discussions with 
the decision maker and values of 6{Dit(X)} were available from 
preliminary experimentation with the model. The set of criteria T 
was also partitioned into and the initial parametrics defined:
» 0 i E L  
1. ■ H t J  
A i - -A i £ K (6.7.3.)
and A was made to vary from -1.0 to +1.0 in steps of 0.2. Three 
experiments were run for different choices of {j ,k }, a typical
result is shown in Appendix x m  and the results summarised
showing the decision maker's best' choice over A for each run
are shown in Table 6.7.1.
•This resulted in the deviations having all the same order of magnitude 
while numerical values of the targets actually range from 0.11 (dividend/ 
share in year 1) to over 30,000 (sales in year 8).
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Tabic 6.7.1.
CRITERIA RESULTING OBJECTIVE WEIGHTS AT 'BEST' X
Sales 3.40 2.04 0.82
Return on Capital 3.80 2.28 3.65
Earnings per Share 4.00 2.40 2.40
Liquidity 3.40 4.20 4.20
Interest Cover 2.50 3.50 3.50
Dividend Cover 3.40 3.40 3.40
Dividend/Share 2.50 2.50 2.50
Net Profit 3.60 2.16 3.46
J: Set Times interest 
covered Liquidity
Sales Sales
K: Set Sales net profit 





'Best' value of 
parameter
X - -0.4 X » 0.6 X - 0
Each succeeding run of these three started from the previous 
'best' choice of weights.
A serious difficulty# which illustrates the problem of 
instabilities in goal programming formulation arises if an attempt 
is made to explore alternative dividend policies with this 
particular formulation. The results of taking the set J to consist 
only of dividend over and K as dividend per share with the remaining 
criteria held constant in L is shown in Table 6.7.2. with an 
increased resolution of X near the critical point. Thus between 
 ^« 0.59 and 0.60 a 2% variation in weights causes a 500% change 
on dividend cover and dividend per share doubles. This difficulty 
arises because the two dividend policy variables dividend per 
share and dividend cover are in direct opposition and are 
functionally related to a third criterion (via. earnings per 
share). Thus depending upon the relative weights an attempt is
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made to meet completely either the dividcnd/share target or the 
dividend cover target.
The effect is in fact even more exaggerated than in Table 6.7.2. 
which gives only average criteria values rather than values in 
individual years. In this particular case the problem is made 
worse because we are trying to find the minimum of the weighted 










Because of the linear nature of the trade-offs assumed ir. goal
programming it may be preferable to continue to reduce the maximum
deviation for a single criterion on a target in one period, even
though a satisfactory average for that criterion has already been
achieved and irrelevant of the fact that the levels on other
criteria are no longer acceptable. It should be. emphasised though
that this difficulty is merely illustrative of the general problem
of instabilities in goal programming formulation. For this reason
the remaining searches were carried out using a minimax structure.
Table 6.7.2. CRITERIA VALUES
( AVERAGES OVER THE EIGHT YEARS )
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6.8 The Phase II Search
One of the initial tasks of this phase was to explore possible 
dividend policies - throughout phase I a minimum dividend per share 
of £0.127* was imposed as a hard constraint. This constraint was 
merely an expedient to maintain a degree of stability in the dividend 
payout and to overcome the difficulties discussed in the preceeding 
few paragraphs while the weightings attached to the other criteria 
were explored. For this second phase the problem was reformulated as




{n . (x ) - T._ UIk(X)> Cz+z .] * X6it it it
D.. T.
100 u. It (6 .8 .2 .)
where the notation is as before, with the additional variables 
defined as
- degree of hybridisation
- defines the range of parametric variation.
A smooth transition from phase I to phase II was obtained by 
defining the new target levels to be equal to the final 'best' point 




This means that the initial target point is on the efficient 
surface and the subsequent parameterisation is such that it moves this 
target away from the efficient surface. The effect of this is illustrated 
schematically in Figure 6.8.1.
* This figure was 10% below the current dividend per share level
Figure 6.8.1.
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This represents a search over the {j ,k } subjects of I with two
runs
(i) 6it - Tit • £{D.t (X)} i C J
- 0 i C K U L
<ii) 6it - Tit;/.{Dit(x)} i E K
- 0 i e j u l
In each case X varied from 0 to +1 in steps of 0.2 and the 
effect of this is to move the target first along the line BC and 
then along the line BD. This enables a region of the efficient surface 
centred upon B to be explored.
As it turned out one of the most important factors governing
the search was the choice of a . Too low a value meant that theH
search was subject to the implicit bound problem, while too high 
a value resulted in the solution being insensitive to further 
changes in target levels. See figure 6.8.2.
Figure 6.8.1
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changes in target levels. See figure 6.8.2.
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FIGURE 6.8.2.
Table 6.8.3. show::' the effect of such a parametric search
on the dividend policy variables. The criteria not listed in the
table were roughly constant over the range of parameterisation.
The first half of the table shows the effect of increasing the
target on dividend per share while the second half shows the effect
of increasing the target on dividend cover. A value for a ofH
1.5 was chosen, following an unsuccessful run in which a value of
3.5 for a resulted in the solution being insensitive to changes 
in the dividend per share target.
There are several points to note. The first and most important 
is that the instabilities associated with the previous goal 
programing formulation have been avoided. However, a secondary 
problem has arisen: the previously acceptable levels for the 
times interest cover and liquidity ratios fall to unacceptable 
levels as the dividend per share is increased. The cause of this 
is that the dividends in the early years are largely paid for
by long term borrowing, with the subsequent effect that the times 
interest covered falls to very low levels (-10.0) during this period 
before a growth in earnings begins to ease the situation.
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At this stage of the search, it would be clearly preferable
to explore the two dividend policy variables ir. isolation, with
the exploration making a minimal impact on the values of the other
policy variables. This can be achieved by the method of sub-space
hybridisation in which the hybridisation is carried out only on the
non-parameterised criteria. Further defining a to be sufficientlyH
large (greater '.han 6 in this case) we can obtain goal programming 
on the non-dividend policy variables with minimax on the dividend 
policy variables. The advantage of this is that goal programming 
is insensitive to changes in target levels, an alternative and 
equivalent view is that the parametric search is restricted to 
the dividend/share - dividend cover planes. The effect of such 
a parametric procedure is shown in Table 6.8.4.
As now can be seen from the table the liquidity and times 
interest covered ratios do not fall to unacceptable levels as 
the dividend/share and dividend cover figures are altered. It 
also indicates the extent to which the dividend per share can 
be increased before changes start to take place in other ratios. 
Having chosen a suitable dividend policy it turned out that 
while many of the criteria had satisfactory average levels, 
there remain unsatisfactory time trends in some of the criteria. 
Again the liqudity and times covered constraints were a major 
problem. These ratios in each of the eight time period for 
the previous best solution (X»0.2 for dividend cover) are shown
in Table 6.8.5
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Tabic 6.8.3. CRITERIA VALUES 
(AVERAGES OVER TIME)
Dividend/Share Dividend cover
X 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Liquidity 1.89 1.9 1.93 1.94 1.96 2.01 2.00 2.04 2.09 2.11 2.16
Times covered 10.62 11.22 11.89 12.97 13.60 14.79 14.36 13.62 12.98 13.29 15.26
Dividend cover 1.74 1.84 1.95 2.09 2.23 2.40 2.77 3.27 4.06 5.27 7.09
Dividend/Share 23.81 24.06 22.39 20.69 19.02 17.22 15.81 13.90 11.71 9.49 7.24
Dividend 619 585 551 516 480 441 383 315 245 190 145
Table 6.8.4. CRITERIA VALUES 
(AVERAGES OVER TIME)
Dividend/share Dividend cover
X 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Liquidity No 1.98 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.05 2.07 2.09 2.12
Times covered Change 14.50 14.60 14.90 16.13 18.02 20.22 22.83 27.82
Dividend cover 2.13 2.21 2.40 2.69 3.10 3.66 4.43 5.56
Dividend/share in 19.06 18.41 17.14 15.46 13.56 11.59 9.66 7.78
Dividend Values 508 485 439 389 340 287 237 189
Table 6.9.5. CRITERIA VALUES
Time Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Average




13.25 12.98 13.33 14.50 18.77 16.86 19.16 20.28 16.14
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Table 6.8.6. CRITERIA VALUES •
Time Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Average




14.23 14.26 14.31 14.71 18.99 21.25 22.79 20.10 17.57
The "jump" in time interest covered between years 4 and 5 is because 
a large repayment of long term debt occurs during period 5.
While this procedure does not fit nearly into the search scheme 
as originally proposed for phase II it illustrates the necessity of being 
able to respond to a particular feature of the solution rather than to 
stiaight jacket the responses of the decision maker. Thus it may be 
necessary to introduce a smoothing option at this staqe as well as 
the •do-smoothing* effect of phase III.
6.9 The Phase III Search*
The motivation behind the phase III search was that by the end 
of phase II the decision maker will have had opportunity to experiment 
at some length with average levels and growth rates and presumably 
would now like to relax certain criteria in certain years away from 
the 'smoothed' solution of phase II. Thus it is considered part 
of the skill of financial management to know when it is worth the 
risk of relaxing say liquidity or profit in early years in order to 
improve the medium term position or perhaps earnings cover the year 
before a major debt repayment. The essence of the multiple criteria 
approach adopted here is not to pre-determine which years and which 
criteria to relax but allow the most advantageous relaxations to 
be demonstrated by the algorithm. To do this the minimax metric
•The experiments in this section were carried out by D.R. Atkins.
M
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between years must be dropped and individual deviations zit for each
criteria in each year re-introduced. There are two major difficulties 
with attempting this. Firstly care must be taken to prevent the 
problems of instability associated with the p*l goal programming 
model entering again. Hence a formulation of the type
cannot be contemplated for this reason. In addition such a formulation 
would lose control over the trade-offs established between criteria.
The second difficulty arises because of the need to continue the 
phase III search from the previous 'best* solution found at the end 
of phase II. This will not happen automatically.it' the structure 
of the objective function is changed to permit this new exploration. 
Again, as in the previous phase, this type of issue is one that is 
going to need to be addressed by all large scale applications of 
multicriteria optimisation in which some structured search is attempted. 
The methods adopted for this thesis are unlikely to be of general 
applicability but it is hoped they are instructive in representing 
one particular approach to these two difficulties.
The first step of phase III is the same as with phase II, to define 
the new target levels to be equal to their final 'best' point of







This means that the target is achievable and efficient hence 
any objective function structure would reoptimise to the same point
The problem was then reformulated as:




(zJ+zi) >0, i E J (6.9.5.)
+ zifc) >0 i E J' (6.9.6.)
x e r
I - J U J* J n j* ■ 0
This structure needs some explanation. Initially we could have 
J ' “ 0 and J » I and the structure would be identical to that of 
phase II (equations (6.8.1.) and (6.8.2.)), though the value of 
X6^t in equation (6.8.2.) now has been incorporated into the phase 
III target of equations 6.9.5-6. If a series of experiments were 
done with different choices for J and J' then those criteria left 
within J would still be dealt with as in phase II, while those 
criteria in J' could improve their average values over time at the 
expense of introducing additional deviations z^t in particular years. 
The number of such deviations introduced can be controlled by the 
hybrid parameter X. As X is increased in integer steps by objective 
function parameterisation more and more z^t can enter leading to a 
less ’smooth' though hopefully, a more attractive solution, ’’he 
criteria chosen for inclusion in J' must be those with the least
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liability to cause instability. Thus this procedure does not really 
allow for further exploration in the dividend policy criteria.
One last technical note needs to be added for completeness 
before presenting the results. The parameterisation with respect 
to X cannot begin immediately because the target point is now on the 
efficient surface and there is no reason for changes in X to 
affect the solution. The target point has therefore to be altered again 
and ’lifted away' from the efficient surface. To do this with 
minimal disruption of the current 'best* solution, the right-hand 
side parametrics of phase II were again used but with chosen 
so that the value of the weighted deviations on all criteria 
remained balanced. Minor changes did in fact occur following 
redefinition of the criteria remaining in set J but these changes 
were not considered serious.
Three principal experiments were made with the choice of J' 
as in Table 6.9.1. Each experiment started from the phase. II 'best* 
solution adjusted by 'lifting off' as above.
Table 6.9.1.
Experiment Criteria in J'
A Earnings per share in each year. 
Sales in each year.
Profit in each year
B Those in A plus
return on capital employed in each year.
C Those in B plus 
the liquidity ratio
In Table 6.9.2. the number of individual deviations 2^(i£J')
that entered as X decreased over six steps is shown for each experiment.

















A 1 30.85 22.56 0 0 0
2 30.15 12.53 0 0 2
3 30.99 10.40 0 0 2
4 33.76 0 0 3 3
5 30.38 0 0 3 4
6 28.26 0 1 4 4
B 1 30.22 18.93 0 0 2 0
2 30.77 16.00 0 0 2 0
3 30.77 15.00 0 0 2 0
4 35.27 1.71 0 1 3 1
5 34.47 0 1 2 4 1
6 27.06 0 1 5 4 5
C 1 26.47 20.76 0 0 0 0 0
2 26.96 19.53 0 0 2 0 0
3 28.09 15.38 0 0 2 0 1
4 28.09 15.38 0 0 2 0 1
5 31.67 0 0 2 4 1 1
6 22.77 0 1 6 4 5 5
The years in which it is attractive to relax earnings per share are 
years two and five. Both are difficult years; year two because 
initial outlays have still to generate adequate returns and year 
five because of the need to make a substantial debt repayment 
schedules in that year whilst maintaining growth. Heavy initial 
investment also explains a poor liquidity position in year five and 
the below average earnings in year five results in a poor return on 
capital employed. Other deviations arise because the sales target 
in year four and the profit targets in years two and eight are also 
difficult to meet. As a comparison of the 'smoothed' and 'unsmoothed' 
nature of the results, figure 6.9.1. shows the yearly values for 
profit, earnings, return and liqudity ratio for initial and final 
X-values for experiment C. While Table 6.9.3. shows for this experiment 
the average values over time for X-values of 1, 5 and 6. In
FIGURE 6.9.1
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particular, a comparison of the values 1 and 5 for X shows the 
pivotal role played by the earnings cover constraint.
Table 6.9.3. Average Values for X-values of 1, 5 and 6 in Experiment C.
X 1 5 6
ROCE(%) 21.77 22.17 21.82
LQDY 1.98 2.02 2.01
ECOV (in p) 17.20 16.81 17.56
ERPS 39.30 40.88 38.60
DCOV 2.62 2.64 2.70
DVPS (in p) 15.28 15.81 14.38
SALES (in £1000) 18844 19091 18453
PROFIT
(in £1000) 1056 1103 1049
A comparison of the actual investment decisions corresponding
to the initial and final X-values for experiment C shows substantial
differences. Out of the 22 totally or partially accepted projects
10 have a change in scale of 25% or more, 5 of these having a change
of 75% or more. Particularly noticeable is increased investment in
year three with only a modest increase in financing. This damages 
%the firms performance in the middle years but allows the benefits 
to be reaped in the closing years.
6.10 Conclusions
In this Chapter an attempt has been made to look in detail at 
just one particular way in which mathematical programming methods 
might be modified to produce a more managerially acceptable decision 
tool for corporate financial planning. The essence of the strategy 
devised was that it should be responsive to the decision makers 
preferences. Hence the idea emerged that the decision maker should 
not only be able to indicate the currently most satisfactory solution
but should also be able to give guidance to the desirable features 
of any improved solution and so direct the search into the appropriate 
region of the efficient surface. This strategy of responding to 
the perceived weaknesses of the existing solution ensured a rapid 
convergence to the final solution. Another feature of the method 
was the avoidance of inquiring directly into the decision makers 
trade-off preferences between criteria relying instead on the 
decision maker to indicate the preferred alternative of an ordered 
set of efficient solutions.
Clearly there remain many weaknesses in the method outlined 
here» for example the objective function structures devised are 
frequently cumbersome, though here a matrix generator would have helped 
considerably. Only one solution strategy and a limited set of search 
tools were considered. There remain many other plausible strategies 
and additional multicriteria tools which ..light prove useful. In the 
absence of any coherent and comprehensive framework on the properties 
of linear multicriteria structures the methods developed were of 
an ad hoc nature. Also in the end the important problem of controlling 
the intertemporal stability was resolved unsatisfactorily.
While clearly the methodology as presented here is still a 
long way from implementation and in need of considerable refinement 
in the search procedures. A comprehensive solution to all the 
weaknesses identified and the problems raised in this Chapter may 
not be necessary prior to trial implementation. A firm currently 
using a financial statement generator could have this type of 
multiobjectiva programme built on to the front so that the statement 
generator would now be a report writer to an LP. In the initial 
stages of development and implementation most of the investment and 
financing opportunities could be fixed at specific values within 
the model and the resulting tool would be indistinguishable as
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but should also be able to give guidance to the desirable features 
of any improved solution and so direct the search into the appropriate 
region of the efficient surface. This strategy of responding to 
the perceived weaknesses of the existing solution ensured a rapid 
convergence to the final solution. Another feature of the method 
was the avoidance of inquiring directly into the decision makers 
trade-off preferences between criteria relying instead on the 
decision maker to indicate the preferred alternative of an ordered 
set of efficient solutions.
Clearly there remain many weaknesses in the method outlined 
here; for example the objective function structures devised are 
frequently cumbersome, though here a matrix generator would have helped 
considerably. Only one solution strategy and a limited set of search 
tools were considered. There remain many other plausible strategies 
and additional multicriteria tools which ..light prove useful. In the 
absence of any coherent and comprehensive framework on the properties 
of linear multicriteria structures the methods developed were of 
an ad hoc nature. Also in the end the important problem of controlling 
the intertemporal stability was resolved unsatisfactorily.
While clearly the methodology as presented here is still a 
long way from implementation and in need of considerable refinement 
in the search procedures. A comprehensive solution to all the 
weaknesses identified and the problems raised in this Chapter may 
not be necessary prior to trial implementation. A firm currently 
using a financial statement generator could have this type of 
multiobjective programme built on to the front so that the statement 
generator would now be a report writer to an LP. In the initial 
stages of development and implementation most of the investment and 
financing opportunities could be fixed at specific values within 
the model and the resulting tool would be indistinguishable as
far as the user was concerned. As the methodology advanced and 
requests for more and broader options were made,the control of 
the solution values could be made to depend increasingly on the 
manipulation of performance ratios. Thus acceptance and use of 
the system would be intimately linked with the managerial demands 
as well as with the evolution of the methodology.
In summary tue contribution of the work of this Chapter 
to such a process is that it begins to address some of the practical 
and procedural issues involved in the use of a multicriteria 
approach to financial planning.
The contribution of this Chapter to the thesis is that it 
illustrates one possible avenue for the future construction and use of a 




This thesis has been so structured that the detailed conclusions 
have already bean presented at the end of each chapter. However, 
it is perhaps worthwhile to take a more global perspective of the 
work and to see the relationships between, and the limitations of, 
these conclusions. To this end a brief review of the development 
of the thesis would seem appropriate.
In chapter two the theoretical foundations of much of the 
subsequent analysis were laid down. Here the nature of the relation­
ship between the primal formulation of the investment and financing 
decision and the dual formulation was reexamined and clarified. The 
third chapter was then able to exploit the structure of the dual 
solution to impose bounds on the primal solution. These bounds 
showed that for many models, whose objective function is based on a 
discounting methodology and where decisions are constrained by 
debt capacity (and possibly other) considerations, the chosen set 
of investment projects is not radically different from that which 
could be obtained by the use of a simple rule of thumb.
It was this conclusion which directed the research into the 
exploration of two different,and quite distinct roles, which could 
be played by L.P. models in financial planning.
The first of these roles was the development of analytical tools 
for financial theory. Chapter four looked in detail at how L.P. models 
could be used as a framework for the normative appraisal of individual 
projects within the broader context of the firms total investment
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and financing opportunity set. These ideas were extended in chapter 
five to the analysis of a simultaneous investment and financing 
decision - that of a financial lease.
In contrast the last section explored a very different role 
for L.P. models and considered how they could be restructured to 
become more relevant and more effective decision tools for use by 
corporate financial planners. This analysis led to the formulation 
of an interactive goal programming system.
Both of these uses for L P. models have their obvious limitations 
and attendant unsolved problems and it would be inappropriate to 
conclude without drawing attention to these issues and indicating 
where future research might be directed.
The first of these problem areas is the development of an 
algorithm for solving horizon truncated financial planning L.P. 
models in accordance with the horizon principle enunciated in the 
introductory chapter. The outlines of such an algorithm were briefly 
reported in chapter four and although it appeared to work reasonably 
efficiently for the example cited in that section, a great deal of 
involved programming would be necessary prior to a more general 
implementation.
The second problem area is the structuring of suitable objective 
functions for use in the goal programming search. Here it has been 
possible to develop a primitive algebra for the classification of 
objective functions in multi-criteria programming. Such an algebra 
provides alternative linear models which might be used in multi­
criteria programming for the generation of solution with particular 
structural features. As both of these developments form part of 
joint ongoing research with Atkins their details have not been included
in this thesis
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The limitations on the use of linear models, as normative 
frameworks for financial theory or as interactive goal programming 
devices,are sufficiently serious that the particular formulations, 
though not necessarily the methodology, adopted in this paper would 
appear to afford little future until they can be overcome.
In using the model for the development of a normative theory of 
investment appraisal it was necessary to adopt without further 
question many results based on a two moment equilibrium theory of 
capital markets. Thus the incorporation of uncertainty was 
principally via a risk adjusted discount rate coupled with restrictions 
on the level of debt. While such an approach maintains linearity it 
does require the return on debt to be perfectly elastic upto some 
predetermined limit and perfectly inelastic thereafter,while the 
return on other financing instruments were required to be constant 
through this range. This simplification contradicts many of the 
assumptions of capital market theory and places a severe limitation 
on the validity of the conclusions which can be drawn from such 
models. The mere adoption of a step wise linear approximation to the 
risk return schedule is too crude for theoretical, though not 
necessarily for practical, purposes.
In using the restructured model for multi-criteria programming 
the non-linearities introduced by financial ratios were largely 
glossed over. Further research has shown that, for the fractional 
criteria necessary to financial planning, the efficient region is 
not necessarily closed and might also include interior points. Such 
findings severely limit the use of the interactive goal-programming 
models presented here and indicate that until the topology of 
the feasible region in multi-criteria fractional programming formu­
lations is better understood, it would be unwise to continue with the
development of this particular programming methodology.
These two major limitations would thus seem to block, though 
hopefully only temporarily, further progress. It would thus seem 
an appropriate point at which to formally present the findings so
far and to submit this thesis.
287
REFERENCES
Adelson, R.M., "Discounted cash flow - can we discount it - a 
critical examination". J.B.F. Summer 1970. Vol.2 No. 2.
Amey, L.R., "Interdependencies in capital budgeting: a survey.Journal 
of business finance Vol. 4 No. 3 1972.
Ashton, D.J., and Atkins, D.R., "Interactions of Corporate Financing 
and Investment decisions - implications for capita budgeting - 
a further comment". University of Bath. Working paper No. 2. 1978.
Ashton, D.J. and Atkins, D.R., "Rules of thumb versus linear
programming in capital budgeting". Working paper 389. Faculty 
of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British 
Columbia, Vancouver, May 1976.
Atkins, D.R., "The relationship between the discount rate in capital 
budgeting and the opportunity cost of rational capital".
School of Industrial and Business Studies, working paper No. 7 
February 1972.
Atkins, D.R. and Ashton, D.J., "Discount rates in capital budgeting - 
a re-examination of the Baumol and Quandt paradox". The 
Engineering Economist Vol. 21 No. 3 (1976) pp. 159-171.
Barges, A.A., "The effect of capital structure on the cost of capital". 
Prentice-Hall 63.
Baumol, W.J. "Business behaviour: value and growth". Macmillan,
New York, 59.
Baumol, W.J. s Quandt, R.E. "Investment and discount rates under
capital rationing - a programming approach". Economic Journal 
Vol. 75 June 65 pp. 317-329.
Baxter, N.D. "Leverage, risk of ruin and the cost of capital".
Journal of Finance 22 (September 1967) pp. 395-403.
Beale, E.M.L., "Mathematical programming in practice”. Pitman 1968.
Beenhakker, H.L., "Discounting indices proposed for capital investment 
evaluation - a further examination". Engineering Economist 
Vol. 18 No. 3 (73).
Benayoun, R., Tergny, J., "Mathematical programming with multi­
objective functions: a solution by POP (progressive orientation 
procedure)". Metra 9, 1970.
Beranek, W., "The cost of capital, capital budgeting and maximization
of shareholder wealth". J.Financial and Quantative Analysis. March 75.
Bernard, R.H., "Mathematical programming for capital budgeting -
a survey generalisation and critique". J.Financial Quantitative 
Analysis. 4 No. 2 1969.
288
Bernard, D., Richard, H., "A comprehensive comparison and critique
of discounting indices proposed for capital investment evaluation."
The Engineering Economist Vol. 16 No. 3 1971.
Bhaskar, K.N. "Borrowing and Lending in a Mathematical Programming
Model of Capital Budgeting". J.B.F.A. Summer 74, Vol 2., No. 2.
Black, F., "Capital market equilibrium with restricted borrowing".
Journal of Business 45, July 1972.
Bower, R.S., "Issues in lease evaluation".Financial Management, 2.
Winter 73, pp. 25-33.
Bower, R.S., Herringer, F.C., and Williamson, J.P., "Lease evaluation". 
Accounting Review 41 (April 1966) pp. 106-114.
Bristin, L.E. (66) "A method unifying multiple objective functions".
Man.Sci. 12. 10.
Bromwich, M., "Capital budgeting - a survey". Journal of Business 
Finance, Autumn 70. Vol. 2. No. 3.
Burton, R.M. and Damon, W.W., "On the existence of a cost of capital 
under pure capital rationing". Journal of Finance 74.
Byrne, R.A., Cooper, W.W., Charnes, A., and Kortanek, K. "A chance 
constrained approach to capital budgeting with portfolio type 
payback, liquidity constraints, and horizon posture control".
J.F.Q.A. Vol 11 No. 4 December 1967.
Carleton, W.T., "Linear programming and capital budgeting models -
a new interpretation”. Journal of Finance XXIV No. 5 December 1969.
Carleton, W.T. "An analytical model for long range financial planning".
The Journal of Finance, vol. 25, May 1970. pp. 271-335.
Carleton, W.T., Dick, C.L., Downes, D.H., "Financial policy model:
Theory and Practice". Journal of Financial and Quantative Analysis 
December 1973.
Chambers, D.J., "Programming the allocation of funds subject to
restrictions on reported results". O.R.Q. Vol 18. No. 4 December 1967.
Chambers, D.J., "The joint problem of investment and financing"
O.R.Q. Vol 22 No. 3 September 1971.
Chambers, D.J. "Dividend plans and balance sheet management". Journal of 
business finance. Vol. 4 No. 3 1972
Chambers, D.J., Singhai, H.S., Taylor, B.D., and Wright, D.L. "Developing 
dividend policies with a computer terminal" Journal of Accounting 
and business research, Autumn 1971.
Charnes, Cooper, Ijiri, "Breakeven budgeting and programming to
Goals". Journal of Accounting Research, Spring 1963, reprinted 
Livingstone, Management Planning and Control. (McGraw-Hill).
289
Charnes, A., Cooper N.W. and Miller M.M., "Applications of linear 
programming to financial budgeting and the costing of funds". 
Journal of Business XXXII No. 1 January 1959.
Cyert, R.M. and March, J.G., "A behavioural theory of the firm". 
Prentice Hall 1963.
Dantzig, G.B., "Linear programming and extensions". Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 1963.
Durand, D., "The cost of debt and equity funds for business".
In Ezra Solomon (Ed.) The Management of Corporate Capital 
(New York s Free Press 59) pp. 91-116.
Durand, D., "The cost of capital, corporation finance, and the
theory of investment ; comment". The American Economic Review 
Vol. XLIX No. 4 September 1959. Reprinted S.H.Archer and 
C.A.D'Ambrosio - The theory of business finance - a book of 
readings - Macmillan. 1967.
Elton, E.J., "Capital rationing and external discount rates".
Journal of Finance June 1970.
Elton, E.J., Gruber M.J., and Lieber, Z., "Valuation, optimum invest­
ment and financing for the firm subject to regulation".
Journal of Finance Vol XXX No. 2 May 1975.
Evans, J.P. and Steuer R.E., "A revised simplex method for linear 
multiple objective programming". Math.Prog. Vol. 5 1975.
Evers, J.J.M., "Linear programming over an infinite horizon".
Tilburg University Press (June 1973).
Evers, J.J.M., "Linear infinite horizon programming and Lemke's
complementarity algorithm for the calculation of equilibrium 
combinations". Research memorandum 45 Tilburg Institute of 
Economics. November 1973.
Evers, J.J.M., "On the initial state vector in linear infinite
horizon programming". Research memorandum 49,Tilburg Institute 
of Economics (1974).
Evers, J.J.M., "Optimization in normed vector spaces with applications 
to optimal economic growth theory." Research memorandum 50, 
Tilburg Institute of Economics (1974).
Evers, J.J.M., "On the existence of balanced solutions in optimal 
growth and investment problems". Research memorandum 5],,
Tilburg Institute of Economics (1974).
Evers, J.J.M., "A duality theory for convex “> - horizon programming". 
Research memorandum 54 - Tilburg Institute of Economics (1975).
Evers, J.J.M., "More with the Lomke-Howson complementarity algorithm". 
Department of applied mathematics working paper. University of 
Twente Holland July 1977.
Fama, E.F. "Risk-adjusted discount-rates and capital budgeting under 
uncertainty". Journal of Financial Economics 5 (1977) pp. 3r34.
Fawthrop, R.A., "Underlying problems in discounted cash flow
appraisal". Accounting and Business Research - Summer 1971.
Fawthrop, R.A. and Terry, B.T., "The evaluation of an integrated
investment and lease decision”. Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting Vol 3 No. 2 Summer 1976.
Fogler, H.R., "Ranking techniques and capital budgeting". Accounting 
Review. January 1972.
Freeland, J.R. and Rosenblatt, M.J., "An analysis of linear programming 
formulations for the capital rationing problem". Paper at the 
Joint Conference of TIMS and ORSA, San Francisco. May 9-11, 1977.
Geoffrion, A., "Proper efficiency and the theory of vector maximization" 
Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications Vol. 22 (1968) 
pp. 618-30.
Geoffrion, A.M. Dyer, J.S., and Feinberg, A., "An iterative approach 
for multicriterion optimisation with an application to the 
operation of an academic department". Man.Sci. 19.4 (1972) 
pp. 357-368.
Gershefski, G.W. "Corporate models - the state of the art". Management 
Science 1970.
Goldberg, S., "Introduction to difference equations". (New York s 
Wiley, 1958).
Gordon, M.J., "The investment, financing and valuation of the 
corporation", Homewood 111 s Irwin 1962.
Grinyer, P.H. and Wooller, J., "Corporate models today”. Institute 
of Chartered Accountants, 1975.
Hadley, G., "Linear programming", Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. 1962.
Hamilton, W. and Moses, M. "An optimisation model for corporate 
financial planning”. O.R.S.A. May-June 1973.
Hannan, E.L. "Effects of substituting a linear goal for a fractional 
goal in the goal programming problem". Paper delivered at 
TIMS/ORSA San Francisco Meeting May 1977.
Higgins, J.C. and Finn, R. "Planning models in the U.K. : a survey". 
Omega Vol 5 No. 2, 1977.
Hillier, F.S., Lieberman, G.J., "Introduction to operations research". 
Holden-Day 1967.
Hirschleifer, J. "On the theory of optimal investment decisions".
Journal of Political Economy 66 (August 1958).
291
Hopwood, A., "Accounting and human behaviour”. Accountancy Age 
Publications Haymarket 1974.
Hoskins, C.G., "Benefit-cost ratios versus net present value: revisited" 
Journal of Business Finance. Vol. 1 No. 2. Summer 1974.
Ijiri, Y., "Management goals and accounting for control". North- 
Holland Publishing Company 1965.
Ijiri, Y., Levy, F.K., Lyon, R.C., "A LP model for budgeting and
financial planning". Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn 1963. 
reprinted Livingstone, Management Planning and Control, McGraw Hill
Intriligator, M.D. "Mathematical optimization and economic theory". 
Prentic-Hall 1971.
Jensen, M.C. "Risk, the pricing of capital assets and the evaluation 
of investment portfolios". Journal of Business 42 (April 1969).
Jensen, M.C., "Capital markets: theory and evidence”. Bell Journal 
of Economics and Management Science 3, Autumn 1972.
Keeney, R., "Examining corporate policy using multi-attribute utility 
analysis". Paper presented at the Multiple Criteria Decision- 
Making Conference, Jouy-en-Jouas, May 1975.
Klammer, T., "Empirical evidence of the adoption of sophisticated
capital budgeting techniques". Journal of Business, July 1972. 
pp. 387-397.
Kornbluth, J.S.H. "A survey of goal programming". Omega Vol. 1 
No. 2 1973.
Lane, M.N., "Goal programming and satisficing models in economic 
analysis". The University of Texas at Austin, Unpublished 
Ph.D. 1970.
Lev, B., "Financial statement analysis: a new approach.” Prentice- 
Hall, 1974.
Litner, J., "The valuation of risk assets and the selection of risky 
investments in stock portfolios and capital budgets".
Review of Economics and Statistics 47. February 1965.
Lorie, J.H. and Savage, L.J., "Three problems in capital rationing". 
Journal of Business Vol. XXVIII October 1955.
Luce, R.D., and Raiffa, H., "Games and decisions". (New York : John 
Wiley, 1957).
Lustig, P. and Schwab, B., "A note on the application of LP to 
capital budgeting”. J.F.Q.A., pp. 427-431. December 1968.




Mao, J.C.T., "Security pricing in an imperfect capital market".
Journal of Financial and Quantative Analysis, 6, September 1971.
Merville, L.J. and Tavis, L.A., "A generalised model for capital
investment". Journal of Finance, Vol XXVII No. 1 (March 1973).
Miller, M.H., and Modigliani, F., "Dividend policy, growth and the 
valuation of shares". Journal of Business 34, October 1961.
Modigliani, F., and Miller, M.H., "The cost of capital, corporation 
finance, and the theory of investment". The American Economic 
Review, Vol XLVIII No. 3 (June 1958) Reprinted S.H.Archer and 
C.A.D'Ambrosio - The theory of business finance - A book of 
readings - Macmillan 1967.
Modigliani, F., and Miller, M.H., "The cost of capital, corporation 
finance, and the theory of investment : reply". The American 
Economic Review Vol XLIV No. 4 (September 1959) Reprinted,
S.H.Archer and C.A.D'Ambrosio - The theory of business finance 
- A book of readings - Macmillan 1967.
Modigliani, F., and Miller, M., "Corporate income taxes and the cost 
of capital - a correction". The American Economic Review - 
Vol. LII No. 3., June 1963.
Modigliani, F., and Miller, M.H., "Reply to Heins and Sprenkle"
The American Economic Review - September 1969 pp. 592-95.
Morin, T.L., "Computational advances and reduction of dimensionality 
in dynamic programming : a survey". Paper delivered at TIMS 
XXIII meeting Athens 1977.
Myers, S.C., "A note on linear programming and capital budgeting”. 
Journal of Finance, March 1972.
Myers, S.C., "Interactions of corporate financing and investment 
decisions - implications for capital budgeting". Journal of 
Finance, March 1974.
Myers, S.C., Dill, D.A. and Bautisto, A.J. "Valuation of financial 
lease contracts". Journal of Finance Vol. XXXI, June 1976 
No. 3.
Myers, S.C., and Pogue, G.A., "A programming approach to corporate 
financial management". Journal of Finance, May 1974.
Myers, S.C., "The determinants of corporate borrowing". Journal of 
Financial Economics, January 1978.
Nantell, T.J. and Carlson, C.R. "The cost of capital as a weighted 
average". Journal of Finance, 30. December 1975.
Naslund, B., "A model of capital budgeting under risk". The Journal 
of Business, April 1966.
293
Naylor, T.H. and Schauland, H., "A survey of users of corporate
planning models". Management Science, Vol. 22 No. 9 May 1976.
Perrin, J.R. "Business success as measured by an accountant". Paper 
given at the British Association for the Advancement of Science. 
Economics Section - 1966.
Peterson, D.E., "A quantative framework for financial management".
Irwin, 1969.
Quirin, G.D., "The capital expenditure decision" Irwin, Homewood,
Illinois - 1967.
Robichek, A.A. and Myers, S.C., "Optimal financing decisions".
Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall. 1965.
Schwab, B., and Lustig, P., "A comparative analysis of NPV and the 
benefit-cost ratio as measures of the economic desirability of 
investment". Journal of Finance June 1969. pp. 507-516.
'Senju, S., and Toyopa, Y., "An approach to linear programming with
0-1 variables". Management Science, December 1968.
Sharpe, W.F., "Capital asset prices : a theory of market equilibrium
under conditions of risk". Journal of Finance 19, September 1964.
Shubik, M., "Objective functions and models of corporate optimization". 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1961 pp. 345-375.
Simon, H.A. "Models of Man. New York”. John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 1957.
Simon, H.A. "On the concept of organization goals". Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 1964-65, reprinted in Readings in Management 
Decisions Ed. L.R.Amey, Longman 1973.
Solomon, E., "The theory of financial management”. Columbia 
University press. New York 1963.
Steuer, R.E., "An interactive linear programming procedure employing 
an algorithm for the vector - maximum problem". College of 
Business Administration and Economics, University of Kentucky.
Stiglitz, J.E., "A re-examination of the MM Theorem". American 
Economic Review, December 1969.
Stiglitz, J.E. "Some aspects of the pure theory of corporate finance 
bankruptcies and takeovers”. Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, (Autumn 1972) pp. 458-482.
Terry, B., "Leasing, an international bibliography". Technisch 
Hogeschool Twente, Enshede, Holland, April 1976.
Thanassoulis, E., "Multi-criteria programming solution methods and
associated problems". Centre for Industrial Economic and Business 
Research, University of Warwick, Working paper No. 69 September 1976.
Vancil, R.F., "Lease or borrow: new method of analysis". Harvard 
Business Review 39 (September-October 1961).
Vancil, R.F. "Leasing of industrial equipment" McGraw-Hill. Book 
Co. Inc. 1963.
Vein Horne, J.C. "Financial management and policy". Prentice-Hall 
Fourth edition 1977.
Heingartner, H.M., "Mathematical programming and the analysis of
capital budgeting problems". Englewood Cliffs N.J. Prentice-Hall 
1962 Republished Kershaw 1974.
Heingartner, H.M. "The excess present value index - a theoretical
basis and critique". Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn 1963.
Weston, J.F., "A test of cost of capital propositions". The
Southern Economic Journal Vol XXX No. 2 (October 1963) Reprinted 
S.M.Archer and C.A.D'Ambrosio - The theory of business finance - 
A book of readings - MacMillan 1967.
Weston, J.F. and Brigham, E.F., "Managerial finance"., (6th Edition)
The Dryden Press (1978)
Yu, P.L. and Zeleny, M. "The set of all nondominated solutions in
the linear cases and a multicriteria simplex methods". Centre 
for System Science, University of Rochester. In Cochrane,
J.L., Zeleny., M. (Eds.) Multicriteria Decision Making,
University of South Carolina Press, S.C. 1973.




A Mathematical Statement of the Model.
The following set of equations constitute the model for periods 
1 to 8. The source of the equation is given. The symbols in 
brackets give the corresponding row names which serve as variables 
in the computer model. The notation is defined in appendix II.
There are three distinct constraint sets. The first set consists 
of the accounting and technological constraints which are common 
to both the single criterion and the multicriteria model. The second 
set consists of the 'hard' constraints on financial policy variables 
used in the single criterion model only while the third set constitutes 
part of the goal programming structure used for exploring alternative 
financial strategies, and is exclusive to the multicriteria model.
1 Accounting and Technological Constraints
1.01 Sales (Total sales equals the sales from existing projects
plus sales from new projects)
7 S..X. - SALES = - SO [TS.j jt] t t
1.02 Building and Land (Book value of building and land equals 
new investments from projects plus existing investment 
less depreciation)
T CBL. X. - 1.03 FABL + FABL , = - CBL0t [BL “ ]t j t t-1 t t
1.03 Plant and Equipment (As for building and Land)
y CPE. X. + FAPE , - 1.3333 FAPE ’]t 3 t-1 t CPEOfc [PEt
1.04 Earnings (Earnings equals the earnings from existing and 
new projects less net short term interest payments less 
depreciation






1.05 Current Assets (Total current assets equals current assets
from existing and new projects plus short term deposits)
Y(AP. +ST.JX. + MARK - CURA^ = - CAC) iCAj 3t J t t t t
1.06 Current Liabilities (Total current liabilities equals 
liabilities from old and new projects plus overdraft, 
dividends and taxation payable)
I<AR
j j t V
+ OVDR CURLfc + TAXfc CLO. [CLt
1.07 Number of Shares (Increase in the total number of shares 
outstanding equals shares plus rights issues)
- Y RG + NUM. - N CE£>
T<t T ° *
1.08 Debt (Increase in debt outstanding equals new debt less 
any debt repayments)
- LLfc + DEfc - DEfc_1 = - DERPOt [Dfc
1.09 Net Profit after Tax (Net book profit after tax equals 
(1 - Tax rate) times taxable earnings)
- 0.5(Et-RL.DEt l ) + NPATt - 0 [PRt
1.10 Tax payable (Tax payable equals (1 - tax rate) times gross 
earnings less actual tax allowances)
TAXt - NPATfc - 0.2FABLt l + 0.191FABLt - O.SFAPE^
+ 0.5FAPEt + 0.5BLTAt = TAOfc [TPfc
1.11 Tax allowances (Tax allowances on buildings and land equals 
existing allowances plus any new allowances)
0.04FABLt x - 0.041FABLt + BLTAfc - BLTAfc l = 0 [TAfc
1.12 Cash Balance (Total cash inflows equals total cash outflows)
Efc - FABLt + FABLt l - FAPEfc + FAPE^__1 - CAfc + CAfc l 
+ CLt - CLt l  + LLfc + 1.6RGfc - TAXfc - DVfc - RLDEfc_1 - 0 [CBt
I R H H H M H g g g i n i
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1- 13 Scale Constraint (A project can be taken on at any level
up to full scale)
0 S S 1
3*14 Non-negativity (All primal variables are constrained to be 
positive or zero)
2 Single Criterion Model - Financial Policy Variables
2- 01 Return of Capital Employed (Earnings after depreciation
and short term interest should be greater than a-times 
net book value of assets after depreciation)
- Et + a(FABLt + FAPEfc + CAt - CLfc) S 0 [R0CEt
2-02 Current Ratio (Ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
should be greater than (3)
- CAt + 6CLt S 0 [LQDYt
2.03 Times Covered (Earnings after depreciation and short
term interest should be greater than y times total interest 
payments on debt)
- Et + Y(RL.DEt_1+RS.0VDRt l) «; 0 tEC0Vfc
2.04 Earnings per share (Net book profit after tax should be 
greater than times the number of shares)
- NPATfc + StNUMt S 0 [ERPSt
2.05 Dividend Cover (Dividends should be covered e times by 
distributable profit)
- NPATfc + EDXVt S 0 [DCOVt
2.06 Dividend Target (Planned dividend/share should be met)
DIVt - DTARGt-NUMt S 0 [DTARG^
Multicriteria-Model - Financial Policy Variables
3.01 Return on Capital Employed (Where possible earnings after
depreciation and short term interest should be greater than 
a^-times net book value of assets after depreciation)
- Et + Ot (FABLt + FAPEt + CAfc - CLt) - Uroce.ZED S O  [rqq£
3.02 Current Ratio (Where possible the ratio of current assets 
to current liabilities should be greater than 3^)
- CA + 8 CL - u .ZED S 0 [LQDYt t t  LQDY
t
t
3.03 Times Covered (Where possible, earnings after depreciation
and short term interest should be greater than y times total 
interest payments on debt)
-  E t  +  Y t (R L .D E t  l  + RS.0VDRt  l ) UEC0V *ZED £ 0 [ECOVt
3.04 Earnings per share (Where possible the book profit after 
tax should be greater than 6^ times the number of shares)
- NPATfc + i>t .NUMt - uERpg.ZED S 0 [ERPSt
3.05 Dividend Cover (Where possible dividends should be covered 
E times by distributable profit)
- NPATt + EtDIVt - .ZED S 0 CDCOVt
3.06 Sales Target (Planned sales target should be aimed for)
SALES + II . ZED > SALES TARGET. CSTARGt ST t t
3.07 Profit Target (Planned profit target should be aimed for)
NPAT + U . ZED * PROFIT TARGET. [PTARGt PT t t
3.08 Dividend Target (Planned dividend/share should be met)
DIV - DTARG .NUH +U.ntlc. ZED * 0 [DTARG^
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.09 Upper limit on Growth (In the multicriteria model the
total growth factor measured in terms of fixed and current 
assets should not be more than three times over the eight- 
year planning period)




For ease of reference the definitions and notation are 
divided into two sections. The first section explains the notation 
which is used in the formulation of the model to be found in 
Appendix 1 and the variable names used in the computer program 
of which sample printouts are also to be found in the Appendices. 
The second section deals with the mathematical notation which is 
used in the main body of the thesis for the development of 
theoretical arguments.
Definitions and Notation of Variables used in the computer model.
APjt - accounts payable on project j in time period t.
ARJt - accounts receivable on project j in time period t.
BLTAfc - accumulated tax allowances on building and land at 
time period t.
CAOfc - value of working capital in time period t resulting 
from operations already undertaken.
CAt - total value of current assets at the end of time 
period t.
CBLjt - capital expenditure on building and land on project 
j in time period t.
CBLOt - capital expenditure on building and land from 
commitments already undertaken.
CLOfc - value of creditors in time period t resulting 
from operations already undertaken.
CPEOt - capital expenditure on building and land from 
commitments already undertaken.
DEt - total value of long term in time period t.
DEPROt - planned debt repayment in time period t.
.
T O T * ' -  •























- the dividend per share target in time period t.
- actual dividend declared in time period t.
Paid in time period t + 1.
- earnings in time period t after depreciation and 
short term interest payments/receipts.
- gross earnings in time period t from project j.
- book value of building and land at time period t.
- book value of plant and equipment at time period t.
- new long term debt taken out in time period t.
- short term deposits at the end of time period t.
- number of shares outstanding at the beginning 
of the planning period.
- net book profit after tax in time period t.
- number of shares outstanding at the end of time 
period t.
- overdraft at the end of time period t.
- denotes project n undertaken at time t.
- profit target for time period t.
- number of rights issued in time period t.
- interest rate on short term deposits.
- interest rate on long term debt.
- interest rate on overdraft facilities.
- sales generated by project j in time period t.
- total sales in time period t.
- sales in period t from existing operations.
- sales target for period t.
- tax payable on operations for period t.
- tax allowances in period t from existing building 
and land.
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II - weighting vector on deviations from targets.
Xj - scale at which project j is undertaken.
ZEO - vector representing deviations from targets on
the policy variables.
a - 'degree' of hybridisation of goal programming
model.
- return on capital employed required in period t.
8t - minimum value of current ratio in period t.
Yfc - number of times earnings cover debt in period t.
6fc - earnings/share required in period t.
et - value of dividend cover in period t.
Definitions and Notation used in the development of the theoretical 
arguments in the main text
Below are two alphabetical lists (English and Greek) of the 
notation used in the main text. This summary is provided mainly for 
quick reference; the precise definition may vary with the context 
of the argument and any ambiguities should be resolved by reference 
to the local definition. Heavy type used in the text indicates a 
vector and the list below should be interpreted as the components 
of these vectors where appropriate.
a - weighted average cost of capital.
- risk adjusted discount rate for the valuation of 
project cash flows assuming a base case of all equity 
financing.
- cost of an asset to be leased.
- matrix of resource outputs from the adoption of a 
set of decisions.
- adjusted present value in t.








bt - capital allowances available in period t per unit of project adoption.




- cash inflow from project j in time period t.
- net present (terminal) value of project j.
ctj - capital required by project j in time period t.
dt - dividend/share in time period t.
Dt - total dividends paid by the firm in period t.
Dit(x) - denominator.ratio criterion i in period t.
D-statistic - Chebycheverror norm for project selection.
ejt - earnings from project j in period t.
Et - total value of equity issued in time period t.
f - flotation costs associated with equity issues 
or occasionally a constant multiplier.
V  Fofc - funds available from existing projects in time period t.
g - level of gearing.
H - planning horizon
i - interest rate (usually of equity capital).
al - implied interest rate in lease financing.
xt - total interest paid in t.
IRR - internal rate of return.
j - subscript used to denote project number.
K - constant defining limit on capital structure.




- scale of leasing project j.
- duals on leverage (gearing) in Chambers model.
- duals on leverage (gearing) in Chambers model.
- marginal reinvestment rate.
MM attributable to Modigliani and Miller.
numerator of ratio criterion i in time period t.
number of shares issue in t.
net present value.
net terminal value.
issue price of a share in t.
(pre-tax) lease payment to be made in t. 
interest rate (usually debt).
« r(l-KT).
borrowing interest rate, 
lending interest rate.
repayment of principal of a loan or lease, 
issue price in t of a share, 
rate of Corporation tax. 
target for criterion i in time period t. 
compounded value of net funds to project j at time t. 
relative utility attached to criterion i. 
utility function, 
fixed interest investment in t. 
value of firm at time t. 
level of debt in t.
income per unit investment in period t. 
after tax income per unit investment, 
scale of acceptance of project j. 
objective function.
deviations (from criterion i) (in time period t) from 
target.
vector of decisions taken in t.
dual on the borrowing limit in time period t.
incremental step on target i in time period t.
'it
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criterion function for criterion i in time period t.
feasible region.
used to denote small increment.
vector of dual variables.
dual on debt valuation stream at time t.
dual on income valuation stream at time t.
dual on the debt capacity constraint at time t.
dual on the scale of acceptance of project j.
discount factor.
dual on cash balance constraint in time period t. 
cost of capital rate for the screening of projects, 
function denoting debt capacity at time t. 
function denoting the value of equity at time t. 
level of debt at time t.
(•4
Appendix III
The Inltlal Balance Sheet, Operatine projectlons and thè background
Envlror.ment
Initial Balance Sheet (E'OOOs)
SHARE CAPITAL AND LONG-TERM DEBT ASSETS
Share Capital Fixed Assets
(2,000 @ £1) 2,000 Land and Buildings 1,634



















4,700 TOTAL ASSETS 4,700
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INITIAL PROJECTIONS (E'OOO)
YEAR-1 YEAR-2 YEAR-3 YEAR-4 YEAR-5 YEAR-6 YEAR-7 YEAR-8
Sales from existing 
proj ects HOOO loooo 9500 8800 8000 7500 7500 7000
Gross earnings from 
existing projects 1950 1850 1600 1560 1240 1220 1200 1000
Planned expenditure 
Building and Land 400 600 500 200 - - - -
Tax allowances 130 130 130 120 120 120 120 loo
Plant and equipment 600 500 400 400 400 400 400 400
Working capital 
(pebtors and Stock) 3510 3588 3705 3432 3120 29 25 2925 2730
Creditors 1120 1145 1170 1095 1020 946 948 902
Additional Data
(i) The initial market value of shares is E2 and the rights issue price is 
El.6. No more them EO.Om may be raised in the form of rights at any
one time.
(ii) Long-term debt is available at 8% over 25 years upto Elm in any year.
(iii) There is a planned debt repayment of Elm in year 5.
(iv) Overdraft is available upto £0.25m in any year at 12% before tax.
(v) Excess funds may be placed on 1 year deposit at 7%.
(vi) The sales during the current financial year were £10,550,000 producing 
a net profit after tax of £900,000.
(vii) The initial value of tax allowances on building and land is £130,000.
308
The internally Imposed financial constraints under which the firm operates* 
are as follows
(a) Return on capital lmployed in any year must be greater than 18%.
(b) The dividend cover should be greater than 1.5.
(c) The ratio of current assets to current liabilities must be greater than 1.8.
(d) The number of times that debt is covered should be greater them lO.
(e) The earnings/share and dividend per share figures in each year are:
YEAR—1 YEAR-2 YEAR-3 YEAR-4 YEAR-5 YEAR-6 YEAR-7 YEAR-8
Earnings per share 
(E) 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.24
Dividend per share 
(E) 0.130 0.135 0.140 0.145 0.150 0.155 0.160 0.165
Treatment of Taxation
There are two categories of capital assets. These are:
(a) Building and Land.
(b) Plant and Equipment.
Tax Allowances available
Building and land receive a first year allowance of 40% with 4% of the initial 
total cost allowed on a straight-line basis thereafter.
Plant e-.d equipment receive a first year allowance of 100%.
Book Depreciation Rates
The book depreciation rates are 3% on building and land and 25% on plant and 
plant and equipment both on a reducing balance.
It is assumed that the rate of corporation tax is 50% and that there is a time 
lag of one year in payment.
* These constraints only apply to the single criterion model
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Timing of Cash Flows
One of the problems associated with programming models is the mapping of 
continuous time into discrete time. It was decided because of«
(a) Projects had been developed in which all cash flows were recognised 
at the end of a period.
(b) The model was to be used for valuation and as such it was necessary to have 
well defined recognition points.
(c) The model was to be used to generate Balance sheet information.
that the simplifying assumption of recognising all transactions at the 
end of a period was adopted. Figure A3.1 illustrate the
implications of this approach.









(ili) bALI-NCE SHEET ITE?'S 
ASSFTP
PERIOD t-1
MARK. INTEREST «I OVT'R
OVDR REPAID
T  I
PERIOD t PERIOD t+1
V
OVDR. INTEREST ON I ARK.
MARKt RETURNED
DIVt DECLARED DIVfc PAID













Table A4.1 Project Specification
The projects were specified by the following accounting data over their eight year liyes.
P R O J E C T  KO. Pii 1
SALES 0 0 500
B U I L D I N 3 / L A N D 100 50 50
PL aìJT/E'3'JI p n e n t 0 80 70
E A R N I N G S 0 0 too
C U R R E N T  A S S E T S 0 0 200
C U R R E N T  L I A 3 S' 0 0 40
8 0 0 1000 1 2 0 0 1 200 1 too
0 0 0 0 0 "
0 0 0 0 0
134 2 4 0 360 300 2 5 3
357 39 3 4 2 9 4 2 4 40 4
67 71 8 5 84 79
P R O J E C T  NO. P R
SALES 310 670 700
B U I L D I N 3 / L A N D 50 0 0
PL A N T / E Q U I P M E N T 90 45 0
E A R N I N G S 30 30 105
C U R R E N T  A S S E T S 123 234 297
C U R R E N T  L I A 3 3 37 74 73
690 6 5 0 620 590 530
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
105 105 8 7 30 64
2 9 4 2 6 6 261 251 195
78 73 70 69 65
P R O J E C T  NO. PP. 3
S A L E S 410 620 1800 1680 1740 1 5 2 0 1310 1 020
B U I L D I N G / L A N D 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 O
P L A N T / E 3 U I P N E N T 100 8 0 0 0 0 O 0 O
E A R N I N O S 20 62 270 324 3 1 2 2 7 4 238 1 5 3
C U R R E N T  A S S E T S 149 257 714 692 718 6 2 9 60 7 4 9  7
C U R R E N T  L I A 3 S 60 103 235 2 0 0 185 1 7 6 153 121
-PROJECT NO. P R 4 J
S ALE S ' 300 7 6 0 9 8 0 9 1 0 8 3 0 7 6 0 710 6 9 0
S U X L 0 1 N Q / L A N 0 75 25 0 0 0 0 0 0
P L A N  T / E Q U I P M E N T 2 5 0 1 30 0 0 0 0 0 0
E A R N I N G S 27 130 2 2 6 200 174 152 134 1 2 4
C U R R E N T  A S S E T S 97 139 317 305 278 2 4 4 2 3 2 2 2 4
C U R R E N T  L I A R S 45 108 123 113 109 110 107 3 3
P R O J E C T  NO. P R  
SALES
5
510 830 1250 1330 1350 1310 1230 1200
¡.THE DING/ L A N D 145 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
R L A N T / E O U I P M E N T 130 150 90 0 0 0 0 0
E A R N I N G S 54 1 16 224 266 270 250 230 192
C .'.'.RENT A S S E T S 123 362 535 59 5 591 550 498 4SI
T A.EMT LIAS»3 33 90 124 130 141 1 35 126 1 27
311
P R O J E C T  NO. P R  
S A L E S
BUI L E I  UG/LA.J D 
PL Ai.T/EOUI P H  E N T  
E A R N I N G S  
C U E P E E 7  A S S E T S  
C U R R E N T  L I A B S
"  \
1 20 270 7 50 1250
2 2 5 0 0 0
120 100 75 0
0 1 5 135 250
30 75 115 240
20 60 95 105
1300 1250 1 0 0 0 1000
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
260 250 190 200
340 330 3 6 0 375
140 170 1 9 5 2 0 0
P R O J E C T  HO. P R 12
SAL E S 120 390 530
3’JI L DI.'JS/LAND 190 0 0
P L A N T / E Q U I P M E N T 50 80 70
E A R N I N G S 4 36 103
C U R R E N T  A S S E T S 41 134 229
C U R R E N T  L I A B S 17 53 124
P R O J E C T  NO. P R 13
S A L E S 600 9 4 0
B U I L D I N G / L A N D 2 5 0 0
P L A N  T / E O U I P H E N T 140 1 20
E A R N I N G S 7 2 160
C U R R E N T  A S S E TS 174 236
C U R R E N T  L I A 3 5 60 102
7 6 0 1000 1010 1 1 0 0 9 5 0
0 0 0 0 0
50 30 10 10 0
160 2 3 0 220 2 3 2 190
341 48 6 4 3 4 3 5 4 2 8 3
163 2 0 0 198 185 193
1560 1 too 430 660 2 1 0 9 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
70 0 0 0 0 0463 242 48 112 3 6 9518 451 166 233 61 39180 121 85 103 2 5 10
P R O J E C T  N O .  P R 14
S A L E S 5 0 0 1000 1250 1 500 1500 1500 1 2 5 0 1 00C
B U I L  D I N 3 / L A N  D 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
P L A N T / S O U I P i l E N T 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
E A R N  INS 5 50 150 250 300 300 300 2 5 0 2 0 0
C U R R E N T  A S S E T S 120 2 1 0 300 390 480 550 6 3 0 6 7 0
C U R R E N T  LI A O S 40 80 120 160 200 200 2 0 0 120
P R O J E C T  NO. P R 15
S A L E S 230 680 720 710 730 680 7 2 0 710
B U I L D I N G / L A N D 50 25 0 0 0 0 0 0
P L A N T / E O U I P i i E W T 60 40 0 0 0 0 0 0
E A R N I N G S 7 34 72 142 146 123 1 37 142
C U R R E N T  A S S E T S 3 4 188 218 272 292 329 3 1 3 29 4
C U R R E N T  L I A B S 20 25 40 73 85 102 100 101
P R O J E C T  NO. P R  16
S A L E S 2 0 0 600 1000 1200 1200 1200 1200 1000
B U I L D I N G / L A N D 1 60 60 0 0 0 0 0 0
P L A N T / E 9 U I P H E N 7 100 100 50 0 0 0 0 0
E A R N I N G S 0 42 160 240 264 264 240 180
C U R R E N T  A S S E T S 65 2 1 3 365 448 460 4 6 3 451 400
C U R R E N T  L I A B S 20 70 100 1 40 1 60 1 60 150 140
312
P R O J E C T  M O .  PP. 21
S A L E S 1200 2 0 0 0
B U I L D I M G / L A U D 300 0
P L A U T / E Q U I  P U  EU T 250 400
EARN IN G S 192 360
C U R R E N T  A S S E T S 372 640
CU P P  EU’ T L I A 3 S 131 279
P R O J E C T  N O .  P R 22
S A L E S 500 5 0 0
B U I L D I M ü / L A M D 100 0
P L A U T / E Q U I P U E N T 40 100
E A R N I N Q S 100 100
C U R R E N T  A S S E T S 1 50 1 54
C U R R E N T  L I A B S 69 73
P R O J E C T  NO. P R 23
S A LES 700 750
B U I L D I N G / L A N D 125 65
P L A N T / E Q U I P M E N T 250 100
E A R N I N G S 140 1 65
C U R R E N T  A S S E T S 210 2 4 4
C U R R E N T  L I A 3 S 100 100
P R O J E C T  N O .  P R 24
S A L E S 1200 1 700
B U I L D I N G / L A N D 150 0
P L A N T / E Q U I P M E N T 250 200
E A R N I N G  S 156 253
C U R R E N T  A S S E T S 405 506
C U R R E N T  L 1 A 3 S 137 250
P R O J E C T  NO. P R 25
S A L E S 1000 1200
B U I L D I N G / L A N D 125 25
P L A N T / E Q U I  PI 1 E N T ISO 1 50
r.A Piil N 3 S 140 2 2 0
C U R R E N T  A S S E T S 367 419
C U R R E N T  L I A D S 162 190
2000 1300 1 700 1400 10000 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0
340 233 233 132 120702 690 6 7 2 5 8 5 475285 263 241 219 189
500 500 5 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
40 0 40 0 0
110 105 100 1 10 105
169 178 1 76 1 73 166
67 68 68 6 6 61
800 3 1 0 8 0 0 770 750
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
152 137 128 103 105
310 313 3 1 3 2 3 2 257
116 121 121 120 100
1490 1495 1 520 1530 151
0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0
209 224 253 2 7 5 242
503 510 537 555 570
270 265 2 5 5 2 6 0 250
1260 1290 1 300 1 3 1 0 1300
50 0 0 0 0
l 50 0 0 0 0
240 220 190 150 120
451 446 4 6 7 450 445
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Table A4.3 The Availability of Projects 




















(i) The Structure of the Objective Function - Single Criterion Model.
When the model was being used for the maximization of the 
value of the firm (chapters 3 - 5 )  the form of the objective 
function was
where i, the equity rate was 12% and a, the cost of capital for discounting 
project cash flows was 10% orlCl 5% as detailed in the text.
The first two terms in A5.1 represent the net dividend flow 
to the equity holders. At the horizon the portion of the value of 
the firm attributable to the equity holders consists of the after 
tax cash flows less adjustments for the value of the outstanding 
fixed interest instruments. The value of the former is just the 
post-horizon after tax cash flows discounted at a, while the latter 
consists of the market value of the fixed interest instruments plus 
adjustments for unpaid taxation in H-l. The details of the derivation 
of the form of A5.1 are to be found in section 4.6.
H-l DVfc H RGt
(1+i) t





(ii) Selection by internal rate of return - structure of objective function
In section 3.6 the single criterion model was used to 
consider selection by IRR, the objective function took the form
ip + T (1000 x IRR.)x. AS.2
° j e ÏPR Y } * jn t
where <|>o is as defined in equation 5.1, with H ** 8 and
IRRj = +1 If IRR of project j > i
*■ -1 If IRR of project j < i
where i denotes the cut-off rate for selection.
(iii) Selection by internal rate of return ranking
In this case the objective function took the form
l|» + y (1000 X RANK.)X.
° j e ÏPR Y J  j jn t
where RANK_. was a number in the range 1 to 45, corresponding to the 
ranking of project j by an internal rate of return criterion. For 
projects which were available in more than one year, the project 
occurring first was given the highest ranking.
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27/10/75 COMPILED *Y XALV MIC. 34
* TRACE•1 
•BEGIN*
•iMTffifR* I J i K i M )
*REAL*RES .«! #*»l#R5 J
•p r o c f d u n f * v a r p t f x t c a ,*): •v a l u e * nj
•«PRAY* a ; •INTEGER• 4; «EXTERNAL';
•INTEGER* •pcr.CEMIRE * IA'TPARR(S * A)J 
•STRING* Sj •ARRAY* AJ «EXTERNAL*;
* POO L * A« • •PRI,CE6,JPF * TEAT (4) t *VAL'«F* n ; »INTEGER* n ; «EXTERNAL* S 
•PROCEDURE* PEA6TRAn CP>: * PROCE OUR* • p; »EXTERNAL*!
*P»OCE0"r F* RFAr.ERRiN): «INTEGER* n ;•AI4Ift*
•INTEGER* 21
n f w l i * e C1);
U » I T M F >  T< * < *••#XPFAD*FAIl%JUST*FFFORFX/* > * ) S
•for* j:« 1 *a t f p ‘ 1 »u n t i l * So * *d o * p r i w t c r e a d c m ) ;
P*I‘5E<94)}
•e n d * r e a p e r *:
•PNOCFOilfif • I NT T LI C3TR) • *STR|n G* SIR?
•CO^MFftl' $r l RS OVER CURRENT INPJT STREAM UNTIL C •’« r- A C T1 R I **Ei> 1 A TE l V 
FOLLOW I Vf. SEEING ATi*. SWITCH 1 6»V F S DIAGNOSTIC P U N T  OF FJn »T 120
Cr'ARACTF'KS AAIPPEO;
•BEGIN*
• INTEGER* • ARRAY* *>UFM:30]; *I»-TF6ER* COUrfTj 
COUNT:» I' ST n a r r (STP.'uiF):
•IF* TESTC1) •THE*1'• n F A I n *
NF ««. |*fcM >.* AfRlTfTf < . C M * * *  *lr I NT ILL XX* >• #; PR * N I (COUNT # M #0); 
NEUL1NFC1); VARRTEXTiBI»F#CO»|NT>;
•END*;
•e n p * i n t i l l ;
•PROCEDURE* DAT« 1« (VAR,ATP1,STP2): *»EAL* VA* • ‘STRING* STM«STR2; 
•COMF*ENT * Sf ARCHES !► Tup *• FOR STPp.GS SIR1, FT*? A Bit M E *  AT 1F4ST 
ONE SPACE Ht-fORt- REAPING a REAL VAPIAIILF VAR. »U11C R 2 ON GIVES
d i a g n o s t i c  p r i n t  o f v a l u e  r e a d ;
•BEGIN*
IMTILL(STPI); INTILKSTR?) S 
LOUP:
•IF* n f k TTH* Hf • COf)F < • < *X * ) * ) ‘THEN*
•b e g i n * s k i p t h : »g o t o * l o o p : *f n d *: 
v a b i * r e a d ;
•i f * 1EAT(2> »t h e n *
• H E M * '
MEULINF(I); WPITET?XTC*(*p * p XD«TA1NXX*T*); PRIr T(VAR«0*6>;
•FftD*1
• e n p * d a t a i n :
•PROCEDURE* APRAY1%CAPR#SI2F.STP1.STP2); «VALUE* S17FI
•NEAL*‘ARRAY* APR.* • INTEGER* Slf«; 'STRING* STRl,ST»2|
•b e g i n *
•i n t e g e r * j ; .
• FOR* /!■ 1 * 5 T F P ' 1 'UNTIL Sl?f *f>0* DAT A 1N ( ARP f J ) » S TP1, STR2> J 
•END* A M A Y I R I
•PROf«PURE • | NOIIT < APR # s * 7F * 5 ™  J • 'MM U F *  SI7F:
• R f Al*•«RWAV* ANRI • INTEGER SI?t; 'STRING* SIR?
• B F G I N *  ,  . i n |
i4fcAYlU(A°R«SI/F*STR»'t'* '
•lNr* i n p u t :
344
6» 7470 7471 7577 7773 7874 7975 7978 8177 8278 8279 F480 8681 8687 8783 8784 6985 9086 9187 92
08 92 •89 94»0 95VI 9592 9793 9994 10095 10196 10397 10498 10599 107100 1071U1 108102 IOC103 1C6104 108105 108106 110107 111108 112109 113110 114111 115112 117113 118114 119115 120116 170117 172118 123119 124120 125121 126122 128123 129124 130125 132126 133127 133126 136129 137130 138131 139132 140133 141134 142
•PROCFDURFMEXTPUMP;
1 PE G IN • MPTEr.FR> R; |RT I H C  • C • OUKPt DUMP • > • > ;
AtRREADI
• IF • R 'EO’M ' TM FR’ »MTIPU'P >EISE> Fl'Ki 
•FpP* t
• PROCFOUR S• OUTPUT«»):
•REAL'‘ARRAY1*;
•r e g i r *
C O P Y T E X T C M M M M I
•FUR•I:■!M T r P M •ONT 11>8 •DO,PR|MTCCCAC|]*0.5><*in>,/ ’10.7.0>l 
• F R O M
•PROCF DUM E • PERlOn;
•r e g i r *
►E»»IIRE(1)I
WPITETEXTC* (• • C >1r 3 4 S M * P E R  IÛ0-1 XtpF*IUD-2XXPE* IPO- J**PER 100-4* ) • > I 
URITFTEXTC • ( • • C ? S ' )  •PERII>0-5X*PFRI00-6XXPE*IUP-7*3PSRIUP-8M,>; 
REULIREd);
• FRO'*
•PROCF PURE M C “ IE Vf H E RM A. ») ;
• » E A f  • A R M A V A , 6:
•REGIR*
c o p y t f x t c m *« m m ;
•FOR • I:»1•STFP>1>UNTII*8,00*PRIRTIA(1).5.1); ---
MF l* II RF ci);
c o p y t e x t c ,c ,» m m ;
•FOR' l:>1•STEP•1'URT11>R•P0* PRIRTCOtl).S.1>:
r f r l i r f c d ; 
c u p y t e x t c *<•••)•>;




,AA.*P,TAX.F*ri.F/>pF .CU»A,C"RI.PVP*.R»RX.OV,NUR,OF.FITA,A1 IO jRJ;
SEIFET INPUT Cl> F 
rfaptrapcreaderp);
IRTI H C *  C * 11 ST I NGTBYXI OIUPM • ) • ) I
I R T I l l C M ' Y A R I A O l F S M M l
ARRAY I M C R O C E . Ä . M M A O I M ' . M *  ROCE •)•>;
ARRAYIRC L0PV.6.•< •CURI*)*•* * *188Y*>•>I
D A T A l R C R S . M ' O V P R I M ’. ' C M A i M M l R S l P - R S ;
oatainc«i.,c**'a»icim,.,c,fa2MM;ARRAYIRCOCOV.R.M'OVM'.'C'OCOVMMi
•FOR* J I >1 'STEP* 1 MI RT H* 8 *00*
•REGIR*
d a t a i r c e r p s c j i .* c • mui* • > •••c e r p s m *»; 
I R T I H C *  C M T A R G M M i
sxipcr;
DT ARG(J ) tp REAO;
• F R O M0*T*l*Ctlf,t'M1,>'*,t,e « ,)'»H|A.«l|
I R T I l l C M M C O V I * ) * » ;
•FOR'
EfOVtl] IPREAOI . . . ...
• F 0 P M s « 2 ,STEP*1*"N T U  " • DO* O A T . I R C F C C I Y U J . M ' O E M M M  
IJ*1 •STEP' 1 •U NT U* 8 «PO' «BFGIR*
0 T*PGI|]:,nTAR G m * C - 1 0 0 .8 >| 
e m p s c i i :,1p p .o « e * p s ( i );ROCf CI)j«pOCF(11»100.p;- — *C°w,*>l*ECnvtll/Rl!
•Er o *;
IfcTIll C •C,SOIUTIOR,),>? 
IRTIllC’C'OURP*)*); iRTiii ccoiiRp*»*)» 



































































144 1 *PUTf SAITS,8, * C " 8 A I E S M  • ) ;
1*5 19PUT(F*k‘ .N.a('E,R9a>a>:
/•146 !«PUTÌ n P A T , H , •C*NPAT'> * >:
1*7 I*PUT<TAX,8,•(•Ta X ,>*>J -
148 1NPUT(FABL,8#»('FABI')*);
1*9 I 4 PIJT (FAPF*8# ' ('FADE*) •) J
15«» INPUT<CUHA,K,•(»CURA*) 1>;
151 INPUT! CURL, * , a !aC!IRLa ) •) J
152 I SPOT(OVOa,M,•< aOVf>Ra) •>J
155 I» p u t <»a m k ,m ,•('h a r k •) • ) j
154 INPUTiov.n,•<•ov*> • >;
155 I4PUTCNUK,8, •<•ROM * > * 1 ; J" * * - ■ '
156 INPUT (MG,# ,•< • RG*) •): „
157 lKPUT<DE.»a.a<*DEa> a>;
15» INPUT!LI»».* ('BIT** >•):
159 I NT III «•!•POUT INFORMAI ION')•) ; ■ ..........  '
160 ! 4 T 1 L 1. ( • < ' PROBLEM* ) • ) ;
161 COPY TF X T < *('ROUXIVFORMAT ION*)•)J . . .
162 SELFCTI,'PUTl2); »COMMENT* GE05 SHOULD PROVIDE »CROS
1*5
163 NIIMIO]:«READI
164 r f S s b r e a d ;
165 d f [0):«r e * d :
166 f a b u o ] ;>m e * d :f a p * co 1 :>re *o: .. ..
168 • m a r k [(iJ:m h e >»;c h r ì !o ]:*r e *d ;
170 TAXIO) :*r e a d ;o v r * i o ):*r f a d ;d v [i>1:*r f a d :c u p l (01 :*r e *d ;
17*
17* •c o m m e n t * BALANCE s h e e t ;
174
174 c o p y t e a t  ! •i 1 •• >•): ¡p e r i o d ;
177 COr TT F X T < * (•♦•)*):
178 o u t p u t  i n u '4) : at toj i> r e s :
180 a <U01:*o ,ii;a » i u ):«u .O;
172 •FOR*1s«1'STFP*1•U9TIL* 8 anO'aREOlR
163 Alll) U 1 I H  ) ♦ N P A T I 1 1-DVll):
175 •tin » At» c 1 -1 J ♦BP AT 5 1 1-TAXI ! );
166 AAI 1 1 rrt.6*R0t I ) « M (  !-1 1 J
157 *211) *»11 11•NMM(11»DEI 1)♦»*!!)*AOII);
168 *511) »C»RMI)-*i»R»tll:
1*9 * * U ) • CURL!) )-T»»f. I )-OvDR( I I-DVl I);
190 *51 1 ) «CUR A( 1 )-CURI II]:
19! A6[ 11 *F*BLt 1 J*F*PE!1l*C"»AtI l-CURLI I):
192 ’END 'f
193 o u t p u t !**); .
19* O u t p u t (a O ) ;
195 o u t p u t c a d ;
196 OUTPUT ( I>E > •
197 OUTPUT| a 2) ;
198 NEWLINFI2);
199 CnpVTFXTC'(***)a);NFULl4E(1>; **
201 COPY!FAT!•!•••)a >:NFWLINE(1 >:
205 OUTPUT C FAOL) t
20* 0>ITPUT!F*PE>;
20 5 C0PVTPXTl,Ia* a1a)iNPWLINE!1)I
207 OllTPUTIHART);
20» o u t p u t i »5>;
209 OUTPUT(CUP A);
210 COPTTFAT! • ! •••>a>;NFWL!NEI1>:








219 * COMMf NT * PP0F1T t»SS|
219
219 pAPFPTHWO'JiwR I TFTFXT ( * ( 1 STOOHP* > a|»rH?4T<M#3*0>:





























































































‘U l  ) :*?»( fS( I )-E«(iKt i )-»5»ovpBt l-i j
»¿,!J:*r»P*MJ*BS«ovo»:i-T 1-BI •*»»!«« j- 1  j; • MI »:**!.«»»«CI-U!
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A P P E N D I X  IX
SOLUTIONS TO THE SINGLE CRITERION MODEL
A9.1 LP SOLUTION AT NORMAL EARNINGS
A9.2 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND RATIO 
ANAYSIS AT NORMAL EARNINGS
A9.3 LP SOLUTION AT A TEN PER CENT 
INCREASING IN EARNING
A9.4 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND RATIO 
ANALYSIS FOR A TEN PER CENT 
INCREASE IN EARNINGS
A9.5 LP SOLUTION AT A TEN PER CENT 
DECREASE IN EARNINGS
A9.6 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR A TEN 
PER CENT DECREASE IN EARNINGS
EXHIBIT A9.I L P  SOLUTION AT NORMAL EARNINGS
PRUDLFM (*P|tHMDFl-«6 
DUMP j MJMp til
ROW SFT
SOLUTION
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0 0 800.00110 *1.0170 —0.06290 ■ V 0 800.0000 -0.9070 -0.00890 0 800.0000 -0.8110 -0.11040 p 800.0000 -0.72*0 -0.0571
0 0 800.0000 -0.6464 -0.000161963.37*0 - 0 ..... 0 0
1087,9833 0 0 0
2436.07*7 0 ■*-* **■ ‘ — ... # - 0J636.V747 0 0 0
3494.2*434*46.>Nh1 00 ■ - ........-• o ... 0
0
04346.5581 _ . 0 “:~=-........ ------ - 0.0133 - . 0
4346.5581 0 » -0.4039 0463.3740 0 looo.oo-ítí o 04.4003 0 1000.0000 0 0
648.VV14 ~T*.” 0 . 1000.0000 0 01000.0000 0 1000.00-0 0 0.0103
S57. 6 . 0 ■ 1000.0000 0 0
852.2039 0 1000.0000 0 0
0 0 1000.0000 0 -0.0039
0 Q 1000.0000 0 u
. 44.4262 . ■ 0 0 095.65*5 0 0 0
130.1233 0 — - 0 0175.504* 0 0 0
193.4505 ... . 0 ‘ 0 0
223.4532 0 0 0246.1772 . . 0 .'7 - 0 0
251.0073 0 0 0
1.001-0 0 1.0000 -4*.*290 20.975*
1 .cuoo 0 1.0000 -21.8106 60.V994
1 .-ouo 0 1.OOoO -33.1198 11.4*301 . OOUO 0 1 . Oli«0 0 67.2091
0 0 1.0000 -51.7715 >311,469 3
1.0000 0 1.0000 -18.5371 2.2480
0 ..... 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 -17.6908 -15.7094
1.0000 0 1.0000 18.3774 7.1875
1.0000 ~r" 0 i.nono -7.1407 6.7901
0 0 1.0000 15.9540 -4V.5435
1.0000 0 1.0960 1.2117 32.2017
1.0000 0 1.0000 -47.2363 21.1587
0 0 i.oooo 23.9513 -81 .0567
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SOLUTION
PICHT h a n d  SIOC 
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« ? ■ UPPER ROUND UPBND . . . . . . . .  -ROW SET •(DUMMY ) COL SET* -;■■:.* - ......COLUMN INFORMATION>U ' .• > .NAME VALUE LOWER BOUND UPPEh BOUND objective REDUCED cost
U 1 PR24Y2 ♦ o. . . . 0 1.0000 . -7.2702 -35.7877U PR07V3 ♦ 1.0000 0 1.0000 57.9986 1.7773
U - • PR11Y3 ♦ 0.4875 0 . . . 1.0000___ *6.7716 : ; oU PRISTS ♦ 1.0000 0 1.0000 43.4596 1.16V1M ; ' U PR01Y4 ♦ 1.0000 . ..... 0 . 1.0000 . 126.0168 22,6666PR0SY4 ♦ 0 0 1.0000 117.9388 -17.2978t* * • PR11V4 ♦ 0.3123 0 1.oooo ; »3.2034 0U PR17Y4 ♦ 1.0000 0 1 .nono 144.1923 15.7933?J i ~ i U PMl3Y4 ♦ 1.0000 0 1.0000 42.0134 33.3094U pr14v4 ♦ 1 .oooo 0 1.001)0 -17,0830 7.4108
1/ \_ U Pm2?V4 ♦ l.rtgOO 0 1.0000 .... 33.7660 5.8577U PR25Y4 ♦ 1 .oooo 0 1.0000 51.6992 17.2760J« * PR07Y5 ♦ 0 0 1.0000 . .. 66.6435 _ -1.5181u proüy* ♦ 1 .ouoO 0 1.0000 151.0506 6.5845i ' ■ B PR11VS ♦ 0.44*4 0 1,0000 *: 101.7828 0PR21V5 ♦ 0 0 1 .oooo 130.0558 -59.493411 ' PR23Y5 ♦ 0 ... . 0 . 1.0000 _ 71.8942 -13.9222U PH04Y6 ♦ 1.0000 0 1.oooo 112.6881 40.48003u PH05Y6 ♦ 0 L'i. 0 1.0000 199.9305 -1.3103U PR11Y6 ♦ 1 .0000 0 1.oooo 131.2675 25.78880 PR14V6 ♦ 1,0000 0 1 .nono 49,2758 9.5258U PR15Y0 ♦ 1 .0000 0 1.0000 95.3204 11.0532
?■* 7T. U PP14Y6 ♦ 1. dogo 0 1.0000 180.9472 7.0064PR21V6 ♦ 0 0 1.0000 IVI.0447 -17.7150
3« : U PR23Y6 ♦ 1.oooo . _ _______ . 0 1,0000 85.2229 1.2545U PR01V7 ♦ 1.0000 0 1.0000 98.5516 15.1655
.. ■ U PKUSY7 ♦ 1 .<>o«o . .  . 0 1.0000 127.2285 51.3665U PR 14 V 7 ♦ 1.0000 0 1.0000 8V.6658 3.2261
4 * ' PR22V? 0 0 ... 1,0000...- 44.8329 -8.8970PR07YH ♦ 0 0 1.0000 74.3176 -4.8664
6- ' PH1SYM ♦ 0 0 1.0000 .. . 65.451* . -2.05V1PR22VP ♦ 0 0 1.0000 44.4290 -4.4821
•4 PR**Y8 ♦ 0 0 .. 1.0000 ____ 147.8274 -1.6646OBJECTIVE 1VR4.0158
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EXHIBIT A9.3 LP SOLUTION AT A TEN PER CENT INCREASE IN EARNINGS
PROlILkM OPT Ihi>|iFI-H6 
DUm P iPu MP 112
ROW SFT
SKL'I r MU 
• K.MT NANO SI Ok
o b j e c t i v e  
l o w e r  s o u n d
UPPER SOUND
RNS 1 *0.100O*PMS2 
COSJ *0»0BJ6* LORNO 
UPSNO 
<DUMMY )
PA T F 0*/««//A
cot SET
COLUMN INFORMATION
n a m f V A Ll'E
SALFS1 - 12A3V.553 3
B SALFS2 ♦ 1AAOU.OUOO
B SALES3 ♦ 1/S2/.22PA
B SALESA ♦ 22682,606«
I« - - B SALFS5 ♦ 23323.R619
B SALFSA ♦ 2AA83.01U3
B SAIES/ ♦ . 30873.6983
B S* LESA ♦ 31316.1939
T r.- . B EARN1 ♦ 17H1.VVV 2
B EARN2 ♦ 1779,8980
”  B EARNj ♦ ‘ * ' 22/3.013A
B EAR44 ♦ 315/.1092
B e a r n S ♦ 290/.OSSA
B EARN6 ♦ 35V5.NVVS
B EARpZ T ~ ♦ A071.901A
B e a r n r ♦ *787.7293
:■ :___B APAT1 _ ♦ «30.9996
B NPAT 2 ♦ «00.95A1
-*o B NPATJ ♦ 10A7.511«
B APAT4 ♦ 1A6A.9039
- o NPATS ♦ 1799.6935
B APAT6 ♦ 1652.5V5J
" B NPAT/ ♦ 1256.1557
B NPATS ♦ 196A.0697
v, B TAXI ♦ -----  263.Ü02A
B TAX2 ♦ 86.1383
.** .. 8 TAX3 ♦ 4 593.2*96
B TAX4 ♦ 1A36.1583
<o ~ 'z Z. ' B TAXS ♦ 1015.AS3S
B T A X A ♦ 1126.61/2
•: _L. i. B TAXZ 1532.985*
B TA X A ♦ 1991.f022
" B FARLI ♦ 2A68.932U
s FASL2 ♦ 3853.3321
FABL3 . ' ♦ *5/9.5003
F AB 14 ♦ 5588.7J1A
B FADlS . ♦ 5907.7869
1 O  « FABL6 ♦ 6*7*.2167
• FASI/ ♦ 6856.13*0
FASI« ♦ 6826.3Ai/
\ ° f a r e i ;V ♦ 1*7*.*361
APF2 ♦ 277*.0121
O  »E3 ♦ 7’.15.218A
’A ♦ 297*.37*7
.Pi •*:*.» ' ♦ 3708.7138
* ♦ 3A(i6.*V34
v.: ■ ••• - *
LOVER SOUND UPPER ROUND
! - r- --"r- . :
objective reduced COST
I 1 0 0 0
0 • ~ • . 0 0
t 0
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0-1.A2B0 -1.7760 -1.1339 -1.01/0 -0.90/0 -0.8110 -0.72A0 -O.AAAA 
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: £ D m
A1A.
1 0 0 0 .792.
BAI.
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KNuntv-Tr OKI IPIUpM ••ft »VLUIIUN ....... PAVE U4/U8//6 r_._. f
RIGHT HAND !SIDE ANSI *0,1000.RMS2
... OBJECTIVE CUBA *0*ORJ6 . .
LOWER P O U N D _ 10BND
UPPER ROUND u p b n d  .
NOW SET .-<Otirt*«Y ) COL SET
.... _ . -- ::V-__
COLUMN INFORMATION . — . ,_____
NA*t VALUE LOUFR b o u n d  u p p e r  b o u n d o b j e c t i v e «EDUCED COS
PR24Y2 ♦ 0 0 1.0000 -7.2702 -17.328«
U PMO?Yi ♦ 1.0000 0 1.0000 37.1198« 1.8409
B PH11V3 ♦ 0.10 36 0 1.0000 ---- A«.771» 0
U PR 1A V 3 ♦ 1,0000 0 1 .OOllO A3.A59« 1.5429
U PR01YA ♦ . iL._  1.0000 0 ____ 1.0000 176.01«« 22.6861
PH05Y4 ♦ 0 0 1.0000 117.938« -16.6616
II PR11YA ♦ 0.18«2 ....... 0 . 1.0000 B3.203A 0
u PHI2 VA ♦ 1.0000 0 1.0000 1AA.1923 15.3927
U PM 13YA ♦ 1.0000 . . 0 . ... 1.0000 A2.813A 34.2314
u p r i a v a ♦ 1 .(lOoll 0 1.0000 -17.0N5II 7.1791
u p r 2 2 v 4 ♦ 1 .0000 0 ... 1.00 oO 33.7640 ‘ 5.1947
U PH2AYA ♦ 1.0000 0 1.0000 51.6992 16.3370
PR02Y5 ♦ 0 0 1.0000 ._ 6A.6A35 -1.157«
U PH03Y5 ♦ 1.oouO u 1.0000 151.0586 6.8V58
d PR11Y5 ♦ 0.S3A0 0 . 1.0000 . T 101.782« 0
PR21Y5 ♦ 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 130.055« - 39,V«60
PR23Y5 ♦ 0 0 . _ 1.0000 _ 71.«942 -14.3091
0 PN04Y* ♦ 1.0000 . u M I N 112.»«81 39.1241
PP05V6 ♦ 0 0 1 .oooo 190.«1305 ' -2.6612
U PK11Y6 ♦ 1.0000 0 1.0000 131.2675 21.7982
O PR14Y6 ♦ . 1.0000 0 1.0000 A9.2758 8.7840
U PR15Y6 ♦ 1.0000 0 1.0000 9 5 . 320A 10.4422
U PM16Y6 ♦ 1 .nimo 0 i.oooo 180.94/2 5.5012
PR21Y« ♦ 0 0 1.0005 191.0447 -20.4008
B PK23Y6 ♦ 0.H0O3 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 85.2229 0
U PR01Y2 ♦ 1.0000 0 1 , Oil. 10 V8.5516 13.1655
u p r o a y 7 ♦ 1.0000 0 127.2285 31.3665
U PH 1 A Y 2 ♦ 1.0000 0 1.0000 89.665« 3.2261
PR22Y2 ♦ 0 0 1.0000 44.8129 -8.8970
PR02V8 ♦ 0 0 i .ooiiu 74.3176 -4.8664
PR15YA ♦ 0 0 1.0000 65.4318 -2.0391
PH22Y8 ♦ 0 0 1.0000 44.4290 -4.4821
PH25Y« ♦ 0 0 1 .uo.Ill 147.8274 -1.6646
O r JFCTIVE 2471.5725
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SOLUTION ___________________ _ __________
PIKHT HAND SIDE ANSI -0.1000»RHS2
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LOWER ROUND LOB ND








8 KP AT / 
0 n P M M  
8 T A > 1 


















9 4 .m »V4 


















0 •—  0
B TAKA ♦ //4.1V/2 0 0 0
B TAJ/ ♦ 93S.H tov 0 0 0
B YAXM ♦ 1343.««22 0 0 0
B EANI.1 ♦ 24x4.4660 0 * ' ' 0 0
B FABL2 ♦ 3S3U. 3(iU4 0 0 0
B FA0L3 ♦ 41V6.620Ó 0 0 0 ...
B M b  14 ♦ 510«.5/S3 0 0 0
B FA6LS ♦ 514V.2«/8 0 0 0 ^
8 FA8L6 ♦ S6BII. HSU« 0 0 0
8 FABIA ♦ 604V.S1V1 0 ft —  #
0 F4PF1 ♦ 1436,.H 421 0 0 0
8 FAPF2 ♦ 1970.1200 0 0 0
8 FAPF3 ♦ 2223.••326 .. _ . 0 v ....  0 Ì  0
8 FApE4 ♦ 2485.882« 0 A 0
B EAPES ♦ 26« o , .MiVri 0 - 0 0 ...
B M P F 6 ♦ 32U2./130 0 0 0
B E APE/ ♦ 3S30.6/V6 _________Q. -----......... ......—  0 --- s..., «¿.-«»r-s. 9 ^
8 FAPF8 X a  
8 CURAI ♦ 3931.0000 ' 0 A
- .0 
~ 0
8 CUPA2 ♦ 4SS5,4922 0 * ~ 7 *  * “ ‘ 0 0
• CIIRA3 ♦ 5SB0.0346 0 A 0
B CUPA4 ♦ 6 A0 6 .1800 0 0 0
8 CURA3 ♦ 6704.6HH1 0 0 0
B CUHA6 ♦ 7748.0265 0 0 «
B CURA/ ♦ 8S/6.4J/5 0 0 0
8 CURRO ♦ 10205.63«1 0 ft 0
8 CURII ♦ 1/13.0415 0 A 0
t CURL2 2110.V91S 0 0 0
n CUR l 3 ♦ 2846.659« 0 A 0
i c u r l s ♦ 179«.«31J 0 « 0
B CURLS ♦ 3701.0412 0 0 0
B C t » R L 6 ♦ 4304.4SV2 0 0 0
B CURL/ ♦ 43V4.1V34 0 0 0
8 CURI8 ♦ 53/6.29/S 0 0 0 -
0 V DR 1 ♦ 0 0 250.0000 0 -0.0*45
8 QVAR2 ♦ 20.4818 0 25".ROOD 0 0
OVDRS ♦ 0 0 2S0.0A00 0 -0.0424
0VDR4 ♦ 0 • *• ..... 0 210.0000 ft -0.0126
« vi.r S ♦ 0 0 25ft.A0>»0 ft -O.OSV4
0VPR6 ♦ 0 0 25A ,OOftO 0 -0.0128
(IVOR / ♦ 0 0 259.000« 0.0231 - A . 0100
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1340,60062SS.6AS2 429,0408 504.6848 747.7*21 A31.6394 82/.5172 455.6533 917.0019 2197.4249287.03322847.03322047.0332 2847.83322647.03322047.03322047.0332 197.424V 650,4062
0000001756.9046 1756.V046 2263.»479 3032.5027 2671.8960 3277.9475 3541.0948 3541.0946 756.9046 0527.0433
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1  »  ^ ... NAPE ■ ■ VALUE LOWER BOUND "UPPER ROUND o b j e c t i v e REDUCE0 COST
1 l» ~^L^. RR24V2 ♦ . . . 0 ■ . 0 '• _ i.oooo -7.2702 -14.6644
RR02Y3 ♦ 0 .... ; 0 1.0000 37.9986 -2.3615
■  •  ’* =3 — - • PR11V3 ♦ 0.631? 0" 1.0000 46.7716 0
1  . —  - •
PR15V3 ♦ 0 0 1.00«0 43.45VA -6.6178
u PR01YA ♦ . qr.ii_s.v- 1.0000 ‘ o ■ 1.0000 - 126.0168 ’ - 14.4810
1 __ PR05V4 ♦ ......___ 0 0 1.0000 117.9380 -39.1422
I  “ r :t u PR1?Y A ♦
;-r*.=ss





u PR13V4 ♦ .. - • 1.0000 ... 0 1.0000 42.0134 18.5232
u PN14V4 ♦ 1.0000 0 1.0000 -17.0050 5.8284
■ u PR27YA ♦ I.OuOO " 0 1.0000— ~ ~ 33.7660 6.6165
u PR25V4 ♦ 1.0000 0 1.0000 51.6992 1(1.0112
I  14
PRÙ2Y5 ♦ - 0 __•___ .. . 0 1.0000 66.6435 -5.9873
1  ■
• PR03V5 ♦ 0.1020 0 1.0000 151.0566 0
PR11V5 ♦ 0 0 1.0000 ----- 101.7828 •6.6784
PP21Y5 ♦ _________ 0 ■ ■ . ___ _ 0 1.0000 130.0558 -44.4104
I u P R U 4 Y 6 ♦ ' ' -- 1.0000
-----...
0 1.0000 112.6*61 39.2606
1  . RRilSVD ♦ 0 • 0 1.0000 199.9305 -4.1634u PR11V6 ♦ . . _____ 1.0000 _______ 0 1.0000 131.2675 23.7719





S .606 2 
9.4177
1  ■’* u PK16Y6 ♦ .... - ■--- ‘ : 1.0000 .. — ■ o - i.oooo ISO.947? 4.2780
I  • PR21Y6 ♦ 0 0 1.00011 191.0447 -20.51)52
tt PR23Y6 ♦ ■ ?:• 0.3359 0 ' 1.0000 ---- 85.2229 0
u PR01Y7 ♦ 1.0000 0 1.00110 98.5516 12.4758
U PR04Y7 ♦ 1.0000 . . 0 ' 1.0000 - 127.7285 28.8576
u PD1AY7 ♦ 1.0000 0 1.0000 89.6656 2.1304
il «* • PR22Y7 ♦ i • 0 o 1 . 0 0 0 0  : • 44.8329 -9.4071
I  *
PR02YR ♦ 0 0 1 .oooo 74.3176 -4.6664
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A P P E N D I X  XII
THE REPORTING SUITE-MULTICRITERIA MODEL
A12.1 PROGRAM FOR COMPLETE FINANCIAL 
STATEMENT ANALYSIS
A12.2 PROGRAM FOR SUMMARY STATISTICS
È
E X H I B I T  A12.1 PROGRAM FOR COMPLETE FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS
» L U T I N G  n F t''JRXF I IF , A A A *00061 234 ( 1 / > PFOn u CED 11N 27JCT/5 AT 72.AS.79 
•OUTPUT BY m i M I E  J »_*_t U U P S P y i . S T » U M I I S '  U*_ 2NIÇT75 »T 08.10.1* 
D"CUHFn T 1-1
22/43/11(1 27/10/75 CvOFIltc BY »a Lv 1«. .34
LINE STATFMFRT ..........  - -r t - -
0 0 • INPUT• u » CPI ' ...  “
1 0 * 1 Ft Pul • 1 ■ TfiO - .-
2 0 •INPUT* 2 » CAO
3 0 •OUTPUT’ 0 « IPO
4 0 •COO f 1NIIC 1
22/43/00 27/10/75 COMPILER BY XALY MX. 3A
LINE S T i T M f U T " *
3 0 •Tp a C P ‘1 • rr.
6 0 • 8 E G IM • *
7 1 •INTESE»* I . J « K . M ; ................... . . . .
B 1 'REAL *RES.R|.Pl.RSS
10 2 •PROCEDURE* VANRTFXT ( A,4) : 'VALUE • 4 ;
11 3 •a r r a y 1 a : •i n t e g e p * n : 'e x t e p n a l *; -
^ ¿ 7 •INTEGER*•PROCEDURE' |NS,»*»»(S,A)I
13 9 •IHI'.A* s; 'ARRAY* *. 'EXTERNAL'S
14 ii •r o u l f  a n • «p r o c e d u r e  • t e s i ««); 'v a l u e * «s * 1n t e g f  » • a ; •EXTERNAL*:
15 15 'PROCEDURE • BFABTPAP(P); • PROCEDURE * PI *FXTEPNAl*J
16 18
1/ 1b •p r o c e d u r e * rf a b f p r  < i. ) ; 'i n t e g e r ' n ;
IK 21 •Ber.!«* - - . ‘ ’ - ~
10 21 •i n t e s e »* j :
20 21 •»Pwtl'-tCDi
21 23 JP| TETF»T< • ( ••••XRt'AK* F a ! 11JUSTlr.AFOREX/* > •) ; - -
22 24 •FOR* j :« 1 'STEP* 1 •UNTIL1 160 'l>u* p p i n t C h i n f a BC h ) ;
Ai 26 p a u s e (v v ) ;
24 27 . •e n o • k f a o f a r ;
25 27 *
2o 27 •p r o c e o u r f * i m i l k s t f i : •SIRING' 1T»S
27 30 •Cû m k e n t * SNIPS o v e » COPPFNI INPUT STREAM UNTIL CHARACTER I K M E D U J E L V
?M 30 FULLvu IAS STRINA STR. S ’ITCH 1 UN GIVES DIAGNOSTIC PRI n I OF FIR-* 120
24 30 CHABNCTthS SNIPPED;
3«i 30 •E*«IN*
ii 30 • i n t e g e r *«a r r a y * r u f i i i s o i : ' i n t r g f r * c o u n t : * •
32 31 COUNT : * 1*STRABO(51c,RUF):
33 33 •IF* T E S T O  'Th e n '
54 33 »* F «•!•••
35 33 NERI l«f(1II UR|TETFXTCM*»..*|»T|LIXX,» ,>| p r i a  T (COUNT .8.0) I
36 ^7 •.fwU'Éil); V44WT6»1 10114 #CoU*iT ) ;
37 39 • f m > • ;
50 40 •fwn* IN TILLS
30 40 -
40 40 • PROCF NUN E • O A T M M V A A  , STRI ,ST»2» S 'REAL* VARS •SlPINfi* STRI,STR?;
41 44 •CO-MC-.T* St A R C » E S !•. TUP* FUR STPILOS STRI, ST>2 AUD THEN AT LEAST
4? 44 04f SPACF BF Fl'RF I'tAPi / .  * HfAl VAttlADLt VAP. SWITCH ? OH GIVES
43 44 DIA6 M)ST le PRINT OF V*L"E READ;
44 44 •36P.1N*
45 44 i n  I L K S T R D ;  INT IIU3TR2);
4ft 47 LOOPS
47 47 •IF' NEXTCN'NF'rOnECM'X*)*» * TMEN*
4K 47 • B 6 Fi | M • SKIPPH; •f.olU* lO-'P; ' F9D • ;
4.9 51 v an s■ r e a d ;
30 52 •IF* T E S T < 2) •THEN'
51 32 • P E G 1 W •
52 52 AL n L I N F O :  MR I TF TF X T ( • I ' *• RX6 - T A I NXX • > • I I PR INI (VAR.0.81 :
53 56 • F N D • ;
34 57 •ENO* BATA!*.:
35 57
36 37 ■PROCF 6 U RF• Rr S1n C»VN,SI/E.STo >; 'VALUE* SI/ES
57 60 • P( AL " A R » A Y '  ANRI ' i n t e g e r * SI/ f ; 's t r i n g * ST»;
3b 63 •COMMENT* lOoP SITE 1 1 — t S ï SEARCH F"» SIRING STR »*<6 THEN OftE SPACE
59 63 DFTOHF »FACING TUB »»«I VARIABLES. 1.1 SECOND IS STORED IN ARRAY ARR.
Ml 61 SWITCH 2 ON GIVES DIAGNOSTIC PRINT OF T H| ARRAY;
61 65 •■ESIN*






























































































































•tu»* Jt» 1 'STEP* 1 •UNTIL* 3170 *00•
•REGI’**
In T I L K S T R ) !
10-JPi »It* N E XT C H •40* CJftE E • « •♦• I * > •»»»•■0X1CH ’»F« fODEE'E'-*)*) 
•THE**
••»»I»* s n P c « ;  «GOTO* LOOP 1 •fc»»,I . . . .stipe«!
«>"«*»;• r e a d ; * hp t J1 :« HIAftS 
•tkft* i l o o p ;
*11* TESTE?) •THEN*
• M S I » 1
•Fl:;i*i(i>; u « i i f t f «*(*c *»*»»«s i « u ,) ,) i
•tOH> i s m  1 'STEP* 1 •UNTIL' SITE *00a PH I NT(AH*(J 1,0,0)I 
•SNO*I
•EMI" PHSInj * -■
•PROCEDURE• AR R a Y I N E A R R , S U E , STRI,STR2>; •V a l u e • S U E P v  
•HE3L*,AHMAV* Ap r ; •INTEGER• SI2EI •s t r i n g * s t r i .s t r ?;
•PEAIN*
•INTEGER* j;
• EwR • J : ■ 1 'STEP* 1 "UNTIL' SITE «DO* DATAI NE ARRI? J .STRI . S T « )  ; 
•e n d * a x a a v i n :
•PROCEPORE* I4PIITEARR.SI2P.STR); •VALUE* SITE)
•r e a l " a r n a v ' a r a ; •i n t e g e r * s u e ; 's t r i n g ' s t r :
•r é g i n *
APRAUAIAPR,$!7F,STR, •!•»•>•); " *  - ...  — — -----  -----
•éni»* i n p u t ;
• PROCEDURE•NEXTRURPJ
•REGIR* »INTEGER1 NI|NTILLE*E*BU«P|DUHP*)*>;
a s» r e *d ;
•IE* » •é O'M'TNEA» NitTftUNP »ELSE* «IRNI 
•e n d »;




•EOR' I s»1 'STEP'S • UNTI L ’0 • OU* RP I NT E E E A E 11 »El, S ) «1 0 > • / • 10.7.0) ; 
•END*;
•PftOCtpURE* p e r i o d ;
•REGIN* *
NEWIIREEII!
vR|TETE»TE,E**E,ir X N S ' U P E R I u P - I X X R ER IO DU XX P é p IOD-SXXPERIOO-A*)*); 
9RITFTFXT E•E••E•2 S •>•PER 1Uft-SXXPER100-ftXXPER10D-7XXPERIOD-0* >•>E
NEwLI NE El>: ---
•e n d *; i
••'ROCtlilINF'ACHIEVtHfNTEA.B): __
* PE»l*'ARRA»•».GE „ .
•b e g i n *
C0P»TE»TE*E*4*)*)I
•FOR* I: »1 •STFP*1*llNTIL*ft*00*PRINTEAlI1.5.1)I
Rfcvll.NE E1 ) :
roP»TEXTE*E*»*),)l
•FOR* I s«1 *STEP'1 *UN f IL'ft'DO'PRINlEBE I J ,S,1).‘
Nt wL l N E E D I
C0PYTEXTE*E*p *>*)I
•F OR* lt"1* STEP'S'UNTIL* ft,DO*P>lNTEEB(l)-Aill>/A(l)*10Cl.5.1>l 
•END*I 
•BEGIN*
•PEAL* *AR'.AV'SALES, EARN.NPAT.N6. LI .fB . NOCE , LOiY , E»OV , EPPS , DCUV , DTARC, 
PYARG ,ST«N6,A2,A5.A4,A5*AB,A7,Attll|0]
, AA.An.î AX, FARI. M P F .  ruRA.C'IRL.OVOA, MARK, PV. Nil«, DF, RITA, AIEOlB);
s e l f c t i n p i i t e d ; 




ARN AY I n E L'lPY #ft , • E * Ci'RL * ) * . * E * LORY* ) • > I 
0 ATA IN E RS .•E *ft«PR1*)*.* E•EA? *)•);RS t p »RSI 
OAT A I NERI . *E •«■•ARAI * > * . * E*f A?*) * >:
APR AY I N E PCOV,» .* E •BV •)*.•E * BCO» * > *))
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OAT/. IN (HI.. • (>8E1 • t •, • «*CB2*T*);Rl:»*Rlf 
I N T I t H M ' i C O V I M M »
ECOV 11 J:*31 * o ;
,i OM#J ( » 2 ,STf»,1 ,HN TI l,A ‘DO* D i T M M F C O V U l . ' t ' D O ' . M ' E C O V * ) ' ) ;  
•EO»* 11 ■ 1 ‘STEP* 1 'UNTIL* 8 • DO* 'BFr.18'
«0CMI):«'OCHI)*1(10,0!
f <-o* [ l): =Ff n, [ i )/b l :
* i b p s c  i )t»ioo.o»(»p$C|1;
DT«kG(l):>:>TA»Gll)*<-ino.O>l 
•IPO*J
l *T i n  i ' c h u h u ’I • 11 
lH TILH'i'OuHP')*»»
<•:»*E«u:p« p e r t m p u u :
START:
IPPUT13ALPS «6«1C 9 3AlE3 *)*)f 
I »PUTIEAH*:. (•,•<* EARN' » • » *
I'-PUT «*PAT ,■>, • < • HPAT • » • > I _  _




INPUT < LIML . ft. •<• «.URL •>•> J 
l»lPUT(>lvA<.«,•<•gwo»,>,»»
I%PUT(MAR*<1.’(•HARr•) • >S




l * T l l l C M ,R<iilY|NPORHATini|A>A>| • t
IftTI LI. «,< ,PkOP|«rt,»,»J 
COPYTPXTC* <'«00 * 1 uFORUAT 10). • > • > !
AH*H Mi TA ki .8 ,' «'STAR«') ' >T 
RMSIMPTAPu.ft.'CPTARft'l'):
SElfCT|NPUT<2>| •COKHEXT1 g e «i3 Sh o u l d  PROVIOF AC»0:
MUH(O) !>RtAl>:
RFS:»»EAO!
Oflul«» r e a d :
FASl(n)l»pfAO«» APEtOJr»»EAOI 
MA«Mll]:»--tAD!CURA(0]:*»EADi
TAX101 : “ Rf AOSOVORlO J «»READ J OVCU) j»AfAH:CUAl(01j»RFAI>;
•COMREAT1 b a l a n c e  s h e e t : 
c o p » t f > t {* c »»i >*): ¡p e r i o d ;
COPVTrA T ( ,<1*•>•):
o u t p u t  «n o -') :ai i o i -»r e s ;




A AI I] :»I).6»RG[ I)*AA(1-1i :
»2111:»A1 ll]*8li«*C I l*f>E (I ]»AA|l)AA0tl)> 
a S(i 1:»ci'Ra (i ]-h a r k (u :
»*ll):«CHHH!)-T»RfI l-OVPB111-8V (II:
a s h  ] :»c u b »c i 1-ciiri (I]:
A»tt]|»»AlAL(I)*f APE(l]*CHRA(|]~CURLtl) 
' EN6 • |
OUTPUT«»»)?




n f « i i 'F(2>:
COPYTfAT (•<•*•>•>: Ilf “tl lE ID I 
CUPYTA * T (•(•••)• > J N f UI 1» E M  >:
OU TPUT(FAPI):
OUTPUT«:APEII
C o p y t e  »t t'«'•• >' > :n m h i * e <i >:
O'lT PUT «RABAT !
OUTPUT«»!)!
OUTPUT«CUBA»}
c o p y  if <»«•«•••>'>:n f u i i n e «i >:
OUTPUT «AN];
O'lTPuTIT»«))
OUTPUT <UVPR> t 
O u i P u u n v ) ;
OUTPUT I CUPl) ]
OUTPUT «'5)1 
OUTPUT(An) I
PAPPRTpPu •'T UR I YE 1» AT < • « •ITTUUP* ) 1 ) IPRI NT«M *3»6>T 




























































































Al I I 1!«1Ali $( I )-(»«*.( I )-RS*liV»P( 1-11
«R|*»«*Rf|-1)|
A?( I J:»f «R4(l )*R$«OVD¡-( 1-1 l-NI «MARI (|-1); 
A1(l)t>«|*«»Rk(l-1)!




O U T P U T I A I X  
O'iiPi'T < »7) i 
OIITPUT(*3>l 
U'irpuTi*»u 






•CORPFRT» CAS« FIDO STATF»ERTI
C'i p v t f a u m 'r ' I ' K r f u i i n e o i i
COPyTF«T<*«,»*>,>!
•FUR* U » 1 ,STER,1 MlPTIl* 6 ,I>0,,I>ES1R*
a 3(|):*o v o r (I l-ovnu(I-1U 
A4( i ) t*r>( 11 )-*F (1-11;
«III1:*E AR*(I)*0.03U1*FA8llI] 
•0.3333*F«PC{I ]*CURLI 11-CU0KI-11 
-CURA (I )*CURA(I-1)*KS*OVOR(I-1) 
»«•4K(I]-H«BK(1-11-DV(|]«DVll-l) 
-T»*(1)*T*X(1-1|-A3(I)-RI»HARR(I-1); 
—  - - -  A?(ll:««l»6*»r(i-i)}
A3(l)t«1.**RG(l)l
!------ — - - - ...  A*(11:*A1l1]*42(I1 *«4111*»5(1)1




OUTPUT < 46 >! . . .
COPVTE4T(#C l*')•)!
•EUR* l:«1'STFP'I•ORT1L' * * 00••PEO 14 •
Al ( 11 S*1 .0303*F»8l( 1J-fAOLI 1-11* '
A?(IJ:a1,1313*FAPF(|)-FAPE(l-1)l
A.K 11 :*»S*0V0* ( 1-1) ¡
A4(l):«Rl*DF(l-1);
«o( i) i■>'*•«r i i -h * r r (|.i ).o v p r (I)*o v d r i i - i ): 
“  ■ A7( 11 :•!«>( 1-11;
A6( 11!*OV(1-11}
. A5(1):*a 1[|]*a 2(I)* a 3(I)*a 4(I)-a 7(I)*a S(1);
•e r o 'i
ó ü t p ú t i a d »
UMTPUT(«2>S 
0 u t p u t (a 3 > ;
Ul'TPUT (44) ;
OUTPUT (4<i>|
OUT PUT < A7) }
OUTPUT (43>; “ --- ------
OUTPUT(46 >: >
•COp p f r t » i4Dir«T0PS;
P«PERThROU}URITETEXT(•(•XtO'-IMP1) •);PR14T(M.3,0>t 
NEUllNE(l);
•FON* |I*1*STE0# 1 'UTTIl' A'llO* 'LEOIR*
41 ( I ) :*E4PK( I J/(F4Dl[l}«F4P((I)*Cl>»«(1)
- U I K I D I
Al(l)iM1(1)*100.0l
•2ii):«ru4«rij /c u p (( i )>
A S( I 1 :*}«»■<( 1)/(RI.*I>ET I )*HS»0V»R(I]>;











AC(* IE9IRE 4T (STARA#E*LFS)I 
AC h IEVF’i e n T(PT«RS,n p AT))
c o p v t f »t (,< ,* m ,i ;
FPFFIHP.i t : ' CO'*HF 4T • RE LEAS IRG *C»0 OR C6ATREI 2}
*El(CT|NP0T(1)}




EXHIBIT A12.2 PROGRAM FOR SUMMARY STATISTICS
R 1.1 S T I »• I'F ; • OR* * ? LE . A * ft *V**(?71 641 (1 / ) P*wfiUCEf* On i^tic I f't AT 17,21,?S 
(OUTPUT #v U S U I L I  IN • |Uw h s <>Ow S.« n Sp A(A»FT' ON 31UCY75 «T IT.'? 1.32' 
PUCUMFNT 1-1
17/20/20 
LINE STATFUFNT 0 01 0
2 *  0
3 0
31/10/73
•INPUT* 0 • 
•INPUT* 1 • 
•OUTPUT* 0 
•CONTINUO»
C O N F U I D  BY XAIV M<. 3*
17/20/26 
U h i  s t f u n i n t  
» 0
31/10/75 C O N P U M I  BY XAIV NX. 3*
•b e g i n *
• INTESI(• I.J.K.M;
• PIAL • PES . H I .(L ,r s ; „ . / T / V T ” ."." ‘ T:
• P P O C F U U P E '  VARPTFXT(A,N>; •VALUE• NI 
•a r h AY* a : • i n t i /’-k 1 n ; •FXTEPkAl1;
• INTEGIA* • PROCI PIKE • INSTBAPMS.A) ; ~
•SThl't* s: •(»"»/• »• 'IllliMl'l•BOUl f A'- • • PMirirupE • TFSi.h): •VALUE' n :
• PR^Cf DOR? * R F A i'T P A *» < P } : 1 PPl»C E D O R F  • p;
•|*|RGfR* « 
• F. X T  E R «  A l  • ;
•e x t e r n a l *;
•PROCH»*»r f * RRADERRfN); M n TFGFR* *»•
'•Hill'• integer* j: “
n r *i l*tlfIf “ “ .
WRJ TF I M T I  • C * ***1«>F Ml»f HI UJ!JSTr»f FORE X / * ) • ) ;
•Mi*»' J:« 1 'STEP* 1 •UNTIL* 360 *DO* P R I N TC H ( RE < DC H ) J
PAUSE < W > ;
•E*n* r f a h e p r ; ' ~. _ .. ..
•PROCEDURE* I N T U I  <STP>; *STR|N6* STPJ
•CO^FFNT* $*|p$ OVFP CVPPFMT INPUT STREA* U»<TIL CHARACTER IMMEDIATELY 
FOLIUWpr, STRING STP. SWITCH 1 O n DIVES DIAGNOSTIC p f |n T OF FIRST -120 
Ch a r a c t e r s  «k i p p e d ;
•b e g i n * .
• INTEGER** ARRAY* *M'H1:30)S ‘INTEGER* c o u n t ;
COUNT:» ir$t r a r p (s t r ,r u f >;
•IE* T E S T M )  ‘THEN*
• N|G | N *
I.EUI l » F | T F T » X T ( * C * * * * t I » T U L X X * > * > ;  P P  U  T ( C O U N T  , R p U  >:
M W L P ' E M ) ;  VAP*-TEXT (BUF .COUNT ) ;
•f * d *;
•e n d * i n t i l l ;
• pROC F t>UP E • t»ATft|»(VAP,NTPl#STP^); * R f A l * VAP: «STRING* STR1.STR?;
*fO-».fN»* S»APCMES IN t u r n  FUR STRINGS STP1. ST1’2 AND THEN a ? l e a s t  
O n e SPACE fttFOItf PENDING a p f a l  VAB|*r l F VAR. SWITCH ? ON GIVES 
DIAGNOSTIC PRINT OF VA'.''E Rfc AD;
•b e g i n *
i n i i l l (STw I); i n t i i l c s t r ?); 
l o o p :
• i f * «i«Trn**iF'ronM'(*i')'i *t h e n *
•b e g i n * s m p c h ; »g o t o * l o o p ; *e n d *: 
var:« reap;
•IF* TEST (2) * THEN •
•BEGIN*
n c w i i n e m ); v*r i t e t f x t c *(**a *x d a t a i n x x *)*); p r u t  (v a r .o «b >;•end*;

























































































-n—  'PROCEDURE' ARRAV|N(ARRfSI2E,STR1,STR2IS 'VALUE* SIZES T^'C T r »"
•r e a l " a s r a y ' *»»: 'In t e g e r * s i z e s  'i in mc ' s t r i .s t r Z:
•b e g i n * -• m i i M 1 j;
'EUR* a m  1 'STFP' 1 'UNTIL* SITE '«O' BATA IN < Aft P i J ) , STRl , STBZ » I 
'ENA* AAAAVINS
•PROCEDURE* INRUTEARR.SIZE.STR); ''VALUE' SIZE#
'•E»L''ARRAY* AAR! 'INTEGER* SIZES 'STRING* STRS 
'REGIN'
ARNAYINEARR.SIZF.STR.'E'e 'I'I! V T•ENn' INPUTS
• PHOf E PUR F 'NEYYPUUPS
•p E g | n  • 'INTEGER' n s i n t ILLE'E'd u - p : DUMP'S'IS 
N S BREADS
•IE* N 'EO'N'THEN' NEXTPUMP 'ELSE' Nj«NI ~ ~ - r
•END'S
'PROCEDURE' DIIAl<»RP,SIZE,STR) S'VALUE • SIZES ' ‘
• R E A L ''ARRAY' APRS 'INTEGER' SIZES 'STRING' SIRS
•REAL' DUMMY.’ • INTEGER' 41
•e o r ' j j■ i 's t e p ' 1 'u n t i l * s i z e  'o o * - ... _
•«e g i n *
INTtlKSTRI;
LOOPS 'IE' NEXTCH •'E • CO"E<*«'*')'> 'AND'NEXTCN 'NE* fODEE'E'-1 
•THEN' -
•NEGIR' SKIRCNS 'GOTO* LOOPS 'END'S'
•END* J LOOPS ----- --- ■
SK1PCHS
DUNMY!»«EADSDHMMV:«READSARRfZ|8»READS ~ ~ *. V V
•IF' TEST IZ> 'THE«'
•REG!-.' '
NFMlINEEllS UR ITETFXTE' <••••* R-SINl*')')S 
•FOR' J :■ 1 'STEP* 1 'UNTIL* SIZE 'DO' PR I NT <ARP|JI,0.61S 
•END'S
•END* BNDOAt S
•PHOC'DURF' PUTOUl(A.">S'REAl"ARRAY' A.PS 
•m EGI n * 'INTEGER' L.N.VS 





•If* N IT* 3 • TMFN• L!«1 •FlSf* l:«Ui
•IF* ' f P C I 1) * LT • 0.0001 • THfN • • B*f.! N • v : ■7-?*l-«iS
■BEGIN'  SPACEEVIS DR I NT I Al  I  ) . N , l > S ' I N D • S 
•END'
•El. SE "B FG IN ' Vs»D-Z*l-IIS 







'PROCEDURE' PE RI OP S'begin' _ .
NiWltNEEIII
WR|TETE*T«,< " < * 1 C  3AS'l'PER|OD-1»*PER|OD-Z**PER|OD-SXXPi«IOD-A'>'>J 
I'RITETEXTE'E' ' E'ZS'I'PERIOD-SXtRFRIOli-ASlRERIOD-ZTXPfRIOD-B'I'IS
" t U L l N E d l l  J.____ ____________ ... . . . . . .
•END'S
•REGIN'
'R EA l"ARRAY* f • RN.RG.i l . CB. ROC E . LQDV . ECOV . F DPS . BCOV . DTARG •
PTARG .STARG.AZ.AX,A*.AS.A«.A7.A811|81.SALES.NPAT
, AA. AO,TAX.FABl.FAPF.DURA. niPL.OVDR.HARr.DV.NUM.DF.Pl TA, ATEOIBIS
SELFTTI npiiT El I S
r f a p t r a p e r e a o f r r »:
INI 1 LI E'E'llSTINGNPYXGOlURN*I•)S 
INTIllE'C'VARIABLfS'I'IS
APRAYINERU l F.E.'E'FAu I'I'.'E'POrE'I'ZS 
ARRAYINEINDY,».•E'GURI•l•.•«'LODY•I•>8 
DATAINERS.•E'0YDN1')1•* *'E*Z'I'>8RStn -RSS
OATAINERl.'E'PEl'I'.'CCDZ'I'liEl«—  »IS 
INTI LIE'E•SOLUTION'I'> S 
INTIILE'E'DUMP'I'll 
INTILI E'CPONP'I'IS 
h s > r e «d s p a p e r t n p o m : 
k :«o;



















































































START:H u u  n (¿);•mu* l!»1 'STFP* 1 •imTIl • 6 'fio* 'MU'*'
0* T A |»ISAlFSII).'«'SAIES*> •*•«•*•>•»» 
•FUR* J:« • 1STF P • 1 •ufcTIl' So 'PO' 5 < I PC M :
S T a r g f l1 :*“cAP; 1  _‘.J:•n.n* :
IVPUT<FARM.H,M*EAR» * I M I•FOP* IS»1 'STEP' 1 *MKT IL * 6 •PO* 'BUtA*DATAI* (UPAUl J. •(•rPAT*)
FOR • J ! * 1 •ST F P • 1 ••llt»<t* SO 'tO*
ptarg(i1:*»fad:
•ERO*
IKPIIT(**>II.>. . M ,F*HI •»•>: 
|NPUT(P»PF,o> i(’f<PF,),>;
1 N PUT (CORA iti • ( • COR A • > • 1 ; ■
1 4PIIT (COMI. • 6 # • < * COR I ‘»'»i
iupotu'vor,h,•(*ovop• >• ); _
lUPUTIDV.rt.M'DVM*»:
" i v p u t <60m .3,*c *n u *>,> ,>: —
m T i i u ,c,« « ,»,»í
lopuT (p f ,k , • ( • pF • > • > :
|R PU T( ll , P , M » P l T « ,) ,>!'
IOTI U  I •{ •ROWS |kPOR-»T|OI(»>»);
I N T U I  I • ( ' PPOPIFH* ) • > !
c p p v t f a t (><1 l o w ' > a >:
• G O T O • l»«Fl:
D O A K R O C F  . A. • « •PO'iPncr • > • ) !
OIIAKt t,DT.n.,<,R«>P10DV,),>S 
DiiAKccov ,n, • i •pupprov* > •> : 
0IIAl<*RPS.'W,l,A4l'P»PS,>,>¡
OIIAK I>CI‘V • t • AAr.nrovM •»;
O'iakdiarg ,h,•«•»>. imvAS*)*»:
I H K :  «flip* l:«1 •STfP’ 1 «URITI Ia
ROCFI * ) s«l<iP»r 11 j»Fr«>w| IJ t «F»®s 1 11
ROCFI1):»F r p SI Sii «provisi :«lQDVt2)
trovi s) : « p I » R M  SI :»ST«RK|4] :r -o .u 1 
•COp p f n T*  i o n i r a t Or s ;
y
A • P O 1
• Drool 11 :»«T » R« tI):*0.0: 
*Dt a »GI7! i r 0.1:
•f o p * I i b V S T C P *  1 •04 T 11 * A * DO••REGIO1
A1II):*FAvPlli/(F»Hl[l ] > l » F l  I J«CURA l I J
-c u r i i im
»111 l:*»iIT1*100.o: 
a ? 11 1:*c u p a i i i/c o p  1 1 i t :
A311 1 :*F4«N(i)/(Rl*PFrI1*PS*0VDPIII);
AAI I 1 : »ORATI I 1/HON I 11*100.0;
A S H !  :»*P'T|| 1/HVIII ;
AftI 1! :»DVI H / S U H I 1 1*100.0;
A7II l: *( SU FS r Il-SAI * M  |-1I>/SAIF<!U-1 l*1»o.u;
ARI I ! ;»(NPATII1 •*.r AT l 1-11)/p PAT11-11*100.0:
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A P P E N D I X  X l l l  
A HIERARCHY OF INFORMATION
A13.1 AVERAGE VALUES OF CRITERIA OVER TIME
A13.2 A SUMMARY OF CRITERIA FOR A PARTICULAR PARAMETRIC 
VALUE
A13.3 A SUMMARY OF LP SOLUTION FOR A PARTICULAR 
PARAMETEIC VALUE
A13.4 A COMPLETE LP SOLUTION
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EXHIBIT A.13.3 A SUMMARY OF LP SOLUTION FOR L » 4
• 1 s a
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EXHIBIT A13.4 A COMPLETE LP SOLUTION
PAORLEM RETAGOAL-01 SOLUTION








NANE VACUE LOWER BOUND UPPER ROIINO ORJFCT1 VE
• SALE SI * 117*«.01*7 0 14000.0000 0
B SACES7 ♦ 12418.4400 F 0 16006,0000 1 1 ®
B SALFSS ♦ 14596.1591 0 18006,6060 6
B SALES* • 17419,7955 0 23006,0000 0
B SALFSS ♦ 18669.Q M 6 0 27006.0060 6
B S U F S A  ♦ 21250.8905 0 36606.0060 0
b SAIES7 ♦ 24RU1.1579 0 33606.6000 0
B S * l F Sfi ♦ 261*9.4*11 0 36000.0000 0
B FARN1 ♦ 1107.«1V2 0 A
B BARN? ♦ 1111.P7«I 0 0
B j ♦ 1 A2A,1454 0 0
B EARN4 ♦ 2703.8436 0 0
B EAR44 ♦ 2168.7314 0 0
B M E N A  ♦ 2110.AIO* 0 0
B E A MK 7 ♦ 2987.9112 0 0
b EARbh ♦ 3365.4017 0 0
b NPAT1 ♦ 693.SOVft 0 1006.0060 0
B NPAT2 ♦ 698,7902 0 1206,0000 0
B NPATJ ♦ 829.39;1 0 1306.0060 (1
B RPAT4 ♦ 1005,694.3 0 1406.0060 0
B NPA V 8 ♦ 973.7910 0 1506.0060 0
B NPAT6 ♦ 1187.1212 0 1800.0000 0
B NPA17 ♦ 1416.7816 0 2100.0060 0
0 KPATH ♦ 1*01.ulti* 0 2400.0000 0
N TAXI ♦ 743.7549 0 0
B T A 42 ♦ 756.*693 0 0
0 TAXI ♦ 137.78*0 A 0
n TAX4 ♦ 767.1190 0 0
B TAX5 ♦ 643.3707 0
B IAX6 ♦ 734,7032 0 0
B TAX7 ♦ 1114.01/4 0 0
B Tm XA ♦ U n o . ?8<»8 0 ... . 0
H FARLI ♦ 2332.3773 0
B FARI 2 • 1182.7IUR 0 0
B FARLI ♦ 3807.A247 0 0
4756.3108 0
B FABlS ♦ 4708.4156 0 0
B TARLÒ ♦ 4OJ3.9690 0
* FARI./ « II/*.761* 0
«1 FABLH ♦ 1144.4127 0 _ _ __ 2. .
B FAPf1 ♦ 1182.1117 0
B FAPF2 ♦ 1786.4791 0
B F APE 3 ♦ 1967.7575 0
B F APF 4 ♦ 2098.7904 0
B FAPFS ♦ 2400.7552 0
B FAPF6 ♦ 1-I«9,0ò Hò o \
B F APE/ • 1776.1297 0
B FAPFB ♦ 3723.399? 0
B CURAI ♦ «151.1091 0
B CURA2 ♦ 4768.1846 0
B CURA 3 ♦ 5319,9225 0
B CURA4 ♦ 6807.4767 0
B CURAI ♦ 6636.7809
B CUPA6 ♦ 71*8.'.AIR
B CURA/ ♦ 9011.6411 0
B CURA* ♦ 11081.4817 0
B CURII ♦ 1593.3605 0B CURI? ♦ 1364.7099a CURII ♦ 2410.1/17 0B Curi 4 ♦ 1087.6*84
B CURII ♦ 3481.0733
B CURL6 ♦ 3965.8905 0
B CUR17 ♦ «*211.711/0






U OVO»* ♦ 2SO.OC4JO
U OVO»» ♦ 730.0000
0V0»7 ♦ 0
Ü OVO»» ♦ 730.0000
• MAR»1 ♦ 411,0JAS
MAR4C2 ♦ 0
MAR»3 ♦ 0
0 MARR4 ♦ 173.»417
MAR«} ♦ -----  0
MARRÓ ♦ A
• m a »k 7 ♦ 2AO.O0O9
0 MARRA ♦ 1774.6501
O ASSETS1 ♦ 6775.4394
• ASSCTS2 ♦ 7393.3845
• ASSFTS3 ♦ SA59.°740
• ASSETS4 ♦ 10074.4097
• ASSFTS5 ♦ 107A4.77M6
O ASSFTS6 ♦ 11565.8329
• ASSFTS7 ♦ 12848.»336 -
• ASSFTS8 ♦ 14100.0000
i 1MTR1 ♦ 158.743A
• 1RTR2 ♦ ** 1 »7.5791
0 IMTR3 ♦ -- 102.4569
• IMTR4 ♦ 222.1613
• INTIS " ♦ 105. SB01
i IMTRó ♦ 105.3001 *
0 1MTR7 ♦ 1SS.3HA1
• 1BTR8 ♦ 105.31101
0 OV1 ♦ 1 Jó.7019
• 0V2 ♦ 139,75*40
• OV3 ♦ 165.*7*4
O 0V4 ♦ 71)1 .1 3H9
0 OV5 ♦ 778.0843
B OVÓ ♦ 339.2929
B 0V7 ♦ 404.6530
B OVO ♦ 45(4.5745
• MUM1 ♦ 2057.7062
e n u m 2 ♦ 2057.7062
B MIM3 ♦ 2057.7062
0 DU14 ♦ 2OJ7.7062
• MUM3 ♦ 2057.706?
B NUMÓ / ♦ 2057.7062
B NUM7 ♦ 2057.7062
• h u m a  ♦ 2037.7062
0 RC1 ♦ 57.7067






RGB ♦ 01 011 ♦ 1078.0474
• 0(2 ♦ 2094.7391
B OCS ♦ 2405.7119
0 0(4 ♦ 2777.0168
i OES ♦ 1042.2506
• M ó  ♦ 1042.7541»
B 0(7 ♦ 1042.2506
• 0(0 ♦ 1042.2506
• til . » 478.0474
• 112 ♦ 116,6917
B U J  » 310.9727
0 114 ♦ 571.3049





• BIT Al ♦ 30.6275
0 01TA2 4 .67.8243
• BITAS ♦ 96.6359
0 BITA4 ♦ 118,1317
0 BITAS 4 141.6407
0 75O .O 0O 0 0 0 . 0 1 1 1
A 2 5 0 .0 0 * * 0 0 n . 0 1 1 6
0 2 5 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 1 1 1
0 250 .00041 0 0 . 0 0 6 *
0 2 5 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 • n . o i i o
0 2 5 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 • o . o i s o
0 * v » . o o < t o 0 0 . 0 1 8 8
0 2 5 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 •
0 0 0 . 0 1 1 »___ . — . . . 0 . 0 4 1 2
0 0 •
0 • • - 0 0 . 0 1 1 *
• 0 0 , 0 1 2 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 -------- -- - - 0 0
0 0 0
0 • - ' • * 0 0
0
----- -  - - 0 0
0 0 • 0
0 0 •
0 ............ . i ■ ' 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 * *' * ‘ ............. ' . ............. 0 •
0 \ 0 - o
0 1 ............. 0 •
0 8 • 0
0 -  - -----------;---- . 0 0
0 0 0

















0 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 o r o  ooúo 0 0 . 0 1 6 6
0 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 1 1 0
0 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 * 0 1
0 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 6 * 1
0 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 0 0 5
0 A 0 O .00O 0 0 o . i * r s














0 0 0 . 0 1 1 7
0 0 0 . 0 * 6 1




0 \ 0 t
0 0 0
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P R O U E N  OETAOOAl-01 SniDTinN
DUMPiDUMP 11« RIANT NANO SIDE





VINI VAU't LOWER BOUND
R RLTA6 « 155.3606 0
R RlTAE ♦ 170.T9E4 •f
R RITAS * 162.5735 0
1 R(T ♦ 119.TOSE 0
• P»F ♦ 707.1567 0
• SAL ♦ JOSS.S59E 0
EPS ♦ 0 0
0 LOD ♦ EEAA.1ESS 0
• 1 NT ♦ 1140.T1E7 0
• OVA ♦ 364.50*0 0
ove ♦ 0 0
U PR01V1 ♦ 1 .«ODO 0
U PROAVI ♦ 1.6000 0
PAI7T1 * 0 0
• PR 1 X v1 ♦ 0. TESA 0
001 AVI ♦ 0 0
ERE2T1 • 0 0
PRETTI ♦ 0 0
R PR0JT7 ♦ 0.6170 »
PROAV? ♦ 0 0
EROTTE ♦ 0 »
0011V? ♦ 0 0
U 0014V2 ♦ 1 .nono 0
RRE1TE ♦ 0 0
r pulii? ♦ 0.1111 0
U PR0?Y3 ♦ 1.6000 0
P011V3 ♦ 0 0
1 poiivi ♦ C.7666 0
0001 VA ♦ 0 0
poOlV A ♦ 0 0
0011 VA ♦ 0 0
001 ?VA ♦ 0 0
poi Iva ♦ 0 0
u POI AVA . ♦ 1.6000 0
u PR27V4 ♦ 1 .0006 0
U PRESTA ♦ 1.6000 0
0 PP07V5 ♦ • 0.6*94 0






R PRE1TS ♦ 0.RS10 0
PRESTI ♦ 0 0
U OOOAV6 ♦ 1.0000 0
U P00SV6 ♦ 1.6000 0
poliva ♦ 0 0
U 001 AVA ♦ 1.6000 0
U P015V6 ♦ 1.0000 0
0 P016V6 ♦ 0.D198 0
PR21V6 ♦ 0 0
PRESTA ♦ 0
0001V7 ♦ 0
PH0AV7 ♦ 0 0
U 001AV7 ♦ 1.6000 0
U PO??V7 ♦ 1.6000 0
poo?va ♦ 0
poliva ♦ 0 0
U PREETA ♦ 1.6006 0





































1 .nono 0 •S1.EE07
1.0000 0 1E.S769
1.6060 6 0













1.0060 0 S .7188
1.0060 0 0








1.0000 , • 0 3.5SE«
1.0000 / n 4.703A

































































Proof of the fomulae for rerankinq by discounted benefits/discounted 
costs at the internal rate of return of the marginally rejected project.
Let this rate of return be i, and define the notation
$ t-sTV.(t,i) = - l c .(1+i) 8 A14.1
j s-1 8j
Then the required reranking by parameter B mews the approximation 
to the dual equations of
Uj + BTVj (T-l,i) S - TVj (T,i) A14.2
or alternatively
p.. + 0TV_. (T—1,i) i cj + Qpj " (l+i)TVj (T-l,i) A14.3 
Using the identity that
T-2
TV (T-l,i) = TV <T-l,r) + (i-r) £ TV (t,i)(l+i)T-2-t
3 3 t=l 3
A14.4
the equation can be rewritten as
T-2
p + (B+i-r) TV. (T-l,r) + (i-r) J (l+i)T_2_t(B+l+i)TV (t,r) 
3 3 t—1 3
i a^ - TV..(T,r) » NTV^ A14.5
Thus this is seen to be equivalent to having
eT_2 ■ (i-r) (6*l»il
Bt - (i-r) (B+l+i) (l+i)T-2_t for t-l,2,...T-3 A14.6
413
The internal rate of return approximation.
Using the identity
(l+i)T_t - (l+r)T-t + (i-r) l 1(l+i)T-t~8“1(l+r)8 A14.7
s-0
and putting - (i-r)(l+i)T 1 the equations
T-l
l TV. (t) 6 - NTV A14.8
t-l 3 3
become
T T-l , t
- I c. .(l+r)T-t - (i-r) l (l+i)T-1-t l c . (1+r)t_s - 8.
t-l 3 t-l s—1 83
or
- f c |(l+r)T-t + (i-r) l (l+i)T_t_8_1(H-r)8l - 8
t-l 31 s-o 7 3
or
T
- I c. ,(l+i)T_t - 8 A14.ll
t-l 3 3




A P P E N D I X  X V
THE WEINGARTNER MODEL
AIS.1 CASH FLOW DATA USED BY WEINGARTNER
AIS. 2 THE LP INPUT DATA LISTING FOR TOE 
MODEL USING THE PROJECTS DETAILED 
IN APPENDIX IV
A15.3 THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION IN TOE CASE 
OF SEVERE CAPITAL RATIONING
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EXHIBIT A15.1 CASH FLOW DATA AND IRR OF PROJECTS USED BY
WEINGARTNER (EXTRACTED FROM "MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING 
AND THE ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL BUDGETING PROBLEMS”
BY H M WEINGARTNER, KERSHAW EDITION, 1974, p.181-182)
CASH PLO W S ASSOCIATED WITH TH IRTY HYPOTHETICAL INVESTMENT PROJECTS»
T ABLE 9A.4. INTERNAL RATES OP RETURN AND
RANKS FOR THIRTY INVESTMENT PROJECTS*
Project No. 1 2 » 4 5 0 7 8
Unte (%) 11.0» 13.04 11.90 19.02 12.20 11.75 13.84 12.57
Rank 9 2 7 13 5 8 3 4
Project No. 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 1C
Kate (%) 15.«* 9.07 7.(10 8.55 8.70 9.22 10.80 10.24
Hank 1 IU 19 18 17 15 10 11
Project No. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Hate <%) 5.81 5.70 0.75 5.19 0.35 0.11 11.94 10.10
Rank 22 23 20 24 14 21 0 12
Project No. 25 20 27 28 29 30
Rate <%) 4.52 4.25 3.50 •1.71 4.04 4.93
Hunk 28 29 30 20 27 23
(  •T Iim *  rate« a r t  compiiteli by in i««  the horixun value* a t 10% of Table I.V.J.
416
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P P I I 5 Y 7 , O l i l i  , 4 1  . A
49 •" P P I I 5 Y 7 . 0 M.I7 . J H .  3
P P b S V P . f H J 3 . 4 4 . 7
07 P P 0 5 Y 7 . 0 M . I O ,  J " .  5
P P l 4 V 7 , f A Í H 7 . - J A 1 ,
^ 4 4  v ~— .. . l i p P p M ,  1
P P 1 S v 7 .l H J 1 . 3 . 4
“  H Z P P 1 J Y 7 . C U J 7 . 3 . 4
* P P 1 .1 Y 7 . 0 H . I J ,  3 . 4
oa P P 1 J * ? , Oli .1 0 , J . U
P A 1 J Y 7 . r 3 J M 7 . - 4 3 7 ,!
. o p r i l o , 1
. 1 7 . - 1
U  ¿ í„-.. U J Y 7 . C A S - 7 . 4 3 7 . - 1
. U P I  r J . 7 7 . 7 7 .;
M  r ; . 1 7 . 1
P P 1 4 V 7 . P B . I 1 , - 1 3 1 . 8
9 p p i 4 Y 7 . f i l 7 . - 1 J 4 . 3
P P 1 4 V 7 . 0 U  3 , 1 7 9 . 4
4M p P 1 4 Y 7 . f - M J 6 . - 1 1 7
T p P l 4 Y 7 . f J M i 7 . - 1 M > , -
*■» V .l.'PRIJO , 1
’îv r
----
* r :  -  Ttr —s. -
••---•* •• -  - r . ■TESïggg
.-mu _






























.l'PPHO.1 I- . .
PP15YJ.ro 11.119 
PP.15Y3.0JJ2.117.0
PP15YJ.MIJÏ.119.0 _  _______
PP15V3.CUJA.107.6 . ----l
P P 1 5V 3 , C A S n J . - 1 6 7 , - 9 J . 6 6 , B 6 , 6 H £ J 1___
,i'ppn".i ; I. i^ rl-^
PRt,1Y4 ,OBJ1 .347.0 __ __ ___________
PP01Y4,00.17.346.9 ' ' ■ 7 .
PP01V4,CPJ5.3<6.3 _________
PA01V4,06.14,317





















___- ■_ V .
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P IO »|.Y P  M l IP I.A P T h FP --IHPUT -__»P.TP. U/01/74
■  -
p p i  iV4,i u j i .i p a .s _
P»’ 1Y«,( -1JA.106 ....




,r»i.H4, 12H,-2a «.- s ?,-*?.-S2 
, I U I  14.104,1?. 52,52, *2 
.11.)
► KK.V«.,* -)J1 .-54.V 
P M 4 Y 4  .n,|J2.-A6.?
PK1 4 Y k .CH J l.-45.‘$
Pn14Y4.i-MJ6.-45
PPl4V<.,r„sr<. ,-1.Í0.-29,123.1 A4.7« I~ 
.1 PI'WP , 1
pn?2Yt ,i<h J1 .94.S 
P«22Y4,t'IIJ2 .»A. I
P»22Y4 il HJ 1 .V?./ ...... ..
pP?2V4,rilJA,81.A










pnu2Y5 «I «13 • 2*0 _
pnu2Y4.<.Hl6.1Pk 
PP07VS »P 1SM 1.-1V6.-49 ,7‘>»*0 
.llpMin.l
PPUlVS.I-p.ll ,4?/,V 
p u t lYS.up12,444.5 
P p u IYS.i h .15,412.2 
pnii4yS,i-M.ift,17s.2 
PP i-IV'.T 4*li5,-iftV,U,h,1 10 
.UPI •(», 1
P I H V 5 , I  4 11 .7*7,4
PPIIVS.i.u J2.2V/.2 ___
P H 1 Y 5 . I U  5.2711.1
4 1 o P P 1 1 V5,l>n.l A , 752.6
PPl1Yr.,r4S«S,-lSi
.l.ppnu, 1c II o : PP 21Y* ,r 4.11 ,1x9.3 
pP71YS.rnj7.3Pft.?
PP21Y*-.C 4.11.3*4u o PP21YS.ilJA .3??
1 M pP?1YS,r*5HS,-S4ft
,lipP.«h,1
I o  1 PP/JYS.I' IJI .2-11.4
PP2lYS.l-HJ7.21«.»
1 PP23YS,uuJ3.1')«.4
V  I o pp?1YS.i.HJft.1 ?h 
p"<lY'-.P \s-iS .-J45
II w .l-PPHU, 1
1 » V p r o a y a  ,ri|)jl ,31V.7 
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EXHIBIT A15.3 THE- OPTIMAL SOLUTION IN THE CASE OF SEVERE CAPITAL RATIONING
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Then in general 422
t - S +1 c.
AIVT-S-1 " E tT S 1 t-0 (l+r*)*
T-S-l+t r AT-S+t(r_Po)
¿ 0
and in particular by letting S * T-l 
t-T C
APV - 7O u t-0
t
(l+r*)t
+ ? At (r-po)
t-o (1+P~> (. (1+r*)"' (1+p ) o o
A ( r - p )o o
where r* - r(l-TL),
Now
■ XT C. ii-tiit (1+Po)J
and this expression can be substituted into the second tern on the 
hand side of A16.8 to give
t-T C. T T
APVo - l n j ? | T  + l l
c t (r-P o ) A (r-p ) o o
t-0 ¿ 0  itt (1*0 l1-“ 1!!*.*)' U * V
which on eliminating the second summation sign can be reduced to
t-T |" 1 r-Po f  (l+Po)t “ (l+r*)fc^
APV° ' t-0 \  1 -  W o _





• H r * L l  « .<l+r*)t l r*-p£
•r rTL
•r* 1 p -r*o
T Ct T











An analysis of the Dual Equation associated with the accounting variables
The following dual relationships apply t-1,8. The sourve of 
the equation is defined in the opening bracket.
EARNfc) - EAt + Pt - (l-T)PRt - ROCE^ - ECOVt - 0 A17.1
T TP*.NPATfc) - » + PRfc - ERPSfc - DCOVt - 0 A17.2
TAXfc) CLfc - pt + TPfc - 0 A17.3
while the following equations apply t-1,7.
cuRAfc) •- - CAfc - pt + pt+1 + afc.RCX:Et - 0 A17.4
CURLt) - CLt + Pt - Pt+1 - at-ROCEt + .LQDYfc = 0 A17.5
and finally
CURA ) - CA„ - p + a.ROCE0 = 0 A17.6O O o o
CURLg) - CLg + Pg - Og.ROCEg + Bg.LQDYt - 0 A17.7
From which the following identities can be deduced
CLt “ Pt “ Pt+1 " + Bt-LQDYt (t-1,7) A17.8
CI*8 - Pg " Og.ROcE8 + Bg.LQDYg A17.9
CAfc = pt+1 - pfc + at.R0CEfc (t-1,7) A17.10
“ s " " Ps + A17*11
TPfc - Pt+1 + at.R0CEt + BtLQDYt (t-1,7) A17.12
TP8 - Clg.ROCEg + Bg.LQDYg A17.13
PRt - ^  ^ Pt+1 + atROCEfc + BtLQDYj+ ERPSt + DC0Vt (t-1,7) A17.14
PR8 " T—?  [°8 ROCE8 + + ERPS8 + PC°V8 M 7 *15
EAfc - pt " T-Pt+i “ H**Tl.R0CEt - T.St.LQDYt
+ (l-T)ERPSt + (l-T)DCOVt - ECOVt (t-1,7) . A17.16
EAg - P8 - [1+aTl.ROCEg - T.Bg.LQDYg
+ (1—T)ERPSq + (1—T)DCOVg “ ECOVg A17.17
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A P P E N D I X  X V I I I  
TOE CHAMBERS (71) MODEL
A18.1 LP INPUT DATA LISTING AND SOLUTION
A18.2 THE LP SOLUTION WHERE 
TOE FIRM IS IN A 
DEFICIT STATE IN EACH YEAR
A18.3 TOE LP SOLUTION WHERE THE 
FIRM IS IN A SURPLUS 
STATE IN EACH YEAR
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EXHIBIT A18.1 LP INPUT DATA LISTING AND SOLUTION
P60M.7P ChAMUtilS I 4' PUT »ATI 04/03/76
XIOO.COST.u,30.7.-4.5.-4.5,-4.3,-100.16.24,9.«
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X111 irvi 1.111». , .7.». 7,1 .'.-2 0 6 ,-160.-123,-74.- 33
XI 11.OC7• —4fl,-5/,—4«,—41
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XII 2 .UPi* '6,1
X112, eus f .Id«,. .0.3.,-1.1.-200,-1/.0,-140,-119,-9 7 
X112.6C2.-4U,-20,-21,-2? '
I112.ru» f,-46.2113,1 72.1 3H. 3. m i .  6.61 .«.2oii,154.1*)8.62.l6
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X 1 1 l.lIPl '6,1
X113,0U'T,1«,,,.9.3,IS ,,-100,-60,-Mb.-67 




X114.S41 C l  ,1 
Xl14,ni:4,-21,-16




















X 2 « 1,1 U S T ,347»»»»» — 4»»,-3««» — 240, — 179 
X2U1.6C4,-«••*,-61 




T I N I
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S'»i»'r io*-
O'i* r t *• •* *»
s**« s
- i r **• 0 s toi oAjtmv*l'prtn ro'iN»!
r divi -to >
il.SI
COSTÜOHNO
0«TF 04 i f ' i t t *  11**» 1
fOL SfcT
coi***’** m î o p .-i* r io*»
NMf VâlMf 10WFR MOll»*
U XI »1 ♦ 1 . i‘,M»0
u e u ? ♦ 1.0100
u xifti ♦ 1.0300
U 41 14 ♦ 1 .«* 100
U 411*6 ♦ 1. 10.10
t1»s ♦ u
X1 of. ♦ 0
U XI *7 ♦ 1.0000
U 419* ♦ 1 .<0 10
U *1»«» ♦ 1.0*J'»O
4110 » 0
4111 ♦ 0
U 411? ♦ l.ftJAO
• i n ? ♦ 0.4 ¿*10
U 4115 ♦ 1.0)00
ft «114 ♦ 1.«.«>*)0
|11S ♦ 0
U *iw. 4 1 .1*000
411/ ♦ 0
4iia 4 •1
• «1 IV ♦ 4.« 112
U A / .J 1 » 1.« M
0 4/0? ♦ 1.A.JO0
U 4/’»* 4 1 .' )00
»1 4 7 •.* 4 • 1 . 0 0 0
U X/jS 4 1 .0 J*»0
0 42«#6 ♦ 1 .*V90
U 4/'*7 4 1.*)0Û
U *?"■ ♦ 1,»»).l0
U 4 7.»9 ♦ 1 .*1 >‘»0
4?10 4 0
• *»11 4 O.A 141
U 4/1? 4 1.«'O*I0
U 4/13 4 1.7900
• *?14 4 1 . »0O0
4/1*» 4 0
U 4 ? W 4 l.ojfiO
• 4/17 4 2.2196
* 4/1* 4 0
4/19 4 0
U < V»f 4 i.rot»o
U 4.1«»/ 4 1.7* |O0
U 4« »5 4 1 .«'000
U 4 3**H 4 . 1.70»0
U 4?'»S 4 1.« >00
4*Î»A 4 «fr> 0
U 4 So7 4 1.0)00
U 4 5 J* 4 l.rjno
tlpPM 0OUI»D ONJFCriVF 9 ft DUC Kl» COSI
1.00«» ü 117.0000 52.2115
1.O0O0 21X . o*»oo 63 .6 7M
1.OÖO0 341.AO0O 127.7142














1,00«»0 «7.1.0009 191 1.4‘»AJ
20UO.O0OO -157.9000: -1.4109
2000.O00O -95.5<*00 -2.3«o/
200-0. *»d'»0 1/4.400« 0
1 .00*10 1So.oOoo 45.174*
1.000(1 243.0000 71.1126
1.0000 3A7.OO00 1*17.772/
1.0000 109.1*000 1 «»A. «»5 32
1.0000 7*.OOOO 23.3191
1.0000 0 1.3452
1 .OflOO -3.0000 4.4«14
1.0000 200.0000 41..4361
1.0000 VS.0009 IA. 50*4
1.0000 244.0000 -0.2415










1.001 0 204.001*** 74.1 44»»
1.00(0 3 9 7 .OOOO 112.06*9
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0 X309 ♦
**H' ♦g *311 ♦
u * M ? ♦g *313 ♦






$(»U'T|ON OBTE 04/03/76 TlPF 1
BIGHT M AM D S1 OF HHS1
OBJECTIVE COST
t'PPEP ftOUNft *JPi*lD
HOW * M  (1 E VI -LV ) COl SET
Vftiilf LOUFB BOUND UPPER POUND OBJECTIVE HEwt'CCP COST
1 . rjoo 1.0000 114.0000 19.«»230
i•««## 1 .ftOOO 200.0000 S.«a 69
0 1,0030 174.0000 •4.3330
1 .-1)1/0 1 .AOOO 199.0000 4.2364
1 ,f..)00 * 1.00<»O ?». 01*00 11."?!«
1 m »u 1,90ou 7».0000 0
0 200^. 000*# ft -10.3374
0.3 ?O0 2009. C0*)0 -1*5.1ft»»ft 0
12.371*4
0




1 .' .00 1 . OO'JO 140.0000 44.4i.09
1 . • ?«*0 1 .ftOOO ¿01.0000 7 3. <•«•1*0
1 >00 i.ftftftO 422.pOOO 111.7009
1.ft »«0 1 ,ft0»?0 2*3.ftftCO 03.0460
1.' ICO I.OOt'0 117.00**0 22.ft?JO
0 S.ftOOO -3.5410
l.rtJOO i.'igoo Sfi.ftOoO 2.ft404
1 .•• )00 1 .0I*00 ¿55. uft'-'O 47.M0O0
1 .»* I«0 1.0000 124.0000 70.41*00
l.o (Oil 1.00«»0 575.0000 14.2 «.»00
1. “ )00 1 ,0ft«*0 19m . 6.0440
1 )O0 1.0000 2f1.4000 11 .«.460
1 . .’ |00 1. ftftftft 4 5.r f 0 0 *. 17.4000
1 .»• |00 — ..... 1 . »!«»•• ft 71.1*100 •f
0 200*1.0000 -2.400ft -7.9772
¿.1*32 2000. «»0»M -170. ¿00'» 0ft ~ *2000.0000 -95.7000 -9.463»
o 12».DC00 -0.5345
1.0 »00 1.0ftOft 35.01*00 35.0000
1 ,l*.|00 * 1.ftouo 57.0000 3 7. ooi»0
1.0 100 1.0000 *4.6009 h6.*»tt*»0
1 ,ft.»flO 1.ftftuo 29y. oOOO 91 .H0«>0
1 .ftiMiO 1.ftrt«»0 127.0000 ',TT^ 73.400«)
l.ftubO 1 .ftOOO ~ Hft.oftOft 1.3371
1 . 1.0000 116.000») 7.3371
1.0 ,i(i Q 1 ,A0*»0 33.0000 3 3. *m m »0
1 ,(*»»00 • - r v— - • * ■ ■; • ” 1. ftOOO * 14.0000 14.0000
0 1 .uOoo -3.ftouo -3.U0O«





1.1*000 ■— - * " i.oooo 64.0000 0
5.«¿00 ---  - - 200ft.0000 ' 103.6000 0
/. 4*/ S9 200ft.*1000 -175.ftCOO 0
A 200ft.ftOOO •97.0000 -13.6376
0 •*“ ■ 112.00i»0 -0.03*2
<«4?S.34f»0
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P t r t ' . i r t rm a m e * * SO» u l  f o r P A f f 0 4 / 0 3 /
D U f io jp n »  p 4 « IGH T M*»f> S i d e  p o s i  
o n j f t n v r  c o s t  
u p p e r  o o u K p  u p r * d
sow s r i  CIPV1 - I V  ) COI S Ï T
ROW - A Ì I 0 * »
M * P S l  A t  \ » . » . s . P H t e t
0 C d s r / 0 4 2 5 , 3 4 0 « 0
t u n ♦ 0 - A 3 . 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 7 K 1
l * V ? ♦ A - 2 7 0 . 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 1 4 2 4
o i * v « ♦ *V , A M » 5 9 5 3 . 0 0 0 « 0
IP V 4 ♦ 0 . ;  6 4 1 , -0 0 0 0 ..'■ ■ W  - * . « 7 * 0
♦ 0 ¿ 7 5 . 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 1 6 t f A
CAS-1 0 - 0 3 4 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 * 9 *
0 - 1 * 4 4 . 0 1 ) 0 0 0 . 0 9 9 2
c a s * s 0 - 1 4 7 6 . 0 0 0 0 '  0 . 1 5 1 4
C * S “ 4 0 - 2 2 7 2 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 7 1 «
c a s « * 0 - 2 Ö 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 3 6 0
$ * 1 * 5 1 ♦ 0 0 - 9 3 . 0 2 V 3 .
5 * L « S ? ♦ 0 0 - * 6 . i , f - 0 4 • *
S A t * S 3 ♦ 0 0 - 7 A . O 0 0 0
5 4 1 * * 4 ♦ 0 4- 0 . _ - 7 1 . 0 0 0 0
♦ 0 0 - 6 4 . 0 0 0 O
■ 11 ♦ 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 l i ♦ 0 0 0




0 . S S V 4
0 ■
- , ........ — . - i .  0
0
a i s ♦ 0 0 0
•  i * ♦ 0 0 0
•  17 ♦ 0 ■0 0
•  17 ♦ 0 0 0
» IV ♦ 0 0 0
TABLE A18.1 CASH BALANCE AND DEBT CAPACITY DUALS
YEAR pt Lt p + >jL *t t
1 1.5764 0.3673 1.7600
2 1.4076 0.3392 1.5772
3 1.3084 0.1968 1.4068
4 1.1570 0.1968 1.2554
5 1.0360 0.1688 1.1204
Here
and where LEV^, 
and Pt, Lt
Lt  -  Ï « v t
T-t
5
p - Î CASH 
* T-t C
CASHt are dual variables in the computer solution above
are as defined in section 3.5
EXHIBIT 18.2 THE LP SOLUTION WHERE THE FIRM IS IN A DEFICIT STATE IN EACH YEAR
C « A ' i ! * K ! t  J ' l t M T l ; »  l i l f »  0 4 / l ‘ i  I/O 1 M i
ouHH i r»u»j p 6
«00  * « »  (1
ft 1 M i l  HXNh S 
OHJ F f  T 1 VF 
UPPER POUND 
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TABLE A18.3 CASH BALANCE AND DEBT CAPACITY DUALS.
YEAR Lt pt * ______
1 1.5905 0.3569 1.7689
2 1.4407 0.2728 1.5771
3 1.3087 0.1961 1.4067
4 1.1889 0.1329 1.2553
5 1.0815 0.0778 1.1204
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EXHIBIT A18.3 THE LP SOLUTION WHERE THE FIRM IS IN A SURPLUS STATE IN EACH YEAR
PM OèiH- c i SOLUTION ONTE 0 4 /0 3 /7 6  116*
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tA«C V U » è in u m  HOUnO UPPEP POUNO o iO F c n v e  m e p u c h  c o s i
u X I 01 ♦ 1 .««>00 1 .0001) 117.PO00 7K.10SJ
u *1« > ♦ i .  •tuffo 1 .0 0 0 0 21 A .»00» 119 .4591
U X103 ♦ 1 .''»»«IO 1 .0 0 0 0 3 4 1 .» 0 0 0 187.1.4 3»
u « u à ♦ 1 .»»••no 1 ,oo*»o 1 4 v , iM'OO 1 5 5 . iu . l6
u  A l ia ♦ 1 .1 0 0 0 \ 1 .0 0 0 0 - SO.0000 C 4 .4 * ? .
U c 5 ♦ 0 •2 3 .N O 00 -8 2 .6 1 9 3
feH'D ♦ 0 1 .»»000 A •« .9 7 6 4
U A1U7 ♦ l . ' i iO O 1 .0 0 0 0 •9 .0 0 0 0 •1 .6 *76
U JtlOi* ♦ 1 . •*u*)0 1 .<»000 177.0001* BK.4 Si V
O X 1 *•'» ♦ 1 . 1 .00«I0 74.1*1*1111 J 7 .4 1 0
U X11*' ♦ 1 . MOO 1 .OOoO 1 *8 .0 0 0 0 5u.2v<*4
U A111 ♦ 1 ..».»oo 1 .0 0 0 0 1 0 5 .«»DO S V ./u s o
o • 1.-MMI0 1 .0 0 0 « 1 8 » .0 *0 0 S 7 ..S 7 A
L H > ♦ 0 •  4A.O**0» -1 5 3 .« 5 7 1
u x n  1 ♦ i  ,:*ooo 1 .o o fio 1 9 .0 0 0 0 7 6 .7 4 5 2
« x m ♦ 1 . 1000 l . o o r o 4H.O000 •1
B x i n ♦ <4.S2»»0 2 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 »
u x i u - ♦ 1 • ^ ik io 1 .0 0 0 0 » 7 0 .0 0 0 0 1964.11.85
a 117 » 0 2 0 0 0 .» 0 0 0 -157 .90««* -1 .2 4 7 1
X117 ♦ j 20IJA. »»Oli -9  5 . 30i*0 • m . m f l
i  A11V ♦ 6 ./t . .» 0 ÌO rtrt.O O ' 0 1 76 .00 0 0 9
U A>«1 ♦ 1 .*•*••>(' 1.00*10 130.1*000 6 2 .0 8 2 4
U X 2 t? ♦ 1 .'««Off 1 ,0 0 0 0 2 43 .00 0 0 104 .9241
II X 2» J ♦ ! . .  IriM» 1 .0 0 0 0 3 8 7 .Orto» 1 4 8 .4 -9 2
U I M 4 ♦ 1 . •o>-i 1 .OOliO 1 89 .00 0 0 1 40 .12 4 4
u x /» '. ♦ 1 , *0**1» 1 .0 0 0 0 7 « . Oli II •> * 1 1 . 0 * /
X7o6 ♦ 0 1 .» 0 0 0 0 -1.SSSS
U X '» 7 ♦ 1 . U liilfl 1 . Oii<*0 - 3 .  offa» 5 . v i * u
U X2'«f. ♦ 1 .•  «H#t» 1 .00-10 2 08 .00 0 0 7 5 .7 49 5
U ♦ 1.*»0 »0 1.0001) 95.1*00» J S . / I O
II x ? l " ♦ 1 . 'O l i l i 1 2 4 * . f i0 u » 4 1 .4 7 5 4
U A211 ♦ 1 . M itili 1.00*1» 1 1 7 . »»«•) S C .V K 'I
u X217 ♦ l . - O ' l . ) 1 .0 0 0 0 19 5 . «001* 4 8 .1 63 9
U X211 ♦ 1 .■•unii 1.O6O0 s i  .n i i i id H . m N
•  1214 ♦ 1 .o c o o 6 0 .0 0 0 8 »
» X2-1S ♦ V f 2000.00*10 (• 0
U X 21* ♦ I.C.ffO ff 1 .0 0 0 0 365.1*001» 6 66 .47 4 4
•  X217 ♦ 1 .4 9 * 2 2 0 0 0 . Oli-M - I M i .'IUO i» «
X 21* ♦ 0 20110, ooo ii -9 5 .3 0 0 6 -7 9  ,**Av5
X219 ♦ 0 200.011*10 1 57 .00 0 0 - » .M S ?
0 X '» 1 ♦ 1.000*1 1 .ftCuO 1 4 » .0 *0 0 4 ............
«  X I« / ♦ i  . ‘ " j j u 1 ,oo«o . 2 6 4 .0 0 0 0 V 0.1.0 «4
U X I»  3 ♦ 1 .0 0  10 1 .O0O0 397.0»*»» 13A .M *07
o x t« a ♦ 1 . f u  M» 1 .Off.iO 2 3 6 . . • '»•)* 1 /5 .44**H
U XH '< ♦ 1 .4 0 i0 1 .«ini<o 9 7 . «MIO 0 15.7141
X '« a ♦ <1 1 .•»II«*) - 1 5 .»«»0 -2 5 .4 7 5 «
U X3»7 ♦ l. t ifc O ff 1 .0 0 0 0 2 4 .0 0 0 0 4 .9 6 *7
U X3o.l ♦ 1 , ‘ f  •»*# 1 .« O li i 2 3 » . *• ■! *»*i 8 ? . .  .-*4
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(1 X 3 v9 ♦ l . #t|f*)0 1 .0 0 0 0 114.0*1*10 *7 .4 0 0 7
U X51(' * 1 . “ 0 iU 1 .0 0 0 0 7 9 0 .0 0 0 0
2 9 .B9«*7
U x m  ♦ 1 .*»<*10 1 .0 0 0 0 -----  1 7 4 .0 0 0 0 7 0 .4 7 4 4
U X31? ♦ 1 . ' ( i  l«» 1.0001# 1 0 9 #,iA^U 9 0 .6 4 7 /
U X31 3 ♦ 1 . ùO.lf* 1 .0 0 0 0 2 6 .0 1 0 0
IT .O ilO ? ..
•  X 1 U  ♦ 1 ,ro h» 1 .0 0 0 0 71». 90*10 0
•  X 51 S ♦ 1 .» 7 * 7 2000.0*100 0 0
X 51 7 ♦ il 2000.0111)0 •  163.1**00 - 1 . ©A?t
X 51 H ♦ 1» 200«.0»#00 -A5.2*»0O -33 .»»3 -6
•  X.319 ♦ 2 7 .7 7 1 2 1 4 0 .p o u r U
U X401 ♦ 1 .M I1 4 1 .0 0 0 0 ^  1 4 6 .0 0 0 0 . 4 4 .4 0 9 0
U X407 ♦ 1 .0«*»0 1.011*10 2H1 .0.11)0 7 1 . *•••»»•
U X4u3 ♦ 1.**4>00 1 .0 0 0 0 4 2 ? .r**o o 1 1 1 .2 0 6 0
U X4i*4 ♦ 1.*C-»Ü 1 .00**0 2 H l. i* 0  JO 1 *)'• . i#*»P4
U *4 0 5  ♦ 1 .**010 1 .0 0 0 0 ~  117.C  **00 J0.»'«;02
¿406 ♦ II 1 . 00*10 "A . 0**1# *) •9 .3 3 1 0
U X407 6 I.OlMlÜ 1.001*0 S ti.ooùC 4.?*467
U X*»U* ♦ 1 . 1*111*11 1.00*10 233.0O 0O 47.0*100
U X409 ♦ 1 .r»0*»o 1.1*000 1 2 4 . f)«*»0 * 2 1* . 4*1*0
U X410 ♦ 1 ,« 0 "0 1.1)0*10 3 2 3 . »•*»*#»* 1 4 .7*»6*>
U X411 . ♦ 1.<*I*Of> 1 . 01*00 1 9 6 .1 'i‘Oy 2 7 . •**•04
U 741? ♦ 1 ,« ro f t 1 ,00 i»0 201 .o*«*)i* 2 ? .i) i*0 4
U *4 1 3  ♦ 1.»*0OO 1 .0 0 0 0 4 3 .0 0 0 0 1 7 .4«l**0
• X 41 4 ♦ 1.*(M*I* 1 . «OUI* 71.690** «
B X 41 *» ♦ 3 4 .7 1 » / 200«.1*000 -2.4»**Jl» 0
B X 4 1 7 ♦ 3 .7 6 4 5 2 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 -1 7 0 .7 0 0 6 0
X 4 1 X ♦ » 2 0un .  no*>u - V 5 .  ?'••)» - I 3 . 3 V S 3
X41«* ♦ A 123.C*»*I#» —1.9545
U XSu1 ♦ 1 .«Mf'iO 1.001*0 33 .  MM»«* JS.tüi i i l *
U X*»02 ♦ I.C U f‘0 1.001*0 57.i#6|*0 3 7 .« « 0 0
U X5tf3 ♦ 1 .«*CM> 1 . 0 0 0 0 6 6 . i* " 0 *.» H 4 .P W 0
U x5l*4 ♦ 1 .  b il l 'd 1 ."0>*tí 2 99 .06D 0 91 . PÍMM)
U X5l*9 4 1 ,**l»»*0 1.01*00 127.1*000 23.4*100
U X5U6 ♦ 1 .« « c c 1 .0 0 0 0 1 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.3 371
U >507 ♦ 1 .90AB 1 .00**0 1 1 6 . ••*«»(# 7.3371
U XMM» ♦ 1 .* WO 1 . i * 0 oo 3 3.0**0»» 5 5 .  t iooo
U X5U<* ♦ 1 . Ü o 0 1 .0 0 0 0 I4 .r«»o0 14.1*000
H510 ♦ 0 1 .0 0 ,(0 -3.1*1*10 - I .O U t ‘0
U X S 1 1 ♦ 1.60« 0 1 .oo*»o 219.l»*)*Jl* 1 1 .** **••»!
U >517 ♦ 1 .A O I 0 1.00*10 ? ? 4 . |»l»l*0 16.H*)i*0
y  X515 6 1 . « M O 1 . o o o o - 5 h • (»**00 6.01*60
B X514 ♦ 1 .« iM ’Û 1 . 0 0 0 0 4 4 .  <»»*0** 0
B >515 ♦ 0 4 .5 6 5 ? 2 00 0 .0 0 0 0 1 0 3 .6 0 0 « 0
B X517 ♦ 6.7-4V3 2 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 -175.••»01* 9
X ^ l f i  « 0 2 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 -97 .D 0O 0 -1 1 .6 3 7 6
X519 ♦ 0 1 1 ? .6 0 0 « - 0 .0 3 B ?
OBJECTIVE 2 0 7 1 1 .5 1 1 7 * ■
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¿ 9 .0 *1 0 7
U #3 1 1  ♦ 1 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 " •  1 7 4 .0 0 0 0  * * 7 9 . 4 7 * 4
U # 3 1 ?  ♦ 1 . ‘»U-l«* 1 .000*1 10Q # 00«JO 3 0 .0 4 7 7
U #31  1 ♦ 1 .  A 0.10 1 .0 0 0 0 20 .0 4 1 0 0
I T . 0 0 0 ?
•  XS 14 ♦ 1 ,6 « j Ml 1 .«»ono 7 0 .0 0 0 0 0
•  X SI S ♦ 1 . 7 7 * 7 ¿ n o o .o u o o 0 0
X 51 7  ♦ tl ¿ 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 - 1 6 4 . 1 0 0 0 - 1 , 0 a 21
X 31 H ♦ 0 2 0 0 0 .0 *1 0 0 -9 5 .2 *» 0 O - 5 4 . 0 3 - 6
B # 3 1 0  ♦ 2 7 .7 7 1 ? 1 4|» .00411» u
0  #401 ♦ 1 . 0 0 * 0 1 .0 0 0 0 1 4 0 .0 0 0 0  . 4 4 .4 9 9 0
U X 4 0?  ♦ 1 .0 0 * *0 1 ,oo*»o 2H1 .*;.i*»0 7 3 .  •*•*•»«*
U # 4 0 3  ♦ 1 .*»0**0 1 .0 0 0 0 4 2 ? .  c *O 0 111 .¿*»00
U X 4 04  ♦ 1 .*C *»0 1 .00*10 2 H 3 .* o .H 1 1 *1 9 .0 0 0 4
U X 4 ll$  ♦ 1 ,«*0 '*0 1 .0 0 0 0 ~  1 1 7 .C O 0 0 5 0 .0 0 0 2
# 4 0 4  ♦ 0 1 .0 0 0 *1 - A .0 0 0 0 - 4 . * 4 1 0
U X 4 0 7  • 1 .6 **0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 Sa .OUUC 4 . 0 4 6 /
U X40K ♦ 1 •«•OOI* 1 .0 0 **0 2 4 5 .5 0 0 * * 4 7 .  U n i , s i
U # 4 0 9  ♦ 1 ,n0*»o 1.1*1*00 1 2 4 .0 0 0 0  * 21*. 4 0 0 0
ü  X 410  ♦ 1.60*M » 1 .00*10 324.0O*»«* 1 4.?*»4«l
0  X411 ♦ 1 .0 0 0 0 1 . 0|t*>4| l9 4 . r * 'O i» ¿? .  ••«•A4
U # 4 1 ?  ♦ 1.110**0 1 ,0 0 **0 ?01 .l»0*>0 2 7 .0 0 0 4
0  X 413  ♦ 1 .«'OOO 1 .0 0 0 0 4 5 .0 0 0 0 1 7 .4 0 0 O
B # 4 1 4  ♦ 1 , *0 * * 0 1 . 0*»*»|» 71 .«••*.»•» (>
•  # 4 1 4  ♦ 3 4 .7 1 *  / ¿O O O .oooo - 2 . 4 * ‘ *il» 0
B # 4 1 7  ♦ 3 .? 6 4 5 2 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 - 1 7 6 . 7 0 0 0 0
# 4 1 #  ♦ 0 2 0 0 0 .0 0 '»  Il • 1 *5 .2 0 0 0 - 3 4 .3 V 4 5
X41W ♦ 0 1 2 4 .0 ‘ *‘ I** —1 .5 5 4 5
U X 4 'i1  ♦ 1 . * :« ' i0 1 . ‘»«Ilio 3 4 .IO O O *4  .••¿»**0
U # 5 0 2  ♦ 1 .0 0 6 0 1 ,«*o«*o 5 7 .  «*0*»0 5 7 .0 0 * *0
U X 5 v 3  ♦ I . p c o O 1 .«*«>00 0 6 . 0»'OO 0 0 .6 1 *0 0
U x S i'4  ♦ 1 .0 0 1 *0 , 1.«»0v*O ? « 9 . n«**»0 91 .►•*** 0
U # 5 OS ♦ 1 ,'*0 O 0 1 .0 0 0 0 1 2 7 .0 0 0 0 2 3 .4 0 0 0
U Xî»l»6 ♦ l . o v Q f f 1 .«»0«»0 IIO .P O O O 1 . S J7 I
U # 5 0 7  ♦ 1 .0 0 0 0 1 .0 0 * *0 1 1 6 .  ®o*#0 7 .3 3 7 1
U # 5 0 #  ♦ 1 . *  »00 1 .«»O.ÍU 3 4 . 0**O0 3 5 .0 0 0 0
0  # 5 0 9  ♦ l . o o u f t 1 .0 0 0 0 14 .C **U 0 1 4 .0 0 0 0
# 5 1 0  ♦ 0 1.004**1 - 4 . 0 4 0 0 -4 .0 O O O
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